BlackBerry LimitedDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 13, 2020IPR2020-00392 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 13, 2020) Copy Citation Trials@uspto.gov Paper 8 571-272-7822 Date: July 13, 2020 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ SNAP INC., Petitioner, v. BLACKBERRY LIMITED, Patent Owner. ____________ IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 ____________ Before MIRIAM L. QUINN, GREGG I. ANDERSON, and ROBERT L. KINDER, Administrative Patent Judges. KINDER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review 35 U.S.C. § 314 Denying Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 2 Snap Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 311– 319 to institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 5, 8–10, 13, 16 (“the Challenged Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,676,929 B2, issued on March 18, 2014 (Ex. 1001, “the ’929 patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). Petitioner also filed a Motion for Joinder to join IPR2019-00940. Paper 3 (“Mot.”). BlackBerry Ltd. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered both the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we exercise our delegated discretion, under 35 U.S.C. § 314, to deny the Petition in this proceeding. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review. Because we deny institution of the Petition, we also deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. I. BACKGROUND A. The ʼ929 Patent (Ex. 1001) The ʼ929 patent is directed to a “System and Method for Pushing Information to a Mobile Device.” Ex. 1001, code (54). The ’929 patent claims priority through a series of continuation applications to Provisional Application No. 60/307,265, filed on July 23, 2001. Id. at codes (63), (60). The “invention relates to pushing information to a mobile handheld communication device,” through the use of “an information source, a wireless network, and a proxy content server.” Id. at 1:22–28, 51–53. IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 3 The Abstract describes detecting “[a] triggering event,” such that “[w]hen the information relevant to the detected triggering event comprises content information, a meta tag is inserted to the content information.” Id. at code (57). Further, “[t]he meta tag relates to display of specific one or more advertisements with the content information,” and “[t]he content information that includes the meta tag is transmitted to the mobile device.” Id. The Specification describes storing information received from an information source in a “proxy content server” that sorts the information into a “plurality of channels based on pre-defined information categories.” Id. at 1:55–60. In addition, “the proxy content server . . . automatically transmits information from a selected channel over the wireless network to the mobile device.” Id. at 1:58-61. “Proxy Content Server 18 stores received information 12 to a particular channel 21 based on user specific information categories.” Id. at 4:33–35. These concepts are illustrated in Figure 8, reproduced below. IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 4 Figure 8 of the ’929 patent represents a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary method of pushing information to a mobile device based on a triggering event. As depicted in Figure 8, information is pushed to the mobile device based on a “triggering event.” One example of a triggering event is a timer firing, controlled by the Proxy Content Server. Id. at 13:24–27. Examples of significant time intervals that might trigger a timer are lunchtime, suppertime, and other significant times of the day. Id. at 13:27–31. If a triggering event is detected, Proxy Content Server 18 determines if any of the information categories assigned to channel 21 are relevant to the triggering event. Id. at 13:36–39. If the Proxy Content Server determines that the triggering event is relevant to information in a channel, the Proxy Content Server then determines the type of information. Id. at 13:36–47. If it is advertising information, it is passed on to the mobile device; if it is content information, then meta tags are added. Id. at 13:47–51. The ’929 patent provides one example of meta tags as “embedded control sequences that the Proxy Content Server 18 has inserted to indicate when advertising should be inserted.” Id. at 8:32–34. The Specification further describes how the Proxy Content Server determines whether to insert meta tags describing advertising information in the instance of content information. Id. at 11:66–12:16. “Once this insertion [of the meta tags] is completed the data package is sent to the mobile device . . . .” Id. This ensures “that the mobile device user has a consistent and transparent experience of receiving both information content and advertising content.” Id. at 3:1–4. On the mobile device, Channel Viewer and Selector 45 displays combined advertising and content information to the user. Id. at 8:29–31 (the Channel Viewer and Selector “presents the content information IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 5 51A, 51B to the user and monitors the information for meta-tags within the content.”), 8:44–47 (the Channel Viewer and Selector “uses the advertising tag to retrieve the corresponding advertising information and inserts it into the exact space indicated by the meta tag”). B. Illustrative Claim Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claims at issue: 1. A method for pushing information to a mobile device, the method comprising: detecting a triggering event comprising a time triggering event; determining, by a server, information relevant to the detected triggering event from among information stored in one of a plurality of memory location channels, wherein the information is stored in the one of the plurality of memory location channels based on a category of the information matching a pre-defined category of the one of the plurality of memory location channels; when the information relevant to the detected triggering event comprises content information, inserting to the content information, by the server, a meta tag for one or more advertisements to be displayed with the content information, wherein the meta tag identifies the one or more advertisements and advertisement display requirements, and wherein the one or more advertisements are selected based on the detected triggering event; and transmitting the content information that includes the meta tag to the mobile device. Ex. 1001, 14:11–31. While claim 1 covers a method for pushing information to a mobile device, independent claim 9 (also challenged) is directed to the server that pushes the information. Id. at 14:58– 15:10. IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 6 C. Related Proceedings According to the parties, the following matters are related proceedings involving the ’929 patent. Pet. 1; Paper 6, 2. i. BlackBerry Ltd. v. Snap, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-02693 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2019) ii. BlackBerry Ltd. v. Facebook, Inc. et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-01844 (C.D. Cal.) iii. Facebook, Inc. et al., v. Blackberry Limited, IPR2019-00940 iv. Snap, Inc. v. BlackBerry Limited, IPR2019-00829. D. References Petitioner relies on the following references: Langseth, US Patent No. 6,671,715 B1, issued Dec. 30, 2003 (Ex. 1003, “Langseth”); Excerpts from Stephen Walther, Sams Teach Yourself E-Commerce Programming with ASP in 21 Days (2000) (Ex. 1004, “Walther”); Excerpts from Robbin Zeff et al., Advertising on the Internet (2nd ed. 1999) (Ex. 1005, “Zeff”); Excerpts from Anthony T. Mann, Microsoft SQL Server 7 for Dummies (1998) (Ex. 1006, “Mann”); Gilhuly, WO 01/22669 A1, published Mar. 29, 2001 (Ex. 1019, “Gilhuly”); and, U.S. Patent No. 7,406,697 B2, filed Dec. 13, 2000, issued July 29, 2008 (Ex. 1020, “Laux”). IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 7 E. Grounds Asserted Petitioner challenges claims 1, 5, 8–10, 13, 16 of the ʼ929 patent on the following grounds (Pet. 3): Claim(s) Challenged 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis 1, 5, 8–10, 13, 16 103(a) 1 Langseth, Walther, Zeff, Mann 1, 5, 8 103(a) Langseth, Walther, Zeff, Mann, Gilhuly 9, 10, 13, 16 103(a) Langseth, Walther, Zeff, Mann, Laux II. ANALYSIS A petition must show how the challenged claims are unpatentable under the statutory grounds it identifies. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (2019). Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim for a petition to be granted. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Patent Owner argues that we should exercise discretion to deny the Petition in the interests of fairness and efficiency. See Prelim. Resp. 1–9. As explained in detail below, we agree with Patent Owner. A. Legal Standards Under § 314(a), we have discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to 1 The relevant sections of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 16, 2011), took effect on March 16, 2013. Because the application from which the ’351 patent issued was filed before that date, our citations to Title 35 are to the pre-AIA version of § 103. IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 8 the Patent Office’s discretion.”); SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (“[Section] 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question whether to institute review . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). In exercising that discretion, the Board may consider the advanced state of a related district court proceeding, among other considerations, as a “factor that weighs in favor of denying the Petition under § 314(a).” NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential); Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5‒6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“the Fintiv Order”). In deciding whether to institute inter partes review, we consider the guidance in the Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide of November 2019 (“Consolidated Trial Practice Guide”), which states: Based on the Board’s experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations. Two or more petitions filed against the same patent at or about the same time . . . may place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the Board and the patent owner and could raise fairness, timing, and efficiency concerns. Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 59 (Nov. 2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf?MURL=. The precedential Fintiv Order identifies several factors to be considered in analyzing § 314(a) issues, with the goal of balancing efficiency, fairness, and patent quality. See Fintiv Order, Paper 11 at 5–6. These factors include: 1) whether a stay exists or is likely to be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2) proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 9 projected statutory deadline; 3) investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and parties; 4) overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5) whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6) other circumstances and considerations that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Id. B. Procedural Background On March 25, 2019, Petitioner filed a request for inter partes review of claims 1–5, 8–13, and 16 of the ’929 patent. IPR2019-00829, Paper 1. On October 1, 2019, we considered the merits of the petition in IPR2019- 00829 (“Snap’s first petition”) and determined that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of the challenged claims on any ground of unpatentability asserted in the Petition. Snap, Inc., IPR2019-00829, Paper 7 at 20. BlackBerry first sued Petitioner for infringing the ’929 patent on April 3, 2018. On October 1, 2019, the United States District Court for the Central District of California issued a final order finding claims 1, 9, and 16 of the ’929 patent unpatentable pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101. Ex. 1021, 19, 24. The district court entered final judgment in favor of Petitioner (Snap) as well as Facebook, Inc. on those claims on November 15, 2019. Ex. 2002. The district court’s final judgment is currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Mot. 2 (“BlackBerry has appealed this judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit against both Snap and Facebook. 2:18-cv-0293, Dkt. 120; 2:18-cv-01844, Dkt. 498.”); see also Blackberry Ltd. v. Snap, Inc., No. 20-1258 (Fed. Cir. filed Dec. 17, 2019). IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 10 On December 4, 2019, we issued a decision instituting review of claims 1, 5, 8–10, 13, 16 of the ’929 patent in a proceeding brought by Facebook, Inc., Instagram, LLC, and WhatsApp Inc. Facebook, Inc. v. Blackberry Ltd., IPR2019-00940 (Paper 13). The Facebook petition in IPR2019-00940 challenged the same claims that Petitioner challenges in the current proceeding. See Paper 3, 3 (Motion for Joinder). When compared to Petitioner’s first petition, “Facebook’s petition contained entirely different grounds and prior art references than Snap’s first petition.” Id. at 2. Petitioner has also filed a Motion for Joinder to join IPR2019-00940. Id. at 1. On December 18, 2019, Patent Owner filed a “Disclaimer in Patent Under 37 CFR 1.321(a).” IPR2019-00940, Ex. 2003. In this filing to the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Owner disclaimed claims 5, 8, and 13 of the ’929 patent. Id. The current Petition was filed on January 3, 2020. Pet. 75–77. This Petition introduces identical arguments and the same grounds raised in Facebook’s petition (IPR2019-00940). Mot. 4. C. Analysis for Discretionary Denial Although we examine whether to exercise discretion in light of the precedential decisions noted above, the unique background of this proceeding does not fit squarely into a typical situation. For example, the Fintiv factors examine whether we should deny institution based on the advanced status of an underlying district court case. In this instance, the district court case has concluded. Further, all but one of the Challenged Claims not disclaimed have been held to be invalid by the district court pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Exs. 2002, 1021. Only dependent claim IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 11 10, which is not even asserted against Petitioner in the parallel proceeding, has not been disclaimed or found to be unpaintable. Prelim. Resp. 2, At the outset, Petitioner seeks to join IPR2019-00940, but that does not obligate us to institute in this proceeding without first considering whether to exercise discretion. The statutory provision governing joinder in inter partes review proceedings is 35 U.S.C. § 315(c), which reads: If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314. Two clauses within 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) are the source of discretion to deny joinder. The first states “the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party.” Thus, joinder is not required, but remains discretionary. Second, the statute requires an additional step. Acting under delegated authority from the Director, we first determine whether the petition warrants the institution of an inter partes review under § 314. Id. (“the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 . . . determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314”). The statute allows for a patent owner preliminary response, and we read 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) as requiring us to consider all of patent owner’s arguments, including those related to discretionary denial under section 314(a). The unique circumstances of this case persuade us to exercise discretion and not institute review. The district court entered final judgment on November 15, 2019. Ex. 2002. Claims 1, 9, and 16 of the ’929 Patent were held to be unpatentable pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id.; Ex. 1021. IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 12 Patent Owner disclaimed claims 5, 8, and 13 of the ’929 patent on December 18, 2019. Petitioner then filed the current Petition on January 3, 2020. At the point when the Petition was filed, all but one of the Challenged Claims had either been disclaimed or found to be unpatentable subject matter in a final district court decision. The Fintiv factors provide support for exercising discretion not to institute this Petition. See Fintiv Order, Paper 11 at 5–6. The district court case cannot be stayed because it has concluded. We would endeavor to meet our statutory deadline in December 2020, one year after the district court issued final judgment. The parties’ and district court’s investment in the district court case was sufficient to already reach a final adjudication. Now, the parties are involved in a Federal Circuit appeal that may or may not affirm the district court’s determinations. Petitioner and the defendant in the district court case are also the same party. These factors favor exercising discretion. The issues do not necessarily overlap between the petition and the parallel proceeding because the district court reached final judgment based on 35 U.S.C. § 101, which is not before us. We also weigh the potential burdens, and joining Patent Owner to an already existing proceeding would not increase the burden for Patent Owner or for the Board. These factors favor not exercising discretion and instituting review. The General Plastic factors also provide guidance for exercising our discretion. See General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19, 15–16 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential). In our precedential decision in General Plastic, we articulated a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in evaluating IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 13 whether to exercise discretion, under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), to deny a petition that challenges a patent that was previously challenged before the Board. These factors are: 1. whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition directed to the same claims of the same patent; 2. whether at the time of filing of the first petition the petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the second petition or should have known of it; 3. whether at the time of filing of the second petition the petitioner already received the patent owner’s preliminary response to the first petition or received the Board’s decision on whether to institute review in the first petition; 4. the length of time that elapsed between the time the petitioner learned of the prior art asserted in the second petition and the filing of the second petition; 5. whether the petitioner provides adequate explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to the same claims of the same patent; 6. the finite resources of the Board; and 7. the requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) to issue a final determination not later than 1 year after the date on which the Director notices institution of review. Id. at 16. General Plastic Factors 1–4 As noted above, Petitioner filed IPR2019-00829 on March 25, 2019, which was already near the end of Petitioner’s statutory period. We denied institution on the merits on October 1, 2019. The Challenged Claims were part of this prior petition. Petitioner’s second petition, the current Petition, was filed on January 3, 2020. At that time, Petitioner had already received the Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response in IPR2019-00829 as well as our decision denying institution. IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 14 Petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the current Petition at least as of April 6, 2019 – the date Facebook filed its petition in IPR2019-00940. Prelim. Resp. 3; Ex. 2001. Thus, Petitioner waited at least nine months after learning of the asserted prior art to bring the second petition. These factors favor exercising our discretion to deny institution. General Plastic Factors 5–7 Petitioner’s explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to nearly the same claims of the same patent consists of the following: Petitioner is also unaware of any basis under § 314(a) for the Board to decline to consider this Petition. As discussed in section I.B., Facebook previously filed an IPR petition challenging the ’929 patent on April 6, 2019. (Ex. 1022). Snap obtained Facebook’s petition, after it was filed and publicly available, from the Patent Office. Snap’s petition is a substantively identical copy of Facebook’s ’929 petition. (See Ex. 1022). Pet. 3. Petitioner does not address why we should institute a petition challenging claims that have already been disclaimed or found unpatentable by a district court. Petitioner also does not address the delay in bringing the current Petition even though Petitioner was aware of the prior art for at least nine months. The facts of this proceeding are unique, and Petitioner has not explained adequately why we should not exercise our discretion to deny this Petition. As noted above, the resources of the Board would not be strained because Petitioner seeks to join the Facebook proceeding. See Paper 3, (“[T]he proposed joinder will neither unduly complicate the Facebook proceeding nor delay its schedule.”). Similarly, allowing the Petition would IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 15 not impact our ability to issue a final decision within one year as required by 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11). The decision whether to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on “a balanced assessment of all relevant circumstances in the case, including the merits.” Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 58 (citing General Plastic, Paper 19 at 15). As we determined in the Facebook decision to institute (Facebook, Inc., IPR2019-00940, Paper 13), we did not find the merits to be flawed, and, in fact, found the merits compelling enough to institute. All of these factors favor institution. Weighing the totality of the record before us, we determine that exercising our discretion, under 35 U.S.C. § 314, to deny the Petition in this proceeding is the proper outcome. As noted above, several factors weigh in favor of institution. We are most persuaded, however, by all the factors favoring exercising our discretion, including the advanced phase of the litigation. Despite knowing of the prior art for some time, Petitioner delayed filing the Petition until after all of the Challenged Claims (except dependent claim 10) had either been disclaimed or found to be unpatentable subject matter in a final district court decision. Claim 10 is not at issue in the district court case. III. CONCLUSION Although we are guided by our precedent in Fintiv and General Plastic, we are unaware of prior decisions addressing a scenario where a district court has issued final judgment holding the Challenged Claims unpatentable pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101. Under the circumstances presented here, we do not consider it an efficient use of Board resources to institute an inter partes review where all but one of the remaining Challenged Claims have already been adjudicated by an Article III court. IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 16 Petitioner had one opportunity to challenge the ’929 patent and that petition (IPR2019-00829) was denied. Although Petitioner knew of the asserted prior art for at least nine months, Petitioner delayed filing the current Petition until after Patent Owner filed a disclaimer and the district court issued its final judgment. Instituting inter partes review now would defeat the objective of being “a timely, cost effective alternative to litigation,” since litigation already concluded. See 77 F. Reg. 48680-01 (Aug. 14, 2012) (emphasis added). Petitioner does not address any of these issues. Petitioner chose to adjudicate fully its case in district court and under the unique circumstances before us, we see no reason why an additional inter partes review is warranted. For the foregoing reasons, we exercise our delegated discretion, under 35 U.S.C. § 314, to deny the Petition in this proceeding. Because we deny institution of the Petition, we also deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. IV. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted; and, FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder (Paper 3) is denied. IPR2020-00392 Patent 8,676,929 B2 17 PETITIONER: Yar R. Chaikovsky David Okano PAUL HASTINGS LLP yarchaikovsky@paulhastings.com davidokano@paulhastings.com PATENT OWNER: James M. Glass Ognjen Zivojnovic Sam Stake John McKee QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN LLP jimglass@quinnemanuel.com ogizivojnovic@quinnemanuel.com samstake@quinnemanuel.com johnmckee@quinnemanuel.com Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation