Bruce Merati

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 30, 2020

14513302 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/513,302 10/14/2014 Bruce Merati Bruce4 8629
81979 7590 09/30/2020
THIBAULT PATENT GROUP
P.O. Box 722112
San Diego, CA 92172
EXAMINER
LIM, SENG HENG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3715
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/30/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
TOM@THIBAULTPATENTGROUP.COM
USPTO@dockettrak.com
tomthibault@yahoo.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte BRUCE MERATI
Appeal 2020-000696
Application 14/513,302
Technology Center 3700
Before BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD, ANNETTE R. REIMERS, and
CARL M. DEFRANCO, Administrative Patent Judges.
DEFRANCO, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–9 and 11–19, which constitute all the
claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a).

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Application 14/513,302

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Of the claims on appeal, claims 1, 13, and 18 are independent. All
three claims are directed to a “gaming system.” Claim 1 recites—
1. A gaming system, comprising:
a surface on which to play a game;
first means for providing a first random gaming value to a
game player on the surface during execution of the game; and
second means for providing a second random gaming
value to the game player on the surface when a predetermined
event occurs, the second random gaming value provided in
response to an instruction from the game player to receive the
second random gaming value.

Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).

EVIDENCE OF RECORD
EXAMINER’S REJECTIONS
Claims 1–9 and 11–18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as
anticipated by Lutnick. Final Act. 4–8.
Claim 19 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Lutnick and Lancaster. Id. at 9.
ANALYSIS
A. Claims 1–9 and 11–18
Appellant argues independent claims 1 and 13 together. See Appeal
Br. 6–8. Appellant does not argue dependent claims 2, 3, 5–9, 14, 15, and
17 separately from claims 1 and 13, thus, we presume they are argued solely
on the basis of their dependency from their respective base claims 1 and 13.
Name Reference Date
Lancaster US 2006/0135238 A1 June 22, 2006
Lutnick US 2011/0065490 A1 Mar. 17, 2011
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Appellant does argue dependent claims 4, 11, 12, and 16 separately, thus, we
likewise address them separately. See id. at 7–8. And while Appellant also
argues independent claim 18 separately, its arguments are essentially the
same as those for independent claims 1 and 13, thus, we treat independent
claims 1, 13, and 18 together. See id. at 8–9.
The Examiner rejected independent claims 1, 13, and 18 as anticipated
by the teachings of Lutnick. Final Act. 4–8. Of the limitations recited by
the independent claims, Appellant disputes that Lutnick discloses “two
sources of random game values, where a player decides when and from
which source to receive a game value during game play.” Appeal Br. 6, 7
(bolding omitted). According to Appellant, Lutnick teaches that selection of
cards during the game “is dictated not by players, but as a pre-arranged
sequence.” Id. (citing Lutnick ¶¶ 1777, 1778, 1787). While acknowledging
that Lutnick allows players to choose a shoe from which cards are dealt
“before the game begins,” Appellant asserts nonetheless that Lutnick “fails
to teach a player selecting a random number generator during game play,
and [also] fails to teach when, during a game , a player may select a random
number generator.” Id. at 7 (bolding omitted).
We disagree, as Appellant ignores what Lutnick teaches as a whole.
First, it is beyond dispute that Lutnick discloses the claim limitations of a
“first means” and a “second means” for providing, respectively, a “first
random gaming value” and a “second random gaming value” to a player on a
game surface. In that regard, as explained by the Examiner, Lutnick
discloses a table card game (i.e., blackjack or poker) where a player receives
playing cards from at least two card shoes (i.e., random number generators).
Final Act. 4–8 (citing Lutnick ¶¶ 1776–81, 1784, 1787, Fig. 2); Ans. 2–3.
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We agree with the Examiner that Lutnick’s card shoes amount to a means
for providing random gaming values (i.e., cards) to be used by a player in
the course of playing a game of blackjack or poker.
Moreover, contrary to Appellant’s arguments, the Examiner explains
specifically where Lutnick discloses not only that a player chooses when to
be dealt a random gaming value (i.e., card) from a card shoe, but also that
the player does so during the game and not simply at the beginning of the
game. For instance, the Examiner points to Lutnick’s disclosure that a
player “may use cards from two or more card shoes” and “may select a shoe
to use” because she/he “may decide that the second shoe is the luckier shoe.”
Ans. 3 (citing Lutnick ¶¶ 1777, 1778) (emphases added). The Examiner also
points to Lutnick’s disclosure that “a player may choose a particular random
number generator [or card shoe] from a set of possible random number
generators [or card shoes] to be used in a particular game.” Id. (citing
Lutnick ¶ 1787) (first emphasis added). And, in choosing a card shoe from
which the cards are dealt, Lutnick discloses that the player “may use cards in
alternating fashion from two shoes.” Lutnick ¶ 1778 (emphasis added).
In our view, a skilled artisan would understand Lutnick’s disclosure
that a player “may select” or “may choose” a particular card shoe from
which cards may be dealt in the course of playing blackjack or poker, and
may do so “in alternating fashion,” to mean that the cards in the shoes are
dealt in response to an instruction from the player to receive a card. Indeed,
in the very section of Lutnick relied on by the Examiner (i.e., the section
titled “Random Generators”), Lutnick states as much—
In various embodiments, a card shoe may be under manual
control. For example, a human or computer may indicate to the
card shoe when to deal a new card. In this way, a new card may
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be dealt only when necessary in a game. For example, if a player
is using the cards dealt from a card shoe for a game of video
poker then the remote terminal of the player may instruct the
card shoe to deal new cards only when the player has indicated
which cards to discard from an initial hand. The cards dealt
from the shoe may then be used as replacement cards for the
cards discarded.

Lutnick ¶ 1772 (emphasis added). That disclosure by Lutnick clearly
supports that new cards are dealt from the card shoe only upon an instruction
from the player to replace any discarded cards.
Elsewhere, Lutnick repeats the same point. For instance, in
introductory paragraphs speaking of “VR Gaming—Generally,” Lutnick
discloses that the player decides when to be dealt a card. See, e.g., Lutnick
¶ 70 (“The player may make decisions in the additional game, such as
decisions of whether to hit or stand in a game of blackjack, or such as
decisions of how many cards to draw in a game of video poker.”). Similarly,
in describing a game terminal used by players, Lutnick discloses
the terminal may have various input devices, such as input
buttons. In various embodiments, input buttons may allow the
player to make standard decisions in games. A terminal may
have buttons (e.g., dedicated buttons) for making a decision to
‘hit’ or for making a decision to ‘stand’ in a game of blackjack.
A terminal may have a button to ‘draw’ a button to ‘hold’ and/or
a button to ‘discard,’ where such buttons may be utilized in a
game of video poker.

Id. ¶ 79.
In sum, when Lutnick is read as a whole, we are persuaded that
Lutnick satisfies the claim limitations requiring that the game value be
provided “in response to an instruction from the game player” (claim 1), “in
response to the game player requesting a game value” (claim 13), or as a
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result of “an indication from a player of the game, from the user interface, of
a selection by the player to receive a random game value” (claim 18). The
record does not support Appellant’s arguments to the contrary. Thus, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejections of independent claims 1, 13, and 18, as
well as the dependent claims not argued separately from those base claims,
i.e., claims 2, 3, 5–9, 14, 15, and 17.
B. Claims 4, 11, 12, 16
Although Appellant argues claims 4, 11, 12, and 16 separately, it
repeats the same argument it made in refuting the Examiner’s rejection of
the independent claims, namely, that Lutnick only allows a player to select a
shoe from which a card is to be dealt “before commencement of game play”
but not “during game play.” Appeal Br. 7–8 (bolding omitted). For the
same reasons provided above in our analysis of the rejection of the
independent claims, we do not find this argument persuasive. Thus, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 11, 12, and 16. See Final Act.
5–8; Ans. 3–5.
C. Claim 19
The Examiner rejected dependent claim 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Lutnick and Lancaster. Final Act. 9. To refute the
rejection of this claim, Appellant relies solely on the arguments it presented
with respect to base claim 18. Appeal Br. 8–9. For the same reasons
provided above in our analysis of the rejection of claim 18, we do not find
this argument persuasive. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of dependent claim 19.
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CONCLUSION
We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9 and 11–18 as
anticipated by Lutnick, as well as the rejection of claim 19 as unpatentable
over Lutnick and Lancaster.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–9, 11–18 102(a)(2) Lutnick 1–9, 11–18
19 103 Lutnick, Lancaster 19
Overall
Outcome
1–9, 11–19

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED