BROADWAY FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY LIMITED

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 21, 2020

2020000272 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 21, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/004,457 09/11/2013 Iain MCKENZIE 800001.00162 1618
32294 7590 07/21/2020
SQUIRE PB (DC Office)
ATTN: IP Department
2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037
EXAMINER
CHAKRAVARTI, ARUNAVA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/21/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
IP-Squire@SquirePB.com
sonia.whitney@squirepb.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte IAIN MCKENZIE
____________

Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before LARRY J. HUME, CATHERINE SHIANG, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1–19, which are all the claims pending and rejected in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
The disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to “a method
for providing short term credit.” Spec. 1. In particular,

1 We use “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 .
Appellant identifies Broadway Financial Technology Limited as the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 2–3.
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

2
[t]he method includes receiving an application form comprising
banking credentials of an applicant and receiving, based on the
banking credentials, a current balance and a certain number of
transactions for the applicant from a database. The method
further includes categorizing the transactions into a plurality of
categories by searching the transactions for keywords,
performing an affordability assessment to reject the applicants
that cannot afford to repay in a sustainable manner, and, when
the applicant passes the affordability assessment, performing a
scorecard decision to assign a score to the customer and
categorizing the applicant according to the score. The method
may further include finally accepting or rejecting the
application based on their score categorization.

Spec. 1–2. Claim 1 is exemplary:
1. A method, comprising:
receiving, by a system comprising at least one processor
and memory, an application form comprising banking
credentials of an applicant;
retrieving by the processor, based on the banking
credentials, a current balance and a certain number of
transactions for the applicant from a database, wherein the
retrieving comprises connecting to an aggregation engine
configured to scrape the current balance and the certain number
of transactions for the applicant;
categorizing, by the processor, the transactions into a
plurality of categories by searching the transactions for
keywords;
performing, by the processor, an affordability assessment
to reject the applicants that cannot afford to repay in a
sustainable manner;
when the applicant passes the affordability assessment,
performing, by the processor executing a statistical model, a
scorecard decision to assign a score to the applicant and
categorizing the applicant according to the score,
wherein the categorizing of the applicant comprises
applying score banding in which the applicant is placed in one
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

3
of a plurality of categories based on the score assigned to the
applicant; and
finally accepting or rejecting, by the system, the
application based on the score categorization of the applicant.

References and Rejections2

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
References/Basis
1–19 101 Subject Matter Eligibility
1–19 103 Breslow (US 2013/0339217 A1, published
Dec. 19, 2013), Showalter (US
2011/0270779 A1, published Nov. 3,
2011)

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101
We disagree with Appellant’s arguments. To the extent consistent
with our analysis below, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions
in (i) the action from which this appeal is taken and (ii) the Answer.
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural

2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the (1) Final Office Action dated
September 12, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) Appeal Brief dated June 12, 2019
(“Appeal Br.”); (3) Examiner’s Answer dated August 9, 2019 (“Ans.”); and
(4) Reply Brief dated October 9, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

4
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

5
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office has published revised
guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO, 2019 REVISED PATENT
SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

6
(“Guidance”).3 Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (Step 2A, Prong 1); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th ed. rev.
08.2017 2018) (Step 2A, Prong 2).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. (Step 2B.)
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.

Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Guidance
Turning to Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Guidance, claim 1 (with emphases
added) recites:4
1. A method, comprising:

3 The Guidance was updated in October 2019.
4 We select claim 1 as the representative claim, and group the remaining
claims accordingly under 37 C.F.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“[T]he failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of each grouped claim separately.”).
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

7
receiving, by a system comprising at least one processor
and memory, an application form comprising banking
credentials of an applicant;
retrieving by the processor, based on the banking
credentials, a current balance and a certain number of
transactions for the applicant from a database, wherein the
retrieving comprises connecting to an aggregation engine
configured to scrape the current balance and the certain
number of transactions for the applicant;
categorizing, by the processor, the transactions into a
plurality of categories by searching the transactions for
keywords;
performing, by the processor, an affordability assessment
to reject the applicants that cannot afford to repay in a
sustainable manner;
when the applicant passes the affordability assessment,
performing, by the processor executing a statistical model, a
scorecard decision to assign a score to the applicant and
categorizing the applicant according to the score,
wherein the categorizing of the applicant comprises
applying score banding in which the applicant is placed in one
of a plurality of categories based on the score assigned to the
applicant; and
finally accepting or rejecting, by the system, the
application based on the score categorization of the applicant.

Because all of the italicized functions can be practically performed by
a human in the mind and/or by using a pen and paper, they are like the
mental processes in CyberSource and Synopsys. See CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“All of
claim 3’s method steps can be performed in the human mind, or by a human
using a pen and paper. . . . Such a method that can be performed by human
thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under §
101.”); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146 (Fed.
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

8
Cir. 2016) (“[W]e continue to ‘treat[ ] analyzing information by steps people
go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as
essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.’” (citation
omitted)).
For example, a person can “receiv[e] . . . an application form
comprising banking credentials of an applicant”5 by receiving a paper
application. A person can also
retriev[e] . . . based on the banking credentials, a current
balance and a certain number of transactions for the applicant
from a . . . , wherein the retrieving comprises . . . scrape the
current balance and the certain number of transactions for the
applicant

by reviewing the applicant’s banking records on paper and retrieving the
applicant’s current balance and certain transactions accordingly. Further, a
person can “categoriz[e] . . . the transactions into a plurality of categories by
searching the transactions for keywords” by reviewing the transactions to
look for keywords, and putting the transactions into categories on paper. A
person can also “perform[] . . . an affordability assessment to reject the
applicants that cannot afford to repay in a sustainable manner” by reviewing
the applicants’ information and rejecting applicants who cannot afford to
pay in a sustainable manner, such as marking “no” next to the applicants on
paper. For the applicant who passes the affordability assessment, a person
can
execut[e] a statistical model, a scorecard decision to
assign a score to the applicant and categorizing the applicant
according to the score,

5 The quoted language here (and on pages 8–10) belongs to the italicized
limitations.
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

9
wherein the categorizing of the applicant comprises
applying score banding in which the applicant is placed in one
of a plurality of categories based on the score assigned to the
applicant

by using a statistical model that is written on paper, and assigning a score to
the applicant by writing down the score and category for the applicant on
paper, and the category is based on using score banding and the applicant’s
score. We note the claimed “statistical model” appears once in the
Specification. See Spec. 9 (“In one embodiment, the score decision may be
performed by a statistical model.”). The Specification then describes steps
to adjust and assign a score, and a person can practically perform such steps
by using a pen and paper. See id. For example, the Specification describes
the following steps, all of which a person can practically perform by using a
pen and paper:
As illustrated in Fig. 5, the process begins at 500 and, at an
initial base score assigned to the applicant. For example, in one
embodiment, the initial base score may be between 550 and
650. At 510, the base score is adjusted based on surplus cash. In
other words, in an embodiment, the applicant’s spending is
subtracted from their income during a set time period. If the
applicant has a surplus of income, then their score is adjusted
positively.

Id.
In addition, a person can “finally accepting or rejecting . . . the
application based on the score categorization of the applicant” by marking
“yes” or “no” to indicate whether to reject or accept the application based on
the score categorization.
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

10
As a result, we conclude claim 1 recites mental processes, and thus an
abstract idea. See Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 1 (Groupings of Abstract
Ideas).

Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance
Turning to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance, contrary to Appellant’s
assertions (Appeal Br. 6–15; Reply Br. 4–10), claim 1 does not recite
additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application. In particular, Appellant’s arguments about “a novel and
unconventional approach for scoring an individual applicant and
automatically depositing funds into their account” and “completely
chang[ing] the paradigm when it comes to scoring an individual and
automatically depositing funds into their account6” (Appeal Br. 9–10; Reply
Br. 5–7) are unpersuasive because “a claim for a new abstract idea is still an
abstract idea.” Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1151. “[U]nder the Mayo/Alice
framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural
phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery
for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility . . . .” Genetic
Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations
omitted).
Further, Appellant’s assertion regarding pre-emption (Appeal Br. 11;
Reply Br. 7) is unpersuasive, because
[w]hile preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter,
the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate
patent eligibility . . . . Where a patent’s claims are deemed only

6 Appellant’s argument is not commensurate with the scope of claim 1,
which does not recite “automatically depositing funds into their account.”
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

11
to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo
framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are
fully addressed and made moot.

Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–
63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or
may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make
them any less abstract”).
Contrary to Appellant’s assertions (Appeal Br. 8, 12, 14, 17; Reply
Br. 5, 8, 10–11), the rejected claims are unlike the claims in Enfish. In
Enfish, the court determined:
The . . . patents are directed to an innovative logical model for a
computer database. . . . A logical model generally results in the
creation of particular tables of data, but it does not describe how
the bits and bytes of those tables are arranged in physical
memory devices. Contrary to conventional logical models, the
patented logical model includes all data entities in a single
table, with column definitions provided by rows in that same
table. The patents describe this as the “self-referential”
property of the database.
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(emphases added).
[T]he plain focus of the claims is on an improvement to
computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for
which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.
[T]he claims . . . are directed to a specific improvement to the
way computers operate, embodied in the self-referential table.
Id. at 1336.
Unlike the claims of Enfish, claim 1 is not “directed to an innovative
logical model for a computer database [that] . . . includes all data entities in a
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

12
single table, with column definitions provided by rows in that same table” or
similar improvements. Id. at 1330. Instead, Appellant acknowledges “the
claims recite a series of specific and discrete steps that are performed by a
processor and/or memory.” Appeal Br. 11; Reply Br. 7. As discussed
above, the italicized limitations are mental processes, and the Specification
describes using a well-known processor and memory to perform those
processes. See Spec. 11–12 (“Processor 22 may be any type of general or
specific purpose processor”; “Memory 14 can be comprised of any
combination of random access memory (RAM), read only memory (ROM),
static storage such as a magnetic or optical disk, or any other type of
machine or computer readable media.”). Therefore, contrary to Appellant’s
arguments about “an improvement in computer functionality” (Appeal
Br. 12; see also Reply Br. 8), “improvements in computer-related
technology” (Appeal Br. 12; Reply Br. 5), and “transform[ing] . . . into a
special purpose computer,” (Appeal Br. 11; Reply Br. 7), claim 1 focuses on
abstract ideas that merely use computers as tools to process data.
Further, Appellant’s arguments about DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Appeal Br. 13–14; Reply
Br. 9) are unpersuasive. In DDR Holdings, the Court found:
[T]he claims at issue here specify how interactions with the
Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result—a result that
overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events
ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink. Instead of the
computer network operating in its normal, expected manner by
sending the website visitor to the third-party website that
appears to be connected with the clicked advertisement, the
claimed system generates and directs the visitor to the above-
described hybrid web page that presents product information
from the third-party and visual “look and feel” elements from
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

13
the host website. When the limitations of the ’399 patent’s
asserted claims are taken together as an ordered combination,
the claims recite an invention that is not merely the routine or
conventional use of the Internet.
DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258–59 (emphasis added).
Unlike the claims of DDR, claim 1 does not “specify how interactions
with the Internet are manipulated to yield . . . a result that overrides the
routine and conventional sequence of events” or provide similar technology
improvements. Id. at 1258. Further, this case is distinguished from DDR
because claim 1 recites an invention that merely uses computing devices as
tools—the opposite of what the claims of DDR represent. See id. at 1258–
59.
As a result, we conclude claim 1 does not recite additional elements
that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See
Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 2. Instead, claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea
of receiving data, retrieving information from the data, analyzing the
information, and determining an outcome based on the information, using
computers as tools.

Step 2B of the Guidance
Turning to Step 2B of the Guidance (Alice step two), Appellant does
not persuasively argue any specific limitation (when viewed individually or
as an ordered combination) was not well-understood, routine, or
conventional in the field. Nor does Appellant persuasively argue the
Examiner erred in that aspect. As a result, Appellant has not persuaded us
the Examiner erred with respect to the Guidance’s Step 2B analysis. See
Guidance, Step 2B. In particular, as discussed above, Appellant’s arguments
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

14
about Enfish and technology improvements (Appeal Br. 17–18; Reply
Br. 10–11) are unpersuasive.
Further, Appellant argues the Examiner has not complied with the
requirements under Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2018) and the Memorandum of Changes in Examination Procedure
Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility
Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) (“Berkheimer Memorandum”). See
Appeal Br. 15–16. The Examiner responds by citing court cases, the MPEP,
and the Specification and determines as a result, “the Berkheimer standard
has been satisfied.” See Ans. 8–9. Appellant does not dispute that
determination and, therefore, fails to show Examiner error. In any event, as
discussed above, the recited additional elements “processor” and “memory”
were well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field. See Spec. 11–
12; see also BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (explaining the Alice “Court only assessed whether the claim
limitations other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it
was directed were well-understood, routine and conventional” and “did not
consider whether it was well-understood, routine, and conventional to
execute the claimed intermediated settlement method on a generic
computer”) (emphasis added).. In short, claim 1 does not “contain[] an
‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. As a result, Appellant
has not persuaded us the Examiner erred with respect to the Guidance’s Step
2B analysis. See Guidance, Step 2B.
Because Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

15
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2–19, as Appellant
does not advance separate substantive arguments about those claims. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

35 U.S.C. § 1037
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellant’s
contentions and the evidence of record. We concur with Appellant’s
contentions that the Examiner erred in finding the cited portions of Breslow
and Showalter collectively teach
categorizing . . . the transactions into a plurality of
categories by searching the transactions for keywords;
. . .
when the applicant passes the affordability assessment,
performing, by the processor executing a statistical model, a
scorecard decision to assign a score to the applicant and
categorizing the applicant according to the score,
wherein the categorizing of the applicant comprises
applying score banding in which the applicant is placed in one
of a plurality of categories based on the score assigned to the
applicant,

as recited in independent claim 1. See Appeal Br. 23–25; Reply Br. 13–15.
The Examiner cites many paragraphs from Showalter for teaching the
disputed claim limitations. See Final Act. 6; Ans. 14–16. We have reviewed
the cited Showalter portions, and they do not describe applying score
banding in the manner required by the disputed limitations. As a result, the
cited Showalter paragraphs do not describe

7 Appellant raises additional arguments regarding the prior art rejection.
Because we determine the identified issue is dispositive of the appeal with
respect to the prior art rejection, we do not address the additional arguments.
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

16
categorizing . . . the transactions into a plurality of
categories by searching the transactions for keywords;
. . .
when the applicant passes the affordability assessment,
performing, by the processor executing a statistical model, a
scorecard decision to assign a score to the applicant and
categorizing the applicant according to the score,
wherein the categorizing of the applicant comprises
applying score banding in which the applicant is placed in one
of a plurality of categories based on the score assigned to the
applicant,
as required by claim 1.
Because the Examiner fails to provide sufficient evidence or
explanation to support the rejection, we are constrained by the record to
reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1.
Each of independent claims 10 and 19 recites claim limitations that
are substantively similar to the disputed limitations of claim 1. See claims
10 and 19. The Examiner applies the same findings and conclusions
(discussed above) to claims 1, 10, and 19. See Final Act. 7. Therefore, for
similar reasons, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims
10 and 19.
We also reverse the Examiner’s rejection of corresponding dependent
claims 2–9 and 11–18.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–19 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–19 under
35 U.S.C. § 103.
Appeal 2020-000272
Application 14/004,457

17
Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection with respect to
each claim on appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims
1–19. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–19 101 Eligibility 1–19
1–19 103 Breslow,
Showalter
1–19
Overall
Outcome
1–19

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED