0120100961
07-21-2011
Brenda L. Caggiati, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Eastern Area), Agency.
Brenda L. Caggiati,
Complainant,
v.
Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Eastern Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120100961
Hearing No. 532-2008-00159X
Agency No. 4C-440-0038-08
DECISION
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant’s
appeal from the Agency’s November 25, 2009 final order concerning
her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment
discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the
following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's final order.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked
as a City Carrier at the Post Office in Barberton, Ohio. On February
25, 2008, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency
discriminated against her on the basis of disability when, on January 11,
2008, her request for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
was denied.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant
with a copy of the report of investigation (ROI) and notice of her
right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).
Complainant timely requested a hearing. When Complainant did not object,
the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s motion for a decision
without a hearing and issued a decision on November 17, 2009.
In her decision, the AJ assumed arguendo that Complainant had established
a prima facie case of disability discrimination and determined that
the Agency had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
its actions. Specifically, the Postmaster stated that Complainant
had a pre-disciplinary interview on September 13, 2007 and then left
work early. She did not return until September 24, 2007. The FMLA
Coordinator asserted that she received a telephone call from Complainant
on November 5, 2007, during which Complainant informed her that her doctor
would be faxing medical information to the FMLA office. On November
8, 2007, Complainant submitted an incomplete FMLA certification form.
On November 29, 2007, Complainant submitted a second FMLA certification
form that included the requested additional information. The FMLA
Coordinator affirmed that on December 10, 2007, she received a note from
Complainant’s doctor indicating that Complainant was out of work from
September 13, 2007 to September 24, 2007 and October 6, 2007 to October 9,
2007, due to anxiety. The FMLA Coordinator stated that Complainant’s
FMLA request was approved for future absences, but was not retroactive
to cover absences connected to discipline.
The AJ determined that Complainant had presented no evidence that the
Agency’s reasons were pretextual. As a result, the AJ found that
Complainant had not been discriminated against as alleged. The Agency
subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s decision.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant makes numerous arguments unrelated to the instant
matter. In sum, Complainant requests that the Commission reverse the
final order.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Decision without a Hearing
The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of
the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such
that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material”
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case
can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment
is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,
an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination
that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
Upon review of the record, the Commission determines that there are no
genuine issues of material fact or any credibility issues which required
a hearing and therefore the AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing
was appropriate. The Commission concludes that, even assuming all facts
in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact finder could not find in her
favor, as explained below. Therefore, no genuine issues of material
fact exist. Under these circumstances, the Commission finds that the
AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate.
Disparate Treatment
In analyzing a disparate treatment claim under the Rehabilitation Act,
where the Agency denies that its decisions were motivated by Complainant's
disability and there is no direct evidence of discrimination, we apply
the burden-shifting method of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Heyman v. Queens Village
Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty Adolescent Program, 198 F.3d 68
(2d Cir. 1999); Swanks v. WMATA, 179 F.3d 929, 933-34 (D.C.Cir. 1999).
Under this analysis, in order to establish a prima facie case,
Complainant must demonstrate that: (1) she is an “individual with
a disability”; (2) she is “qualified” for the position held or
desired; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and
(4) the circumstances surrounding the adverse action give rise to an
inference of discrimination. Lawson v. CSX Transp. Inc., 245 F.3d 916
(7th Cir. 2001). The burden of production then shifts to the Agency
to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action. In order to satisfy his burden of proof, Complainant
must then demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency's
proffered reason is a pretext for disability discrimination. Id.
In the instant case, the Commission shall assume arguendo that Complainant
has established a prima facie case of disability discrimination.
Nonetheless, the Agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its actions. Specifically, Complainant did not have FMLA
coverage for the period of her request. ROI, at 87. The record indicates
that Complainant’s supervisor conducted a pre-disciplinary interview
with Complainant on September 13, 2007 for an incident that occurred the
day prior and Complainant subsequently went home on sick leave through
September 24, 2007. Id. at 94-96. The record indicates that Complainant
received a 21-day suspension beginning September 12, 2007 for failure
to follow instructions and failure to perform job responsibilities.
Id. at 44. The FMLA Coordinator confirmed that she informed Complainant
that her submitted FMLA certification would not cover absences connected
to any disciplinary action. Id. at 95. As a result, Complainant’s
FMLA was not retroactive and could only be approved for future absences.
Id. at 96.
Because the Agency has proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for the alleged discriminatory events, Complainant now bears the burden
of establishing that the Agency's stated reasons are merely a pretext for
discrimination. Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Request No. 05960403
(Dec. 6, 1996). Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Complainant, the Commission finds that Complainant has not shown that
any of the Agency’s actions were based on discriminatory animus or that
the reasons articulated by the Agency for its actions were mere pretext
to hide unlawful discrimination. At all times the ultimate burden of
persuasion remains with Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance
of the evidence that the Agency’s reasons were not the real reasons,
and that the Agency acted on the basis of discriminatory animus.
Complainant failed to carry this burden. Accordingly, the Commission
finds that Complainant failed to establish that she was subjected to
discrimination as alleged.
CONCLUSION
After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration
of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency's final order,
because the Administrative Judge’s issuance of a decision without a
hearing was appropriate and a preponderance of the record evidence does
not establish that discrimination occurred.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See
29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (Nov. 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency
head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full
name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal
of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department
in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a
civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative
processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with
the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits
as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File A Civil Action”).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
July 21, 2011
Date
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0120100961
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
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0120100961