BGC Partners, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 27, 2021

2021001715 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 27, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
16/029,204 07/06/2018 Howard W. Lutnick 01-6141-C3 1540
63710 7590 09/27/2021
CANTOR FITZGERALD, L.P.
INNOVATION DIVISION
110 EAST 59TH STREET
NEW YORK, NY 10022
EXAMINER
BARTLEY, KENNETH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/27/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Caitlyn.kelly@chareiter.com
mcatarino@cgolaw.com
patentdocketing@cantor.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte HOWARD W. LUTNICK

Appeal 2021-001715
Application 16/029,204
Technology Center 3600

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the
Examiner’s Final decision to reject claims 62–68, 70 and 71.1 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies BCG Partners, Inc. as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed subject matter relates to providing a hedged instrument.
Claim 62, reproduced below with emphasis added, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
62. A method for providing a hedged instrument, the method
comprising:
identifying, by a computer of a provider, a first position on
a first tradable instrument;
identifying, by the computer, a second position on a
second tradable instrument, the second position being contrary
to the first position, in which the first tradable instrument has a
different maturity date from the second tradable instrument, in
which the first and second tradable instruments are issued by a
same entity;
undertaking, by the computer, the first position and the
second position by buying, in real time over a communication
network from at least one remote computing device, the first and
second tradable instruments;
creating, by the computer, a hedged instrument including
the first position and the second position;
receiving, by the computer, over the communication
network, a request to purchase the hedged instrument from a
second remote computing device; and
executing, by the computer over the communication
network, at the second remote computing device, in real time a
sale of the hedged instrument with a user of the second remote
computing device, in which the sale is executed without the user
undertaking the first position on the first tradable instrument and
the second position on the second tradable instrument.

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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Tambay US 2002/0026403 A1 Feb. 28, 2002
Wong US 2003/0028468 A1 Feb. 6, 2003
Wilton US 6,519,574 B1 Feb. 11, 2003
REJECTIONS
Claims 62–38, 70 and 71 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as
failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Claims 62–68, 70, and 71 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to judicially-excepted subject matter without significantly more.
Claims 62–66, 70, and 71 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Wong and Wilton.
Claims 67 and 68 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Wong, Wilton, and Tambay.
OPINION
The rejection of claims 62–38, 70 and 71 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (a) as
failing to comply with the written description requirement.
According to the Examiner,
Claim 1 has "computer," "remote computing device,"
"communication network," and "second remote computing
device" where no computing, computer, processor, server, or
other processing device can be found in the written description
of the disclosure. Also no "communication network" can be
found in the written description.
Final Act. 13.
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Appellant does not appear to dispute that the claim terms “computer,”
"remote computing device," "communication network," and "second remote
computing device" are not recited verbatim in the Specification. See Appeal
Br. 13–14.
Appellant argues that there is no in haec verba requirement. Rather,
“newly added claim limitations must be supported in the specification
through express, implicit, or inherent disclosure.” Id. at 13, quoting MPEP
§2163(I)(B). Appellant argues that para. 29 (i.e., 8:4–15), for example, of
the Specification, “provides implicit and inherent disclosure for the claim
limitations.” Id. Appellant reproduces said paragraph, in part, emphasizing
the words “traded electronically and in real–time.” Id. at 13–14.
According to Appellant, “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would understand
that at least paragraph [0027, [i.e., 8:4–15]] provides sufficient support for
the claim limitations of: computer," "remote computing device,"
"communication network," and "second remote computing device," as
recited in claim 62.” Id. at 14.
We can understand how one of ordinary skill in the art would infer a
computer is employed from the claimed requirement that a sale be executed
in “real–time”. But we do not see how one of ordinary skill in the art would
understand “real–time” to necessarily also require employing a "remote
computing device," "communication network," and "second remote
computing device.” “Real time” execution of a sale does not require the use
of said devices/network and therefore they are not implicit and inherent to
the disclosure in the Specification of instruments being “traded
electronically and in real–time” (8:4–15).
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The question of written descriptive support under 35 U.S.C. § 112 is a
question of fact. In that regard, the Appellant has not come forward with
sufficient facts and/or evidence to rebut the Examiner’s position. Without
more by way of facts and/or evidence, a general argument that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have understand “real–time” to necessarily
require employing a "remote computing device," "communication network,"
and "second remote computing device” is not an adequate rebuttal. It
amounts to attorney argument. As such, the argument is unpersuasive as to
error in the Examiner’s position.
Accordingly, the rejection is sustained.

The rejection of claims 62–68, 70, and 71 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to judicially-excepted subject matter without significantly more.
The Appellant argues these claims as a group. See Appeal Br. 6–10.
We select claim 62 as the representative claim for this group, and the
remaining claims 63–68, 70, and 71 stand or fall with claim 62. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Introduction
35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.”
In that regard, claim 62 covers a “process” and is thus statutory
subject matter for which a patent may be obtained.2 This is not in dispute.

2 This corresponds to Step 1 of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance which
requires determining whether “the claim is to a statutory category.” 84 Fed.
Reg. at 53. See also id. at 53–54 (“consider[] whether the claimed subject
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However, the 35 U.S.C. § 101 provision “contains an important
implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013)).
In that regard, notwithstanding claim 62 covers statutory subject
matter, the Examiner has raised a question of patent eligibility on the ground
that claim 62 is directed to an abstract idea.
Alice identifies a two-step framework for determining whether
claimed subject matter is directed to an abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
Alice step one — the “directed to” inquiry:
According to Alice step one, “[w]e must first determine whether the
claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 218 (emphasis added).
The Examiner determined that claim 62 is directed to “creating a
hedged instrument” and “executing a sale.” Final Act. 10. Specifically,
These above limitations [of claim 62; see Final Act. 9],
under their broadest reasonable interpretation, cover
performance of the limitation as certain methods of organizing
human activity. The claim recites elements, highlighted in bold
above, which covers performance of the limitation as a
fundamental economic practice (e.g. creating a hedged
instrument) and commercial interaction (e.g. executing a sale). If
a claim limitation, under its broadest reasonable interpretation,
covers performance of the limitation as a fundamental economic
practice, then it falls within the "Certain Methods of Organizing
Human Activity" grouping of abstract ideas.

matter falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter
identified by 35 U.S.C. 101.”).
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Id.
Appellant contends that, in executing a trade in “real–time”,
“improvements to technology that are rooted in networking and computers”
are achieved. Appeal Br. 9. “Among other things, speed, usability and
efficiency are technological improvements addressed by the claims that are
rooted in computers and networking.” Id.
Accordingly, a dispute over whether claim 62 is directed to an abstract
idea is present. Specifically, is claim 62 directed to “creating a hedged
instrument” and “executing a sale” (Final Act. 10) or an improvement in
computer technology?

Claim Construction3

3 “[T]he important inquiry for a § 101 analysis is to look to the claim.”
Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336,
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “In Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co.
of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the court observed that
‘claim construction is not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity
determination under § 101.’ However, the threshold of § 101 must be
crossed; an event often dependent on the scope and meaning of the claims.”
Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1347–48
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
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We consider the claim as a whole giving it the broadest reasonable
construction as one of ordinary skill in the art would have interpreted it in
light of the Specification at the time of filing.4,5,6
Claim 62 recites 6 steps. The first five – “identifying,” “identifying,”
“undertaking,” “creating,” and “receiving” – involve contrary positions on
tradeable instruments and a hedged instrument including those positions.
The last step calls for “executing … in real time a sale of the hedged
instrument … without the user undertaking” said positions.
The claimed method is reasonably broadly construed as a scheme for
providing a hedged instrument. This comports with the Specification. See
4:17–18 (“According to yet another embodiment, a method for providing a
hedged instrument is provided. The method includes identifying a first
position on a first tradable instrument and a second position … .”)
Accordingly, we reasonably broadly construe claim 62 as being
directed to a scheme for providing a hedged instrument.

4 “In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent
protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole.”
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
5 “First, it is always important to look at the actual language of the claims. .
. . Second, in considering the roles played by individual limitations, it is
important to read the claims ‘in light of the specification.’” Smart Sys.
Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (J. Linn, dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing Enfish, LLC
v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016)), among others.
6 See 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, footnote 14 (“If a
claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation.”).
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The Abstract Idea7
Above, where we reproduce claim 62, we identify in italics the
limitations we believe recite an abstract idea.8 Based on our claim
construction analysis (above), we determine that the identified limitations
describe a scheme for providing a hedged instrument. Providing a hedged
instrument is a commercial interaction. It falls within the enumerated
“[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” grouping of abstract ideas
set forth in the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance.9 2019 Revised 101 Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Technical Improvement10 (Appellant’s Argument)

7 This corresponds to Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. Step 2A
determines “whether a claim is ‘directed to’ a judicial exception,” such as an
abstract idea. Step 2A is two prong inquiry.
8 This corresponds to Prong One (a) of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101
Guidance. “To determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea in Prong
One, examiners are now to: (a) Identify the specific limitation(s) in the
claim under examination (individually or in combination) that the examiner
believes recites an abstract idea.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
9 This corresponds to Prong One [“Evaluate Whether the Claim Recites a
Judicial Exception”] (b) of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. “To
determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea in Prong One, examiners
are now to: . . . (b) determine whether the identified limitation(s) falls within
the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in Section 1 of the
[2019 Revised 101 Guidance].” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. This case implicates
subject matter grouping “(b):” “(b) Certain methods of organizing human
activity—fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging,
insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including
agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising,
marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including
social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions).” Id. at 52.
10 This corresponds to Prong Two [“If the Claim Recites a Judicial
Exception, Evaluate Whether the Judicial Exception Is Integrated Into a
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Our characterization of what the claim is directed to is similar to that
of the Examiner’s (“creating a hedged instrument” and “executing a sale”
(Final Act. 10).) The Examiner’s characterization is described somewhat
differently. Nevertheless, “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at
different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229,
1240, 1240–41 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The Board’s slight revision of its abstract
idea analysis does not impact the patentability analysis.”).
We have reviewed the record and are unpersuaded as to error in our or
the Examiner’s characterization of what claim 1 is directed to.
Appellant contends that in executing a trade in “real–time” various
technological improvements are gained. See e.g., Appeal Br. 7 (“helps
control activity over the network and control computer workload including
computer resources such as memory resources, processor resources, and
network resources such as network bandwidth”).
However, we do not find that the claim adequately reflects a
technological improvement.

Practical Application”] of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. “A
claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will
apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54. One consideration, implicated here, that is “indicative that an
additional element (or combination of elements) may have integrated the
exception into a practical application” is if “[a]n additional element reflects
an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to
other technology or technical field.” Id. at 55.

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The method as claimed describes, in very general terms, providing a
hedged instrument (via “identifying,” “identifying,” “undertaking,”
“creating,” “receiving,” “executing” steps). The method as claimed is not
focused on improving technology. Cf. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC,
921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The claims are focused on providing
information to traders in a way that helps them process information more
quickly, ’556 patent at 2:26–39, not on improving computers or
technology.”).
We have carefully reviewed the claim. Per our previous claim
construction analysis, claim 62 is reasonably broadly construed as covering a
scheme for providing a hedged instrument. We see no specific asserted
improvement in computer capabilities recited in the claim. Rather than being
directed to any specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities, the
claim supports the opposite view — that the claimed subject matter is
directed to a scheme for providing a scheme for providing a hedged
instrument employing generic computing devices.
The claim provides no additional structural details that would
distinguish any device required to be employed to practice the method as
claimed, such as the recited “computer,” from its generic counterparts.11
Appellant emphasizes the recited “real time” execution. But we do not
see how said “real time” operation is anything more than what would

11 Cf. Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., 721 F. App’x 950, 954 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (non-precedential) (“Claim 1 is aspirational in nature and devoid
of any implementation details or technical description that would permit us
to conclude that the claim as a whole is directed to something other than the
abstract idea identified by the district court.”).
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normally result from using a generic computer. Cf. Electric Power Group,
LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016):
The claims in this case specify what information in the power-
grid field it is desirable to gather, analyze, and display, including
in “real time”; but they do not include any requirement for
performing the claimed functions of gathering, analyzing, and
displaying in real time by use of anything but entirely
conventional, generic technology. The claims therefore do not
state an arguably inventive concept in the realm of application of
the information-based abstract ideas.
With respect to the “identifying,” “identifying,” “undertaking,”
“creating,” “receiving,” “executing” steps, the Specification attributes no
special meaning to any of these operations, individually or in the
combination, as claimed. In our view, these are common computer
processing functions that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention would have known generic computers were capable of performing
and would have associated with generic computers. Cf. OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
Beyond the abstract idea of offer-based price optimization, the
claims merely recite “well-understood, routine conventional
activit[ies],” either by requiring conventional computer activities
or routine data-gathering steps. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359 (quoting
Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294) . . . . For example, claim 1 recites
“sending a first set of electronic messages over a network to
devices,” the devices being “programmed to communicate,”
storing test results in a “machine-readable medium,” and “using
a computerized system . . . to automatically determine” an
estimated outcome and setting a price. Just as in Alice, “all of
these computer functions are ‘well-understood, routine,
conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.”
Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294)
(alterations in original); see also buySAFE[, Inc. v. Google, Inc.],
765 F.3d [1350,] 1355 [(Fed. Cir. 2014)] (“That a computer
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receives and sends the information over a network—with no
further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”).
We find the Appellant’s contentions that the claim presents an
improvement in computer technology unpersuasive as to error in the
Examiner’s or our characterization of what the claim is directed to because
the method as claimed fails to adequately support it. We are unable to point
to any claim language suggestive of an improvement in technology. An
argument that such an improvement exists is alone insufficient. See
generally In re Glass, 474 F.2d 1015, 1019 (CCPA 1973); In re Pearson,
494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705
(Fed. Cir. 1984); and, In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602 (CCPA 1965).
Accordingly, within the meaning of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance,
we find there is no integration of the abstract idea into a practical
application.
The Appellant also argues that “[t]he claimed features allow a
computer to perform a function not previously performable by a computer
and are implemented using a particular machine.” Appeal Br. 8. It is not
entirely clear what the “particular machine” the Appellant is referring to,
given that the claim requires at best using generic computing devices. Be
that as it may, Appellant may be arguing that a device performing the recited
steps is “particular.”
But the difficulty with such an argument is that it points to the recited
steps (“identifying,” “identifying,” “undertaking,” “creating,” “receiving,”
"executing”) themselves, the very subject matter that we, and the Examiner,
have characterized as being an abstract idea. Rather than showing that these
steps describe a technical improvement, the Appellant is pointing to result-
based functional language that is without any particular means for achieving
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any purported technological improvement. By so broadly defining the
inventive method, that is, by setting out what it is aspiring to accomplish
without any particular means for achieving it, let alone any purported
technological improvement, the claim is in effect presenting the invention in
purely result-based functional language, strengthening our determination
under Alice step one that the claim is directed to an abstract idea. Cf. Two-
Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Claim 1 recites a method for routing information using
result-based functional language. The claim requires the functional results of
‘converting,’ ‘routing,’ ‘controlling,’ ‘monitoring,’ and ‘accumulating
records,’ but does not sufficiently describe how to achieve these results in a
non-abstract way.”). See also Uniloc USA v. LG Elecs. USA, 957 F.3d 1303,
1308 (Fed. Cir. 2020):
The claims we held ineligible in Two-Way Media similarly failed
to concretely capture any improvement in computer
functionality. In Two-Way Media, the claims recited a method of
transmitting packets of information over a communications
network comprising: converting information into streams of
digital packets; routing the streams to users; controlling the
routing; and monitoring the reception of packets by the users.
874 F.3d at 1334. Two-Way Media argued that the claims solved
data transmission problems, including load management and
bottlenecking, but the claimed method was not directed to those
improvements. Id. at 1336–37. We therefore held the claims
ineligible because they merely recited a series of abstract steps
(“converting,” “routing,” “controlling,” “monitoring,” and
“accumulating records”) using “result-based functional
language” without the means for achieving any purported
technological improvement. Id. at 1337.
We have considered Appellant’s other arguments challenging the
Examiner’s determination under step one of the Alice framework and find
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them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the record supports the
Examiner’s determination that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.

Alice step two — Does the Claim Provide an Inventive Concept?12
Step two is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012)).
In that regard, the Examiner determined, inter alia, that
The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient
to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception
because, when considered separately and as an ordered
combination, they do not add significantly more (also known as
an "inventive concept") to the exception. As discussed above
with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical
application, the additional element of using a computer hardware
amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception
using a generic computer component.
Final Act. 11. We agree.
Appellant argues that the Examiner has not followed “Changes in
Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent
Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP Inc.[, 881 F.3d 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2018)],” USPTO Memorandum, Robert W. Bahr, Deputy

12 This corresponds to Step 2B, of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56 “if a claim has been determined to be directed to a judicial
exception under revised Step 2A, examiners should then evaluate the
additional elements individually and in combination under Step 2B to
determine whether they provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the
additional elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself).”
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Commissioner For Patent Examination Policy, April 19, 2018 (the
“Berkheimer Memo”)). Appeal Br. 11–12. Specifically, Appellant would
have the examiner provide citations to the Specification, court decisions, or
publications, or take official notice, that computers are well understood,
conventional, and routine, or else “all of the pending claims are in a proper
condition for allowance.” Id. at 12. We think that is unnecessary here.
Citing the Specification is not possible since no computer is disclosed.
Be that as it may, it cannot be factually disputed that computers, networks,
and remote computing devices were notoriously well known at the time the
application was filed.
No other persuasive arguments having been presented, we conclude
that no error has been committed in the determination under Alice step two
that claim 1 does not include an element or combination of elements
circumscribing the patent-ineligible concept it is directed to so as to
transform the concept into a patent–eligible application.
We have considered all of the Appellant’s arguments (including those
made in the Reply Brief) and find them unpersuasive.
Accordingly, because we are not persuaded as to error in the
determinations that representative claim 62, and claims 63–68, 70, and 71
which stand or fall with claim 62, are directed to an abstract idea and do not
present an “inventive concept,” we sustain the Examiner’s conclusion that
they are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter for being judicially-
excepted from 35 U.S.C. § 101. Cf. LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc.,
656 F. App’x 991, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We have considered all of
LendingTree’s remaining arguments and have found them unpersuasive.
Accordingly, because the asserted claims of the patents in suit are directed to
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an abstract idea and do not present an ‘inventive concept,’ we hold that they
are directed to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”); see, e.g.,
OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1364; FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.,
839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

The rejection of claims 62–66, 70, and 71 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Wong and Wilton.
The rejection of claims 67 and 68 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Wong, Wilton, and Tambay.
Appellant has not addressed these rejections. See generally Appeal
Brief. Accordingly, they are summarily affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 62–68, 70, 71 is
affirmed.
More specifically:
The rejection of claims 62–38, 70 and 71 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as
failing to comply with the written description requirement is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 62–68, 70, 71 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to judicially-excepted subject matter without significantly more is
affirmed.
The rejection of claims 62–66, 70, and 71 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Wong and Wilton is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 67 and 68 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Wong, Wilton, and Tambay is affirmed.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
62–68, 70,
71
112(a) Written
Description
62–68, 70,
71

62–68, 70,
71
101 Eligibility 62–68, 70,
71

62–66, 70,
71
103 Wong, Wilton 62–66, 70,
71

67, 68 103 Wong, Wilton,
Tambay
67, 68
Overall
Outcome
62–68, 70,
71

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED