Carlson, Jeremy Robert. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 14, 2020

14820850 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 14, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/820,850 08/07/2015 Jeremy Robert Carlson RPS920150136-US-NP 9809
63203 7590 01/14/2020
ROGITZ & ASSOCIATES
4420 Hotel Circle Court
SUITE 230
SAN DIEGO, CA 92108
EXAMINER
PARRIES, DRU M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2836
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/14/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
John@rogitz.com
Noelle@rogitz.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JEREMY ROBERT CARLSON, PHILIP JOHN JAKES, and
LARRY GLENN ESTES
____________

Appeal 2019-002612
Application 14/820,850
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before JEFFREY B. ROBERTSON, CHRISTOPHER C. KENNEDY, and
JANE E. INGLESE, Administrative Patent Judges.

INGLESE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 requests our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s decision to finally reject claims 1–21.2 We have jurisdiction
over this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Lenovo Singapore PTE. Ltd. as the
real party in interest. Appeal Brief filed September 14, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”)
at 2.
2 Final Office Action entered June 15, 2018 (“Final Act.”) at 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claim 1 illustrates the subject matter on appeal, and is reproduced
below:
1. A device, comprising:
system components;
a battery which supplies power to the system
components;
at least one wireless charge receiver that charges the
battery while influenced by a magnetic field of a wireless
charge transmitter, the at least one wireless charge receiver
comprising a circuit coupled to the battery, a first coil coupled
to the circuit, and a second coil coupled to the circuit; and
at least one magnetic field barrier at least in part
separating the first coil from the second coil, the device being
movable between plural configurations, the magnetic field
barrier being disposed between the first and second coils
parallel to the first and second coils in each of the plural
configurations.

Appeal Br. 10 (Claims Appendix).
REJECTIONS
The Examiner maintains the following rejections in the Examiner’s
Answer entered January 17, 2019 (“Ans.”):
I. Claims 1 and 3–10 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2)
as anticipated by Stone et al. (US 2013/0043734 Al, published February 21,
2013);
II. Claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Stone in
view of Huang et al. (US 2016/0072299 Al, published March 10, 2016);
III. Claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Stone in
view of Partovi (US 9,496,732 B2, issued November 15, 2016); and
IV. Claims 12–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Stone.
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FACTUAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Upon consideration of the evidence relied upon in this appeal and
each of Appellant’s contentions, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1 and 3–10 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2), and
rejections of claims 2 and 12–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103, for the reasons set
forth in the Final Action, the Answer, and below.
We review appealed rejections for reversible error based on the
arguments and evidence the appellant provides for each issue the appellant
identifies. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072,
1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (cited with approval in In re Jung, 637
F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that even if the Examiner had
failed to make a prima facie case, “it has long been the Board’s practice to
require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s
rejections”)).
Rejection I
We first address the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 3–10 under
35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Stone. Appellant
presents arguments directed to claim 7 only, to which we accordingly limit
our discussion. Appeal Br. 4–5; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Claim 7 depends from claim 1 and recites that “the wireless charge
receiver comprises only one circuit.”
Stone discloses wireless power transfer system 200 for charging
battery 236 comprising transmitter 204 and receiver 208 including receive
circuitry 210. Stone ¶¶ 31–33; Fig. 2. Stone discloses that receive circuitry
210 may include matching circuit 232 and rectifier and switching circuit
234. Stone ¶¶ 32, 33; Fig. 2.
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Appellant argues that Stone does not disclose a receiver comprising
“only one circuit” as required by claim 7 because Stone discloses that
receive circuitry 210 includes at least two circuits 232, 234. Appeal Br. 4–5.
The Examiner responds to Appellant’s argument in the Answer by
first noting that claim 7, and claim 1 from which claim 7 depends, place no
structural limitations on the recited circuit. Ans. 2. The Examiner
determines that, therefore, under a broadest reasonable interpretation, a
“single ‘circuit’ can be a grouping of smaller sub-circuits which makes the
circuit functional for its intended purpose(s).” Id. The Examiner finds that
Stone consequently anticipates claim 7 because Stone teaches single circuit
208 comprising plural sub-circuits 232, 234. Id.
Appellant argues in the Reply Brief that the Examiner’s interpretation
of “only one circuit” as a combination of sub-circuits “would effectively
render any combination of plural circuits as but only one ‘circuit’ and render
the limitation at issue meaningless.” Reply Br. 1–2.
Appellant’s arguments do not identify reversible error in the
Examiner’s rejection, for reasons that follow.
We begin by interpreting the phrase “only one circuit,” and in so
doing, we give the phrase its broadest reasonable interpretation consistent
with the Specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in
the art. In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (During prosecution of patent applications, “the PTO must give claims
their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. . . .
Therefore, we look to the specification to see if it provides a definition for
claim terms, but otherwise apply a broad interpretation.”).
While we consult the Specification to determine the meaning of “only
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one circuit,” we take care not to limit this phrase to particular embodiments
disclosed in the Specification, when the phrase appears to have a broader
meaning. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(“[L]imitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification.”);
E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(explaining that claims must be interpreted “in view of the specification”
without importing limitations from the specification into the claims
unnecessarily).
Appellant’s Specification discloses that the device of Appellant’s
invention includes at least one wireless charge receiver that charges a battery
while influenced by a magnetic field of a wireless charge transmitter, and the
Specification explains that the wireless charge receiver comprises a “circuit”
coupled to the battery. Spec. 1. The Specification indicates that “[t]he term
‘circuit’ or ‘circuitry’ is used in the summary, description, and/or claims. As
is well known in the art, the term ‘circuitry’ includes all levels of available
integration, e.g., from discrete logic circuits to the highest level of circuit
integration such as VLSI, and includes programmable logic components
programmed to perform the functions of an embodiment as well as general-
purpose or special-purpose processors programmed with instructions to
perform those functions.” Spec. 5–6.
Appellant’s Specification also describes Appellant’s Figure 1, which
illustrates “an example block diagram of an information handling system
and/or computer system 100.” Spec. 6. The Specification discloses that
system 100 includes battery pack 191 electrically coupled to wireless charge
receiver 193, which “may comprise plural coils 195 . . . [and] also includes
at least one circuit 197 (in some embodiments only one circuit may be
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included, while in other embodiments plural circuits may be included).”
Spec. 9–10. The Specification explains that circuit 197 is configured to
receive current from coils 195 and provide current to system 100 and/or
provide current to battery pack 191. Spec. 10. The Specification further
explains that “circuit 197 may be an Rx circuit, and/or the circuit 197 may
be comprised of one or more of a converter(s), a regulator(s), and/or a
communicator(s).” Spec. 10.
Appellant’s Specification thus explicitly defines a “circuit” to include
“all levels of available integration,” which one of ordinary skill in the art
would understand to indicate that a single “circuit” according to Appellant’s
invention may include multiple, integrated sub-circuits. Although the
Specification also indicates that Appellant’s wireless charge receiver may
include plural circuits, the Specification explicitly describes an exemplary
single circuit of Appellant’s invention that may be comprised of multiple
sub-circuits.
Consistent with these disclosures in Appellant’s Specification, under a
broadest reasonable interpretation, “only one circuit” as recited in claim 7
refers to a single circuit that may include one or more integrated sub-circuits.
Therefore, receive circuitry 210 including matching circuit 232 and rectifier
and switching circuit 234 disclosed in Stone—a single circuit including two
integrated sub-circuits—reasonably corresponds to “only one circuit” as
recited in claim 7.
We, accordingly, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 3–
10 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Stone.
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Rejections II and III
We summarily sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 2 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Stone in view of Huang (Rejection II),
and rejection of claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Stone
in view of Partovi (Rejection III), because Appellant does not contest these
rejections. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); see also Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1205.02 (9th ed. Jan. 2018) (“If a ground of
rejection stated by the examiner is not addressed in the appellant’s brief,
appellant has waived any challenge to that ground of rejection and the Board
may summarily sustain it, unless the examiner subsequently withdrew the
rejection in the examiner’s answer.”).
Rejection IV
We next address the Examiner’s rejection of claims 12–21 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Stone. Appellant presents arguments
directed to the recitation in claim 12, which depends from claim 1, that the at
least one magnetic field barrier includes a ceramic, the recitation in claim
13, which also depends from claim 1, that the at least one magnetic field
barrier includes ferrite, the recitation in independent claim 14 of disposing at
least one magnetic field barrier made of ceramic between first and second
coils, the recitation in independent claim 19 of a wireless charge receiver
including a ceramic layer disposed between first coil and second coils, and
the recitation in claim 20, which depends from claim 19, that the ceramic
layer includes at least one magnetic field barrier at least in part separating
the first coil from the second coil. Appeal Br. 5–9. We, accordingly, limit
our discussion to claims 12–14, 19, and 20. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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Stone discloses wireless power transfer system 600 including
transmitter 630 and receiver 610 connected to device to be charged 620.
Stone ¶ 57; Fig. 6A. Stone discloses that receiver 610 includes first 650 and
second 660 receive coils configured to receive power transfer from transmit
coil 640 in transmitter 630. Stone ¶ 58; Fig. 6A. Stone discloses positioning
device to be charged 620 between first 650 and second 660 receive coils,
such that first receive coil 650 is closer to transmit coil 640 than second
receive coil 660. Stone ¶¶ 60, 62; Fig. 6A. Stone discloses that device to be
charged 620 “may include a material that interferes with wireless power
transfer such as, for example, a ferrous housing or other interfering
material.” Stone ¶ 62.
The Examiner takes official notice—for the first time in the Final
Action from which the present appeal was taken—“that ceramic and ferrite
are materials that are known in the relevant art to be used to interfere with a
magnetic field.” Final Act. 5. In view of this knowledge in the art, the
Examiner concludes that “it would have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art at the time the invention was made to substitute the magnetic
field barrier in Stone’s invention for one comprising ceramic or ferrite, since
it involves a mere simple substitution of one magnetic field barrier for
another to perform the same function.” Id.
Appellant argues that the Examiner improperly takes official notice
that ceramic and ferrite were known materials used in the relevant art to
interfere with a magnetic field, because the Examiner does not provide any
evidence that these materials were known to be used in wireless charging as
magnetic field barriers. Appeal Br. 5–6. Appellant argues that “even if
ceramic and ferrite were known materials for other purposes in other fields
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prior to Appellant’s filing date,” the Examiner “would need to demonstrate
that that there existed a motivation to use ceramic and ferrite in magnetic
field barriers prior to Appellant’s filing date.” Appeal Br. 7. Appellant
argues that because the Examiner does not provide any evidence that one of
ordinary skill in the art would have been so motivated, the Examiner’s
rejection is based on “impermissible hindsight.” Id.
Appellant’s arguments do not identify reversible error in the
Examiner’s rejection, because the Examiner provides evidence in the
Answer to support the Examiner’s official notice. Specifically, in response
to Appellant’s challenge to the Examiner’s taking of official notice for the
first time in the Final Action, the Examiner provides evidence in the
Answer—Golko et al. (US 2015/0270058 Al, published September 24,
2015)—to support the Examiner’s finding that ceramic and ferrite were
known in the art of inductive power transfer to be used to interfere with a
magnetic field. Ans. 2.
Golko discloses “systems and methods for magnetic shielding in
inductive power transfer.” Golko ¶ 29. Golko discloses that elements for
such magnetic shielding (“shield elements”) may be formed of
ferromagnetic materials and ceramic materials. Golko ¶ 32. The Examiner
finds that Golko thus “teaches the idea that ferrite and ceramic can be
materials used to shied or direct a magnetic field,” which Appellant does not
dispute. Compare Ans. 2, with Reply Br. 2–5. One of ordinary skill in the
art would have understood from these disclosures in Golko that
ferromagnetic and ceramic materials could be successfully used for magnetic
shielding in inductive power transfer systems. Contrary to Appellant’s
arguments, the ordinarily skilled artisan, therefore, would have been
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“motivate[ed] to use to use ceramic and ferrite in magnetic field barriers
prior to Appellant’s filing date,” and the Examiner’s rejection is not based
on impermissible hindsight as Appellant asserts. Appeal Br. 7.
Appellant further argues that the Examiner also “need[s] to
demonstrate that there existed a motivation to combine any such ceramic or
ferrite magnetic field barriers with Stone prior to Appellant’s filing date to
thereby arrive at what is claimed.” Appeal Br. 7; Reply Br. 2–5. Appellant
argues that the Examiner’s allegation of a “simple substitution” is
“unaccompanied by any supporting evidence predating Appellant’s filing
date.” Appeal Br. 7–8.
Appellant’s arguments again do not identify reversible error in the
Examiner’s rejection. As discussed above, Stone discloses device to be
charged 620 positioned between first 650 and second 660 receive coils, and
discloses that device to be charged 620 “may include a material that
interferes with wireless power transfer such as, for example, a ferrous
housing or other interfering material.” Stone ¶¶ 60, 62; Fig. 6A. One of
ordinary skill in the art seeking to develop a wireless power transfer system
as disclosed in Stone would have sought suitable “interfering materials” to
use in the system. In view of Golko’s disclosure of the suitability of using
ferromagnetic and ceramic materials for magnetic shielding in inductive
power transfer systems, the ordinarily skilled artisan reasonably would have
used such magnetic shielding materials as the “interfering material” in
Stone’s device to be charged 620. It is well-established that “[e]xpress
suggestion to substitute one equivalent for another need not be present to
render such substitution obvious.” In re Fout, 675 F.2d 297, 301 (CCPA
1982); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007)
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(“[W]hen a patent claims a structure already known in the prior art that is
altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the
field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result.”).
We, accordingly, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 12–21
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Stone.
CONCLUSION

Claims

35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–10 102(a)(1),
102(a)(2)
Stone 1, 3–10
2 103 Stone, Huang 2
11 103 Stone, Partovi 11
12–21 103 Stone 12–21
Overall
Outcome
1–21

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED