Beverly J. Fleming, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 2, 2003
01A32753_r (E.E.O.C. Jul. 2, 2003)

01A32753_r

07-02-2003

Beverly J. Fleming, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Beverly J. Fleming v. United States Postal Service

01A32753

July 2, 2003

.

Beverly J. Fleming,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A32753

Agency No. 1-H-374-0059-99

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from an agency's final decision

concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein is whether complainant has established that

the agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (Caucasian)

and sex (female) when she was denied the opportunity to attend training

on July 25, 1999.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a Vehicle Operations Assistant at the agency's Memphis, Tennessee Bulk

Mail Center facility. Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently

filed a formal complaint on September 8, 1999. At the conclusion of

the investigation, complainant was informed of her right to request a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) or alternatively, to

receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant requested an agency

decision without a hearing. In its decision, the agency concluded

that complainant failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination

based on race and sex as she failed to show that she was treated less

favorably than similarly-situated employees outside her protected groups.

The agency stated that assuming arguendo that complainant did establish

a prima facie case of discrimination, complainant failed to rebut

management's articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its

action, namely that complainant was not selected for VTAPS training

because her supervisor did not recommend her.

Complainant makes no arguments on appeal. The agency requests that we

affirm its final decision.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency

has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility

to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the

third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of

whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal

Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Upon review, we find that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. The record contains an

affidavit from Person A, Supervisor Transportation Networks, stating

that selections to attend training in Cincinnati were made based on the

needs of the service and the recommendations being made by supervisors

and managers. Person A stated that he was the supervisor for employees

on Tour Two, and noted that since complainant was a VOA on Tour Three,

she was not one of the employees eligible for him to select. Further,

the record contains an affidavit from Person B, Manager Transportation

Networks, who stated that she recommended some employees and requested

that her supervisors submit names for employees to serve as VTAP trainers.

Person B noted that selections for the training were made by the VTAP

Coordination Team and restated that complainant was not considered because

her supervisor did not recommend her. Thus, we find that the agency

has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for complainant's

nonselection for training.

The burden turns to complainant to establish that the agency's legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual. The Commission finds that

complainant failed to rebut the agency's reasons.

Therefore, we AFFIRM the final decision finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 2, 2003

__________________

Date