Candice B.,1 Complainant,v.Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Great Lakes Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Dec 11, 2018

0120171229 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 11, 2018)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Candice B.,1
Complainant,

v.

Megan J. Brennan,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Great Lakes Area),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120171229

Hearing Nos. 440-2015-00146X,
440-2015-00184X

Agency Nos. 4J-604-0168-14,
4J-604-0030-15

DECISION

On February 16, 2017, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s
January 13, 2017, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint
alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons, the
Commission MODIFIES the Agency’s final order.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues presented are: (1) whether the preponderance of the evidence establishes that
Complainant was subjected to discrimination when she was sent home on October 7, 2014, and
when she was told that she could not park in the Agency parking lot on October 24, 2014; (2)
whether, pursuant to the finding of an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) that Complainant
established that she was subjected to discrimination based on disability when she was suspended

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
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and when she was denied a reasonable accommodation, the matter should be remanded for a
determination on Complainant’s entitlement to compensatory damages; and (3) whether the AJ
erred with respect to other relief ordered.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant, an African-American female,
worked as a Letter Carrier at the Agency’s Wood Dale, Illinois Post Office. Complainant’s first-
level supervisor was a Supervisor, Customer Service (S1, Hispanic Caucasian male), and her
second-level supervisor was the Postmaster (S2, Asian female).

On January 18, 2014, Complainant injured her right knee while delivering mail. Complainant was
off work as a result of her injury until May 12, 2014. On May 19, 2014, S1 scheduled a pre-
disciplinary interview to discuss her January 18, 2014, accident. S1 determined that Complainant’s
assertion that the accident was unavoidable was not credible. On June 19, 2014, S1, with S2’s
concurrence, decided to issue Complainant a 14-Day Suspension for Failure to Perform Duties in
a Safe Manner, although Complainant did not receive a copy of the suspension until September
13, 2014.

On July 7, 2014, Complainant’s right knee began hurting again. Between July 7, 2014, and October
3, 2014, Complainant participated in physical therapy, had an MRI, took anti-inflammatory
medications, used a brace, and received injections. Complainant stated that on October 6, 2014,
she told S2 that her knee was hurting again and provided S2 with medical documentation, which
indicated that Complainant could only work inside. According to Complainant, on October 7,
2014, S2 sent her home from work after a while because her medical restrictions were not
documented on the proper Light Duty Request Form. S2 stated that Complainant worked 6.11
hours on October 7, 2014, but that there was no additional work available within her restrictions,
so Complainant requested sick leave for the remainder of the day. The record reflects that S2
provided Complainant with a Light Duty Request Form on October 7, 2014. Between October 7,
2014, and November 7, 2014, Complainant either took eight hours of sick leave per day or worked
part of the day and requested sick leave when there was no additional work available within her
restrictions.

On October 15, 2014, Complainant returned the completed Light Duty Request Form, which noted
her medical restrictions, including no driving. On October 24, 2014, S2 told Complainant that she
could not park her car in the Agency parking lot. According to S2, she did so because
Complainant’s medical restrictions indicated that she could not drive, and she was worried that the
Agency could be liable if Complainant injured herself or others while driving on Agency property.
On October 31, 2014, Complainant’s doctor clarified that she could drive to and from work but
not during the workday. On November 7, 2014, Complainant’s doctor took her off work due to
torn cartilage in her knee.

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Procedural History

On October 27, 2014, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated
against her on the bases of race (African-American) and sex (female) when on September 13, 2014,
she was issued a 14-Day Suspension for Failure to Perform her Duties in a Safe Manner.

On February 20, 2015, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency
discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American), sex (female), and reprisal for
prior protected EEO activity under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act when:

1. On October 7, 2014, the Postmaster sent her home because her work restrictions were not
on a Light Duty Request form;

2. On October 24, 2014, the Postmaster instructed her not to park her personal vehicle in the
Agency parking lot; and

3. From October 6, 2014, to November 7, 2014, the Agency failed to provide Complainant
with a reasonable accommodation.

At the conclusion of the investigations, the Agency provided Complainant with copies of the
reports of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC AJ.
Complainant timely requested hearings, and an AJ consolidated the cases. Over the Agency’s
objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted Complainant’s January 19, 2016, motion for a
decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on December 23, 2016.

The AJ found that Complainant failed to establish discrimination based on race or sex with respect
to her suspension but found that Complainant was subjected to discrimination based on disability
when she was suspended. The AJ found that Complainant failed to establish that she was
discriminated against when she was sent home on October 7, 2014, for allegedly not having her
medical restrictions on the right form or when she was instructed not to park her car in the Agency
parking lot. The AJ also found that the Agency denied Complainant a reasonable accommodation
from October 6, 2014, to November 7, 2014. The AJ ordered the Agency to expunge the
suspension, to restore the 66.43 hours of sick leave she used between October 6, 2014, and
November 7, 2014, to provide training to S1 and S2, and to consider discipline against S1 and S2.
For compensatory damages, the AJ awarded Complainant $733.30 in out-of-pocket medical costs,
but the AJ denied Complainant’s request for nonpecuniary compensatory damages, noting that
“[t]he remainder of Complainant’s claimed damages are viewed as a request for punitive damages,
which are unavailable in federal sector relief.” AJ Decision at 19. According to the record, the AJ
did not conduct a hearing on damages or request that Complainant submit evidence concerning
her entitlement to compensatory damages, relying on Complainant’s pre-hearing submissions in
determining the appropriate amount of damages.

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The Agency subsequently issued a final order fully implementing the AJ’s finding that
Complainant proved that the Agency subjected her to discrimination based on disability in issuing
the suspension and in denying her a reasonable accommodation. The instant appeal followed.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant contends that the AJ erred in finding that she did not establish that she
was subjected to discrimination when she was sent home on October 7, 2014, and when S2 told
Complainant that she could not park in the Agency parking lot. According to Complainant, the AJ
also miscalculated the number of hours of sick leave that should be restored to Complainant.
Complainant argues that the AJ erred in finding that she was not entitled to compensatory damages.
Finally, Complainant contends that the Agency should be required to post a notice at the Wood
Dale Post Office.

In response to Complainant’s appeal, the Agency contends that Complainant has provided no
factual or legal basis for overturning its final action.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and
the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a
“decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .”);
see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO
MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s
determination to issue a summary judgment decision, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed
de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words,
we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual
conclusions and legal analysis – including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional
discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination
statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review
“requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal
determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents,
statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties,
and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its
interpretation of the law”).

Neither party challenges the AJ’s issuance of a summary judgment decision or the AJ’s finding of
discrimination with respect to the suspension or the denial of a reasonable accommodation.
Accordingly, the Commission will consider only the issues specifically raised on appeal.

Disparate Treatment

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part
evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
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U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that
she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an
inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a
prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the Agency’s explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

Complainant alleged that she was subjected to discrimination when she was sent home from work
on October 7, 2014, because her restrictions were not listed on a Light Duty Request form.
Complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race, sex, and/or
reprisal with this claim. We further find that, to the extent Complainant alleges disability as a basis,
this claim is subsumed by Complainant’s claim that she was denied a reasonable accommodation,
as the AJ ordered the sick leave Complainant took on October 7, 2014, to be returned to her.

Complainant also alleged that she was discriminated against when she was told that she could not
park her personal vehicle in the Agency parking lot. The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed
with, because the Agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions: S2
misunderstood Complainant’s medical restrictions to mean that she was unable to drive at all, and
S2 was concerned about the Agency becoming liable if Complainant injured herself or others on
Agency property. We find that the preponderance of the evidence does not establish that these
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons are pretext for discrimination.

Compensatory Damages

When discrimination is found, the Agency must provide the complainant with a remedy that
constitutes full, make-whole relief to restore her as nearly as possible to the position she would
have occupied absent the discrimination. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
764 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975); Adesanya v. U.S. Postal
Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01933395 (July 21, 1994). Pursuant to section 102(a) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, a complainant who establishes unlawful intentional discrimination under either Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., or Section
501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.
may receive compensatory damages for past and future pecuniary losses (i.e., out-of-pocket
expenses) and nonpecuniary losses (e.g., pain and suffering, mental anguish) as part of this “make
whole” relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). In West v. Gibson, 119 S.Ct. 1906 (1999), the Supreme
Court held that Congress afforded the Commission the authority to award compensatory damages
in the administrative process. For an employer with more than 500 employees, such as the Agency,
the limit of liability for future pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages is $300,000. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(3).

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Here, the AJ awarded Complainant past pecuniary damages for out-of-pocket medical expenses,
but he denied Complainant’s request for nonpecuniary compensatory damages, finding that her
request for $300,000 in nonpecuniary compensatory damages amounted to a request for punitive
damages. The AJ correctly noted that punitive damages are unavailable in the federal sector. See
Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(A)(b)(1); Jones v. Dep't of Health
and Human Serv., EEOC Request No. 05940377 (Jan. 23, 1995) (citing Graham v. U.S. Postal
Serv., EEOC Request No. 05940132 (May 19, 1994)).

However, we disagree with the AJ’s assessment that Complainant is not entitled to nonpecuniary
compensatory damages. Nonpecuniary losses are losses that are not subject to precise
quantification, i.e., emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment
of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character and reputation, injury to credit standing,
and loss of health. See Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available
under § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. 915.302 at 10 (July 14, 1992).
There is no precise formula for determining the amount of damages for non-pecuniary losses
except that the award should reflect the nature and severity of the harm and the duration or
expected duration of the harm. See Loving v. Dep't of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01955789
(Aug. 29, 1997). The Commission notes that nonpecuniary compensatory damages are designed
to remedy the harm caused by the discriminatory event rather than punish the Agency for the
discriminatory action. Furthermore, compensatory damages should not be motivated by passion or
prejudice or be “monstrously excessive” standing alone, but should be consistent with the amounts
awarded in similar cases. See Ward-Jenkins v. Dep't of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 01961483
(Mar. 4, 1999).

In Complainant’s February 26, 2016, Supplemental Pre-Hearing Submissions Regarding
Statement of Damages Claimed, a document upon which the AJ relied in denying Complainant’s
request for nonpecuniary compensatory damages, Complainant stated that the alleged
discrimination caused “irreparable harm,” including “mental anguish.” Although the AJ is correct
that Complainant’s non-attorney representative used language in this document that expressed a
desire to punish the Agency for discriminating against Complainant, we find that Complainant has
stated a claim for nonpecuniary compensatory damages by describing her mental anguish. Because
the AJ did not hold a hearing on damages or otherwise request evidence from Complainant
concerning her entitlement to compensatory damages beyond her pre-hearing submissions, we
cannot determine the amount of nonpecuniary compensatory damages due Complainant.
Accordingly, we will remand this issue to the Hearings Unit for a determination on Complainant’s
entitlement to nonpecuniary compensatory damages.

Other Relief Issues

Regarding Complainant’s contention that the AJ incorrectly calculated the amount of sick leave to
be restored to her account, we agree with Complainant that the AJ overlooked some of the sick
leave hours taken by Complainant while she was denied a reasonable accommodation between
October 7, 2014, and November 7, 2014. According to the record, Complainant took 1.89 hours
of sick leave on October 7, 8 hours on October 8, 9, and 10, 8 hours on October 14, 4.23 hours on
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October 16, 5.9 hours on October 17, 5.44 hours on October 18, 3.31 hours on October 20, 4.3
hours on October 22, 2.9 hours on October 23, 4.98 hours on October 24, 6.2 hours on October
25, 3.22 hours on October 27, 8 hours on October 28, 8 hours on October 30 and 31, 8 hours on
November 1, 5.32 hours on November 3, 6.02 hours on November 4, 6.05 hours on November 5,
and 6.08 hours on November 7. See Agency No. 4J-604-0030-15 Report of Investigation (ROI) at
Exhibits 10-12. By the Commission’s calculation, Complainant is entitled to have 129.84 hours of
sick leave restored, rather than the 66.43 hours ordered by the AJ.

Finally, we restate the relief ordered by the AJ with slight modifications, including ordering the
Agency to post a notice.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not
specifically addressed herein, we MODIFY the Agency’s final order and REMAND the matter for
further remedial action in accordance with this decision and the ORDER below.

ORDER

To the extent that it has not already done so, the Agency is ORDERED to take the following
actions:

1. The Agency shall submit to the Hearings Unit of the EEOC’s Chicago District Office a
copy of this decision and a request for a determination on Complainant’s entitlement to
nonpecuniary compensatory damages within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this
decision is issued. The Agency shall also submit a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC
Hearings Unit within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision is issued. Thereafter,
the Administrative Judge shall determine whether Complainant is entitled to nonpecuniary
compensatory damages, consistent with this decision. The AJ shall issue a decision on
remedies in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109, and the Agency shall issue a final action
in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110.

2. Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall
expunge the June 19, 2014, 14-Day Suspension for Failure to Perform her Duties in a Safe
Manner that was issued to Complainant on September 13, 2014, from its personnel records.

3. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall pay
Complainant $733.30 in pecuniary compensatory damages.

4. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall restore
129.84 hours of sick leave to Complainant, less any amounts previously restored to
Complainant pursuant to the AJ’s order to restore 66.43 hours of sick leave.

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5. Within ninety (90) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall
provide a minimum of eight hours of in-person or interactive EEO training to the
responsible management officials, including S1 and S2, with a special emphasis on
disability discrimination and the reasonable accommodation process.

6. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall consider
taking appropriate disciplinary action against the responsible management officials,
including S1 and S2. The Commission does not consider training to be a disciplinary
action. The Agency shall report its decision to the Compliance Officer. If the Agency
decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the Agency decides
not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose
discipline. If any of the responsible management officials have left the Agency’s employ,
the Agency shall furnish documentation of their departure date(s).

7. Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall post a
notice in accordance with the statement entitled “Posting Order.”

The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the statement
entitled “Implementation of the Commission’s Decision.” The report shall include supporting
documentation verifying that the corrective action has been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G0617)
The Agency is ordered to post at its Wood Dale, Illinois Post Office facility copies of the attached
notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative,
shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic format by the Agency within 30 calendar days
of the date this decision was issued, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The
Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer as
directed in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within 10
calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. The report must be in digital format, and
must be submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g).
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1016)
If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)),
she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.
29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney
shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this
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decision was issued. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance
with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION’S DECISION (K0618)
Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(c) and §1614.502, compliance with the Commission’s corrective
action is mandatory. Within seven (7) calendar days of the completion of each ordered corrective
action, the Agency shall submit via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP) supporting documents
in the digital format required by the Commission, referencing the compliance docket number under
which compliance was being monitored. Once all compliance is complete, the Agency shall
submit via FedSEP a final compliance report in the digital format required by the Commission.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The Agency’s final report must contain supporting documentation
when previously not uploaded, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the
Complainant and his/her representative.
If the Agency does not comply with the Commission’s order, the Complainant may petition the
Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has
the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission’s order prior to or
following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and
29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the
underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled “Right to File a Civil
Action.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on
the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp.
IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the
complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or
law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal
Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have
twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in
which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B
(Aug. 5, 2015).
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All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail
to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington,
DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely
filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See
29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s
Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition
must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as
untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0610)
This decision affirms the Agency’s final decision/action in part, but it also requires the Agency to
continue its administrative processing of a portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a
civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from
the date that you receive this decision on both that portion of your complaint which the
Commission has affirmed and that portion of the complaint which has been remanded for
continued administrative processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one
hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency,
or your appeal with the Commission, until such time as the Agency issues its final decision on
your complaint. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the
person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her
full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
“Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or
department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing
a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request
permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs.
Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the
court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or
appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission.

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The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter
the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File
a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

December 11, 2018
Date