Carolyn H. Keenan, Appellant,v.Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 11, 1999
01983448 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 11, 1999)

01983448

02-11-1999

Carolyn H. Keenan, Appellant, v. Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


Carolyn H. Keenan v. Department of the Navy

01983448

February 11, 1999

Carolyn H. Keenan, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01983448

) Agency No. 95-62467-023

Richard J. Danzig, )

Secretary, )

Department of the Navy, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant filed an appeal with this Commission from a final decision of

the agency concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

U.S.C. �2000e et seq. The final agency decision was issued on November

7, 1997. The appeal was postmarked March 28, 1998. Accordingly,

the appeal is timely (see 29 C.F.R. �1614.402(a)), and is accepted in

accordance with EEOC Order No. 960, as amended.<1>

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether the agency properly dismissed an allegation

of appellant's complaint on the grounds of failure to state a claim.

BACKGROUND

Appellant initiated contact with an EEO Counselor on May 9, 1995.

On August 11, 1995, appellant filed a formal EEO complaint wherein she

alleged that she had been discriminated against on the bases of her sex

(female) and in reprisal for her previous EEO activity when:

1. Her Supervisor did not consider a request by an external customer to

change her rating on the customer feedback form from level 4 (Exceeds

Fully Successful) to level 5 (Outstanding).

2. Her Supervisor did not evaluate her performance fairly for the period

ending March 31, 1995.

3. She received an Exceeds Fully Successful as her rating for the

appraisal period ending March 31, 1995, rather than a rating of

Outstanding.

4. She has been worked outside the scope of her position description

for over three years.

5. Her Supervisor intimidated her and instilled fear by suggesting that

her position may be downgraded to a GS-5.

6. Her duties and responsibilities were reduced.

Appellant characterized the agency's treatment of her as harassment.

The agency accepted the complaint for investigation. The investigation

concluded that appellant had not been subjected to discrimination.

Appellant requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).

On November 7, 1997, the agency dismissed allegation 5 of appellant's

complaint on the grounds of failure to state a claim. The agency

determined that appellant was not affected with regard to a term,

condition, or privilege of her employment.

On appeal, appellant contends that the alleged incidents constituted

harassment and thus affected a term, condition, or privilege of her

employment.

In response, the agency asserts that the statement that a desk audit could

cause appellant's position to be downgraded to a GS-5 was an isolated

remark unaccompanied by injury to appellant, and therefore appellant is

not aggrieved. The agency maintains that the statement does not rise

to the level of harassment.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a) provides that an agency may dismiss

a complaint which fails to state a claim pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.103.

For employees and applicants for employment, EEOC Regulation 29

C.F.R. �1614.103 provides that individual and class complaints of

employment discrimination prohibited by Title VII (discrimination on

the bases of race, color, religion, sex and national origin), the ADEA

(discrimination on the basis of age when the aggrieved individual is

at least 40 years of age) and the Rehabilitation Act (discrimination on

the basis of disability) shall be processed in accordance with Part 29

C.F.R. �1614 of the EEOC Regulations.

The only proper inquiry, therefore, in determining whether an allegation

is within the purview of the EEO process is whether the complainant is an

aggrieved employee and whether s/he has alleged employment discrimination

covered by the EEO statutes. The Commission's Federal sector case

precedent has long defined an "aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a

present harm or loss with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of

employment for which there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air

Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049 (Apr. 21, 1994).

In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), the Supreme

court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477

U.S. 57, 67 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's

employment. The Court explained that an "objectively hostile or abusive

work environment" is created when "a reasonable person would find

[it] hostile or abusive" and the complainant subjectively perceives it

as such. Harris, supra at 21-22. Thus, not all claims of harassment

are actionable. Where a complaint does not challenge an agency action or

inaction regarding a specific term, condition, or privilege of employment,

a claim of harassment is actionable only if, allegedly, the harassment

to which the complainant has been subjected was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's employment.

A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless

it appears beyond doubt that the complainant cannot prove a set of facts

in support of the claim which would entitle the complainant to relief.

The trier of fact must consider all of the alleged harassing incidents

and remarks, and considering them together in the light most favorable to

the complainant, determine whether they are sufficient to state a claim.

Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March 13,

1997).

In the present case, appellant alleges that she was subjected to

harassment when her Supervisor suggested that her position might

be downgraded to a GS-5 as a result of a desk audit; she was worked

outside the scope of her position description for over three years; her

duties and responsibilities were reduced; and her performance rating for

the period ending March 31, 1995, was Exceeds Fully Successful rather

than Outstanding. We note that all of the identified incidents were

perpetrated by appellant's Supervisor. Viewing the identified remark

in allegation 5 and the incidents set forth in the other allegations

in the light most favorable to appellant, we find that appellant has

stated a cognizable claim under the EEOC Regulations. See Cervantes

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05930303 (November

12, 1993). Accordingly, the agency's decision to dismiss allegation

5 of appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim was improper.

Allegation 5 is hereby REMANDED for further processing in accordance

with the ORDER below.

ORDER (E1092)

The agency is ORDERED to process the remanded allegation (Allegation 5)

in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.108. The agency shall acknowledge to

the appellant that it has received the remanded allegation within thirty

(30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency

shall issue to appellant a copy of the investigative file and also shall

notify appellant of the appropriate rights within one hundred fifty (150)

calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, unless the matter

is otherwise resolved prior to that time. If the appellant requests a

final decision without a hearing, the agency shall issue a final decision

within sixty (60) days of receipt of appellant's request.

A copy of the agency's letter of acknowledgment to appellant and a copy

of the notice that transmits the investigative file and notice of rights

must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you

have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some

jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner

suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your

civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision

or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,

you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR

DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your

appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME

AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY

HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME

AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

February 11, 1999

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations

1The record does not establish when appellant received the final agency

decision. The certified receipt signed by appellant's attorney does not

indicate the date of delivery. The agency argues that the final agency

decision must have been received on November 10, 1997, since the other

two final decisions issued on November 7, 1997, were received on that

date. However, absent further evidence to support the agency's position,

we decline to presume that appellant's attorney received the final

agency decision on November 10, 1997.