Brett Macdonald

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 31, 2019

14839341 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 31, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/839,341 08/28/2015 Brett MacDonald 19987.2.1.US.U2 8915
94740 7590 12/31/2019
Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A.
Capella Tower, Suite 3500
225 South Sixth Street
Minneapolis, MN 55402
EXAMINER
TORRICO-LOPEZ, ALAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/31/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Winthropdocketing@cpaglobal.com
mmiller@winthrop.com
patent@winthrop.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte BRETT MACDONALD1,2
____________________

Appeal 2018-000622
Application 14/839,341
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, DAVID M. KOHUT, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

KOHUT, Administrative Patent Judge

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–21. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Our Decision makes reference to Appellant’s Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,”
filed October 23, 2017), and Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed April 12,
2017), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” dated August 25, 2017) and
Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” dated August 10, 2016).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2017). Appellant identifies U Tech Innovations,
Incorporated as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
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INVENTION
According to the Specification, construction companies often target
owners of storm-damaged properties to utilize their repair services.
Spec. ¶ 4. Given that storm-damage paths are generally non-linear swaths of
damage that vary in severity, targeting owners is often difficult and time-
consuming for these companies. Id. To solve this problem, Appellant’s
invention generates a targeted customer list using intersecting customer and
weather data displayed onto a map. See id. at Abstract.
Independent claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed invention and is
reproduced below.
1. A method of generating a list of targeted customers within a territory
affected by a severe weather incident, the method comprising:
retrieving severe weather incident data for at least one previously-
occurring severe weather incident from a first database, the severe
weather incident data comprising weather data points defining a past
pattern of severe weather;
retrieving customer data from a second database, the customer data
comprising data for each of a plurality of customers, and for each
customer a customer data point defining a geographic location related
to that respective customer;
displaying the customer data points and the past pattern of severe
weather onto a map viewable by a user, wherein the customer data
points are geocoded for display on the map; and
transmitting a targeted customer list, wherein the targeted customer
list is determined by at least one user-selected parameter and the
intersection of customer data points with weather data points.
Appeal Br. 21 (Claims App.).

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being patent
ineligible. Final Act. 2–3.
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Claims 1–3, 5, 7–10, 12, 13, 15–17, 19, and 21 are rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Root et al. (US 2007/0162234
A1, published July 12, 2007) (“Root”) and Smith (US 2006/0241865 A1,
published October 26, 2006) (“Smith”). Final Act. 4–15.
Claims 4, 6, 11, 14, 18, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Root, Smith, and Blessman et al. (US 2013/0226624
A1, published August 29, 2013) (“Blessman”). Final Act. 15–21.

ANALYSIS
Patent Eligibility
Principles of Law
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
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in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the USPTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
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Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “Guidance”). Under
the Guidance, we first look, under “Step 2A,” to whether the claim recites:
(1) Prong 1: any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice,
or mental processes); and
(2) Prong 2: additional elements that integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h))
(9th ed. rev. 08.2017 Jan. 2018).
If a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, we proceed to “Step 2B” and see
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Examiner’s § 101 Rejection
The Examiner rejects process claims 1–21 as patent ineligible. Final
Act. 2. The Examiner determines representative claim 13 is directed to the
“identification of customers affected by a weather event,” which involves
the collection and comparison of information, and therefore, is an abstract
idea. Final Act. 2–3; Ans. 3.

3 Regarding the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant argues claims 1–
21 as a group. See Appeal Br. 5–12 (arguing that the rejection of claims 2–
21 is improper for similar reasons as claim 1); Reply Br. 1–3. We select
claim 1 as representative of claims 1–21. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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The Examiner further determines claim 1 does not recite additional
elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception itself.
Final Act. 3. The Examiner characterizes displaying data and transmitting a
list of data as “insignificant extra-solution activities (data output).” Id.
According to the Examiner, displaying and transmitting data “do not yield
an improvement in the functioning of the computer itself, nor do they yield
improvements to a technical field or technology” and are, at best, “an
improvement to the business process.” Id. The Examiner also determines
the claims are “implemented with generic technical components in a
conventional way” and that the ordered combination is “well-understood,
routine and conventional in the field.” Id.; Ans. 7.
Guidance Step 2A: Is the claim “directed to” a judicial exception?
Step 2A, Prong 1: Does the claim recite a judicial exception?
Step 2A of the Guidance is a two-prong inquiry. In Prong 1, we
evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, such as an abstract
idea. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. The Guidance synthesizes the key
concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas into three primary subject-
matter groupings: mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activities, and mental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind or via pen and paper (including observation, evaluation, judgment, and
opinion). Id. at 52. For the reasons discussed below, claim 1 recites an
abstract idea that falls in the Guidance’s subject-matter grouping of mental
processes. Id.
Claim 1 recites a process with five steps (1)–(5). Steps (1), (2), and
(3) recite mental processes that operate to identify customers affected by a
weather event, as explained below.
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The first step (1) of “retrieving severe weather incident data for at
least one previously-occurring severe weather incident . . . the severe
weather incident data comprising weather data points defining a past pattern
of severe weather . . . onto a map viewable by a user” is nothing more than
data collection, i.e., observation, that can be performed mentally. To offer a
real-world example, this step encompasses a person, such as a handyman,
observing storm damage at several locations (in person or in a local online
discussion forum) and forming a mental map of the storm path. Drawing a
map via pen and paper, the handyman can plot the locations of storm
damage and then draw lines between plotted locations to define a pattern
representing past severe weather.
Similarly, the second step (2) of “retrieving customer data . . . the
customer data comprising data for each of a plurality of customers, and for
each customer a customer data point defining a geographic location related
to that respective customer” also represents mere observation, a mental
process. In the handyman scenario, this could include the handyman
recalling or looking up addresses of the geographic locations of former
customers and marking those locations on the map.
The third step (3) of list determination “by at least one user-selected
parameter and the intersection of customer data points with weather data
points” represents comparing data or evaluating a correlation, which is also a
mental process. This could encompass, for example, the handyman
identifying which customer locations are marked within the pattern.
Thus, steps (1)–(3) recite mental processes. Our above analysis is
consistent with the Examiner’s findings that claim 1 involves the mental
processes “collection and comparison of information.” Final Act. 3. Courts
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have held that collecting and comparing/analyzing information, in a way that
can be performed mentally, or is analogous to human mental work, fall
within the realm of abstract ideas. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp., LLC v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“we have treated
analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds . . . without
more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category”);
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (collecting and analyzing information are mental processes within the
abstract-idea category); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, 654 F.3d
1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding claims to obtaining and comparing
data as unpatentable mental processes, because the steps can be performed in
the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper).
We further note that Appellant’s Specification discloses that
“computer program implemented steps or acts may be combined with
operator or human implemented steps or acts in order to carry out an
embodiment of the invention” (emphasis added), thus supporting the
position that the claimed steps can be performed mentally or manually.
Spec. ¶ 34.
Based on the forgoing, claim 1 fits squarely into the Guidance’s
subject-matter grouping of mental processes and therefore recites an abstract
idea. We now proceed to Prong 2 to determine whether the claims are
directed to the abstract idea.
Step 2A, Prong 2: Is the judicial exception
integrated into a practical application?
When a claim recites a judicial exception, such as an abstract idea, we
determine in Prong 2 whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into
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a practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are
any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s);
and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination
to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical
application. If the recited judicial exception is not integrated into a practical
application, the claim is directed to the judicial exception. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Here, claim 1 recites the additional elements of a “first database” and
a “second database.” The term “database” can be broadly construed to
include a collection of related data in a handwritten, paper database (e.g., a
card index). As such, the databases do not require a computer and thus
cannot improve computer technology. See MPEP § 2106.05(a) (citing
RecogniCorp LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(process for encoding/decoding facial data held ineligible because process
did not require a computer)). Furthermore, the databases are not a particular
machine so as to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See
MPEP § 2106.05(b).
Even if the claimed “databases” are more narrowly construed to
require computerized databases, these elements merely use a computer as a
tool to perform an abstract idea (i.e., to collect or observe information) and
are, therefore, insufficient to integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 5; see also Versata Dev. Grp., Inc.
v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have
examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the
underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper
or in a person’s mind.”).
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Claim 1 recites two more additional elements: the fourth step (4) of
“displaying the customer data points and the past pattern of severe weather
. . . wherein the customer data points are geocoded for display on the map”
and the fifth step (5) of “transmitting a targeted customer list.”
These steps also do not require a computer. For example, in the
handyman scenario above, the displaying step (4) encompasses the act of
mounting or otherwise presenting the hand-drawn map, with both the storm
pattern and customer geographic locations marked thereon. The transmitting
step (5) encompasses the act of writing down on paper a list customers
residing in the storm pattern that also meet any user-selected parameter, for
instance, the customers must reside in the same county. As such, the claim
neither improves technology nor is applied with any particular machine, and
thus, it fails to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
See MPEP § 2106.05(a),(b).
Assuming for the sake of argument that the claim requires a
computerized display and computerized transmission, as discussed above,
using a computer in its ordinary capacity, as a tool to display or transmit
data, does not show an improvement in computer functionality and is
insufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
See, e.g., SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“[M]erely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting
and analyzing information . . . is abstract as an ancillary part of such
collection and analysis.”) (quotations omitted); see also buySAFE, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer
receives and sends the information over a network—with no further
specification—is not even arguably inventive.”); see also MPEP
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§ 2106.05(g) (discussing insignificant extra-solution activities including
insignificant computer implementation). We therefore agree with the
Examiner that displaying step (4) and transmitting step (5) are insignificant
extra-solution activities and do not improve the functioning of the computer
itself or another technology. See Final Act. 3.
Regarding Appellant’s arguments, we are not persuaded that the
Examiner has described claim 1 in an overly broad and simplistic manner, in
that a proper evaluation would indicate that claim 1 achieves “an improved
technological result.” Appeal Br. 7, 10–11 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); Reply Br. 2–3.
Contrary to Appellant’s contention that the claims are similar to those in
McRO, claim 1 here, at most, uses generic computing components and
functions to automate the abstract idea, but does not improve the underlying
computer technology to provide such automation, as was the case in McRO.
We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is “implemented with generic
technical components in a conventional way.” Ans. 5, 7. The invention
merely automates the conventional process of identifying owners of
properties in a storm-damage path, achieving in a virtual environment that
previously done by physically visiting property locations. However, the
underlying methodology has not changed, i.e., determining which properties
are in the storm-damage path (and therefore damaged and in need of repair)
to identify owners of those properties. What has changed is that computers,
via the Internet, have expanded access to information that was previously
ascertained only by physically visiting a location. The result is easier and
quicker identification of owners. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[R]elying on a computer to perform
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routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a
claim patent eligible.”).
Appellant also argues that claim 1 is “a specific, discrete
implementation” that “improves the field of storm damage evaluation by
providing a visual indication.” Appeal Br. 13–15 (citing Bascom Glob.
Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
and Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294, (Fed.
Cir. 2016)). An improvement to the field of storm-damage evaluation,
however, is not an improvement to a technical field. In other words, the
improvement here is to the concept of storm-damage evaluation, not the
computer technology used to implement the concept. This is clear from our
review of the claim itself, which lacks technical detail, and our review of the
Specification, which provides minimal technical details regarding the
computer technology used to implement the claim, as discussed further
below in Step 2B.
After considering all limitations individually and in combination,
including the first and second databases, the displaying step (4), and the
transmitting step (5), we are not persuaded that claim 1 integrates the
judicial exception into a practical application. As such, claim 1 is directed
to an abstract idea.
Guidance Step 2B: Does the claim provide an inventive concept?”
Having determined that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we turn
to Step 2B. We evaluate whether claim 1 provides an inventive concept
(i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more than the
exception itself). The Examiner determined the claims do not recite an
inventive concept because the additional elements in the claims do not
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amount to “significantly more” than an abstract idea. See Final Act. 3. We
agree.
Under the Guidance, we look to whether claim 1 recites any additional
elements, individually or in combination, that are not “well-understood,
routine, or conventional.” See MPEP § 2106.05(d). We are unable to
identify any such additional elements.
Claim 1’s only additional elements are the first and second databases
used to retrieve data, and the displaying and transmitting steps (4) and (5).
According to the Examiner, the claims are “implemented with generic
technical components in a conventional way” and that the combination is
“well-understood, routine, and conventional.” Final Act. 23.
Turning to the Specification, it does not provide technical details
regarding the databases, but rather states “information [is] retrieved from a
third party database” and “the methods described herein may include any
instrumentality . . . operable to compute, calculate, determine, classify,
process, transmit, receive, retrieve, originate, switch, store, display,
communicate, manifest, detect, record, reproduce, handle, or utilize any
form of information.” Spec. ¶¶ 9, 29. Thus, the Specification only describes
the databases at a high level of generality and confirms that the claimed
steps can be performed by generic computer components.
Similarly, the Specification describes the manner of displaying and
transmitting at a high level of generality and without technical detail.
According to the Specification, the displaying step includes any visual
display (e.g., a computer monitor) and “any commercial or freeware web
browser or other application capable of retrieving content from a network
and displaying pages or screens may be used” including “a suitable map
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browser such as MapQuest, Google Maps, Google Earth, and Bing.” Spec.
¶¶ 30, 44. Transmitting the customer list includes sending “via e-mail, text
message, or other text-based or multimedia-messaging communication
medium such as email, Short Message Service (SMS), or Multimedia
Messaging Service (MMS).” Id. ¶ 38.
Thus, the Specification is intrinsic evidence that the claimed “first
database,” “second database,” the displaying step (4), and the transmitting
step (5) are well-understood, routine, or conventional, and therefore, they do
not amount to significantly more than an abstract idea. Rather, claim 1
simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional components
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the claimed abstract idea.
Regarding Appellant’s argument that the Examiner failed to address
the combination of additional elements (Appeal Br. 15), this is unpersuasive
because, as discussed above, the Examiner addresses each individual
element of the claim and further determines that the claimed combination
“add[s] nothing new” and “is well-understood, routine and conventional in
the field.” Final Act. 3.
In view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded Examiner erred in
determining the additional elements in claim 1, including in combination, do
not amount to significantly more than the judicial exception itself. Final
Act. 23. Considering the claim limitations as an ordered combination adds
nothing to the abstract idea that is not already present when the limitations
are considered separately. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79. The ordered
combination of limitations amounts to nothing more than certain mental
processes implemented with generic computer components that operate “in a
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conventional way.” See Ans. 7; see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26.
Accordingly, we conclude the Examiner did not err in determining claim 1
does not provide an inventive concept.
Preemption
Appellant’s additional contention with respect to preemption is also
not persuasive. Appeal Br. 13–15. In Appellant’s view, claim 1 recites
significantly more because it is “narrowly circumscribed” such that it does
not seek to preempt all methods for generating a list of targeted customers
within a territory affected by a severe weather incident. Id. at 15. This is
unpersuasive because the Federal Circuit has made clear that “the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility” of a claim.
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2015). “[Q]uestions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the
§ 101 analysis” according to Mayo and Alice, which we applied here. Id.
Summary
For at least the above reasons, under the Guidance, we sustain the
Examiner’s § 101 rejection of independent claim 1. Independent claim 16
presents us with the same dispositive issues as claim 1, and Appellant does
not present separate arguments for dependent claims 215 and 17–21. See
Appeal Br. 6–16; Reply Br. 1–3. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 2–21 for the same reasons set forth above for claim 1.

