BINDER, Yehuda et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 10, 2020

15361434 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 10, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/361,434 11/27/2016 Yehuda BINDER BINDER-014-US2 2519
131926 7590 06/10/2020
May Patents Ltd. c/o Dorit Shem-Tov
P.O.B 7230
Ramat-Gan, 5217102
ISRAEL
EXAMINER
KHAN, HASSAN ABDUR-RAHMAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2456
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/10/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte YEHUDA BINDER and BENJAMIN MAYTAL
____________

Appeal 2019-000272
Application 15/361,434
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, JUSTIN BUSCH, and LINZY T.
McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judges.

JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 21–40. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as May Patents Ltd.
Appeal Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention is a control system used in connection with a
vehicle, where the system uses a server implementing gateway or control
functionalities. See Abstract; Spec. 1.2 To this end, the invention uses
sensors that provide information on environmental conditions and events,
and actuators that effect or generate a physical phenomenon responsive to an
electrical command, which can be an electrical signal (e.g., voltage or
current), or by changing a device’s characteristic, such as its resistance or
impedance. Spec. 16–18. Controller functionality can be integrated in a
server 151 external to the vehicle as shown in Figures 15 and 15a, where
sensor data is relayed to the controller via a router inside the vehicle and the
Internet. See Spec. 162–63, 218. Claim 21 is illustrative:
21. A system for controlling a phenomenon in a vehicle for use
with an in-vehicle network for communication in the vehicle, the system
comprising:
an Internet-connected server external to the vehicle connected to an
external network;
a router in the vehicle connected between the in-vehicle network and
the external network for transporting digital data therebetween;
a sensor in the vehicle for producing a first signal in response to the
phenomenon;
a first apparatus in the vehicle that comprises, or is connected to, the
sensor, and operative to transmit the first signal to the router over the in-
vehicle network;
an actuator in the vehicle for affecting the phenomenon in response to
a second signal; and
a second apparatus in the vehicle that comprises, or is connected to,
the actuator, and operative to receive the second signal from the router over
the in-vehicle network,

2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the substitute Specification filed
November 29, 2017.
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wherein the system is configured to transmit the first signal to the
server by the router over the external network, to produce by the server the
second signal in response to the first signal, and to receive the second signal
from the server by the router over the external network.

RELATED APPEALS
On page 2 of the Appeal Brief, Appellant informs us of one related
appeal in copending application 13/733,634. That appeal has been decided.
See Ex parte Binder, Appeal 2018-007694 (PTAB Mar. 2, 2020) (“Bd.
Dec.”), reh’g denied (PTAB May 18, 2020).
Although not indicated in the Appeal Brief or Reply Brief, this appeal
is also related to three other appeals in copending applications 15/361,434;
15/716,881; and 15/657,163, the latter of which has been decided. See Ex
parte Binder, Appeal 2019-002056 (PTAB May 4, 2020).

THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 21–40 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph as indefinite. Final Act. 3.3
The Examiner rejected claims 21–36 and 38–40 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Addepalli (US 2014/0215491 Al; published July
31, 2014) and Norris (US 2007/0198144 Al; published Aug. 23, 2007).
Final Act. 4–15.

3 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Rejection mailed August
6, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed August 26, 2018 (“Appeal
Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed October 2, 2018 (“Ans.”); and
(4) the Reply Brief filed October 10, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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The Examiner rejected claim 37 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Addepalli, Norris, and Gelvin (US 2015/0046582 Al;
published Feb. 12, 2015). Final Act. 15–16.

THE INDEFINITENESS REJECTION
The Examiner determines that the claims are indefinite because, when
read in light of the Specification, it is unclear what particular structure
corresponds to the recited first and second apparatuses and server, thus
rendering the claims’ scope “unclear and confusing.” Final Act. 3; Ans. 4.
Appellant argues that the Examiner not only confuses the claims’
breadth with indefiniteness, but also fails to show why skilled artisans would
not understand the claimed invention. Appeal Br. 4–5; Reply Br. 2–3.

ISSUE
Has the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 21–40 under § 112, second
paragraph as indefinite? This issue turns on whether ordinarily skilled
artisans would understand what is meant by the recited first and second
apparatuses and server.

ANALYSIS
We begin by noting that the claimed first and second apparatuses are
not recited in terms of what they are, but rather what they do, namely that
they transmit and receive signals to and from the router, respectively. That
is, apart from indicating that the first and second apparatuses are in a vehicle
and connected to (or comprise) the sensor and actuator, respectively, the
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claim recites no particular apparatus structure to perform the recited signal
transmission and reception functions.
Although omitting the term “means” in a claim element creates a
rebuttable presumption that § 112, sixth paragraph does not apply, such an
omission does not automatically prevent that element from being construed
as a means-plus-function element. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). In such a case, § 112, sixth
paragraph will apply if the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite
structure, or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for
performing that function. See id. at 1349.
That is the case here. The term “apparatus” is merely a generic
description for a device that performs the recited functions, despite the
recited apparatuses being in a vehicle and connected to (or comprising) the
sensor and actuator, respectively. That is, the recited “first apparatus” and
“second apparatus” are merely nonce words or “non-structural generic
placeholders” that are equivalent to the term “means” because they fail to
connote sufficiently definite structure and, in the context of the claimed
invention, invoke § 112, sixth paragraph. Cf. id. at 1350 (noting that generic
terms such as “mechanism,” “element,” “device,” and other nonce words
that reflect nothing more than verbal constructs may be recited in a manner
that is tantamount to using the word “means” because they typically do not
connote sufficiently definite structure and, therefore, may invoke § 112,
sixth paragraph); see also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP)
§ 2181(I)(A) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018) (including the term
“apparatus for” in a list of non-structural generic placeholders that may
invoke § 112, second paragraph). Nor do the apparatuses’ respective
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modifying terms, namely “first” and “second,” add sufficient structure to the
recited elements to preclude § 112, sixth paragraph construction, for they
merely distinguish one apparatus from the other.
Because the recited first and second apparatus limitations are
equivalent to means-plus-function limitations under § 112, sixth paragraph,
they must be construed in light of the corresponding structure in the
Specification and its equivalents. See In re Donaldson Co., Inc., 16 F.3d
1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
On page 3 of the Appeal Brief, Appellant refers to numerals 23a, 23b,
or 23c in Figure 24 for disclosing both the first and second apparatuses.
Appellant also cites the Specification’s (1) page 16, line 13 to page 17, line 2
for disclosing the first apparatus, and (2) page 17, line 13 to page 18, line 9
for disclosing the second apparatus. Appeal Br. 3.
As shown in Appellant’s Figure 24, numerals 23a–c are “field units”
that are connected to control network 22 in vehicle 241. See Spec. 218, 222
(noting that a field unit may connect to a diagnostic connector for accessing
(1) various sensors or actuators coupled to the connector, or (2) information
available via the connector). According to the Specification’s page 18, a
“field unit” refers to an actuator unit, sensor unit, or sensor/actuator unit. An
actuator unit may include one or more actuators, and a sensor unit may
include one or sensors. Spec. 16–17. Notably, both actuator and sensor
units (and therefore field units) may include a modem or transceiver coupled
to a port (such as a connector or antenna) for interfacing and communicating
over a network. See Spec. 16–17; see also id. at 20 (noting that one or more
vehicle networks may be used for communication between two or more field
units, and to allow the field units to communicate with a router).
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This disclosed field unit communication functionality that includes,
among other things, a modem or transceiver, provides the requisite structure
in the Specification corresponding to the first and second apparatuses to
perform their recited functions, namely that they transmit and receive signals
to and from the router, respectively. To the extent the Examiner finds
otherwise (see Final Act. 3; Ans. 4), we disagree.
Although the recited apparatus limitations are effectively means-plus-
function limitations that are construed to cover the corresponding structure
in the Specification and its equivalents as noted above, we nonetheless note
that merely because a claim is broad in scope does not mean that it is
indefinite. See In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 788 (CCPA 1970) (“Breadth is
not indefiniteness.”); MPEP § 2173.04 (citing Gardner). Therefore, to the
extent that the Examiner’s indefiniteness rejection is premised on the recited
apparatuses being recited overly broadly (see Final Act. 3; Ans. 4), such a
determination not only ignores the fact that the term “apparatus” is a nonce
word invoking § 112, sixth paragraph, but runs counter to the fundamental
legal principle that breadth is not indefiniteness as noted above. To the
extent that the Examiner’s rejection is premised on these functional
limitations not being enabled for their scope under § 112, first paragraph,4

4 See In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he
specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and
use the full scope of the claimed invention without ‘undue
experimentation.”’) (emphasis added); see also MPEP § 2164.08 (citing
Wright); Ex parte Rodriguez, 92 USPQ2d 1395, 1406–11 (BPAI 2009)
(precedential) (discussing functional claiming and scope of enablement);
MPEP § 2181(I)(C) (citing Rodriguez).
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no such rejection was made, nor will we engage in that inquiry here in the
first instance on appeal.
We also find problematic the Examiner’s indefiniteness rejection
regarding the recited Internet-connected server configured to (1) receive the
first signal from the router; (2) produce a second signal responsive to the
first signal; and (3) transmit the second signal to the router. On page 3 of the
Appeal Brief, Appellant refers to numeral 24 in Figure 24 for disclosing the
recited server. Appellant also cites the Specification’s (1) page 69, line 21 to
page 70, line 8 and (2) page 70, line 20 to page 71, line 2 for disclosing the
recited server. Appeal Br. 3.
As explained on page 70 of the Specification, the invention includes
an Internet-connected control server, disposed outside an enclosed vehicular
environment, where the server (1) receives sensor data corresponding to
sensor response signals, and (2) executes control logic to generate actuator
commands responsive to the received sensor data. This functionality
considered in light of the functionality shown in connection with numeral 24
in Figure 24 would enable ordinarily skilled artisans to understand the
recited server. To the extent that the Examiner finds otherwise (see Final
Act. 3; Ans. 4), we disagree.
Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 21–40 as indefinite.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER ADDEPALLI AND NORRIS
Regarding independent claim 21, the Examiner finds that Addepalli
discloses a system for controlling a phenomenon in a vehicle for use with an
in-vehicle network, where the system includes (1) an Internet-connected
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server external to the vehicle connected to an external network; (2) a router
in the vehicle connected between the in-vehicle network and the external
network; and (3) a sensor in the vehicle for producing a first signal
responsive to the phenomenon. Final Act. 4–6. Although the Examiner
acknowledges that Addepalli does not expressly disclose the recited first and
second apparatuses, actuator, and signal transmissions to and from the server
in the claim’s last clause, the Examiner cites Norris as teaching these
features in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. Final
Act. 6–8.
Appellant argues that not only is the Examiner’s rejection unclear, but
it is based on an improper rationale, particularly since modifying Addepalli’s
vehicle to read sensor data and receive external commands as the Examiner
proposes changes the operating principle where a human controls the
vehicle. Appeal Br. 6–11; Reply Br. 3–4. Appellant adds that the cited prior
art fails to teach a sensor and actuator associated with the same
phenomenon, let alone a server that produces and transmits a second signal
to a vehicle-based router responsive to a first signal received from the router
as claimed. Appeal Br. 11–12; Reply Br. 3–4. Appellant argues various
other recited limitations summarized below.

ISSUES
I. Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Addepalli and
Norris collectively would have taught or suggested:
(1) a system for controlling a phenomenon in a vehicle configured to
(a) transmit a first signal to an external Internet-connected server by a router
over an external network; (b) produce, by the server, a second signal
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responsive to the first signal; and (c) receive the second signal from the
server by the router over the external network as recited in claim 21 (“the
server signal limitation”)?
(2) the limitations of claims 22, 23, 27, 28, 30, 34, and 39?

II. Is the Examiner’s proposed combination of the cited references
supported by articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion?

ANALYSIS
Claims 21, 24–26, 29, 31–33, 35–38, and 40
As noted above, the Examiner cites Addepalli for teaching the recited
external server and vehicle-based router and sensors, and Norris for teaching
claim 21’s remaining limitations, including the last clause reciting, among
other things, that the server produces a second signal responsive to receiving
the first signal from the vehicle’s router over an external network, where the
second signal is received by the router over that network. See Final Act. 4–
8. On this record, we see no error in the Examiner’s conclusion that claim
21 would have been obvious over these collective teachings.
As shown in Addepalli’s Figure 1, vehicle 4 includes sensors 14a–c
connected to respective electronic control units (ECUs) 16a–c that are
connected to Ethernet gateway switch 70 associated with the vehicle’s on-
board unit (OBU) 30. Addepalli ¶¶ 43–44. The vehicle’s ECU 16d is also
connected to actuator 13. Addepalli ¶ 44. These components and their
connections are shown in Addepalli’s Figure 1 reproduced below.

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Addepalli’s vehicle component connections in Figure 1

As shown above, not only are sensors and actuator connected to the
Ethernet gateway switch 70 and OBU via their respective ECUs 16a–d, but
the OBU is also connected to various remote nodes via external networks 40,
where the remote nodes include, among other things, authorized entities 98
that can be servers. See Addepalli ¶¶ 45, 57. Given this functionality, the
vehicle’s OBU and Ethernet gateway switch 70 collectively function as a
router between the networks both inside and outside the vehicle. See id.
Although the vehicle’s ECUs fully meet the recited apparatuses
because they are connected to sensors and actuator, respectively, we
nonetheless see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Norris for at least
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suggesting this feature as well as the server signal limitation, particularly
when considered in light of Addepalli.
Norris discloses a system for controlling vehicles and vehicular
sensors, actuators, and communications. Norris ¶ 5. To this end, various
payloads and the vehicle control system are controlled by two operator
control units (OCUs), namely (1) a dashboard OCU, and (2) a remote OCU,
the latter used by a person that is not traveling in the vehicle. Norris ¶ 11.
As explained in Norris’s paragraph 12, the OCUs (1) receive data from the
vehicle’s control system or payloads, and (2) send commands to the vehicle
control system to control its functions. See also id. ¶¶ 38 (“The remote OCU
may receive data from the autonomous vehicle related to the position,
orientation, obstacles, or other similar data and transmit movement
commands or payload commands accordingly.”), 43, 46.
As shown in Norris’s Figure 2A, remote OCU 250 is connected to the
vehicle’s control system via radio links. As explained in paragraphs 78 and
79, the remote OCU not only includes a router, but is also connected to the
vehicle via a long-range physical and data link layer including radio and
satellite links.
This remote vehicle control functionality at least suggests
(1) transmitting a first signal associated with data from the vehicle’s control
system or payloads to a remote control device, namely a remote OCU, over
an external network; (2) in response to receiving this first signal, the remote
OCU produces a second signal that commands the vehicle to control its
associated functions; and (3) the remote OCU transmits this second signal to
the vehicle to control those functions. See Norris ¶¶ 11–12, 38, 43, 45–46,
65. Norris also at least suggests sensing and affecting the same
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phenomenon, such as phenomena related to the vehicle’s movement. See
Norris ¶ 38 (noting that the remote OCU (1) receives data from the vehicle
related to the position, orientation, obstacles, or other similar data, and
(2) transmits movement commands or payload commands accordingly); 46
(noting that remote OCU receives vehicle sensor data). Appellant’s
contention, then, that the cited references fail to teach sensing and affecting
the same phenomenon (Appeal Br. 11) is unpersuasive given Norris’s
teachings, particularly when considered in light of Addepalli’s above-noted
vehicle control functionality.
Notably, after Norris’s remote OCU receives sensor data from the
vehicle, the remote OCU analyzes that data. Norris ¶ 46. Then, a human
operator inputs commands into the remote OCU that are transmitted to the
vehicle control system. Id. After receiving these commands, the vehicle
control system controls vehicle functions accordingly by, for example,
sending control data to the vehicle’s actuators. Id.
Notably, this process—including the remote OCU’s received sensor
data analysis—is automatic except for the human operator inputting
commands into the remote OCU. Nevertheless, claim 21 does not preclude
at least some manual steps, such as data entry, in connection with the recited
system functionality. Nor does the claim require that the various recited
functions, such as those performed by the recited apparatuses and server, are
performed automatically. But even if it did, and even assuming, without
deciding, that some manual steps were required for Norris’s remote OCU to
generate commands via the above-noted technique, that is not dispositive
here, for the term “automatic” does not preclude at least some manual steps,
so long as other steps are automatic. See CollegeNet, Inc. v. ApplyYourself,
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Inc., 418 F.3d 1225, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Nor has Appellant shown that
performing these functions automatically in lieu of at least some manual
interaction would have been uniquely challenging or otherwise beyond the
level of ordinarily skilled artisans. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-
Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161–62 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Applying modern
electronics to older mechanical devices has been commonplace in recent
years.”). To the extent Appellant contends otherwise, there is no persuasive
evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. So even assuming,
without deciding, that Norris’s remote OCU functionality requires at least
some manual intervention, such a fact is not dispositive here, particularly in
view of modern electronic updates to older manual techniques that are
consistent with similar electronic updates noted by the court in Leapfrog. In
any event, it is well settled that merely replacing manual activity with
automatic means to accomplish the same result is an obvious improvement.
See In re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 95 (CCPA 1958).
Therefore, Appellant’s contention that the cited references dictate
control by a human operator or user (Appeal Br. 11–12) are not only
incommensurate with the scope of the claim that does not preclude at least
some manual intervention in connection with the various recited functions,
they are unpersuasive even if the claim recited that these functions are
automatic—which it does not.
Nor are we persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rationale for
combining Addepalli and Norris despite Appellant’s arguments to the
contrary (see Appeal Br. 6–11; Reply Br. 3–4). A key aspect of the
Examiner’s rationale relies on the notion that the proposed combination
provides the ability to control various vehicle functions automatically,
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including those of the vehicle’s actuators. See Final Act. 8. Given this
automatic functionality realized by the proposed combination, the Examiner
concludes that the recited limitations—including the server signal
limitation—would have been obvious over the cited references’ collective
teachings. See id.
We see no error in these findings and conclusions. First, although
Addepalli’s vehicle is operated by a human driver 2 as shown in Figure 1,
that does not mean that at least some of the vehicle’s functions, including
those associated with the vehicle controllers and actuators, cannot be
controlled remotely via a server either as a replacement for, or as an adjunct
to, the driver’s involvement in controlling those functions. We reach this
conclusion noting Addepalli’s OBU is not only connected to the vehicle
controllers via an Ethernet gateway switch, but is also connected to remote
nodes, including server-based authorized entities 98, via external networks
40. See Addepalli ¶¶ 45, 57. Providing remote vehicle control capabilities
via these remote servers would have been at least an obvious variation,
particularly in light of Norris’s remote control capabilities that are realized
via a remote OCU as noted previously. In short, such an enhancement uses
prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an
obvious improvement. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417
(2007).
Appellant’s contention that the Examiner’s proposed combination
would change Addepalli’s principle of operation by providing autonomous
vehicle control from an external, Internet-based system that ostensibly runs
counter to the “conventional wisdom” that such systems are inside the
vehicle (see Appeal Br. 8–10) is unavailing. Leaving aside the fact that this
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assertion is unsubstantiated, it ignores the fact that every vehicle function—
including driving—need not be controlled remotely under the proposed
combination, but rather just some (or even just one) of those functions.
Nevertheless, even assuming, without deciding, that every vehicle function
could be controlled remotely under the proposed combination, this remote
control capability need not replace those functions controlled by the driver,
but could be provided merely as an adjunct to those driver-controlled
functions. That Norris discloses both a remote OCU and a dashboard OCU
with similar control functionality only underscores this point. See Norris
¶ 45 (noting that an operator may use a dashboard OCU and/or a remote
OCU simultaneously or separately to control the vehicle’s operation mode
and other controls).
To the extent that Appellant contends that Addepalli and Norris are
non-analogous art (see Appeal Br. 6–11; Reply Br. 4), we disagree. Prior art
is analogous if it is (1) from the same field of endeavor regardless of the
problem addressed, or (2) reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with
which the inventor is involved. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2004). Here, not only are Addepalli and Norris both in the same field of
endeavor as Appellant’s invention, namely vehicular control systems, but
they are also reasonably pertinent to Appellant’s problem in that regard,
namely how to control vehicular functions remotely.
Lastly, to the extent that Appellant contends that the Examiner’s
obviousness rationale is inconsistent with the patentably-distinct inventions
articulated in a restriction requirement made during prosecution (see Appeal
Br. 10), such a contention is unavailing. First, the propriety of the
Examiner’s restriction requirement that was made during prosecution is a
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petitionable matter that is not before us, as are objections regarding
procedural inconsistencies associated with that requirement. See MPEP
§ 706.01 (“[T]he Board will not hear or decide issues pertaining to
objections and formal matters which are not properly before the Board.”);
see also MPEP § 1201 (“The Board will not ordinarily hear a question that
should be decided by the Director on petition . . . .”); MPEP § 1002.02(c)
(requiring that Technology Center Directors decide petitions from an
Examiner’s final decision requiring restriction in patent applications).
Therefore, to the extent there are inconsistencies between the Examiner’s
restriction requirement and obviousness rejection, the Examiner’s restriction
requirement is not before us, nor are we bound by it. Rather, only the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection is before us—a rejection that is
(1) articulated in the final Office Action from which this appeal was taken,
and (2) based solely on the cited prior art.
Appellant’s request, then, that we remand the case to the Examiner to
reconsider the earlier restriction requirement (Appeal Br. 10) is not only
based on a non-precedential Board decision that is not binding on this panel,
Appellant’s request pertains to petitionable matters that are not before us in
any event. Accordingly, we deny the request.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 21, and claims 24–26, 29, 31–33, 35–38, and 40 not argued separately
with particularity.

Claim 22
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 22 reciting the
external network comprises, or is part of, a vehicle-to-vehicle network for
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communicating with the server via another vehicle. Despite Appellant’s
arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 12; Reply Br. 4–5), we see no error in
the Examiner’s reliance on Addepalli for at least suggesting the recited
limitations. See Final Act. 8–9; Ans. 7. Not only do Addepalli’s networks
40 enable vehicle 4 to communicate with both server-based authorized
entities 98 and other vehicles 59 as shown in Figure 1, but Addepalli also
teaches that vehicles can transfer data to a destination via other vehicles
using peer-to-peer, multi-hop routing in Figure 4. See Addepalli ¶¶ 45, 81,
91. Appellant’s contention that Addepalli does not teach external
communication (Reply Br. 5) is unavailing given this vehicle-to-vehicle
communication path external to the vehicle.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 22.

Claim 23
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 23 reciting the
external network communicates with a stationary roadside unit.
Although the Examiner’s indication in the rejection that “claim 23
does not further define over the limitations in claim 21” is puzzling given the
claims’ different limitations as Appellant indicates (Appeal Br. 12), we
nonetheless deem this error harmless, for the Examiner clarifies the rejection
on page 7 of the Answer by finding that Addepalli’s Figure 3 and paragraph
88 teach the recited limitations.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 13; Reply
Br. 5–6), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Addepalli for at least
suggesting the recited limitations, particularly given roadside infrastructure
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device 146 that communicates not only with a vehicle 104a, but also other
networks and vehicles via vehicle 104a in Addepalli’s Figure 3.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 23.

Claim 27
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 27 reciting the
phenomenon is (1) external to the vehicle, or (2) associated with
surroundings around the vehicle. Our emphasis on the term “or”
underscores that only one of the recited alternatives need be taught or
suggested by the prior art to satisfy the claim.
Although the Examiner’s indication in the rejection that “claim 27
does not further define over the limitations in claim 21” is puzzling given the
claims’ different limitations as Appellant indicates (Appeal Br. 13–14), we
nonetheless deem this error harmless, for the Examiner clarifies the rejection
on page 8 of the Answer by finding that Norris’s paragraph 47 teaches the
recited limitations.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 13–14;
Reply Br. 6–7), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on the
functionality of Norris’s “Follow Me” mode in paragraph 47 that controls
the vehicle’s direction and speed to follow objects, such as other vehicles,
identified by a sensor or camera. This vehicle-movement-based
phenomenon that tracks an external object’s movement direction is not only
external to the vehicle, but is also at least associated with surroundings
around the vehicle, including the road on which the object and the vehicle
following that object travel, as well as the area in their relative vicinity.
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Providing such an enhancement to the Addepalli/Norris system of claim 21
as the Examiner proposes uses prior art elements predictably according to
their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at
417.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 27.

Claim 28
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 28 reciting the
actuator is operative to affect the phenomenon that is (1) external to the
vehicle, or (2) associated with surroundings around the vehicle. Our
emphasis on the term “or” underscores that only one of the recited
alternatives need be taught or suggested by the prior art to satisfy the claim.
Although the Examiner’s indication in the rejection that “claim 28
does not further define over the limitations in claim 21” is puzzling given the
claims’ different limitations as Appellant indicates (Appeal Br. 14), we
nonetheless deem this error harmless, for the Examiner clarifies the rejection
on page 8 of the Answer by finding that Norris’s Figures 2A and 2B and
paragraphs 47 and 55 teach the recited limitations.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 14; Reply
Br. 7–8), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on the functionality of
Norris’s “Follow Me” mode in paragraph 47 that controls the vehicle’s
direction and speed to follow objects, such as other vehicles, identified by a
sensor or camera. This vehicle-movement-based phenomenon that tracks an
external object’s movement direction is not only external to the vehicle, but
is also at least associated with surroundings around the vehicle, including
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the road on which the object and the vehicle following that object travel, as
well as the area in their relative vicinity. Moreover, by controlling the
vehicle’s speed and direction to follow the object as noted in Norris’s
paragraph 47, the vehicle’s movement-based phenomenon is affected.
Providing such an enhancement to the Addepalli/Norris system of
claim 21 as the Examiner proposes uses prior art elements predictably
according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See
KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 28.

Claim 30
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 30 reciting that the
system of claim 21 is further integrated with, or part of, a vehicular system
used for improved safety, traffic flow control, traffic reporting, or traffic
management. Our emphasis on the term “or” underscores that only one of
each group of recited alternatives need be taught or suggested by the prior
art to satisfy the claim.
Although the Examiner’s indication in the rejection that “claim 30
does not further define over the limitations in claim 21” is puzzling given the
claims’ different limitations as Appellant indicates (Appeal Br. 14–15), we
nonetheless deem this error harmless, for the Examiner clarifies the rejection
on pages 8 and 9 of the Answer by finding that Addepalli’s paragraph 56
teaches the recited limitations.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 14; Reply
Br. 7–8), and leaving aside the fact that Norris’s “Follow Me” mode at least
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suggests a vehicular system that is used for improved safety and traffic
control and management by restricting the vehicle’s speed and stopping
distance in paragraph 47, we nonetheless see no error in the Examiner’s
reliance on the functionality of Addepalli’s paragraph 56 for at least
suggesting the recited limitations. That Addepalli indicates that
interconnecting the vehicular bus systems to Internet Protocol (IP)
infrastructure can enable, among other things, safety to vehicular
applications only bolsters this conclusion.
Appellant’s contention that Addepalli does not teach a vehicular
safety system (Reply Br. 9) is not only incommensurate with the scope of
the claim that recites, quite broadly, that the vehicular system is merely used
for “improved safety,” Appellant’s argument is undercut by Addepalli’s and
Norris’s above-noted safety features realized by the disclosed vehicle
systems. Providing such an enhancement to the Addepalli/Norris system of
claim 21 as the Examiner proposes uses prior art elements predictably
according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See
KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 30.

Claim 34
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 34 reciting the in-
vehicle network uses the vehicle’s direct current (DC) power lines. Our
emphasis on the term “uses” underscores that the claim recites, quite
broadly, that the in-vehicle network merely uses DC power lines, but does
not specify how those lines are used. That is, the network can use DC power
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lines by, among other things, powering a component associated with the
vehicle network by those lines. In other words, the claimed “use” does not
require sending data over DC power lines, but could merely power network
devices via DC power lines.
Nevertheless, despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal
Br. 15; Reply Br. 9–10), we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on
Addepalli’s paragraph 109 that teaches using Ethernet over power line
connections, particularly when considered in light of the DC power provided
near Ethernet ports and power distribution along the Ethernet network in
Norris’s paragraph 59. Providing such an enhancement to the
Addepalli/Norris system of claim 21 as the Examiner proposes uses prior art
elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious
improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 34.

Claim 39
We do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 39 reciting that
the router, first apparatus, or second apparatus is at least partly powered via
an on-board diagnostics (OBD) system diagnostics connector. Our
emphasis underscores that the claim requires that power is provided via the
diagnostics connector. Although this limitation does not require the
connector to be the source of electric power, power must nonetheless be
provided via (i.e., by way of) the connector, possibly by enabling power to
pass through the connector to one of the recited loads, namely the router or
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first or second apparatuses. This connector-based powering feature has not
been shown to be even suggested by the prior art.
First, the Examiner’s indication in the rejection that “claim 39 does
not further define over the limitations in claim 24” is puzzling given the
claims’ different limitations as Appellant indicates. See Appeal Br. 16. As
with other instances of similar inconsistencies, however, we deem this error
harmless, for the Examiner clarifies the rejection on page 9 of the Answer by
finding that Norris’s Figures 2A and 2B and paragraph 67 teach the recited
limitations.
Nevertheless, we fail to see—nor has the Examiner shown—how this
disclosure teaches or suggests power is provided via a diagnostic connector,
let alone powering one of the recited devices via the connector as claimed.
The Examiner’s reliance on Norris’s Figures 2A and 2B and
paragraph 67 on page 9 of the Answer is unavailing in this regard. To be
sure, Norris’s vehicle level control 202 includes a power center 208 that
powers gearshift and brake motors 210, 212 as described in paragraph 67
and shown in Figure 2B. That figure also shows Controller Area Network
(CAN) diagnostic port 206 is connected to the vehicle level control such that
the port is connected to the power center 208.
But Norris says nothing about a diagnostic connector providing power
either directly or indirectly to the recited devices. That Norris provides a
power source 208 that is connected directly to gearshift and brake motors
210, 212 further undercuts the notion that power is somehow provided via a
diagnostics connector as the Examiner seems to suggest.
Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 39.
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THE OTHER OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION
We sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 37 over
Addepalli, Norris, and Gelvin. Final Act. 15–16. Because this rejection is
not argued separately with particularity, we are not persuaded of error in this
rejection for the reasons previously discussed.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
21–40 112,
second
paragraph
Indefiniteness 21–40
21–36,
38–40
103 Addepalli,
Norris
21–36, 38,
40
39
37 103 Addepalli,
Norris,
Gelvin
37
Overall
Outcome
21–38, 40 39

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).

AFFIRMED IN PART