0120160432
03-16-2017
Carlos S.,1 Complainant, v. Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Great Lakes Area), Agency.
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Carlos S.,1
Complainant,
v.
Megan J. Brennan,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Great Lakes Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120160432
Agency No. 1J531004515
DECISION
Complainant timely appealed to this Commission from the Agency's October 9, 2015 finding that it complied with the terms of the settlement agreement into which the parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as an Engineer at the Agency's Palatine Processing and Distribution Center in Palatine, Illinois.
Believing that the Agency subjected him to unlawful discrimination, Complainant contacted an Agency EEO Counselor to initiate the EEO complaint process. On June 25, 2015, Complainant and the Agency entered into a settlement agreement ("the Agreement") to resolve the matter. In relevant part, the Agreement provided:
1. A/Manager, In Plant Support, ("M1") agrees to assist [Complainant] with the application process including electronic access. [M1] and [Complainant] agree to set a mutually agreed date by July 30, 2015; and
2. The Plant Manager ("PM") will meet with the Manager of Maintenance Operations ("MO") within two weeks to discuss a plan for [Complainant's] progress including a comprehensive mentoring plan.
Complainant began working as an engineer for the Agency in 2001. As of the date of this appeal, he had 35 years of relevant engineering experience, including nearly a year of supervisory experience from January through December 2003. In or around Spring 2015, Complainant gave his resume to the Plant Manager ("PM") for consideration for a supervisory engineer position. The underlying complaint for the action before us arose when PM selected another engineer who Complainant alleges is less qualified, and was only selected because of her sex.
Once the parties entered the Agreement, M1 met with and helped Complainant apply for positions electronically. M1 also collaborated with MO and created a 90 day detail for Complainant, which would allow him to gain supervisory experience under MO, who would be his mentor. However, Complainant declined the offer. Then, by letter to the Agency dated July 28, 2015, Complainant alleged that the Agency was in breach of the Agreement, stating that his "[underlying EEO Complaint] did not settle" and "[w]hatever [was] discussed isn't done." He further alleges that M1 "showed global search - which is not new to [him]" and that MP "did not do anything to settle this case." After conducting an inquiry, the Agency concluded that no breach occurred.
ANALYSIS
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties. The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a contract between the employee and the Agency, to which ordinary rules of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Request No. 05960032 (Dec. 9, 1996). The Commission has further held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, not some unexpressed intention that controls the contract's construction. Eggleston v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (Aug. 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O. v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05910787 (Dec. 2, 1991). This rule states that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984); Complainant v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120140143 (Feb. 20, 2014).
There are instances when an otherwise valid agreement may be void, voidable, or reformable, depending on circumstances, for example due to coercion, misinterpretation, or mistake. See Nemirow v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01930062 (Dec. 8, 1992). There is no evidence in the record that any of these exceptions apply to the instant case.
Provision 1
In accordance with Provision 1 of the Agreement, M1 assisted Complainant with the application process, including electronic access, and met with Complainant before July 30, 2015. Complainant does not dispute that M1 met with him immediately after they signed the Agreement, and provided him with two job postings and a list of 31 Operational Engineer positions Complainant could apply for. M1 met with Complainant again on June 29, 2015 and June 30, 2015 to assist him with accessing the electronic job bank and application system. M1 helped him reset his password and provided additional assistance by showing him how to reset his career search after his initial attempts yielded no results. M1 told Complainant he could stop by his office "anytime" for further assistance.
We have previously held that if a settlement agreement is made in good faith and is otherwise valid, it will not be set aside simply because it appears that one of the parties had made a poor bargain. See Ingram v. Gen. Serv. Admin., EEOC Request No. 05880565 (Jun. 14, 1988). Complainant alleges breach because he was already aware of how to conduct a "global search," and because he never received assistance obtaining his high school transcripts. The Agreement only requires M1 to assist Complainant with the application process. That Complainant was already aware of how to conduct a global search within the system does not necessarily indicate a breach. It also appears from the record, that M1 assisted Complainant by explaining how to access the system by resetting his password. As for the assistance with obtaining Complainant's high school transcripts, M1 provided Complainant with a contact that could assist him further. We find the Agency satisfied its obligations under Provision 1.
Provision 2
In accordance with Provision 2, on or around June 30, 2015, which fell within two weeks of entering the Agreement, M1 and Complainant met with the Manager of Maintenance Operations ("MO") to discuss a comprehensive mentoring plan. Specifically, M1 and MO offered to detail Complainant to a 90 day supervisory position in Maintenance, starting that September. MO would act as Complainant's mentor, and Complainant would garner experience to help him become a more competitive candidate when he applied to supervisory positions. This is supported by email correspondence between M1, MO and PM dated July 30 and 31 2015. By then, Complainant already filed the instant breach claim. On appeal, Complainant does not discuss the offer, and ultimately, according to the Agency, he declined the detail opportunity. To the extent that Complainant interpreted the Agreement as mandating that the Agency place him in a supervisory position, such an interpretation should have been reduced to writing as part of the settlement agreement, and in the absence of a writing cannot be enforced. See Jenkins-Nye v. Gen. Serv. Admin., EEOC Appeal No. 019851903 (Mar. 4, 1987). Based on the evidence before us, we find the Agency complied with Provision 2. Complainant is unclear as to what he expected from the Agreement.
Non-Breach Claims
On appeal, Complainant strenuously requests that this Commission review his initial claim that gave rise the Agreement. However, the first page of the Agreement, initialed by Complainant, provides that "by signing this agreement [Complainant] withdraws any and all pending EEO complaints and appeals relative to the subject matter of these complaints." The Agreement specifically cites the Agency number for the instant complaint. Therefore, barring a finding of breach, Complainant waived his right to pursue this matter further as an EEO Complaint. As we find no breach occurred, we will not review the underlying complaint.
Complainant's appeal also alleges additional instances of discrimination that were not subject to the Agreement. For instance, Complainant alleges that the Agency further discriminated against him when he submitted a number of other applications for supervisory engineering positions within the Agency and he was not selected for any of them. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(c), allegations that subsequent acts of discrimination violate a settlement agreement shall be processed as separate complaints. Therefore, if Complainant intended to raise additional claims, he must do so by contacting an EEO Counselor to initiate a separate EEO complaint. The Commission does not address whether such contact would be timely.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the agency's decision finding no breach of the settlement agreement.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0416)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The requests may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610)
This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
March 16, 2017
__________________
Date
1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.
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