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Obviousness
Claim 1
The Examiner finds Root teaches retrieving data for “previously-
occurring” severe weather events, as required by claim 1. Final Act. 4
(citing Root ¶ 13).
Appellant argues that Root does not teach retrieving previously-
occurring (past) weather events. Appeal Br. 17–18. Appellant argues that
Root “relates to predictive modeling or forecasting of future weather
events” and provides “weather warnings and advisories to persons in
specified areas.” Reply Br. 4 (citing Root ¶¶ 9, 33); see Appeal Br. 17–18.
Contrary to Appellant’s argument, Root is not limited to weather
forecasting or providing weather warnings. See Root ¶ 22 (“weather
forecasts and/or weather advisories or any other weather information”
(emphasis added)). For example, Root teaches providing weather
information to vendors for purposes of targeted marketing. Final Act. 6–7
(citing Root ¶¶ 44–46). In one such embodiment, Root teaches that a snow-
blower vendor can input a weather content identifier (e.g., amount of snow)
and a time identifier to identify potential customers in a specified area. Root
¶ 46. Root explains that time identifiers may be times in the past, present, or
future. Root ¶ 33; Ans. 9. Furthermore, as pointed out by the Examiner,
paragraph 13 of Root explicitly teaches receiving “real-time weather data,”
where “[t]he term ‘weather data’ describes a wide variety of weather
products including . . . past and current conditions of weather events.” Final
Act. 4 (emphasis added). Thus, Root teaches retrieving data for past, or
previously-occurring, weather events.
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Based on the forgoing, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred
in finding the combination of Root and Smith teaches retrieving data for at
least one previously-occurring severe weather incident. We therefore
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Remaining Claims
With respect to independent claim 16, Appellant’s arguments present
us with the same dispositive issues as claim 1. See Appeal Br. 18–19; Reply
Br. 3–4. Appellant does not present separate arguments for dependent
claims 215 and 17–21. Id. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of
claims 2–21 for the same reasons set forth above for claim 1.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–21 101 Eligibility 1–21
1–3, 5, 7–
10, 12, 13,
15–17, 19,
21
103 Root, Smith 1–3, 5, 7–
10, 12, 13,
15–17, 19,
21

4, 6, 11, 14,
18, 20
103 Root, Smith,
Blessman
4, 6, 11, 14,
18, 20

Overall
Outcome
1–21

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED