CA, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 30, 2020

14643029 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/643,029 03/10/2015 Serguei Mankovskii 104.US20150212US1 3117
121312 7590 09/30/2020
Foley & Lardner LLP/ Broadcom Corporation
3000 K Street N.W
Suite 600
Washington, DC 20007-5109
EXAMINER
BELOUSOV, ANDREY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2145
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/30/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cmckenna@foley.com
ipdocketing@foley.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SERGUEI MANKOVSKII
____________

Appeal 2019-003020
Application 14/643,029
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, MAHSHID D. SAADAT, and
DONNA M. PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judges.

SAADAT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–7 and 16–20.2 We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as CA Inc.
Appeal Br. 3.
2 Claims 12–15 have been allowed and claims 8–11 have been indicated as
allowable if rewritten in independent form to include all the limitations of
the base claim and any intervening claims. Final Act. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s disclosure is directed to a website wireframe, which is
defined as “a visual guide that represents the skeletal framework of a
website or web based service” and “are created for the purpose of arranging
elements to best accomplish a particular purpose.” Spec. ¶ 1. The disclosed
wireframe is created by running a legacy software application and displaying
the user interface on a monitor wherein an image of the user interface,
including a blocked portion of the content is captured and used to create
code describing the user interface. Spec. ¶ 3.
Claims 1–7 are illustrative of the invention and read as follows:
1. A method of creating a wireframe from a display
of a user interface of an executing software application,
comprising:
blocking a portion of the displayed user interface such
that imagery of the blocked portion cannot be captured;
capturing an image of the blocked user interface; and
automatically creating code that reproduces one or more
aspects of the displayed user interface from the captured image
of the blocked user interface.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein:
the automatically creating code comprises automatically
creating HTML code that reproduces one or more aspects of the
user interface from the captured image of the blocked user
interface.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein:
the capturing an image is performed by a camera; and
the automatically creating code is performed by a
computer.
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4. The method of claim 1, wherein:
the automatically creating code comprises automatically
recognizing a shape in the captured image of the blocked user
interface and creating code that reproduces one or more aspects
of the blocked user interface element corresponding to the
recognized shape.
5. The method of claim 4, wherein:
the automatically creating code further comprises
automatically identifying a position of the recognized shape in
the blocked user interface, where the created code describes the
identified position.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein:
the blocking is performed by configuring an e-ink display
overlaid on the displayed user interface.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein:
the blocking is performed by using black-out software to
black-out the portion as originally presented within the
displayed user interface.
The Examiner’s Rejection
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 16–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kohli (US 2012/0166963 Al; pub. June
28, 2012) and Rago (US 2013/0219365 Al; iss. Aug. 22, 2013). See Final
Act. 2–4.
Claim 3 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Kohli, Rago, and Grant (US 2015/0121341 Al; pub. Apr.
30, 2015). See Final Act. 5.
Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Kohli, Rago, and Kiuchi (US 2011/0012294 Al; pub. Jan.
20, 2011). See Final Act. 5–6.

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ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner erred. We disagree with Appellant’s
arguments, and we adopt as our own (1) the pertinent findings and reasons
set forth by the Examiner in the Action from which this appeal is taken
(Final Act. 2–6; see also Ans. 3–6) and (2) the corresponding reasons set
forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s
Appeal Brief (Ans. 7–12). We concur with the applicable conclusions
reached by the Examiner and emphasize the following.
CLAIMS 1 and 16
The Examiner finds Kohli discloses the recited method of creating a
wireframe from a display of a user interface by capturing an image of the
user interface and automatically creating code that represents the displayed
user interface from the captured image. Final Act. 3 (citing Kohli Fig. 5,
¶¶ 19, 29–31). The Examiner further relies on Rago as disclosing “blocking
a portion of the displayed user interface such that imagery of the blocked
portion cannot be captured” and capturing and coding an image of the user
interface with respect to the blocked portions. Final Act 3–4 (citing Rago
¶ 31). According to the Examiner, one of ordinary skill in the art would
have modified Kohli to include blocking portions of the display, as taught by
Rago, in order “to allow a user to blackout areas that are irrelevant, or
contain sensitive or confidential information.” Final Act. 4.
First Argument – 35 USC § 132 Declaration
Appellant contends that based on § 2145 of MPEP and a prior
decision by the Board (Ex parte KARL STUART COLEMAN (PTAB
10/03/2017) Appeal 2016-008548; Application 13/384,881;
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nonprecedential), the Examiner erred in refusing to enter and consider the
after final rebuttal evidence in the Declaration filed under 35 USC § 132.
Appeal Br. 8–9. Appellant specifically refers to the Declaration and
attached exhibits that explain
why “screen capture” does not inherently have one specific
meaning and further explains why those of ordinary skill in the
art would understand Kohli as teaching to obtain GUI structure
information at the highest level of abstraction (having lowest
informational entropy --at Declaration paragraphs 2g-2h, 5d-5h)
which is opposite to pixelated data that would be present if
hypothetically obtained “from” that which is displayed. The
Declaration also explains why there is no display monitor in
Kohli Fig. 6. The Examiner position of record does not address
any of these points and thus Appellant’s rebuttal evidence and
rebuttal arguments remain uncontroverted on record.
Appeal Br. 9. Appellant further refers to evidence in the Declaration
including “rebuttal evidence at Response pgs. 13–14 (the W3C specification
for a ‘screen capture’) demonstrating that ‘screen capture’ does not
inherently capture data of what is actually being ‘displayed’.” See Appeal
Br. 9–10.
Based on those portions of the Declaration, Appellant argues the
Examiner did not consider the proper construction for claims 1 and 16, or
addressed the recited limitations in the rejection as follows:
Claim 16 recites, “. . . code configured to receive imagery
captured from a partly blocked user interface of a software
application, the partly blocked user interface comprising an
originally displayed user interface with one or more portions of
the originally displayed user interface being selectively
blocked such that imagery of the one or more blocked portions
cannot be captured; and . . . code configured to automatically
create code describing a derived user interface that is derived
from the received imagery captured from the partly blocked
user interface.”
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Claim 1 recites, “creating a wireframe from a display of a user
interface” (in the preamble) . . . “blocking a portion of the
displayed user interface” . . . “creating code that reproduces one
or more aspects of the displayed user interface from the
captured image of the blocked user interface” [emphasis added,
text skipped]. The only antecedent basis for “the displayed user
interface” in the claim body appears in the preamble phrase,
“from a display of a user interface”.
Appeal Br. 10, 12.
The Examiner responds that Appellant’s Declaration was filed after
the Final Action, before filing the Appel Brief, which was deemed untimely
by the Examiner. Ans. 7. Additionally, the Examiner asserts that the refusal
to enter such Declaration is a petitionable matter under 37 C.F.R. § 181,
rather than reviewable by the Board. Id. The Examiner nonetheless
evaluated Appellant’s Declaration and provided the following explanation:
Claim 1 uses the term “display” and “displayed.” Claim 1 as
recited, does not include a monitor or a computer screen, i.e. a
physical hardware component. A user interface ‘display’ of
claim 1 may be broadly and reasonably interpreted as merely a
software component.
In light of applicant’s own Affidavit, PHOSITA would be
uncertain whether the user interface (as recited in claim 1) is
actually displayed on a hardware component, such as monitor
or a computer screen. Therefore, Claim 1 could be reasonably
interpreted to go either way, actual visual representation, or
underlying software representation.
Ans. 3.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant refers to a number of disclosed
elements: (1) the application Figure 1 that shows camera 108; (2) Abstract
stating “the user interface is displayed on a monitor;” (3) paragraph 26 of the
Specification describing monitor 104; and (4) paragraphs 3, 21, and 31 of
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the Specification that relate to the configuration shown in Figure 1. Reply
Br. 2–4. We agree with the Examiner’s claim interpretation that the claimed
terms “display” and “displayed” encompass the executed software for
displaying content. As stated by the Examiner (see Ans. 8–9), claims 1 and
16 do not recite a physical display such as a monitor and merely require the
process of displaying or blocking the displayed image, which under the
broadest reasonable interpretation could reasonably refer to the process of
displaying by the software portion of the user interface.
Appellant’s arguments are not based on the limitations recited in the
claims. “During reexamination, as with original examination, the PTO must
give claims their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the
specification.” In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim
term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in
the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing
date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Furthermore, it is improper, when in giving
claims their broadest reasonable interpretation, to read limitations from the
specification into the claims. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. “There has never
been a requirement for an examiner to make an on-the-record claim
construction of every term in every rejected claim and to explain every
possible difference between the prior art and the claimed invention in order
to make out a prima facie rejection.” In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
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With respect to Appellant’s Declaration, we note that
[t]he Board has broad discretion as to the weight to give to
declarations offered in the course of prosecution. See Velander
v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(‘[A]ccord[ing] little weight to broad conclusory statements [in
expert testimony before the Board] that it determined were
unsupported by corroborating references [was] within the
discretion of the trier of fact to give each item of evidence such
weight as it feels appropriate.’).
In re American Acad. of Science Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2004). In any case, even upon fully considering the evidence Appellant’s
arguments refer to, that evidence does not persuade us that the Examiner’s
claim interpretation is improper.
Second Argument – Combination of Kohli and Rago
Appellant contends, based on the asserted claim interpretation in the
submitted Declaration, the proposed modification of Kohli’s interface file
128 to include Rago’s blocked portions “work to frustrate and render
inoperative a fundamental objective of Kohli which is to use ‘modules’ to
fully automate the process of converting a desktop application into a web
application.” Appeal Br. 15. Referring to paragraph 31 of Kohli, Appellant
argues the recited automated process requires accessing all the code of the
desktop application, which frustrates and renders inoperative the system of
Kohli. Id.
The Examiner responds by explaining the cited portions of Kohli
disclose both a software representation and “[t]he snapshot 208 [which] may
include multiple screen captures of the user interface 108 in various visual
states.” Ans. 8. The Examiner concludes Kohli teaches a hardware
component for display or a monitor which provide the user interface
elements in a “visual state.” Id.
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We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments and find the cited
portions in Kohli’s paragraphs 29–31 disclose a snapshot analysis module,
as well as a code analysis module. More specifically, Kohli discloses “[t]he
user interface conversion module 122 may include a code analysis module
202 and/or a snapshots analysis module 204,” which may be used by the
user to enter user interface components. Kohli ¶ 29. Snapshot analysis
module 208 is further explained as follows:
The snapshots analysis module 204 may be configured to
analyze snapshots 208 of the user interface 108. The snapshots
208 may include multiple screen captures of the user
interface 108 in various visual states. For example, during
execution of the desktop application 102, a snapshot tool (not
shown) may take the snapshots 208. The snapshots analysis
module 204 may perform suitable image analysis of the
snapshots 208 in order to determine interface components that
make up the user interface 108. For example, the snapshots
analysis module 204 may identify the presence, location,
and/or size of various GUI elements within the user
interface 108. The snapshots analysis module 204 may then
generate the interface file 128 that specifies the interface
components. The snapshots analysis module 204 may also
generate the web interface 114 based on the interface file
128. In some embodiments, the code analysis module 202 and
the snapshots analysis module 204 may be utilized in
conjunction in order to generate and/or validate the contents of
the interface file 128.
Kohli ¶ 31 (emphases added). Based on the claim interpretation discussed
above, Kohli discloses the recited screen capture. As such, modifying Kohli
to include the blocking option of Rago would not frustrate or render
inoperative the system of Kohli.
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Third Argument – Combinability of References
Appellant contends Rago’s “screenshots” are not the same as Kohli’s
“screen captures” because Rago’s screenshots are used for reporting a
problem to a help desk. Appeal Br. 15–16. Appellant argues that there is no
human user reporting a problem in Kohli and therefore, blocking portions of
the screen in Rago is not applicable to Kohli’s system. Appeal Br. 17.
Appellant further argues that Rago does not include any conversion of the
codes or wireframe creation and does not allow user access to the code of
the executing program. Appeal Br. 20. According to Appellant, the
differences discussed above show that the Examiner has not established a
prima facie case of obviousness. Appeal Br. 21.
The Examiner responds by reiterating the stated rationale as “to allow
a user to blackout areas that are irrelevant, or contain sensitive or
confidential information” and explaining that the noted blocking would have
benefitted both references. Ans. 10. The Examiner adds that Kohli’s
process, although automated, allows user input in the form of entering
interface components using a snapshot analysis module or a snapshot tool.
Id.; see also Kohli ¶¶ 29, 31. In addition, the Examiner asserts the presented
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning supports the
combination of the references that are directed to the field of “taking screen
shots, screen captures, or snapshots of what is displayed, and analyzing
them.” Ans. 11.
Appellant has not persuaded us of error. We agree with the Examiner
(Ans. 10–11) that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that
Rago teaches certain features of the recited method of creating a wireframe
from a display, such as blocking portions of the display, capturing an image
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of the blocked portions that is used in capturing an image and creating the
code representing the user interface, which may be included in a system like
the method of creating a wireframe from a display by converting the user
interface to a web application of Kohli. See Kohli ¶¶ 17, 29–31, Abstract;
Rago ¶ 31, Abstract; see also Final Act. 3–4. As also explained by the
Examiner, both references relate to capturing and analyzing what is
displayed on a user interface and creating the code to reproduce certain
aspect of the image. Ans. 11. Therefore, the blocking feature of Rago,
when considered together with the disclosure of the snapshot analysis of
Kohli, would have suggested the recited features of claims 1 and 16.
Additionally, the Supreme Court made clear that when considering
obviousness, “the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the
specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account
of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
Furthermore, the skilled artisan is “a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton,” and this is a case in which the skilled artisan would “be able to
fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” KSR,
550 U.S. at 421. We therefore find the Examiner provided a sufficiently
reasonable motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to combine Kohli
and Rago based on the above discussed improvements to Kohli’s system as
modified by Rago in rejecting claims 1 and 16.
CLAIMS 2–7
Appellant contends “creating HTML code,” as recited in claim 2, is
not taught or suggested by Kohli’s paragraph 23 because the reference
implies “code of the desktop application is fully accessible so that the
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‘modules’ can analyze the code, ‘deconstruct’ it and automatically produce
the XML file for the web application user interface.” Appeal Br. 22.
Regarding claims 4, 5, and 7, Appellant argues that the Examiner erred
because Kohli’s paragraph 31 “does not inherently teach or suggest anything
about capturing of a blocked and displayed user interface.” Appeal Br. 22–
23.
The Examiner responds that “[t]he term ‘creating’ does not
necessarily imply that the HTML code was not present” whereas “[c]reation
of HTML code could be done in order to overwrite the code that’s already
present.” Ans. 11. In response to Appellant’s assertion that Kohli does not
teach or suggest “capturing of a blocked and displayed user interface”
(Appeal Br. 22), the Examiner explains that the disclosure of “the snapshots
analysis module 204 may identify the presence, location, and/or size of
various GUI elements within the user interface” in paragraph 31 of Kohli
meets the disputed limitations because Appellant’s claims do not require
“that the blocked user interface is actually displayed.” Id. Regarding claims
4, 5, 7, the Examiner refers to Kohli’s disclosure in paragraph 31 regarding
the snapshot analysis module and how it identifies different elements of the
user interface and to Rago’s paragraph 31 regarding the user ability to
highlight or black out certain information in the workspace. Ans. 12.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments. As explained by the
Examiner (Ans. 11), the claims recite “captured image of the blocked user
interface,” which is not the same as “capturing of a blocked and displayed
user interface,” as asserted by Appellant. That is, the snapshot analysis of
Kohli captures the image of the desktop including blacked out or blocked
portions, as modified by Rago. Additionally, we observe that one of
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ordinary skill in the art would have understood that HTML code could be
produced to represent the captured image of the blocked user interface
although the captured image of the unblocked user interface is also produced
in HTML code.
CLAIM 3
Appellant contends adding Grant’s teachings to the Kohli-Rago
combination does not remedy the above-discussed deficiency. Appeal Br.
23. According to Appellant, “[t]he purpose of Grant is to have the full
screenshot associated with its corresponding source code (while in the
process of developing the application using the ‘development’ application”
or taking a screenshot by a camera, which is unrelated to Kohli and Rago.
Appeal Br. 23–24. Appellant further argues “[t]he purpose of Grant would
be frustrated if the camera captured a blocked version of a displayed screen.”
Appeal Br. 24.
We are unpersuaded. As explained by the Examiner, “the purpose of
Grant is to facilitate searching of source code, having blocking means may
further aid in this purpose by focusing on portions of the interface that are
relevant to the source code.” Ans. 12. Additionally, we note that Grant
teaches that a screenshot may be generated both “from source code and/or
from display data that is output from and/or generated by the data processing
system” or “by a camera taking a picture of an image on a visual output
device and providing the screenshot to a data processing system.” Grant
¶ 16. That is, an image captured by a camera may include Kohli’s image of
the displayed user interface with Rago’s blacked out portions, which is used
to create code that represents certain aspects of the user interface.

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CLAIM 6
Appellant contends the Examiner failed to provide a rationale “for
why artisans involved in the disparate endeavors of Kohli (fully automated
code conversion) and Rago (reporting problems to a help desk) would
further look to the far a flung endeavor of Kiuchi (forming a pattern in a
plurality of areas of a surface of an elongated sheet material through a
scanning exposure -- ¶ [0003]).” Appeal Br. 24–25.
We are unpersuaded that the Examiner erred. First, we observe that
claim 6 does not require using a camera to capture an image of the blocked
user interface. Second, Kiuchi discloses an electronic paper or an electronic
ink to form masked patterns on a display and, as stated by the Examiner
(Final Act. 5–6), the proposed combination would “provide a user with a
means for taking masking screenshots that is independent of the system
displaying the screen.” See Kiuchi ¶ 247.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner’s findings and conclusion with
respect to combinability because all of the features of Kiuchi need not be
bodily incorporated into the Kohli-Rago combination. See In re Keller, 642
F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097
(Fed. Cir. 1986). Furthermore, the artisan is not compelled to blindly follow
the teaching of one prior art reference over the other without the exercise of
independent judgment. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d
881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Appellant did not rebut the Examiner’s findings
in the Reply Brief.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claims 1 and 16, dependent claims 2–7, 3, and 6, as well as the
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remaining claims, which are not separately argued by Appellant. See Appeal
Br. 21–25.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4, 5, 7,
16–20
103 Kohli, Rago 1, 2, 4, 5, 7,
16–20

3 103 Kohli, Rago, Grant 3
6 103 Kohli, Rago,
Kiuchi
6
Overall
Outcome
1–7, 16–20

FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED