BIZ TRAVEL SOLUTIONS, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 16, 2020

2019005356 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 16, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/511,868 10/10/2014 Lynn C. HAMPER 9699.001US4/GSB 5918
39564 7590 06/16/2020
FisherBroyles, LLP - MAIN CN
945 East Paces Ferry Road NE
Suite 2000
Atlanta, GA 30326
EXAMINER
MUTSCHLER, JOSEPH M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3627
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/16/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@fisherbroyles.com
patent@fisherbroyles.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte LYNN C. HAMPER
____________________

Appeal 2019-0053561
Application 14/511,868
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before ERIC S. FRAHM, JOYCE CRAIG, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL,
Administrative Patent Judges.

FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF CASE
Introduction
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 3, 4, and 8. Claims 1, 2, 5–7, and 9 have been canceled (see

1 Throughout this Opinion, we refer to: (1) the Final Office Action mailed
June 12, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed January 29, 2019
(“Appeal Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed May 2, 2019 (“Ans.”);
and (4) the Reply Brief filed July 2, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. “The word ‘applicant’ when used in this title refers to the
inventor or all of the joint inventors, or to the person applying for a patent as
provided in §§ 1.43, 1.45, or 1.46.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant
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Amendment filed May 8, 2018 (pp. 2–6)). We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Appellant’s Disclosed and Claimed Invention
Appellant’s invention, entitled “System and Method for Ensuring
Accurate Reimbursement for Travel Expenses” (Title), “relates generally to
computing systems” (Spec. ¶ 2), and more specifically to an expense
verification system (see Fig. 1, 100; Fig. 10). As noted by Appellant,
“[c]hanges in the airline industry have increased the opportunities for
inaccurate reimbursement requests” (Spec. ¶ 4), and there can be difficulty
in complying with company policies that can either vary from company to
company, or with a single company over time (Spec. ¶ 4). As such, “[t]hese
factors place a particularly heavy burden on an employee, etc. to accurately
report expenses to his/her employer, etc., and present ample opportunities
for an ill-intentioned person to obtain unauthorized or excessive travel
reimbursement, resulting in a loss to the company” (Spec. ¶ 4). With this in
mind, Appellant’s claimed invention concerns “[a] computer-implemented
method” (claim 3), and “[a]n expense verification system” (claim 8), “for
ensuring accurate reimbursement of travel expenses” (claims 3, 8).
Exemplary Claim
Independent claim 3 under appeal is exemplary. Claim 3, with
bracketed lettering, formatting, and emphases added to key portions of the
claim at issue, reads as follows:

identifies the real party in interest as Biz Travel Solutions, LLC (Appeal Br.
2).
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3. A computer-implemented method for ensuring
accurate reimbursement of travel expenses by a computerized
expense verification system comprising at least a processor and
a memory operatively connected to the processor, the method
comprising the computerized expense verification system
operating the processor under control of processor-executable
instructions stored in the memory to:

[A] store in the memory of the computerized expense
verification system a plurality of rules for reimbursement of
travel expenses consistent with a company’s travel policy;

[B] receive from an external system via a
communications network, at the computerized expense
verification system, travel reservation record data comprising
a reference code for a ticketed travel reservation;

[C] process, at the computerized expense verification
system, the travel reservation record data to identify the
reference code;

[D] query, by data transmission via a communications
network, a company-independent system to retrieve passenger
name record data corresponding to the parsed reference code;

[E] process, at the computerized expense verification
system, the passenger name record data received via the
communications network to identify an agency identifier
uniquely identifying a travel agent;

[F] determine, at the computerized expense verification
system, whether the agency identifier reflects compliance with
company policy as determined by at least one of the plurality of
stored rules; and

[G] issue an exception alert identifying non-compliance
with the company’s travel policy if the difference does not
reflect compliance.
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Appeal Br. 17, Claims Appendix (emphases, formatting, and bracketed
lettering added). Remaining independent claim 8 recites commensurate
limitations pertaining to “[a]n expense verification system” (claim 8) for
performing the method of claim 3.
Examiner’s Rejections
(1) Claims 3, 4, and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (an abstract idea), without
significantly more. Final Act. 4–8; Ans. 3–6.
(2) Claims 3, 4, and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Fredericks et al. (US 2004/0167808 A1; published Aug.
26, 2004) (hereinafter, “Fredericks”), Mehovic (US 6,122,642; issued Sept.
19, 2000), Hurley et al. (US 2011/0231212 A1; published Sept. 22, 2011)
(hereinafter, “Hurley”), Donnelly et al. (US 2002/0143621 A1; published
Oct. 3, 2002) (hereinafter, “Donnelly”), and Official Notice. Final Act. 9–
16; Ans. 6–8.
Appellant’s Contentions
(1) With regard to the patent eligibility rejection, Appellant primarily
makes arguments regarding claim 3, rely on those arguments for the
eligibility of claims 4 and 8, and generally contends the claims are not
directed to an abstract idea (e.g., math concepts, methods of organizing
human activity, mental processes), but to improvements in computer
function (see Appeal Br. 5–12; Reply Br. 2–4).
Therefore, based on Appellant’s patent eligibility arguments, and
because claims 3, 4, and 8 contain commensurate limitations, we select
claim 3 as representative of claims 3, 4, and 8 rejected under 35 U.S.C.
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§ 101 for patent-ineligibility.
(2) With regard to the obviousness rejection of claims 3, 4, and 8,
Appellant primarily argues the merits of independent claim 3 and relies on
those arguments for the patentability of independent claim 8 (see Appeal Br.
12–16; Reply Br. 4–6). Although Appellant argues dependent claim 4
separately (see Appeal Br. 15–16; Reply Br. 6), Appellant simply states
what claim 4 recites, and contends this subject matter is neither taught nor
suggested by the prior art, without any further explanation or citation to
specific claim language or portions of the references. Such contentions are
not considered a separate argument for patentability. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“A statement which merely points out what a
claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of
the claim.”); In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold
that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive
arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and
a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the
prior art.”); see also In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(conclusory assertions without supporting explanation or analysis
particularly pointing out errors in the Examiner’s reasoning fall well short of
persuasively rebutting the Examiner’s prima facie case of obviousness).
Therefore, we find the arguments regarding claim 3 dispositive of all
claims rejected for obviousness, and select claim 3 as representative.
Principal Issues on Appeal
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (Appeal Br. 5–
16) and the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2–7), the following two principal issues
are presented on appeal:
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(1) Has Appellant shown the Examiner erred in rejecting
representative claim 3, as well as claims 4 and 8 grouped therewith, under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (i.e., a
judicial exception such as an abstract idea), without significantly more?
(2) Has Appellant shown the Examiner erred in rejecting
representative claim 3, as well as claims 4 and 8 grouped therewith, under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Fredericks,
Mehovic, Hurley, Donnelly, and Official Notice?

ANALYSIS
Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
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risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
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to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).3 Under the Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong 1”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, updating and clarifying the Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
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PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th Ed., Rev.
08.2017, 2018) (“Step 2A, Prong 2”).4
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception (“Step 2B”).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
Even if the claim recites an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit explains
the “directed to” inquiry is not simply asking whether the claims involve a
patent-ineligible concept:
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical
products and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural
phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world.
See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (“For all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”) Rather, the “directed to”
inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light
of the specification, based on whether “their character as a
whole is directed to excluded subject matter.”

4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Guidance — Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 54–
55.
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Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“In determining the eligibility of respondents’
claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be
considered as a whole.”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a
whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”).
Step 1
Under Step 1 of the patent-eligibility inquiry under § 101, we
determine whether a claim is directed to one of the four statutory categories
of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
In the instant case on appeal, representative claim 3 recites “[a]
computer-implemented method for ensuring accurate reimbursement of
travel expenses” (claim 3, preamble) including a series of steps for
determining compliance with company policy (claim 3, limitation F) and
issuing an alert when non-compliance is identified (claim 3, limitation G).
Therefore, claim 3, as a method claim reciting a process having a series of
steps, recites at least one of the enumerated categories (e.g., process) of
eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
As a result, as to claim 3, as well as claims 4 and 8 grouped therewith,
we continue our analysis under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Guidance to
determine whether claim 3 recites a judicial exception (a law of nature,
natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the enumerated groupings of
abstract ideas above).

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Step 2A, Prong 1
Although claim 3 recites a “method for ensuring accurate
reimbursement of travel expenses” (see claim 3, preamble) including storing
and receiving reimbursement rules and travel reservation record data (claim
3, limitations A and B), querying to retrieve passenger name record data
(claim 3, limitation D), and issuing an alert upon identifying non-compliance
(claim 3, limitation G), the focus of claim 3 is on performing the steps of a
mental process, e.g., processing travel reservations and reimbursing for
travel expenses (see Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). The
mental process includes steps C, E, and F set forth in the body of claim 3,
that make up an organization of human activity, such as identifying a
reference code in travel reservation record data (claim 3, limitation C),
evaluating passenger name record data to identify an agency identifier
unique to a travel agent (claim 3, limitation E), and evaluating whether there
is compliance with company policy according to rules (claim 3, limitation
F), which constitute a business relation between people or commercial
transaction. As such, the claimed invention recites a mental process, which
is an abstract idea. See, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839
F.3d 1138, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A]nalyzing information by steps people
[can] go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without
more [are] mental processes within the abstract-idea category.”); Clarilogic
Inc. v. FormFree Holdings Corp., 681 F. App’x 950, 954–55 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (gathering, analyzing, and outputting financial data/assessment is an
abstract idea that is patent ineligible); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital
One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (targeted marketing
is a form of “tailoring information based on [provided] data,” which has
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been previously held by the Federal Circuit to be an abstract idea, and a
concept that is a “fundamental practice” that dates back to newspaper
advertisements); Morsa v. Facebook, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1014 (C.D.
Cal. 2014) (finding that both “targeting advertisements to certain consumers,
and using a bidding system to determine when and how advertisements will
be displayed” are abstract ideas), aff’d per curiam, 622 F. App’x 915 (Fed.
Cir. 2015); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (determining that using an advertisement as an exchange or currency
is an abstract idea).
At a high level, representative claim 3 recites a method operating on a
“computerized expense verification system comprising at least a processor
and a memory” (i.e., a computer device; see Fig. 1, expense verification
system 100; Fig. 10, general purpose computer 102 and memory 118) for
performing the method of “ensuring accurate reimbursement of travel
expenses” in accordance with “rules for reimbursement of travel expenses”
and “compliance with company policy” (claim 3; Spec. ¶¶ 25–27, 99, 100).
As set forth in limitations A–G of claim 3, the method is performed by
processing the rules consistent with company policies, travel reservation
record data, and passenger name record data to determine compliance with
company policy to issue an alert identifying non-compliance. The Examiner
determines, and we agree, that claim 3 recites certain methods of organizing
human activity and mental processes (see Ans. 3–4), such as “receiving,
analyzing and processing travel reservation data to determine and issue
alerts” (Final Act. 4).
Our reviewing court has also concluded that abstract ideas include the
concepts of collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected data
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set, and storing the data in memory. Content Extraction & Transmission
LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2014); see also Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873
F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding “claims directed to the
collection, storage, and recognition of data are directed to an abstract idea”).
Moreover, our reviewing court has concluded that acts of parsing,
comparing, storing, and editing data are abstract ideas. Berkheimer v. HP
Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In addition, the collection of
information and analysis of information (e.g., recognizing certain data
within the dataset) are also abstract ideas. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Similarly, “collecting,
displaying, and manipulating data” is an abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures
I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see
also SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“[M]erely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and
analyzing information . . . is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection
and analysis”) (quotations omitted).
In addition, our reviewing court has held that combining several
abstract ideas (e.g., like a mental process and a fundamental economic
activity as here) does not render the combination any less abstract.
RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(“Adding one abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does not render
the claim non-abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.,
839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (patent-ineligible claims were
directed to a combination of abstract ideas).
In view of the foregoing, we conclude claim 3 recites processing
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travel reservations and reimbursing for travel expenses, which is a mental
process and method of organizing human activity, such as a commercial
interaction and/or business relation between people. Because we conclude
claim 3 recites an abstract idea and/or combination of abstract ideas, we
proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance to determine whether claim 3 is
“directed to” the judicial exception, by determining whether additional
elements of the claim integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Such additional elements may reflect an improvement to a technology or
technical field. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Step 2A, Prong 2 – Practical Application
Under Step 2A, Prong 2, we determine whether the recited judicial
exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. If the
recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, the claim
is not directed to the judicial exception.
Appellant contends that claim 3 is not directed to an abstract idea, but
“to an improvement in the functioning of a computer or other technology or
technological field, and in particular, an[] improvement to computerized
fraud/error detection systems” (Appeal Br. 9), and “an improved
computerized expense verification system that provides for fraud/error
detection” (Appeal Br. 9), and solves the technical problem of “permitting
payment and/or reimbursement of travel expenses that should not occur, as
they are contrary to company policy” (Appeal Br. 9), through the application
of “novel instructions stored in its memory” (Appeal Br. 10). Appellant
contends the claimed invention includes meaningful limitations “that
provide[] a technological advance in the field of fraud detection” (Appeal
Br. 11). Thus, Appellant argues the invention recited in claim 3 “recite[s] a
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particular methodology for performing a process for ensuring accurate
reimbursement of travel expenses by performing certain audit-like processes
in a unique and creative fashion to provide for more accurate fraud/error
detection” (Reply Br. 3).
We disagree with Appellant (see Appeal Br. 7–11; Reply Br. 3–4) that
the focus of claim 3 is on a technical improvement (or practical application
of the abstract idea). “[M]erely selecting information, by content or source,
for collection [and] analysis . . . does nothing significant to differentiate a
process from ordinary mental processes.” Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355.
Receiving and analyzing (or identifying data), by itself, does not transform
an otherwise-abstract process or system of information collection and
analysis. See id. Like the claims at issue in Electric Power, we find
Appellant’s claim 3 does not invoke “any assertedly inventive
programming” or an “arguably inventive set of components or methods.” Id.
The mere recitation of identifying and processing travel, passenger,
and company information in claim 3 does not embody an improvement in
computer capabilities as in Enfish. See 822 F.3d at 1336 (“[T]he plain focus
of the claims is on an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on
economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary
capacity.”). Rather, the focus of claim 3 is on determining compliance with
company policies concerning travel reimbursement. This is an improvement
to help the user and/or employer, but not the computer itself (or in the case
of claim 3, the memory and processor of the computing device, and/or the
communications network, company-independent system, or external system
set forth in the claim). Claim 3 does not recite a method that improves the
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speed or efficiency of the communications network or computer systems, or
otherwise improves any of these elements.
To the extent that the claimed method performs fraud detection in
travel expense reimbursements faster or more accurately than other
computerized methods, that would not provide an improvement to the
computer itself. See, e.g., Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d
1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in order for a machine to add
significantly more, it must “play a significant part in permitting the claimed
method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious
mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly”)
(emphasis added); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089,
1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“While the claimed system and method certainly
purport to accelerate the process of analyzing audit log data, the speed
increase comes from the capabilities of a general-purpose computer, rather
than the patented method itself”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a
computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed
subject matter”).
The claimed invention (see claim 3) stores and receives/retrieves data
(e.g., rules and travel reservation record data in limitations A and B, and
passenger name record data in limitation E); analyzes data (e.g., processing
in limitation C and E, and determining compliance in limitation F); and then
issues an exception alert upon detection of non-compliance (e.g., limitation
G). Thus, the steps of (i) limitations A, B, and E are merely conventional
data gathering and analysis (see MPEP § 2106.05(g); OIP Techs., Inc. v.
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Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Elec. Power, 830
F.3d at 1354); and (ii) limitation G is insignificant extra-solution activity that
does not meaningfully limit the claim (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)). As such,
based on the record before us, we determine that the claimed invention is not
integrated into a practical application.
Merely adding a programmed computer to perform generic computer
functions does not automatically overcome an eligibility rejection. Alice,
573 U.S. at 223–24. Furthermore, the use of a general purpose computer to
apply an otherwise ineligible algorithm does not qualify as a particular
machine. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716–17; In re TLI Commc’ns LLC
v. AV Automotive, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (mere recitation
of concrete or tangible components is not an inventive concept); Eon Corp.
IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(noting that Alappat’s rationale that an otherwise ineligible algorithm or
software could be made patent-eligible by merely adding a generic computer
to the claim was superseded by the Supreme Court’s Bilski and Alice
decisions). In the instant case, using a computer to more accurately ensure
reimbursement of travel expenses is nothing more than the abstract idea
itself.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Appellant’s claim 3
(and claims 4 and 8 grouped therewith) invokes generic computer
components (computer systems, memory, processor, communications
network) merely as tools in which the computer instructions apply the
judicial exception and, thus, the abstract idea is not integrated into a
practical application. Because Appellant has not persuaded us the
Examiner’s determination that claim 3 recites an abstract idea under Step 2A
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is in error, and claim 3 recites a judicial exception (i.e., the abstract idea of a
method of organizing human activity and/or mental process) that is not
integrated into a practical application, in accordance with the Guidance, we
conclude claim 3 and claims 4 and 8 grouped therewith, are directed to an
abstract idea under Step 2A, and the eligibility analysis with regard to claims
3, 4, and 8 proceeds to Step 2B.
Step 2B — Inventive Concept
Having determined claim 3 and claims 4 and 8 grouped therewith are
directed to an abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application,
we now evaluate whether the additional elements, whether examined alone
or as an ordered combination, add a specific limitation that is not well-
understood, routine, or conventional activity in the field, or simply append
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract idea. See
generally Guidance.
Here, claim 3 recites the additional elements of “a computerized
expense verification system comprising at least a processor and a memory”
(claim 3, preamble) connected to “a company-independent system” (claim 3,
limitation D) and “an external system via a communications network” (claim
3, limitation B). Considering claim 3 as a whole, none of the additional
elements applies or uses the abstract idea in a meaningful way such that the
claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception.
Although Appellant contends the instructions performing the recited
method stored in the memory are novel (see Appeal Br. 10–12), we agree
with the Examiner (Ans. 3) that at least paragraph 25 and Figure 10
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(showing a general purpose computer 102) support the Examiner’s finding
in this regard. In addition, the Examiner determines, and we agree, that the
only elements beyond the abstract idea are generic computer components or
combinations of generic components used to perform generic computer
functions (Final Act. 7–8; Ans. 3, 5–6) — a determination that is supported
by Appellant’s Figures 1 and 10 and the accompanying descriptions found in
the Specification (see Spec. ¶¶ 25–27, 99, 100). Appellant’s Specification
only shows (see Figs. 1, 10) and describes (see e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 25–27, 99, 100)
well-understood, routine, conventional computer components used for
ensuring accurate reimbursement of travel expenses (e.g., a computing
device/system, processor, memory, and communications network) that are in
a general purpose computing environment in a manner that indicates the
components and the functions they perform were well-known in the art.
See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that “a patent need not teach, and preferably
omits, what is well known in the art”); see also USPTO, Memorandum on
Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility,
Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) at 3
(Apr. 19, 2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/memo-berkheimer-20180419.PDF (explaining that a
specification that describes additional elements “in a manner that indicates
that the additional elements are sufficiently well-known that the
specification does not need to describe the particulars of such additional
elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can show that the elements are well
understood, routine, and conventional); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie
Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile
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interface is so lacking in implementation details that it amounts to merely a
generic component (software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the
performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-specific
resources.”).
Specifically, Appellant’s Specification states that “[s]uch systems are
well-known in the art” (Spec. ¶¶ 26, 27, 31; see also Spec. ¶¶ 29, 30), and
“may include conventional computerized hardware and software” (Spec.
¶ 32). Further, regarding the expense verification system recited in claim 3,
Appellant describes that:
the expense verification system 100 of Figure 10 includes a
general purpose processor and a bus 104 employed to connect
and enable communication between the processor 102 and the
components of the expense verification system 100 in
accordance with known techniques.

Spec. ¶ 99 (emphases added). And, Appellant states that “[s]uch
configurations, as well as the appropriate communications hardware and
software, are known in the art” (Spec. ¶ 100).
As a result, we are not persuaded that the travel reimbursement and
compliance determinations recited in claim 3 are anything beyond generic
computer functions as opposed to an improvement to a fundamental
economic practice and/or method of organizing human activity. Considering
the elements of claim 3 individually and as an ordered combination, claim 3
does no more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract
idea on a generic computer, processor, and/or user interface. Dealertrack,
Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Simply adding a
‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without
more, is insufficient to render [a] claim patent eligible.”)
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Additionally, as noted in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II), the courts have
previously recognized that using computer processors and memories to
collect data and keep records, perform repetitive calculations, and/or
receive/send data are well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions
when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of
generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)(II)(i)–(iv)). See also Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1366 (acts of
parsing, comparing, storing, and editing data are abstract ideas); SAP Am.,
Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[M]erely
presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing
information . . . is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and
analysis”); Intellectual Ventures I, 850 F.3d at 1340 (“collecting, displaying,
and manipulating data” is an abstract idea); Smart Sys., 873 F.3d at 1372
(concluding “claims directed to the collection, storage, and recognition of
data are directed to an abstract idea.”).
As a result, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred with
respect to the Guidance’s Step 2B analysis. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
Step 2B.
Summary
As explained above, under the USPTO’s Revised Patent Eligibility
Guidance, based on the record before us, and informed by our governing
case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not sufficiently shown
the Examiner erred in rejecting representative claim 3, as well as claims 4
and 8 grouped therewith, as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter
without significantly more, and we sustain the rejection of claims 3, 4, and 8
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103
We have reviewed the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 3,
4, and 8 (Final Act. 9–16), and response to Appellant’s arguments in the
Appeal Brief (Ans. 6–8), in light of Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal
Brief (Appeal Br. 12–16) and the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 4–6) that the
Examiner has erred. With regard to representative claim 3, Appellant has
not persuasively shown the Examiner erred in rejecting the claim for
obviousness (see Final Act. 9–15). Our reasoning follows.
The USPTO “must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor
Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that, as an
administrative agency, the PTAB “must articulate logical and rational
reasons for [its] decisions” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
In the instant case on appeal, the Examiner has met this burden (see
Final Act. 9–15; Ans. 6–8). Based on the record before us, we find that the
Examiner has properly established factual determinations and articulated
reasoning with a rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness for claim 3, resulting in establishing a prima facie of
obviousness.
An appellant may attempt to overcome an examiner’s obviousness
rejection on appeal to the Board by submitting arguments and/or evidence to
show that the examiner made an error in either (1) an underlying finding of
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fact upon which the final conclusion of obviousness was based, or (2) the
reasoning used to reach the legal conclusion of obviousness. Similarly, the
applicant may submit evidence of secondary considerations of non-
obviousness. Ex Parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072 (BPAI 2010) (precedential);
see also In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985–86 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing In re
Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (Appellant has the
opportunity on appeal to the Board to demonstrate error in the Examiner’s
position).
Appellant argues that Mehovic, and thus the cited prior art alone or in
combination, fails to teach or suggest (i) a company-independent system for
retrieving passenger name record data as recited in limitation D; and (ii)
performing the querying step set forth in limitation D using an expense
verification system, without explaining, by citation to Mehovic and/or
Fredericks, why (see Appeal Br. 13; Reply Br. 4).
It is well settled that mere lawyer’s arguments and conclusory
statements, which are unsupported by factual evidence, are entitled to little
probative value (In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997; In re
De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984)), and that the arguments of
counsel cannot take the place of evidence in the record. In re Schulze, 346
F.2d 600, 602 (CCPA 1965). Therefore, we accord very little probative
value to Appellant’s conclusory statements that Mehovic, and thus the
combination fails to teach or suggest an expense verification system for
querying as set forth in limitation D.
On the other hand, the Examiner makes explicit findings, citing to
Mehovic’s Figures 3 and 8, column 2, lines 7 through 20, and column 9, lines
30–35 (see Final Act. 11; Ans. 6–7), along with reasoning as to how the
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combination of Fredericks and Mehovic “teach[es] the expense verification
system querying a company independent system to retrieve PNR data
corresponding to the parsed reference code” (Ans. 7). In addition, the
Examiner relies on Fredericks, and not Mehovic, as teaching the claimed
“computerized expense verification system” (claim 3, preamble), as stated at
pages 9 through 10 of the Final Rejection. Specifically, the Examiner maps
Fredericks’ “expense management system 110” (Final Act. 10), shown in
Figure 2 and described in paragraphs 41 and 44, to the recited “computerized
expense verification system” (claim 3). Appellant does not dispute this
finding.
With regard to limitations E and F, Appellant argues the cited prior art
does not disclose the subject matter set forth in these limitations (see Appeal
Br. 14; Reply Br. 4–5). However, we agree with the Examiner that the
combination of Hurley and Donnelly teaches or suggests limitations E and F
(see Final Act. 12–14; Ans. 7–8).
The Examiner relies on Hurley (see Final Act. 12; Ans. 7 both citing
Hurley ¶ 214) as teaching identifying a travel agency identifier in a passenger
name record (PNR) as recited in limitation E of claim 3. Table 1 of Hurley,
listed as part of paragraph 214, shows data fields 12 and 13 corresponding to
data categories respectively entitled “Travel agency” and “Travel agent” (see
¶ 214, Table 1). Appellant admits that “[t]his is well-known in the art”
(Appeal Br. 14), and is disclosed by Hurley.
The Examiner relies on Donnelly (see Final Act. 13–14; Ans. 7–8
both citing Donnelly ¶ 123) as teaching determining compliance with a
company policy as recited in limitation F of claim 3. The Examiner also
cites Hurley for teaching enforcement of policies using agency identifiers
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(see Final Act. 14). Donnelly describes a voucher approval page 3300 (see
¶ 123; Figs. 33A–G) for review and approval, where approval is “based
upon a preferred list of travel agents or 3rd party vendors” (¶ 123). Appellant
does not dispute these findings.
Instead, Appellant contends that Donnelly allows for a person to
intentionally or erroneously misidentify the travel agent when inputting the
information (see Appeal Br. 14; Reply Br. 5 both citing Donnelly ¶ 115; Fig.
26). Notably, the Examiner did not rely on the alternative embodiment
described in paragraph 115 and shown in Figure 26, which allows
modification of field 2602 as Appellant asserts. Again, Appellant has
provided no evidence on this record to contradict the Examiner’s findings
regarding Donnelly, apart from mere conclusory statements that Donnelly
would introduce error in an alternative embodiment not relied on by the
Examiner. Geisler, 116 F.3d at 1470; In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d at 705.
Moreover, Appellant does not provide evidence, such as by way of
affidavit or declaration, to establish that one of ordinary skill in the art
would understand that the method steps performed in claim 3 would
“dramatically impact the results of the audit analysis” (Appeal Br. 15; Reply
Br. 5), or provide various other benefits (see Appeal Br. 14–15; Reply Br.
5–6). Rather, only attorney argument was presented regarding the
unexpected results and benefits.
In view of the foregoing, Appellant has not adequately shown the
Examiner’s prima facie case of obviousness as to representative claim 3 to
be in error.

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CONCLUSIONS
(1) As explained above, under the USPTO’s Revised Patent Eligibility
Guidance, based on the record before us, and informed by our governing
case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not shown the Examiner
erred in rejecting representative claim 3, as well as claims 4 and 8 grouped
therewith, as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter without
significantly more, and we sustain the rejection of claims 3, 4, and 8 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
(2) In addition, Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in
rejecting representative claim 3, as well as claims 4 and 8 grouped therewith,
as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103, and we sustain the
obviousness rejection of claims 3, 4, and 8 as being obvious over the
combination of Fredericks, Mehovic, Hurley, Donnelly, and Official Notice.
In summary, for all of the reasons above, we affirm the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 3, 4, and 8, and we hold as follows:

Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
3, 4, 8 101 Eligibility 3, 4, 8
3, 4, 8 103 Fredericks,
Mehovic, Hurley,
Donnelly, Official
Notice
3, 4, 8
Overall
Outcome
3, 4, 8

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. §§ 41.50(f), 41.52(b) (2013).

AFFIRMED