Burl M.,1 Complainant,v.Sally Jewell, Secretary, Department of the Interior (National Park Service), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 4, 20160120142122 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 4, 2016) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Burl M.,1 Complainant, v. Sally Jewell, Secretary, Department of the Interior (National Park Service), Agency. Appeal No. 0120142122 Hearing No. 550-2013-00186X Agency No. NPS-12-0101 DECISION The Commission accepts Complainant’s appeal from the March 26, 2014, final Agency decision (FAD) concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The Commission’s review is de novo. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the FAD. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Park Ranger Trainee at the Agency’s Golden Gate National Recreation Area in San Francisco, California. Complainant was appointed to the position in 2007 under the Student Career Experience Program (SCEP) while working towards his master’s degree. Students in SCEP sign an agreement laying out the parameters of the program. The agreement notes that the Agency has the option to convert students participating in the program to permanent status at the end of the program if they meet all the requirements. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120142122 2 On May 25, 2011, Complainant’s supervisor (S1) and the Human Resources Specialist (HRS) met with Complainant. Complainant claims that S1 told him that he would not be appointed anywhere within the Golden Gate National Recreation Area, and that the Agency had decided not to convert his appointment to permanent. On June 23, 2011, S1 issued a memorandum summarizing their May 25, 2011 meeting. Complainant challenged numerous statements in the memorandum believing that S1 was trying to cover herself by providing a list of things he had done wrong. Complainant claims that S1 was “really looking for stuff” and that it was probably “easy for her to find stuff to get [him]” in his third year in SCEP when they had to make the conversion decision. Complainant alleges that he had three years of fully satisfactory performance ratings and S1’s actions consisted of “intentionally fault finding at every opportunity.” Following the meeting, Complainant claims that he retrieved some pamphlets that he and a co- worker were to distribute the next day and returned with them to the office around 6:30 p.m. When he entered the work area, S1 was still in the office and told him he should not be there at that time. S1 left the area, went downstairs, and returned with a Law Enforcement Ranger. The Law Enforcement Ranger told him to leave. Complainant responded that he was just getting his things and needed to change out of his uniform to go home. Complainant claims that the Law Enforcement Ranger followed him to the changing area and then followed him as he left the building and walked to his car. Complainant and management initially reached an agreement for Complainant to continue working until July 2, 2011. Management later extended Complainant’s appointment to allow him to remain eligible for placement in a different position, but in a leave without pay (LWOP) status through September 19, 2011, to preserve his 120-day eligibility. On June 1, 2011, Complainant alleges that he was meeting with HRS when his second-line supervisor (S2) interrupted the meeting and asked when he was going to leave. On June 6, 2011, Complainant spoke with the Superintendent and complained about the decision to not convert his SCEP appointment. The Superintendent looked into Complainant’s concerns, and ultimately supported the decision to not convert his appointment. On March 21, 2012, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him and subjected him to a hostile work environment on the bases of race (Latino) and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when he was informed he could not be hired anywhere in Golden Gate National Recreation Area after he completed his Student Career Experience Program and was subsequently terminated after the 120-day timeframe for placement expired; and he was physically removed from his office. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the ROI and notice of his right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing, but subsequently withdrew his request. Consequently, the Agency issued a FAD pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). 0120142122 3 In the FAD, the Agency assumed arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination and reprisal and found that management articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, S1 stated that she reached the decision with the concurrence of the personnel board, not to convert Complainant’s SCEP appointment because his performance – especially in the areas of communication and collaboration – had degraded to the point that it was affecting the Division. S1 confirmed that Complainant’s performance had been inconsistent throughout his term and that management had held numerous informal counseling sessions with him, but there had been no improvement. S1 noted that Complainant was cautioned several times not to work on delivering education material to classes during the day as there was an education staff that handled that, and he was instructed to limit his activities to after-school programs. S2 corroborated S1’s stated reasons and added that Complainant wanted to perform duties outside of those he was assigned, and he was unable to accept what was part of his job. The effect of it was that he was not directly doing his job. As a result, management decided not to convert Complainant’s appointment. With respect to the events of the evening of May 25, 2011, S1 affirmed that Complainant was told at the end of the meeting that he should consider that the end of his shift and that he should return the following Tuesday morning. S1 stated that Complainant returned to the office at approximately 6:30 p.m., and S1 reiterated to him that he was to go home and take a few days off. S1 asserted that she enlisted the assistance of the Law Enforcement Ranger because Complainant became belligerent and she was concerned about being alone with Complainant after hours on the day she had told him his appointment would not be converted and his employment would end. The Law Enforcement Ranger stated that she did not act in a law enforcement capacity and denied watching him get changed. The Law Enforcement Ranger maintained that she simply attempted to address Complainant as a supportive peer to encourage him to leave the building. In attempting to establish that management’s reasons for its actions were pretextual, Complainant disagreed with S1’s criticism of his performance. The Agency noted that Complainant essentially acknowledged that his work performance was deficient by his assertions that S1 found fault “at every opportunity.” Further, Complainant acknowledged that S1 warned him around 10 times over the two years prior to the non-conversion decision not to work on school-day curriculum. Moreover, the Agency found that Complainant’s assertion that S1 was overly picky was unpersuasive. Additionally, Complainant claims that S1 did not explain to him during the May 2011 meeting why his appointment was not being converted, and that the June 23, 2011, memorandum was the first time he learned of the performance-based reasons for her decision. S1 stated that she explained to Complainant the reasons stated in the memorandum for her decision during the meeting. HRS corroborated that S1 discussed Complainant’s performance issues. As a result, the Agency found that Complainant had not shown that S1’s reasons for his non-conversion were false. 0120142122 4 With respect to the incident following the meeting, S1 and HRS stated that they told Complainant at the end of the meeting he was to go home for the long weekend. Complainant claims that he did not recall them saying that. When he returned to the office after his usual hours, S1 was the only one from the Division present and perceived Complainant as becoming belligerent and refusing to leave. Thus, she sought the aid of someone else in the building and found the Law Enforcement Ranger. The Agency found that Complainant presented no evidence demonstrating that the reasons given by management for enlisting the assistance of the Law Enforcement Ranger were false. Finally, the Agency found that Complainant failed to show that S2 interrupted the meeting as he alleged. Likewise, Complainant did not prove that the Superintendent failed to act upon Complainant’s report of unfair treatment. The Superintendent met with Complainant and spoke to both S1 and S2 about the situation. Based on those conversations, the Superintendent concluded that Complainant had not been treated unfairly. The Agency concluded that Complainant failed to show that management’s reasons for its actions were pretextual. As a result, the Agency found that Complainant had not been subjected to discrimination, reprisal, or a hostile work environment as alleged. The instant appeal followed. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, Complainant contends that the Superintendent and his subordinates discriminated against him and covered up their actions. Complainant claims that he was hired to engage the community and to complete his master’s degree, not to be warned, harassed, and intimidated. Complainant argues that his request for the Superintendent to investigate the May 2011 incidents was ignored. Accordingly, Complainant requests that the Commission reverse the FAD. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Disparate Treatment To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. 0120142122 5 Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). In the instant case, assuming arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination and reprisal, the Commission finds that Complainant failed to present evidence to rebut the Agency's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. In particular, S1 stated that she decided to terminate Complainant’s employment and not convert his SCEP appointment, with the concurrence of the personnel board, based on management’s belief that the position he was in was not a good fit for him. ROI, at 95-97. S1 noted that Complainant’s performance had been inconsistent throughout his tenure and management had held numerous informal counseling sessions with him to try to help him improve in areas. Id. In the June 2011 memorandum, S1 cited as an example Complainant’s struggle with the Partnership and Collaboration performance element. Id. at 325. S1 asserted that Complainant had difficulty communicating and collaborating successfully with staff from various partner organizations. Id. Additionally, S1 confirmed that Complainant missed scheduled meetings, failed to keep his supervisor apprised of scheduling conflicts and other pertinent matters, worked on school assignments while on duty, and communicated discourteously or unprofessionally to others. Id. at 325-26. S1 stated that management was open to placing him in another position in the park, but there were no other openings at the time or within the required 120-day time period after his completion of the SCEP program. Id. S1 maintained that she informed Complainant during their May 25, 2011, meeting that he could consider his shift over, go home immediately, and return that next Tuesday morning. ROI, at 105. S1 stated that Complainant returned to the office that evening around 6:00 p.m., and became belligerent and aggressive when asked to leave. Id. at 106. Based on Complainant’s agitation, S1 felt uncomfortable and asked the Law Enforcement Ranger to assist in encouraging Complainant to go home. Id. at 106-07. The Law Enforcement Ranger denied physically removing Complainant from the building or watching over Complainant while he changed; rather, she states that she encouraged Complainant as a peer to listen to his boss and go home. Id. at 192-96, 199. Finally, the Superintendent affirmed that Complainant expressed concerns to him about the circumstances of his non-appointment and, after discussing the matter with S1, he determined that Complainant had not been treated unfairly. Id. at 138-42. Complainant now bears the burden of establishing that the Agency's stated reasons are merely a pretext for discrimination. Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 9, 1996). Complainant can do this directly by showing that the Agency's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. As Complainant withdrew his request for a hearing, the Commission does not have the benefit of an Administrative Judge's credibility determinations after a hearing. Therefore, the Commission can only evaluate the facts based on the weight of the evidence presented. The Commission finds no persuasive evidence that Complainant's protected classes were a factor in any of the Agency's actions. At all times, the ultimate burden remains with Complainant to 0120142122 6 demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency's reasons were not the real reasons and that the Agency acted on the basis of discriminatory or retaliatory animus. Complainant failed to carry this burden. As a result, the Commission finds that Complainant has not established that he was subjected to discrimination or reprisal as alleged. Finally, to the extent that Complainant is alleging that he was subjected to a hostile work environment, the Commission finds that under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems. Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), Complainant's claim of hostile work environment must fail. See Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 3, 1994). Complainant’s harassment claim is precluded based on the Commission’s finding that he failed to establish that any of the actions taken by the Agency were motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01932923 (Sep. 21, 2000). CONCLUSION After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision because the preponderance of the evidence of record does not establish that discrimination occurred. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0416) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The requests may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 0120142122 7 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations November 4, 2016 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation