Burger King

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 1981

258 N.L.R.B. 1293 (N.L.R.B. 1981)

BURGER KING
Greyhound Food Management, Inc. d/b/a Burger
King and Detroit Fast Food Workers, a Council
of United Labor Unions. Cases 7-CA-17550(1)
and 7-RC-15703
September 30, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
ZIMMERMAN
On May 22, 1981, Administrative Law Judge
Harold Bernard, Jr., issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, both Respondent
and the General Counsel filed exceptions and sup-
porting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as
modified herein.
The Administrative Law Judge failed to rule on
the objections in Case 7-RC-15703. In view of our
agreement with his findings concerning the unfair
labor practices committed by Respondent which
are the same as, or similar to, the objections to the
election in Case 7-RC-15703, we find that Re-
spondent's conduct precluded the holding of a fair
election and that the election should be set aside.
AME:NDFD REMEI)Y
The Administrative Law Judge found, and we
agree, that Respondent's unlawful conduct during
the course of the Union's organizing campaign had
the effect of undermining the Union's majority
status and preventing a fair election. The Adminis-
trative Law Judge recommended a bargaining
order to remedy Respondent's unfair labor prac-
' Respondent ha, excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administratike Las Judge It is the Board's etablhlished polic not to
ovecrrule an administrative law judge's resolution, vith respect to credi-
bilit! unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevanl eidence con-
ilnces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Drr Wall Products.
Inc.. 91 NlRB 544 (1950()). enfd 188 F2d 362 (d Cir 1951) We have
carefull exa;mined the record and find nol baslis fir resersing his findings
The Adminisiratise Laa Judge, at sec IV. par 6. inadvertently re-
fcrred to female employee Jamie Ilo, ard as "he." and in par. 31 inad-
rtent.i referred, I , itl,s o., e n Co%.en" We hereh) correct
these rror,
The correct citalion off the case referred to hi the Adminitratise Lax
Judge in firl 2 orf is Ieciin is . iuk aintlo C'orporutln, d/h a .StcDon-
aldi. 1l2 NI R 878 (1971). Ini light of his dis,tt Iherelt. SMemher Fan-
ning inds it uilleccslar% to dstlinguish that case lember Jenkins finds it
untiecessar to) rel oi Bud'
1 3
,d .Siorc. Ixi . d I, a Bud Ihriri-l- l e
236 NLRB 1203 (I97,)
tices.3 However, the Administrative Law Judge did
not make a finding with respect to the effective
date of the bargaining order. The record reveals
that majority status was attained, demand was
made, and the first unfair labor practices occurred
on December 10, 1979. Accordingly, we shall date
the bargaining order as of that date. N%.L.R.B. v.
Gissel Packing Co.. Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969): Trad-
ing Port. Inc., 219 NLRB 298 (1975). 4
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
' We agree wilth the Administrative Lasw Judge that a bargaining order
is appropriate to remedy the unfair labor practices committed by Re-
spondent For the reasons stated by the Administrative Law Judge. we
find th;t Respondent's unlfair labor practices tended to undermine the ma-
jority status of the nion, Further. fr the reasons stated below. e finld
that Respondent's conduct also tended to preclude the holding of a; fair
rerut election.
Respondent commenced its course of unfair labor practices immediate-
ly upon learning of the union campaign and continued its unlawful con-
duct. svilhout interruption. up until the day of the election In addition.
these unfair lahbor practices were committed hby all of Respondenl's ad-
mitted supervisors, including the plant manager, who kas the highest
ranking management official in the facility insolved herein. and the dis-
tricl manager. one of Respondent's national corporate officials More-
oer, Respcndent's actions were directed at all of its employees. some of
swhom *cere of high school age and thus highly susceptible to Respond-
etll' manlipulation.
Respondeti made numerous threats of plant closure and loss of em-
ploy mert henefits. often to groups of employees Such conduct has long
beell recognized as being serilous unfair labor practices hasing a substan-
tial impact o mployc attitudes and reactions. and thus upon employee
free choice See Ji, Baker 7Trucking Company. 241 NLRB 121. 122
(197')) Moreoser. Rcspondent coupled these threats with the unlawful
granting of benefit,. therchby sending a clear message to each employee
that hcrcas ail enc folr the Uniotn would jeopardize one's employment. a
sote gainsl the LUmon sould lead to improved terms and condilions of
employnteit We find the likel! effect of this conduct would be to instill
in employees il strong fear of union representation, such as would conlin-
ue Iot be operatise even in the event of a second election. We further find
that simply requiring Respondent to refrain from repeating such conduct,
the traditiilonal remedy. ill nt erase the effect of this fear of union rep-
reentation. and will not enable the employees to participate in a free and
uncoerced rerun election Morever. Respondent's constant and side-
spread acts of interrogation surveillance and solicitation of grie, ances
signaled o cnploees its displeasure at union actixit aid the lengthi to
w hich it x ould go to stifle the employees' right of self-organization Such
conlduclt would also not he soon forgoten Nor do we think it likel) that
a mcre ceasc-and-desist order ill successfully eradicate the lingering ef-
fects of Respondent's unlawful conduct. Finally, we find it doiuhtful that
a cease-and-desist order ssould deter the recurrence of unfair labor prac-
tices. Respondenl's unfair labor practices %sere committed bh its top man-
agemenlt officials, none of whom appears t have left Respondent's
enlplos and Respondent has made no effort to neutralize the effect of its,
unfair labor practices
For all the ahose reasors. we find the possibility of erasing the effects
of Repoldent's unfair labor practices and f ensuring a fair rerun clec-
lion bh the use of traditilonal remedies i slight. and that employee.' rep-
reCentational tllilmlient )lice Cxpressed through iauthorilatioll cards
ssould on hbalance. he better protected bh our issuance of a hairgaiilg
order thatn h tIraditional rmedies
'Ihe Adnlilltral ise ass Judge failed ilo make a finding ith respect
lo thle cnompliint allegatioll that Resplondent iolaited Sec S(a)(5) of the
Acl Since the record esabhlishes the presece f all the necessar lc-
nlelnts if an 8(;l)(5) ilation under the rationale of .Tl. RB. s (/
PaukiL, upra. and Iradtg 'Port, upra. se finld that Rcponldent engaged
in 1nlc(lindutci lolati, e Of thl sttOit .Accordillgly, e sall niliodf the
recommennided (rdcr Lind riotice t hls rgard
258 NLRB No. 178

1293
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL L.ABOR RELATI ONS BO()ARD
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Greyhound Food Management, Inc., d/b/a Burger
King, Detroit, Michigan, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order, as so modified:
I. Insert the following as paragraph (f) and re-
letter the remaining paragraph as l(g):
"(f) Refusing to recognize and bargain with the
Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the employees in the following appropriate unit:
All full-time and regular part-time general util-
ity employees employed by the Employer at
the Burger King restaurant located at 130 East
Congress, Detroit, Michigan, but excluding
gift shop employees, clerical employees, man-
agers, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election in
Case 7-RC-15703 be, and the same hereby is, set
aside, and that Case 7-RC-15703 be dismissed.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAIl LABOR REI.ATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choice
To engage in activities together for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refrain from the exercise of any or all
such activities.
WE: WILL. NOT in the future give you im-
proved benefits or anything else of value to
induce you to stop helping, to stop supporting,
or to refrain from voting for Detroit Fast
Food Workers, a Council of United Labor
Unions.
WE WIl l. NOT solicit grievances from you
nor promise to resolve them to induce you to
abandon the Union.
WE Wll. NOT keep your union or protected
concerted activities under surveillance and WE:
WIl.l. NOI give you the impression that your
union activities are under surveillance.
WtE Wll.L. NOT threaten loss of seniority, pay
losses, elimination of any job or that the store
will be closed depending on how you vote in
an NLRB election.
WE WIL. NOT refuse to recognize and bar-
gain with the Union as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit described below.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the
above-named Union, as the exclusive repre-
sentative of all employees in the bargaining
unit described below, with respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment, and, if an understanding
is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement. The bargaining unit is:
All full-time and regular part-time general
utility employees employed by us at the
Burger King restaurant located at 130 East
Congress, Detroit, Michigan, but excluding
gift shop employees, clerical employees,
managers, guards and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
GREYHOUND FOOD MANAGEMENT,
INC. D/B/A BURGER KING
DECISION
STATEMENT OF ITHE CASE
HARO LD BERNARD, JR., Administrative Law Judge:
This consolidated unfair labor practice and representa-
tion case was heard in Detroit, Michigan, on October
20-24 and November 5, 6, and 7, 1980. The complaint
and objections to election conducted on February 22,
1980, with which the complaint was consolidated for
hearing, alleges numerous violations of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act, which allegedly render a fair election impossible
and warrant the issuance of a bargaining order remedy.
The questions presented are whether Respondent un-
lawfully interrogated employees, threatened employees
with a closing, loss of wages, and seniority if the Union
were to become their bargaining representative, solicited
grievances, granted benefits such as. inter alia, free food,
paid athletic events, improvements in locker rooms, and
furnishings for the employee dining room, engaged in
1294
B3URGER KING
surveillance and created the impression of surveillance.
A further question presented is whether the Union repre-
sented a majority of employees during the course of the
organizing drive, a period beginning in early December
1979 and extending through the election conducted Feb-
ruary 22, 1980.
Upon consideration of the entire record, the demeanor
of the witnesses, and briefs filed by the parties, I make
the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCIUSIONS
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a Michigan corporation, operates a fast
food Burger King restaurant located on Congress Street
in Detroit, the only location involved herein. Respondent
admits that annual gross revenues from the sale of food
and beverages exceed $500,000, and that it annually re-
ceives products there valued in excess of $50,000 directly
from sources outside Michigan. I find, as Respondent
further admits and was found in the prior representation
case, Case 7-RC-15703, that Respondent is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE I.ABOR ORGANIZATION INVOI.VED
Respondent denied the labor organization status of the
Union in its answer, and declined to stipulate such status
at the hearing, contending that the Union was part of an
organization receiving Federal funds and thus not quali-
fied to be a labor organization under the Act. The issue
of whether the Union is a labor organization was deter-
mined in the affirmative in the prior representation case
decision by the Regional Director; however, Respondent
alleged in the instant hearing that it had not been al-
lowed to go into such issue and, to avoid any possible
contention that Respondent was denied an opportunity
to litigate the matter in these proceedings, it was permit-
ted to examine witnesses and explore the matter further.
Based on said testimony, it is clear that the Union
exists for the purpose of representing employees in col-
lective bargaining with employers over wages, hours,
and working conditions. Respondent produced no evi-
dence tending to support its contention that the Union
either received Federal funds or precedent to support the
assertion that such fact, even if established, would some-
how disqualify the Union from serving as a representa-
tive for collective-bargaining purposes. Nor has any been
uncovered by research. I therefore conclude on the
record before me and aside from Respondent's conten-
tion with respect to the earlier representation proceed-
ing, that Detroit Fast Food Workers, A Council of
United Labor Unions, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. American Automobile
Association, Wisconsin Division, 242 NLRB 722 (1979).
Ill. THE APPROPRIATE BAR(;AINING UNIT
The appropriate unit, as found in Case 7-RC-15703
and described in a copy of the Regional Director's Deci-
sion and Direction of Election (G.C. 2) is as follows:
All full-time and regular part-time general utility'
employees employed by the Employer at the
Burger King restaurant located at 130 East Con-
gress, Detroit, Michigan, but excluding gift shop
employees, clerical employees. managers, guards
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
Respondent stipulated to the appropriate unit in the
representation case, but in its answer to the consolidated
complaint denied such allegation. However, Respondent
took no position at the hearing or on brief pursuant to
such denial that the facts underlying the stipulation had
changed, and consequently. offered no evidence tending
to show that the stipulation did not continue to be a
valid one. Nor did Respondent expressly withdraw from
the stipulation, and I find that in view of the foregoing
Respondent is bound by its earlier agreement. Moreover,
the representation case decision shows that the above-de-
scribed unit encompasses, with statutorily permitted or
mandated exclusions, viz gift shop employees, guards,
and supervisors and all employees at Respondent's single
facility herein, and thus constitutes a presumptively ap-
propriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining, The
record, herein, further discloses that all the employees in
the described unit work under the daily supervision of a
manager, with total responsibility for the operation of
the restaurant assistant manager, and night shift manager
assigned solely to this facility, and that no labor organi-
zation seeks to represent these employees as part of a
broader unit. In view of the foregoing, I find that the
above-described unit, in consonance with the parties' ear-
lier agreement, is an appropriate bargaining unit. Renzet-
tis Market, Inc., 238 NLRB 174 (1978); Magic Pan, Inc..
234 NLRB 1 (1978); and Bud'S Food Stores, Inc. d/b/a
Bud\' Thrift-T-Wi.e, 236 NLRB 1203 (1978).2
IV. TIH UNIAIR ABOR PRACTICES
Respondent's work force at relevant times, December
1979 through February 1980, consisted of approximately
59 employees assigned to either a day or night shift and
engaged in food preparation, and serving, cashiering, and
cleaning up. The record shows that there was regular in-
terchange among some positions in the restaurant, and
that Respondent's employees worked rather closely to-
gether in a tightly knit, integrated operation typical of
restaurants in the fast food business. It is fair to say that
in this environment news of interest to both management
and employees would travel fast, and circulate widely
among employees.
On December 10, 1979, in the morning, two union rep-
resentatives, Chief Organizer Frank Splain and organizer
Maureen Ridge, approached General Manager Dennis
Kadet inside the restaurant. Ridge told Kadet she had
h term "general utility" ncompasses epployees engaged n food
preparaltion iand er.ing. cashiering. and cleaning up
In ,oi findirng, consideratilon has heen gi.cen Io Ihe Board, ileiiiiln ill
a ase mo in ing a slrl. m tat genetically similar ast food operatin
shercin h facts are distinguishable and. unlike the instant proceeding.
there %.as a upporrtcd contnttion. based on mplo>ee inilerchlalge. that a
mutl.cllitl nll it a%1 ; pproprl l Ie here are n , luch i.ts or Colltention
hereti See H ujidahm, Crporaloai. d h i I),,mld,'. P 92 NI R 878
(171)I

1 95
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS O()ARD
cards from a majority of employees of Burger King who
wanted the Union to represent them and asked if Kadet
would recognize the Union. Kadet said he would have to
telephone the district manager since it was not a matter
within his responsibility, and after discussing the matter
with the industrial relations director on the phone, re-
turned and told the two they should contact him. Kadet
recalls that Splain also told him they wanted to negotiate
a contract right now ". . . they wanted representation
and . . . to negotiate a contract . . ." and that the two
then left. The Union filed a representation petition dated
that same day.
A. Respondent's Animus Towards the Union
Events following the above visit established marked
antipathy by Respondent towards its employees' efforts
to seek union representation, and provide an essential
background against which specific conduct must be eval-
uated. Thus, after the departure of the two organizers
Kadet testified himself that, "I was stunned, I thought I
had a good relationship with the crew and I was just
stunned." Plainly Kadet, Respondent's admitted agent
and foremost supervisory authority over employees at
the restaurant found the news employees were organiz-
ing deeply distasteful and strongly damaging to the ". . .
good relationship with the crew." This reflection of hos-
tility is further augmented by Kadet's uncontradicted
statement to employee Cynthia Cowen, who agreed to
bring in union flyers for Kadet, that he wanted "to show
. . .people in Arizona that he . . . still had some loyal
employees." It is evident that Kadet was equating
Cowen's bringing him union organizing literature with
loyalty to Respondent's interests, necessarily thereby op-
posite from employee organizing efforts, a conclusion
borne out by Kadet's use of the term loyalty. Further
Kadet testified willingly that he told employees they did
not need a union because he had a good rapport with
employees, and, as shall be shown below, took further
steps in an effort to thwart employee efforts seeking
union representation. I also credit employee Barbara
Culp's testimony that Respondent's shift manager,
Robert Robinson, admittedly another agent for Respond-
ent, told Culp in January 1980 that the Union ". . .
wasn't doing anything but taking our money and wasn't
good for us" over Robinson's unpersuasive account that
he was merely referring to a union in Philadelphia.
Moreover, Debra Moore testified credibly that Kadet
told her during a talk in his office in January that the
Union was no good. This evidence of Respondent's
animus serves to provide a setting for viewing its other
conduct.
B. Respondent's Interrogation and Surveillance of
Employees
On December 10, just after the union organizers left
the restaurant, Kadet, as testified by employee Cowen,
took each of the cashiers over to a corner by the cash-
box and asked them, in turn, whether or not they had
signed a union card. Cowen recalls she responded by
asking Kadet why he wanted to ask her about a union
card and that he replied, "I just thought I'd ask, why
would you guys need a union, talk to me." Although, as
Respondent correctly points out. Cowen was only able
to identify four of the cashiers by name. Kadet admits in-
terrogating Cowen and employee Beverly Passmore, on
the above-described occasion, asking the latter if she
knew anything about the Union and about the cards.
Passmore testified Kadet asked her ". . . did I know
anything about the union." and that she refused to
answer; whereupon he also asked her if she had signed a
card, to which question she also demurred.
Cowen also testified without contradiction :' that Kadet
one morning in January financed the purchase of a sand-
wich for Cowen and himself from Ham Heaven, and in-
vited Cowen to lunch with him in his office, a first time
event, while Kadet's secretary was present. Kadet told
Cowen she could be "truthful" with him, whereupon
Kadet queried Cowen, saying he ". . . heard there was a
Union meeting this evening." Cowen replied that she did
not know, that she had not gone since the first one and
that is all she could tell him.
Employee Jamie Howard testified that some weeks
before the election, after requesting Kadet to allow him
to start working 5 days a week after school was out, and
being assured by Kadet that he would see what he could
do about it, Kadet asked how he and Howard's compan-
ion, another employee, felt about the Union. Kadet fur-
ther questioned Howard whether the latter had attended
one of the union meetings and questioned the two
whether they thought they needed a union. Howard also
testified that he had not raised the issue of a union in the
conversation. Kadet does not deny the bulk of Howard's
testimony and admits asking Howard how she felt about
the Union, but asserts he did so only after Howard told
him things the Union had said to her. I credit Howard's
more detailed, and not fully denied version of these
events over Kadet's incomplete recollection and failure
to deny Howard's account in important respects, viz
Howard's attribution of questions by Kadte concerning
attendance at a union meeting and whether the employ-
ees thought they needed a union.
Employee Lena Halmon testified that around the time
the Union "was starting to come in" Kadet asked her
and employee Petrina Banks whether they knew any-
thing about the Union, and employee Joyce St. George
recalled in testimony that Kadet similarly questioned her.
St. George stated Kadet asked whether she was in the
Union, did she know anything about it, and why a union
was needed. Both accounts are credited over Kadet's un-
convincingly curt denials. Employee Halmon further re-
called in testimony that Robinson's habit was to joke
around with employees when he "knew the union was
coming" and asked her in the above period "how the
union was coming along." Employee Barbara Culp testi-
fied that in January 1980 Shift Manager Robinson. at the
cashier's post, asked Culp whether she was in the Union
and upon Culp's affirmative reply asked why she wanted
to join the Union and asked further whether Culp's
:' Kadct deniced akinlg C,mLcn "aboul tihe Unionl, other than n I)c-
cmnlhber 10. but did not dell Cou cill'% detailed accoiunt aIhoe, \hich I
fild \;,as interrogation conccrnring CoCll' klewslCdgc abhout lliot aif-
finrs.
1296
BURGER KING
friend, a co-employee, was in the Union. Culp testified
that Robinson ". just came up to me and asked...."
Robinson admitted having a conversation with Culp
about the Union but denied in answer to a leading ques-
tion that he had ever asked Culp about her or Culp's
friend being in the Union. I credit Culp's account over
Robinson's seemingly rehearsed and mechanical testimo-
ny, which I found unreliable in other aspects discussed
both above and further below.
Still further evidence is present in the record reflecting
Respondent's interrogation of its employees in the form
of testimony by Debra Moore that Ed Linden, Respond-
ent's district manager and an admitted agent, in early
February 1980 questioned Moore in a basement office
used by the manager of Respondent's gift shop about the
Union, whether Moore was going to attend a union
meeting and why Moore needed a union. Although
Moore allegedly incorrectly identified the manager of
the gift store as Rhona Barrett, instead of Rhonna Page,
Linden admitted he may have had a conversation with
Moore "... where she asked me something about the
Union," and did not deny Moore's testimony that Linden
had interrogated her about the Union. Furthermore, em-
ployee Stanley Brooks also testified that another shift
manager and admitted agent of Respondent, Jeffrey Tie-
mann, questioned Brooks about a union meeting Brooks
had attended, and Tiemann did not deny Brooks' testi-
mony.
It is clear from a preponderance of the evidence out-
lined above that Respondent engaged in unlawful inter-
rogation of employees concerning their union organiza-
tional activities and sentiments towards the Union. Con-
trary to Respondent's assertion that the aforesaid con-
duct was not unlawful because questioning was isolated,
or arose in an amicable atmosphere partly between man-
agers and production leaders believed to be supervisors
by Respondent, and because employees initiated the dis-
cussions in hostility-free contexts, I find the opposite to
be true. The record supports the conclusion that there
were numerous such interrogations, not an isolated few,
that employees in most instances had not initiated them,
that the atmosphere was not free from antiunion hostility
given Respondent's demonstrated manifestations of union
animus-further established below-and that Respond-
ent's characterization of "amicability" in the interroga-
tion incidents is neither factually supported by the record
nor a defense to otherwise unlawful interrogation as a
matter of law. Quemetco, Inc., a subsidiary of RSR Corpo-
ration, 223 NLRB 470 (1976); and Laredo Coca Cola Bot-
tling Company, 241 NLRB 167, 172 (1979). Accordingly,
I find that Respondent unlawfully interrogated employ-
ees in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
It is readily apparent that by such widespread inquiries
into the union organizational activities of its employees, a
kind of regular monitoring, Respondent maintained what
on this record can only fairly be characterized as virtual
surveillance of employees' protected activities and, given
the closely knit employee community involved, thereby
also conveyed the impression of maintaining such sur-
veillance of their union activities to the employees in fur-
ther violation of Section 8(a)( I) of the Act. I so find.
C. Respondent's Solicitation of Grievances
The record shows that from the day the Union re-
quested recognition and through the entire preelection
campaign Respondent regularly asked employees to
submit any problems they had to Respondent, implying
that a resolution would be forthcoming. To be sure, the
record also shows that Respondent administered a griev-
ance procedure and that some problems had been dis-
cussed at crew meetings antedating the preelection
period. However, there is no doubt that it was only after
the advent of employee union organizing efforts in De-
cember 1979 became known to Respondent that Re-
spondent assiduously solicited the employees' grievances,
as borne out by the testimony of witnesses for the Gen-
eral Counsel and therefore the pre-existence of such a
grievance procedure and its occasional use would be no
defense to Respondent's conduct.
Thus, employee Duran Thomas testified that during
several crew meetings before the election, "Kadet was
always telling us that if we had any complaints we could
come and talk to him about them. We really didn't need
a union to speak for us...." Thomas testified further
that Kadet, during sessions with the crews after the
union campaign started asked them what they thought
could be changed about conditions ". .. so we wouldn't
have to have the union."
Employee Cowen testified that Kadet, in early January
or February prior to the election, said employees would
not really need a union, that if employees had problems,
they could talk to the managers about them and would
not need a middleman to help them. She recalls this
theme being repeated in meetings held a month or month
and a half prior to the election; viz that employees did
not need a middleman to negotiate any problems em-
ployees had. Employee Culp recalls Kadet at such meet-
ings saying to employees that if they had any problems
they should have told him and not gotten the Union, and
that after Kadet asked employees what they thought was
needed to "help the store" employees voiced concerns
about wanting more hours. Employee St. George recalls
that in late December or early January Kadet, after
asking her why employees needed a union told her not
to be afraid to come to him and ". . . tell him that we
need more hours, or something was wrong." Employee
Brooks testified similarly that at crew meetings in De-
cember, January, and February Kadet asked for any
problems and told employees they did not need a union,
that if there were problems employees were to come to
him and that management would take care of all such
problems. Debra Moore testified that District Manager
Linden asked her why she needed a union, that if there
were problems they should be taken to Kadet or to him;
and that during a talk in Kadet's office in January, on
the occasion when Kadet told employees the Union was
no good asked whether there were any problems.
Finally, Kadet himself admits that during crew meet-
ings with employees regularly held during the entire pre-
election period he told employees ". . . that we could
work our problems out together any problems that were
coming up."

1 297
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It is concluded from the foregoing unprecedented in-
quiry into the needs of employees and solicitation of
their problems, on a markedly more pervasive scale than
during periods prior to the preelection period, that Re-
spondent unlawfully solicited grievances from employees
and promised resolution of same in order to demonstrate
to employees that they had no need to resort to union
organization thereby discouraging employee support for
the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Edward A. Utlaut Foundation, Inc. d/b/a Edward A.
Utlaut Memorial Hospital and Fair Oaks Nursing Home,
249 NLRB 1153 (1980); and Landis Tool Company, Divi-
sion of Litton Industries, 190 NLRB 757 (1971).
D. Respondent's Grant of Benefits
It is admitted by Respondent that, as heavily estab-
lished by witnesses, it departed from normal policy re-
garding employee food benefits the day before and the
day of the Board-conducted election by announcing and
granting to all employees the privilege of ordering any
food they wished from the entire menu free of charge. It
is clear that this unprecedented benefit was known by
employees, accepted by many, and was in fact a substan-
tial increase in Respondent's normal free food employee
benefit. Respondent's only explanation for such largesse
on the eve of and on the very day of the election was
that employees were working slowly or production was
lagging. However, Respondent witness Kadet could
recall no prior occasion when such alleged condition was
met by a conferring of extra benefits, and, given the lack
of a persuasive reason for its conduct, as well as the set-
ting of antiunion acts in the preelection period, I find
that Respondent's action was designed to obtain the
good will of its employees in the election close at hand,
and thus violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as such con-
duct was designed to influence the employees' vote in a
Board election and thus the manner in which they exer-
cise their Section 7 rights. Don Pizzolato, Inc., 249 NLRB
95 (1980).
It is also undenied that in the threshold period prior to
the election Respondent purchased a television (early
December) and placed it in the employees' crew room
for their use, as well as a radio obtained from Respond-
ent's gift shop. While the record contains some indica-
tion that the items were discussed the previous August,
well in advance of the advent of the Union, Respondent
offered no explanation whatever why these benefits were
given employees at the time in question viz the critical
preelection period. I therefore conclude, in the absence
of any policy, or predetermined time schedule for the
implementation of these extra employment benefits that,
even though the installation of a TV and radio in the
employees' crew room was not expressly related to the
organizational campaign, that the action was unlawful
given the absence of any explanation, other than the
pending election, for its timing. Honolulu Sporting Goods
Co.. Ltd., a subsidiary of Zale Corporation, 239 NLRB
1277 (1979).
On February 14, 1980, Valentine's Day, Respondent,
in addition to its usual practice of decorating the restau-
rant, gave employees free flowers (60 carnations) and a
single large box of candy was placed at an accessible po-
sition for them to enjoy. In addition, Respondent sur-
prised employee Barbara Culp with a birthday cake, re-
quested by an employee, a further unexpected employee
gift 8 days before the election. Although Respondent had
within its power to establish that such gifts were within
or pursuant to specific company policies, plans, or deci-
sions antedating the preelection period, or within the
period but designedly free from improper vote influenc-
ing intent in purpose, Respondent made no such offer of
proof, asserting merely that it was customary to observe
holiday themes, as borne out by a Halloween-occasioned
gift of small sweets and "costuming" by employees. I
find the Valentine's Day gifts of free flowers and a box
of candy, as well as the free cake for an employee's
birthday not justified by such explanation given the more
substantial nature in these benefits than others, and the
absence of any explanation of the gift to Culp. It is true
that Kadet in the past rewarded employees for fine ef-
forts by purchasing food for them, but no such reason
was advanced for Respondent's generosity in these in-
stances, Kadet merely testifying that cakes had not been
given out before the occasion involving Culp because
none were "available," and, it is therefore concluded the
action was unlawful for the reasons noted above.4 Hono-
lulu Sporting Goods Co. Ltd., a subsidiary of Zale Corpora-
tion, supra.
E. Respondent's Threats of Closing and Loss in
Benefits
There were several occasions during the course of the
preelection period when agents for Respondent, during
discussions with employees about union-related subjects,
adverted to a possible closing of the restaurant if the
Union were to be chosen as bargaining agent. Halmon
recalls Robinson telling her in December 1979 during a
lunchroom talk ". . . that the Union was no good and if
the Union did get in, that it would . . . just take our
money plus it wouldn't be no more Burger King [be-
cause] it would either be closed or changed into another
fast food place." Robinson was not examined by Re-
spondent as to the specifics in Halmon's account, or even
whether he had such a conversation with Halmon or
made such a talk when Halmon was present. Rather, Re-
spondent questioned Robinson whether he had ever said
Burger King would be closed and made into a Jack-in-
the-Box because the Union got in and Robinson denied
that attribution-not the account rendered by Halmon
which is markedly different and therefore remains unden-
ied. Moreover, on cross-examination Robinson was
unable to recall whether or not he ever had a conversa-
tion with an employee in which the subject of the possi-
bility of the Burger King closing came up, or even
whether for example any employee ever asked if the res-
Since the refurbishing of employee lockers was discussed in August
and Kadel ordered the parts in August. which were not delivered until
December, hereupon Kadet proceeded to repair them. I find lno unlaw-
ful grant of a benefit therein since its origin and timing of implementation
are satisfactorily explained as are. I further find. the paid-for baseball
game tickets and basketball games between management and crew whose
occurrences coincided with their customarv seasons.
1298
BURGER KING
taurant might close, eventually and unaccountably testi-
fying no. I credit Halmon's account as the more reliable.
Employees Thomas and Brooks corroboratively testi-
fied that District Manager Linden told them shortly
before the election (Thomas recalls 2 weeks prior) in Re-
spondent's kitchen that he did not care whether the
Union got in, the Union was not going to tell him how
to run the business, and that "they would just close it
down, you know . . . because they got a whole lot of
other stuff in Greyhound Food Management." When
cross-examined by Respondent, Thomas' and Brooks' tes-
timony remained unchanged. After Linden took the
stand and testified he had been asked whether the store
would be closed and denied it, he was cross-examined
and in his responses retreated from the above emphatic
denial. Thus, when asked if he had discussed under what
circumstances the store could be closed, Linden replied,
"Not to my knowledge," thereby advancing the first tell-
tale defensiveness of one unsure of his ground or wary
about the subject matter's import. Linden then admitted
the possibility that he told them the president of Grey-
hound Foods could decide to close the store if "...
business dies down." He testified that if Brooks and
Thomas had asked him for a reason, he might have said
that but to his knowledge he did not remember. When
Linden was pressed further, viz:
Q. But its possible that some additional discussion
went on but you don't remember how much addi-
tional discussion?
A. There might have been another question asked
as to why would the store close?
Q. And you may have given an answer to that?
A. Yes.
Q. But you don't recall what your answer was?
A. No, I don't.
There was no express denial elicited from Linden by
way of redirect examination that in this additional con-
versation with the employees he mentioned the store
closing if the Union got in, and, although Shift Manager
Tiemann alleged he overheard Linden answer the ques-
tion whether the store might close by denying it, both
Brooks and Thomas credibly testified that Tiemann was
not present during the conversation and that based on
the description of Tiemann's alleged eavesdropping posi-
tion they could have seen him if he were to have been
present. Even if Tiemann had overheard the above
snatch in the conversation among the three, the discus-
sion lasted some 20 or 30 minutes and therefore Tiemann
would not be in a position to testify that at no time in
the discussion did Linden communicate a threat of a
closing if the Union came in. I find on the basis of the
demeanor of the witnesses and the basic inherent likeli-
hoods attached to these circumstances that Brooks and
Thomas credibly testified that Tiemann was not present,
at least not throughout the entire above conversation,
and that their testimony that Linden communicated a
threatened closing if the Union came in is accurate testi-
mony.
Cynthia Cowen adds even further support to the
growing body of testimony concerning a closing in her
account of a comment by Kadet during a conversation in
early January or February that if the president of Burger
King wanted to, if he did not like the Union ". . . he
could come in and shut this store [restaurant] down and
we'd just be out of a job." Cowen further testified that
Kadet made it clear to her in the same discussion that
she and others making a wage rate of $3.65 per hour
would be reduced to $3.25 if the Union negotiated the
lower rate and would also lose their seniority saying fur-
ther that it would be up to the Union and the lawyers to
negotiate whether or not there would even be a classifi-
cation of production leader, which Cowen occupied.
Kadet testified that he said to Cowen that these matters
would be negotiated, but I find no convincing denial of
Cowen's account that he said in effect that accumulated
seniority, wages above a future negotiated vote, and the
job production leader would be lost and the restoration of
same left up to negotiations, thereby presenting Cowen,
and employees, with the spectre of lost employment
benefits for an indefinite period of time if the Union were
to be successful in the election. Regarding his denial of a
closing threat, I credit Cowen's spontaneous testimony
over Kadet's rehearsed-like curt denial.
Employee Joyce St. George testified that employees
were told at crew meetings in January by Kadet and
Robinson that if the Union came in the store would close
and be made into another fast food operation corroborat-
ing earlier employee accounts and credited for the same
reasons.
Debra Moore testified that Linden, in early February
told her in a basement office that ". . . before I let the
Union run the store I'll close the son-of-a-bitch down."
Linden temporized in his testimony during cross-exami-
nation on this incident to the same extent as he did when
examined as to Brooks' and Thomas' testimony that he
made reference to such a closing to them. Thus, Linden
first flatly denied any conversation with Moore about a
possible closing. When asked whether Moore ever asked
him about it he answered:
A. She may have asked me but I never had a con-
versation with her.
Q. In other words, she asked you but you did not
respond?
A. Yes.
Then Linden testified that he probably said no and
walked away; then again testified no he did not discuss it
with her. Finally Linden admitted he may have had a
conversation with Moore where she asked him "some-
thing" about the Union. I find Moore's testimony reli-
able.
Accordingly, it is found that by threatening employees
with the loss of important employment benefits, viz,
wage reductions, loss of seniority, loss of favorable job
classification, and a discontinuance or closing of Re-
spondent's facility should employees exercise their rights
under the Act to vote for the Union. Respondent has
further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Chandler
Motors. Inc., 236 NLRB 1565 (1978); St. Vincent Hospital,
244 NLRB 84 (1979) Abouris. Inc., 244 NLRB 980
(1979); Star Manufacturing Company, Division of Star
1299
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL I.ABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Forge, Inc., 220 NLRB 582, 587 (1975); and Treadway
Inn, 217 NLRB 51 (1975).
F. The Union 's Majority Status
It was incumbent upon the General Counsel to estab-
lish that a majority of employees designated the Union as
bargaining representative, and he attempted to do so by
introducing union authorization cards which purport on
their face to represent such authorization, and by authen-
ticating the card signers' signatures as genuine. Such is
the tangled, labrynthian, and incomplete though slanted
analysis of the General Counsel's performance in this
regard presented by Respondent's brief, that it is crucial
to any fair and objective review of the matter that the
following narrative-type running tally be made and un-
derstood.
There was a total of 59 employees, constituting the
agreed composition of the unit. There were 38 authoriza-
tion cards received into the record. A handwriting
expert called by the General Counsel, Richard Bowen,
fully qualified and long-experienced in the profession, de-
voted attention in a document or "opinion" to 37 cards
he had examined and found in this document that 4 cards
contained signatures that were not authentic. Of these 4,
the one signed by Christine Cowen was later authenticat-
ed as a valid card by the employee herself-there thus
remained at this early juncture 33 cards considered au-
thentic in the "Opinion," plus 1, Christine Cowen's plus
an additional card not addressed by the opinion as noted
hereinabove at the outset, or so far 35 cards. In going
over the cards, I found one signed by Debra Moore
which contrary to Respondent's tabulation in its own
brief, which listed it as dated 12/?/79, was in fact not
dated at all in the place set aside for such entry on the
card. It is fair to say this card was probably signed when
the bulk of the cards were executed in December and
the Regional Office date-stamp would indicate that the
latest date would be December 10, but such does not in-
dicate that the card was not in fact signed much earlier
or perhaps even is a stale card and I do not believe, nor
does the Board, that such limited factual question can be
resolved by unsupported inference, rather than testimony
by the person who received the card or saw it signed;
there was no such testimony and I therefore find
Moore's card not validly authenticated. Fort Smith Outer
Wear, Inc., and II. L. Friedlen Company, 205 NLRB 592
(1973). This reduces the card number to 34 cards.
During his testimony Bowen, under examination,
stated that he really did not feel confident about the au-
thenticity of the signature on Florence Sutton's card, but
the General Counsel called Sutton to the stand and she
established it was her card and the date thereon was cor-
rect. Therefore the card total so far remained at 34.
Next, due to some confusion over the card listed in the
opinion as Rodney Richardson's, which arose in connec-
tion with the exemplar used in checking Rodney's signa-
ture against that of an employee not listed in the opinion,
one Steven Richardson, the General Counsel called
Rodney, who authenticated his own card-again leaving
the total at 34. At the same time, however, the General
Counsel also called an employee friend of Steven Rich-
ardson who was, as undenied, familiar with the latter's
signature and handwriting. It is essential to note that this
authentication of Steven Richardson's card does not in-
crease the number of cards in this tally because said tally
began with a number (38) that included the 37 cards ad-
dressed by the opinion plus one other not addressed
therein, which was the card signed by Steven Richard-
son. Thus, still at an incomplete juncture, the card total
stands at 34.
Respondent's position can now be more fully evaluat-
ed and consists of several scattershot-like attacks on the
validity of the cards. Respondent contends, inter alia,
that, since Mobley's card shows a signing date of De-
cember 12 and it is date-stamped December 10 that it
cannot be used to support a demand for recognition
made on December 10 and, since the date stamp contra-
dicts the signing date, the card is invalid. For the first
part of this contention, suffice it to say that it addresses a
legal question rather than validity of the card itself and
even so would avail Respondent nothing since it is well
established that in deciding whether or not to issue a bar-
gaining order remedy based on violations of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act it is irrelevant whether or not a
demand was even made. Beasley Energy Inc., d/b/a
Peaker Run Coal Company, Ohio Division #1, 228 NLRB
93, 96. For the second part of the contention, it would
not be uncommon in human experience for an employee
to misdate a card, and while the card could obviously
not have been signed on December 12 when received at
the Regional Office on December 10 this only means
that there is no correct day showing, which has no bear-
ing on the fact that the month, December, and year,
1979, appear on the card and coincide with the month
and year appearing on all the authorization cards.
Respondent is factually in error when making the flat
assertion that Steven Richardson's card does not contain
an exact date because it does-12-2-79; moreover, since
Florence Sutton testified to the date she signed her card,
it is hardly effective argument for Respondent to point
out in its brief that her card contains no exact date, also
a misleading representation since there does appear clear-
ly the month and year with a somewhat uncertain figure
for the day. Nor does it avail Respondent anything to
argue that Brooks' card is not valid because Brooks
could not recall when he signed the card and at one
point, before giving up on the effort to remember, volun-
teered that the date was on a day different from the
actual date appearing on the card. This did nothing to in
any way change the plain statement on the card showing
the date it was signed, viz, 12-4-79. Result: the total of
valid cards still stands at 34.
Respondent next questioned the card of Gricelda
Childs, contending that Bowen's authentication was not
entitled to weight because he had no exemplar of Childs'
signature in the form it appears as on the card, viz G.,
Childs for comparison purposes. (Emphasis supplied.)
However, it is clear in the record that Cowen did have,
and used, an excellent exemplar in the form of an affida-
vit signed by Childs, albeit with the first name spelled
out. Under questioning Bowen persuasively testified
there were sufficient points of similarity between the sig-
1300
BURGER KING
nature on the card and that contained on the exemplar to
satisfy him that the card signature was genuine. Siiice
Bowen had manifested a professional detachment
throughout his testimony, objectively accepting sugges-
tions in one or two instances that he could have been
mistaken (whereupon the General Counsel properly used
other means to authenticate the cards in question), I
accept Cowen's judgment on Childs' card and all the
others as reliable. Nor does the fact that Cowen decided
not to authenticate Sutton's card under examination by
Respondent's counsel, and Sutton herself did authenticate
it, render Cowen's expertise suspect. Handwriting analy-
sis efforts devoted to studying 37 cards are not necessar-
ily open to question because not shown to be infallible in
100 percent of all the specimens studied, and I find it to
Cowen's credit professionally that he was receptive to
Respondent's strongly suggestive examination into Sut-
ton's card because he manifested objectivity, rather than
a biased rigidity.
In a further last-ditch type contention, Respondent
argues that some cards were filled in with pencil, one
shows an erasure attempt (Sutton), and some were signed
in the name or top linm rather than signed in a normal
uncramped fashion on the signature line. Sutton, as noted
of course, authenticated her own card signature and the
date thereon, and any reference to an attempted erasure
is therefore glaringly irrelevant to Respondent's position.
Passmore's card, showing a cramped signature on the
signature line--which is considerably shorter than the
name or top line section-was not contested though
Passmore was called as a Respondent witness. It should
be further noted that Bowen was unfairly characterized
in Respondent's brief as having been "impeached" be-
cause, inter alia, he had determined that Christina Cowen
had not signed her card. (Resp. br., p. 38) Bowen had
merely shown on the opinion that it was Cynthia Cowan
on the W-4 form given him as an exemplar-that was
why he had correctly stated in the opinion that the signa-
tures were not authentic; he had been given the wrong
exemplar and it was therefore no "impeachment" of
Bowen that later Christine Cowen authenticated her sig-
nature. Finally, the fact that employee Newoka Mackey
signed only her full name on the name or top line is en-
tirely inconsequential as Bowen authenticated her signa-
ture from a known exemplar and was satisfied with his
conclusion that the Mackey card was in fact signed by
her. An examination of the card indicates the first names
appearing above and below are very similar if not identi-
cal and coupled with the undenied testimony by Bowen
that he compared both with Mackey's known exemplar,
further supports a finding that Bowen's authentication of
Mackey's card is reliable.
After all is said and done, the total number of alid
cards authenticated by the evidence remains at 34, or
more than a majority, and I therefore find that at times
material herein the Union was the designated exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of a majority of Re-
spondent's 59 employees in an appropriate unit.
V. IHi I I-I.C CIS OI lHt L NI AIR I AHOR PR XC I(CIS
UPON COMMI:RCI(C
The activities of Respondent set forth in section IV.
above, occurring in connection with its operations de-
scribed in section 1, above, ha\e a close, intimate. and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic. and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor dis-
putes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
CONtI L SIONS O: LANW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act. engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The bargaining unit described above in paragraph
111 is a unit appropriate for collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by:
(a) interrogating employees concerning their union activ-
ities and sentiments towards the Union; (b) maintaining
surveillance of employee union activities and creating the
impression of surveillance of employee union activities:
(c) soliciting and thereby promising to resolve grievances
from employees to persuade them to abandon support for
the Unioa; (d) granting employment benefits or gifts to
employees to influence their exercise of rights under Sec-
tion 7 of the Act; (e) threatening employees with closing
the restaurant. the loss of seniority, reduction in wages,
and elimination of a desirable job position if the Union
were chosen by employees as their bargaining repre-
sentative.
R i)N
In little more than a short 2-month period during the
course of the Union's organizational drive, Respondent
unlawfully interrogated employees concerning their
union activities and sentiments, maintained surveillance
and created the impression of surveillance of employee
union activities, solicited grievances thereby implying
their resolution and the futility in union representation,
unlawfully accorded attractive employment benefits to
employees, and threatened employees with the loss of
important benefits and jobs if the employees selected the
Union as their bargaining representative.
Such conduct would clearly have the effect of under-
mining the Union's majority strength and the employees'
expressed sentiments for union representation as indicat-
ed in the authorization cards executed by them. The
threat to shut down operations is among the most effec-
tive unfair labor practices for destroying the possibility
that an election could reflect the free and uncoerced
wishes of employees regarding representation for pur-
poses of collective bargaining, for as the Board has
noted, such threats are not easily erased from the minds
of employees. Te Great .tlualric and Pacific 7ea Conpa-
ny,. Inc., 230 NLRB 766 (1977): Four ind' Ilndustries.
Inc., 211 NLRB 542 (1974): and Jim Baker rucking
Company, 241 NL.R13 121 (1979). Respondcnt's other x-
l1301
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL. LABO()R RELATI()NS BO()ARI)
tensive unfair labor practices are likewise highly effec-
tive for such purpose, especially when combined with
the fact that the destructive impact on employee rights
of such unlawful conduct is heightened when directed at
a relatively small complement of employees in a highly
integrated closely knit work force. The pervasive, un-
lawful questioning of employees on the broad scale un-
dertaken in this case; the implied promises of resolving
all employee problems without the need for union repre-
sentation; the grant of benefits to influence employee ex-
ercise of Section 7 rights; and the continuous monitoring
or surveillance of employee organizational efforts under-
girded the threatened closure detailed above and make it
clear to me that Respondent's violations have the requi-
site tendency to undermine the Union's majority
strength. See Chandler Motors, Inc., 236 NLRB 1565
(1978); Hedstrom Company. a subsidiary of Brown Group,
Inc., 235 NLRB 1193 (1978); and Honolulu Sporting
Goods Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of Zale Corporation, 239
NLRB 1277 (1979).
It is therefore concluded that prospects for erasing the
effects of such unlawful conduct and insuring a fair elec-
tion by the use of traditional remedies are poor, and that
the employees' sentiment expressed on the valid authori-
zation cards secured by the Union in this case will be
better protected by a bargaining order. N.L.R.B. v.
Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). It shall also
be ordered that Respondent cease and desist from the
violations set forth above.
As Respondent's violations are egregious in nature, a
broad remedy is warranted. 5
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record in this proceeding, and pursu-
ant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the fol-
lowing:
ORDER 6
The Respondent, Greyhound Food Management, Inc.
d/b/a Burger King, Detroit, Michigan, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating employees concerning their union ac-
tivities and sentiments towards the Union.
(b) Maintaining surveillance of employee union activi-
ties and creating the impression of surveillance of em-
ployee union activities.
"cf. lickmo tFods. Inc.. 242 NLRB 1357 (1979).
" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the find-
ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations. he adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall he deemed waived for all purposes
(c) Soliciting and thereby promising to resolve griev-
ances from employees to persuade them to abandon sup-
port for the Union.
(d) Granting employment benefits or gifts to employ-
ees to influence their exercise of rights under Section 7
of the Act.
(e) Threatening employees with closing the restaurant
and the loss of seniority, reduction in wages, and elimi-
nation of a desirable job position if the Union were
chosen by employees as their bargaining representative
(f) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the
Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain with the Union as the exclu-
sive representative of all employees in the unit described
below, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement:
All full-time and regular part-time general utility
employees employed by the Employer at the
Burger King restaurant located at 130 East Con-
gress, Detroit, Michigan, but excluding gift shop
employees, clerical employees, managers, guards
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) Post at its facility in Detroit, Michigan, copies of
the attached noticed marked "Appendix." 7 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 7, after being duly signed by Respondent's repre-
sentative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps have been taken to comply herewith.
1T IS FURTHER ORDERED that any allegations contained
in the consolidated complaint not specifically found to
have merit be dismissed; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED
that the proceedings in Case 7-RC-15703 be vacated.
Nothing in this Order is to be construed as requiring
that any benefits hitherto granted employees, discussed
above, be rescinded.
' In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading Posted by
Order of the National L.ahbor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the lUnited States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of he Nationall Lahbor Rclatliis Board."
1302