Canadian Bank Note Company, Limited

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 14, 2020

15576004 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 14, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/576,004 11/21/2017 Thivaharan THURAILINGAM CAS-104 9806
2387 7590 01/14/2020
Olson & Cepuritis, LTD.
20 NORTH WACKER DRIVE
36TH FLOOR
CHICAGO, IL 60606
EXAMINER
GRABOWSKI, KYLE ROBERT
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3638
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/14/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@olsonip.com
firm@olsonip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte THIVAHARAN THURAILINGAM
____________

Appeal 2019-006724
Application 15/576,004
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and
JEREMY M. PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judges.

OSINSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1–19, which constitute all claims pending in this
application. An oral hearing was held on December 5, 2019.2 We have
jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Canadian Bank Note
Company, Limited. Appeal Br. 1.
2 The record includes a transcript of the oral hearing (“Tr.”).
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THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1 and 10 are independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below.
1. A security document comprising a laminate data sheet
attached to a flexible hinge which is attached to a binding of the
security document and exhibits personalization data for
authenticating the laminate data sheet, wherein:
(a) the flexible hinge has a metalized surface and is
embedded within the laminate data sheet, wherein a portion of
the flexible hinge embedded within the laminate data sheet
extends from a side of the laminate data sheet and binds with one
or more other sheets at the binding, the metalized surface of the
flexible hinge having a visible portion proximate to the laminate
data sheet of the security document; and
(b) personalization data etched on the visible portion of the
metalized surface of the flexible hinge matches personalization
data of the laminate data sheet.

EVIDENCE
The Examiner relied on the following evidence in rejecting the claims
on appeal:
Howland US 6,089,614 July 18, 2000
Gocho US 6,955,839 B2 Oct. 18, 2005
Vincent US 2012/0182443 A1 July 19, 2012
Gurberg US 2013/0017353 A1 Jan. 17, 2013
Herlin US 8,517,427 B2 Aug. 27, 2013

REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1–7 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Gurberg and Howland. Final Act. 2–3.
II. Claims 8 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Gurberg, Howland, and Gocho. Id. at 4.
III. Claims 10–16 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Gurberg, Howland, and Vincent. Id.
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IV. Claims 17 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Gurberg, Howland, Vincent, and Gocho. Id. at 5.
V. Claims 1–7 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Gurberg, Howland, and Herlin. Id. at 2–3, 5–6.
VI. Claims 8 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Gurberg, Howland, Gocho, and Herlin. Id. at 4, 5–6.
VII. Claims 10–16 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Gurberg, Howland, Vincent, and Herlin. Id.
VIII. Claims 17 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Gurberg, Howland, Vincent, Gocho, and Herlin.
Id. at 5–6.

OPINION
Rejection I
The Examiner finds that Gurberg teaches most of the limitations of
independent claim 1, but acknowledges that “Gurberg et al. do not disclose
metallization of the flexible hinge forming personalization data.” Final
Act. 3. The Examiner relies on Howland for teaching “a similar transparent
substrate 1 with an upper surface and lower surface of personalized indicia
20 and 21 which may comprise demetal[l]izations.” Id. (citing Gurberg
3:23–28; 11:13–16; Fig. 11). The Examiner points out that indicia 20, 21
“may form alphanumeric characters.” Id. (citing Gurberg 3:36–67). The
Examiner takes the position that “‘personalization data’ may simply be any
alphanumerical information provided before binding the document” in that
“[a]ny particular data is ‘personalized’ to that person and individual
document (e.g.[,] date, issuing authority, etc.) which may be provided before
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integration.” Ans. 4–5. The Examiner also finds that Howland discloses
that “‘further indicia’ may be provided adjacent the region which ‘matches’
the other indicia” (Final Act. 3) and “[i]t ‘matches’ by virtue of its physical
integration with the provided personalization data” (Ans. 4–5). See also
Howland 3:46–50, 54–57 (“[T]he further indicia and associated first or
second indicia define a security pattern extending across the viewing region
and into part of the substrate surface adjacent the viewing region. . . . An
example would be a word in which one or more of the letters was defined by
the first and/or second indicia and the remaining letters by the further
indicia.”); Final Act. 5 (“[T]he disclosure of Howland” is “believed to teach
personalized data on the flexible hinge and personalized data on the laminate
sheet that are ‘matched.’”). The Examiner concludes that it would have
been obvious “to provide the flexible hinge taught in Gurberg . . . with the
metallized security pattern taught in Howland . . . to provide an easy
authentication check, while requiring difficult registration requirements for
counterfeiters.” Final Act. 3 (citing Howland 10:6–11).
Appellant argues that “[t]he claims under consideration call for
matching personalization data on the metallized hinge and on the laminate
data sheet,” but “[n]one of the applied references teach this particular
feature.” Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant asserts that “[i]nstead, Howland teaches
a[n] . . . anti-counterfeiting feature . . . comprising overlying and co-acting
images on opposite sides of the same single sheet.” Id. at 3 (citing Howland
2:42–65; 5:48–62); see also Appeal Br. 8 (“Howland’s “teaching has
nothing whatsoever to do with the claimed invention that specifies two
separate data fields with matching data on two separate structural elements
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— one on the flexible hinge and the other on the laminate data sheet
attached to the flexible hinge.”).
We agree with Appellant that Howland discloses a single element
(substrate) with first indicia on a first side and second indicia on a second
side second opposite the first side. Howland 2:42–46. Howland also
teaches that the first and/or second indicia may be associated with further
indicia on the same side of the substrate as the first and/or second indicia in
which “[c]ounterfeiting of this arrangement would require very accurate
registration.” Howland 3:40–50. Even assuming arguendo that Howland’s
first and/or second indicia and the associated further indicia are
“personalization data” and “match” each other as claimed, the Examiner has
not adequately explained how Howland would teach or suggest the use of
first and/or second indicia on a first element and the use of associated further
indicia on a second element. Howland teaches the overlying and the co-
acting indicia being on the same single element or substrate in order to make
it difficult for counterfeiters to be able to replicate the indicia (due to the
precise registering of the indicia relative to each other), and thus, make it
difficult for counterfeiters to produce a counterfeit element. In other words,
Howland does not teach personalized data on two different elements (such as
a flexible hinge and a laminate data sheet).
The Examiner’s modification “to provide the flexible hinge taught in
Gurberg . . . with the metallized security pattern taught in Howland” (Final
Act. 3) does not adequately explain how modified Gurberg would have
matching personalization data on both Gurberg’s flexible hinge 130 and the
hard synthetic material layers 20 of Gurberg’s hard durable laminate sheet
160. Even to the extent the Examiner may be contemplating modifying both
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the flexible hinge and the laminate data sheet of Gurberg to have a security
pattern, the Examiner does not adequately explain how Howland’s teachings
would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to do so considering that
Howland only teaches first and/or second indicia, as well as further indicia
associated with the first and/or second indicia, on a single structural element.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant apprises us of error in the
Examiner’s determination that the combination of Gurberg and Howland
renders obvious the subject matter of independent claim 1. Accordingly, we
do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 1, or claims 2–7 depending
therefrom, under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Gurberg and
Howland.
Rejections II–IV
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 8–19 rely on the same deficient
rationale lacking rational underpinnings to explain how and why it would
have been obvious to modify Gurberg so as to have matching
personalization data on both the flexible hinge and the laminate data sheet.
Final Act. 4–5. Accordingly, we do not sustain, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the
rejections of: claims 8 and 9 as unpatentable over Gurberg, Howland, and
Gocho; claims 10–16 and 19 as unpatentable over Gurberg, Howland, and
Vincent; and claims 17 and 18 as unpatentable over Gurberg, Howland,
Vincent, and Gocho.
Rejection V
Rather than merely relying on Howland for teaching “personalized
data on the flexible hinge and personalized data on the laminate sheet that
are ‘matched’” (Final Act. 5), the Examiner further relies on the teachings of
Herlin. Id. The Examiner finds that Herlin teaches “flexible hinge portion
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2' and a laminate data sheet 3, and providing a matching personalized data
‘unique identifier’ 5 on both a flexible hinge portion 2' and the laminate data
sheet 3.” Id. (citing Herlin Figs. 4–5). The Examiner concludes that it
would have been obvious “to provide the personalized data on the hinge
taught in the prior art with matching personalized data on the laminate data
sheet in view of Herlin . . . to make forgery visibly detectable.” Id. at 6
(citing Herlin Abstr.).
Appellant argues that “[n]o explanation has been provided how one of
ordinary skill in the art would have been led to Herlin, or why one of
ordinary skill would have actually combined the claimed structural elements
to achieve the claimed invention.” Reply Br. 3. Appellant further argues
that “even if Herlin was deemed to be combinable, arguendo, with Gurberg
and Howland, the invention defined by the claims nevertheless would not
result.” Id. Appellant further asserts that “[t]he purported teachings of
Herlin also continue to be mischaracterized” in that “[a]ttachment part (2') in
Herlin is not a flexible hinge portion” and “[i]nstead, attachment part (2') is a
sheet that fully underlies information part (3)” and “[t]he entire back surface
of information part (3) is covered by attachment part (2').” Appeal Br. 12
(citing Herlin 3:62–4:1; Figs. 4–5).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The Examiner relies
on Gurberg for teaching “a security document comprising: a flexible hinge
130 (nylon) attached to a laminate data sheet 20 (e.g., two layers of
polycarbonate), wherein the flexible hinge extends from a side of the data
laminate sheet to thereby bind into a security document (0008; Fig. 4).”
Final Act. 3. We have considered Appellant’s argument that “Gurberg does
not teach a flexible hinge that provides a visible portion proximate to the
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laminate data sheet” (Appeal Br. 5), but do not find it persuasive. See
Gurberg ¶ 21 (“The invention provides an improved method for making a
hard, durable laminate sheet 160 with an exposed hinge 130 for binding into
a security document.”); ¶ 33 (“The resulting two-on laminate sheet, when
cut along line 81, provides two finished laminate sheets 160 as shown in
FIGS. 4 and 5, having an exposed hinge 130 attached to the hard synthetic
material side 220 which can be bound into security documents according to
conventional means.”).3
The Examiner relies on Herlin, which describes a security document
having an information page 1 with information part 3 and an attachment
part 2. Herlin 2:43–50. Herlin is concerned with preventing a forger from
“detaching the information part from the attachment part and . . . attaching
another information part to the attachment part of the security document
without leaving visible marks on the information page,” in which case “it
will not be possible to detect that the information part of the information
page in the security document has been changed.” Id. at 1:42–49. Herlin
seeks to provide a solution to this problem by “providing the information
part and the attachment part with a unique identifier which is specific for the
information page in question” such that “[t]he information part and the
attachment part will thereby become a pair from which the same unique

3 We have also considered Appellant’s arguments that “Gurberg does not
disclose a flexible hinge which exhibits personalization data that match[es]
personalization data on the laminated data sheet” and “Gurberg goes not
disclose a metalized surface on a flexible hinge.” Appeal Br. 5. We do not
find these arguments persuasive in that the Examiner does not rely on
Gurberg for providing such teachings, but on the additional references of
Herlin and Howland as described in more detail herein.
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identifier can be visually detected.” Id. at 1:61–67. We agree with the
Examiner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led, in view
of the teachings of Herlin, to provide a unique identifier on both the hard
synthetic material layers 20 of Gurberg’s hard durable laminate sheet 160
(i.e., an information part) and on Gurberg’s flexible hinge 130 (i.e., an
attachment part) (Final Act. 5–6) in order to ensure that any separation of the
laminate sheet and flexible hinge, and subsequent reattachment of another
laminate sheet to the flexible hinge, can be visibly detected. Accordingly,
we are not persuaded that the Examiner’s rationale for modification of
Gurberg based on the teachings of Herlin lacks rational underpinnings.
Herlin contemplates that “[t]he identifier can be provided on the
information part and the attachment part by using the same technique or
alternatively different techniques.” Herlin 2:4–6. The various techniques
referenced in Herlin include laser engraving, printing, and/or perforating.
Id. at 2:6–11. Herlin does not explicitly contemplate metallization and
demetallization for providing the identifier on the flexible hinge, but the
Examiner relies on Howland for this concept. Final Act. 3. Appellant
argues that “Howland could only have been selected as a secondary
reference utilizing [A]ppellant[’s] own teachings as a guide.” Appeal Br. 7.
Appellant argues that “Howland only describes metallization as a means to
provide an obscuring portion for a transparent substrate.” Id. at 8. Howland,
however, describes the general concept of coating a substrate with a metallic
material that may then be partially demetallized. Howland 3:25–27.
Although Howland describes this concept in connection with the idea of
enabling indicia to be viewed through the metallization (id.), the concept of
metallization and corresponding demetallization is known in Howland.
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Appellant has not provided any factual evidence or persuasive technical
reasoning to explain why modifying Gurberg/Herlin so as to create the
unique identifier with the general concept of metallization and
demetallization, as taught by Howland, would yield anything other than a
predictable result, or that doing so would be somehow beyond the level of
ordinary skill in the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
417 (2007). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner’s
rationale for modifying Gurberg/Herlin so as to provide the flexible hinge
with a metalized surface on which the indicia may be provided via
demetallization “to make forgery visibly detectable” (Final Act. 6) lacks
rational underpinnings or improperly used Appellant’s own teachings as a
guide.
We have also considered Appellant’s argument that “Howland’s
transparent substrate (1), a banknote, is not similar to Gurberg’s flexible
hinge [130] by any stretch of the imagination.” Appeal Br. 6. We do not
find such an argument persuasive to explain why the Examiner’s articulated
rationale lacks rational underpinnings. The presence of differences between
two references does not necessarily undermine a prima facie case of
obviousness. See In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Moreover, as noted by the Examiner, “[a] banknote and passport page are
both security documents . . . and have similar aims of producing security
effects on the documents in order to prevent counterfeiting and/or provide
authentication features.” Ans. 4.
We have also considered Appellant’s argument that “an attempt to
perform printing or metallization on the surface of the hinge using offset,
gravure, or screen printing as per Howland after the security document has
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been bound would be viewed by one of ordinary skill as impractical because
the proximity of the surface of the laminate data sheet (and any other bound
pages of the security document) would create a risk of damaging the
document.” Appeal Br. 6–7. The Examiner responds that Appellant’s “own
invention involves removal (demetalli[z]ation) via a laser” and “[t]his
appears to destroy the[] argument that other effects such as printing would
risk damage to the document, since laser ablation would pose similar risks”
and also “Howland . . . discloses demetallization and does not require
printing steps.” Ans. 5. Appellant’s argument that the combination of
Howland with Gurberg/Herlin would be impractical does not persuade us
that the proposed modification would not have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art.
As to dependent claim 7’s recitation that “the metalized surface of the
flexible hinge is metalized by aluminum” (Appeal Br. (Claims App.)), the
Examiner finds that “Howland . . . teach[es] that the metallization may
comprise aluminum.” Final Act. 3 (citing Howland 8:2–3). Appellant’s
argument regarding dependent claim 7, including that Howland also teaches
a “multitude” of other materials (Appeal Br. 8–9) does not persuade us of
error in the Examiner’s finding.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant does not apprise us of error in
the Examiner’s determination that the combination of Gurberg, Howland,
and Herlin renders obvious the subject matter of independent claim 1 or the
claims that depend therefrom. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of
claims 1–7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Gurberg, Howland,
and Herlin.
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Rejection VI
The Examiner acknowledges that Gurberg, Howland, and Herlin “do
not disclose providing a UV-curable protective coating overcoat on the
metallized surface of the flexible hinge.” Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds
that “Gocho . . . teach[es] providing a UV-curable resin as an overcoat on a
security device.” Id. (citing Gocho 23:47–52; Fig. 6). The Examiner
concludes that it would have been obvious to provide “the metallized
security pattern taught in Gurberg and Howland . . . with a UV-curable
[resin] overcoat in view of Gocho . . . to form a protection layer.” Id. at 4, 5
(citing Gocho 23:47–52).
In addition to relying on the arguments we found unpersuasive in
connection with Rejection V, Appellant argues that “Gocho . . . is inapposite
vis-à-vis claim 8 and 9 because the claimed protective UV coating is
provided for an entirely different purpose on an entirely different substrate.”
Appeal Br. 9. More particularly, Appellant argues that “Gocho discloses a
protective coating over a . . . latent image formation layer containing a liquid
crystalline polymer material . . . [that] is known to have a softer surface” and
in order “[t]o provide [a] harder surface, it is important to have additional
hard coat.” Id. at 10. Appellant asserts that the claimed protective UV
coating overcoats a metalized surface. Id.; see also Spec. 6: 23–24 (“It is
preferred to cover the metallic film layer 200 of the flexible hinge by a
protective coating 400 . . . to protect the metalized nylon hinge against
adhering to the polycarbonate sheets during lamination and causing some of
the metallization to become removed.”).
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive because it is immaterial if the
modification to Gurberg/Howland/Herlin to include a UV coating is for a
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different reason than one advocated by Appellant, so long as the Examiner
has articulated reasoning with rational underpinning. See KSR, 550 U.S.
at 418; see also In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 693 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(“Although the motivation to combine here differs from that of the applicant,
the motivation in the prior art to combine the references does not have to be
identical to that of the applicant to establish obviousness.”) and In re
Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1016 (CCPA 1972) (“The fact that [A]ppellant uses
[a claimed feature] for a different purpose does not alter the conclusion that
its use in a prior art composition would be prima facie obvious from the
purpose disclosed in the references.”). Appellant does not persuasively
explain why providing a UV coating as a protective layer (albeit for a harder
surface) lacks rational underpinnings.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 8 and 9 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Gurberg, Howland, Gocho, and Herlin.
Rejection VII
The Examiner acknowledges that Gurberg, Howland, and Herlin “do
not disclose that the demetallization is via laser etching.” Final Act. 4
(emphasis added). The Examiner finds that “Vincent teach[es] a very
similar metallized security pattern” and “the metal may be provided via
vapour deposition (0042) and the demetallization may be provided by a laser
(0045).” Id. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious “to
provide the demetallizations taught in Gurberg et al. and Howland et al. via
laser in view of Vincent as a well-known method of demetallization.” Id.
The Examiner also finds that “a Nd:YAG laser is extremely well known in
the art” and “a particular known technique was recognized as part of the
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ordinary capabilities of one skilled in the art, namely, demetallization via a
Nd:YAG laser.” Id.
In addition to relying on the arguments we found unpersuasive in
connection with Rejection V, Appellant argues that “[n]o valid evidentiary
basis exists for the attempted combination” including Vincent. Appeal
Br. 10. Appellant argues that “Vincent . . . addresses a different security
problem – anti-copying security . . . [t]hat has nothing to do with the claimed
method, or with Gurberg and/or Howland.” Id. (citing Vincent ¶ 25). As
described above, the Examiner modifies Gurberg/Herlin so that the unique
identifier is created by the general methodology of metallization and
demetallization, as taught by Howland. Vincent describes methods of
metallization and demetallization that are effective for use in providing a
security element, in which the demetallization is provided by means of a
laser. Vincent ¶ 45. The Examiner has also made the unrebutted finding
that demetallization via a Nd:YAG laser is well-known in the art.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner’s rationale for
modifying Gurberg/Howland/Herlin so as to provide demetallization via a
laser for providing a “metallized security pattern” (Final Act. 4) lacks
rational underpinnings.
Appellant argues that “Vincent does not teach laser etching of
personalization data onto a visible portion of a metalized surface of a
flexible hinge as claimed.” Appeal Br. 10. We do not find such an
argument persuasive in that it attacks Vincent individually, when the
rejection is based on a combination of Gurberg, Herlin, Howland, and
Vincent. That Vincent alone does not teach laser etching of personalization
data onto a metalized surface of a flexible hinge does not address the
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Examiner’s findings and reasoning in support of the conclusion of the
obviousness of such features as presented in the rejection. “Nonobviousness
cannot be established by attacking references individually where the
rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.” In re
Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing In re Keller, 642
F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)).
Appellant’s representative at the oral hearing advanced a new
argument that had not been presented to the Examiner in the Appeal Brief or
Reply Brief. In particular, Appellant’s representative argued that “for the
method, it is important that the documents, the pages have already been
bound and then the method calls for entering the personalization data on the
hinge that is already in the document. None of the references come even
close to suggesting that.” Tr. 6:15–19; see also id. at 14:20–15:5 (reiterating
that the personalized data is put on the hinge after the document has been
bound). As the argument was not properly before the Examiner, such that
we might have had the benefit of the Examiner’s views on the argument in
reaching our decision in this appeal, we have considered only those
arguments presented by Appellant in the briefs. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.47(e)(1):
“At the oral hearing, appellant may only rely on Evidence that has been
previously entered and considered by the primary examiner and present
argument that has been relied upon in the brief or reply brief except as
permitted by paragraph (e) (2) of this section.” Paragraph (e)(2) of the
relevant section provides: “Upon a showing of good cause, appellant and/or
the primary examiner may rely on a new argument based upon a recent
relevant decision of either the Board or a Federal Court.” Appellant has not
alleged that good cause is present here.
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Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 10–16 and 19 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Gurberg, Howland, Gocho, and Herlin.
Rejection VIII
Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 11) are unpersuasive for the same
reasons described above in connection with Rejection VI. Accordingly, we
sustain the rejection of claims 17 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Gurberg, Howland, Vincent, Gocho, and Herlin.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–7 103 Gurberg, Howland 1–7
8, 9 103 Gurberg, Howland,
Gocho
8, 9
10–16, 19 103 Gurberg, Howland,
Vincent
10–16, 19
17, 18 103 Gurberg, Howland,
Vincent, Gocho
17, 18
1–7 103 Gurberg, Howland,
Herlin
1–7
8, 9 103 Gurberg, Howland,
Gocho, Herlin
8, 9
10–16, 19 103 Gurberg, Howland,
Vincent, Herlin
10–16, 19
17, 18 103 Gurberg, Howland,
Vincent, Gocho,
Herlin
17, 18
Overall
Outcome
1–19

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED