BOSTON SCIENTIFIC SCIMED, INC.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 14, 20202019005427 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 14, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/845,824 09/04/2015 Sumit Agrawal 1001.3579101 3479 11050 7590 07/14/2020 SEAGER, TUFTE & WICKHEM, LLP 100 South 5th Street Suite 600 Minneapolis, MN 55402 EXAMINER HOLWERDA, KATHLEEN SONNETT ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3771 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/14/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): BSC.USPTO@stwiplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte SUMIT AGRAWAL, NAWAZ MADITHETI, ERIC M. PETERSEN, STEPHEN J. OOMMEN, and JAMES A. SCHMIDT Appeal 2019-005427 Application 14/845,824 Technology Center 3700 ____________ Before NINA L. MEDLOCK, JAMES A. WORTH, and KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judges. SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE and enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2019-005427 Application 14/845,824 2 BACKGROUND The Specification states that “[t]he present disclosure pertains to medical devices, and methods for manufacturing and/or using medical devices. More particularly, the present disclosure pertains to locking mechanisms for a replacement heart valve.” Spec. 1, ll. 8–10. CLAIMS Claims 1 and 19 are the independent claims are on appeal. Claim 1 is illustrative of the appealed claims and recites: 1. A medical device, comprising: an elongate delivery sheath; a valve replacement implant disposed within a lumen of the elongate delivery sheath, the implant including an anchor member reversibly actuatable between a delivery configuration and a fully deployed configuration; wherein the implant includes at least one locking element configured to reversibly lock the anchor member in the fully deployed configuration; and at least one actuator element configured to engage a component of the at least one locking element and actuate the anchor member between the delivery configuration and the fully deployed configuration and further having an unlocking member; wherein the unlocking member is configured to compress a first locking portion of the at least one locking element, thereby unlocking the anchor member from the fully deployed configuration. Appeal Br. 22. Appeal 2019-005427 Application 14/845,824 3 REJECTIONS2 1. The Examiner rejects claims 1–9 and 13–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Salahieh. 3 2. The Examiner rejects claims 1–9 and 13–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Salahieh in view of Sutton.4 3. The Examiner rejects claims 10–12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Salahieh in view of Sutton and Hutchinson.5 DISCUSSION New Ground of Rejection We reject independent claims 1–20 as indefinite because we determine that it is not reasonably possible to interpret the claim language “unlocking the anchor member from the fully deployed configuration” in claim 1 and the similar language “unlock the anchor member from the expanded deployed configuration” in claim 19 with sufficient clarity to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). See In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam). We determine that this claim language is amenable to at least two plausible interpretations, and the written portion of the Specification does not provide further clarity to determine the specific scope of the claims. See Ex parte Miyazaki, 2008 WL 5105055, at *5 (BPAI Nov. 19, 2008) (precedential) (“[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to 2 The Examiner withdrew the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), (b) and added a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) in the Answer. See Ans. 9. 3 Salahieh et al., US 2005/0137687 A1, pub. June 23, 2005. 4 Sutton et al., US 2013/0123796 A1, pub. May 16, 2013. 5 Hutchinson, US 5,113,553, iss. May 19, 1992. Appeal 2019-005427 Application 14/845,824 4 more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable . . . as indefinite.”). First, we find that is not readily apparent from the claim language itself what would be “the fully deployed configuration” or “the expanded deployed configuration” of the claimed device. Claim 1 recites a valve replacement implant disposed within a lumen of a delivery sheath and including an anchor member that is “reversibly actuatable between a delivery configuration and a fully deployed configuration.” Appeal Br. 22. Claim 19 similarly recites an implant with an anchor member “reversibly actuatable between an elongated delivery configuration and an expanded deployed configuration.” The claims also require a locking element on the implant that can reversibly lock the anchor member in the fully deployed or expanded deployed configuration. Based on the claim language alone, one could reasonably interpret “the fully deployed configuration” or the “expanded deployed configuration” as the state the implant is in when it is fully expanded and properly placed, but before it is “released” from the remaining structure of the device, i.e. the claimed actuator element and the delivery sheath. Alternatively, one could interpret the language, (particularly, the “fully deployed”) language, as the state the implant is in after it is released from the remaining structure of the device. In short, it is not clear whether or not the “fully deployed configuration” and the “expanded deployed configuration” require that the implant is released from the sheath and unlocking member. Second, the Specification can be interpreted as supporting either construction. We note that we have been unable to locate either of the Appeal 2019-005427 Application 14/845,824 5 phrases “fully deployed” and “expanded deployed” in the written disclosure portion of the Specification. The Specification does provide a distinction between a deployed configuration and released configuration, and that difference is defined by whether the unlocking member is still attached to the locking member of the implant. Spec. 17, ll. 2–14. But this distinction raises the question of whether “fully deployed” simply means deployed or released or something in between. Accordingly, we conclude that claims 1 and 19 are indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). We also conclude that dependent claims 2–18 and 20 are indefinite for the same reasons. Rejections on Appeal In view of our determination that claims 1–20 are indefinite, and because we find that an analysis of the Examiner’s rejections would necessarily be based on a speculative assumption as to the meaning of the claims,6 we do not sustain the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and § 103. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862-63 (CCPA 1962). However, it should be understood that our decision in this regard is pro forma and based solely on the indefiniteness of the claimed subject matter, and does not reflect in any way on the adequacy of the Examiner’s analysis in rejecting the claims. CONCLUSION We pro forma reverse the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–20. 6 We note that Appellant raises the issue regarding the appropriate construction of “fully deployed” in the context of its application and identifies the conflict between Appellant’s proposed construction and the Examiner’s proposed construction. See Reply Br. 2–3. Appeal 2019-005427 Application 14/845,824 6 In a new ground of rejection, we reject claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite. In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed New Ground 1–9, 13– 20 102(a)1 Salahieh 1–9, 13–20 1–9, 13– 20 103 Salahieh, Sutton 1–9, 13–20 10–12 103 Salahieh, Sutton, Hutchinson 10–12 1–20 112(b) Indefiniteness 1–20 Overall Outcome 1–20 1–20 This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides that “[a] new ground of rejection . . . shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides that Appellant, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the examiner. . . . (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. Appeal 2019-005427 Application 14/845,824 7 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv) (2017). REVERSED 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation