Berlin Nero, Jr., Complainant,v.Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 16, 2002
01996811 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 16, 2002)

01996811

04-16-2002

Berlin Nero, Jr., Complainant, v. Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


Berlin Nero, Jr. v. Department of the Air Force

01996811

04-16-02

.

Berlin Nero, Jr.,

Complainant,

v.

Dr. James G. Roche,

Secretary,

Department of the Air Force,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01996811

Agency No. 9V1M99006

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether the agency properly determined that

complainant had failed to prove that the agency discriminated against

him based on disability when he was denied overtime.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a Sheet Metal Mechanic (Aircraft), WG-10, at the agency's Tinker AFB,

Oklahoma facility. Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently

filed a formal complaint on November 16, 1998, alleging that he was

discriminated against on the basis of disability (seizure disorder and

chronic shoulder pain) when, from September 20, 1996 through September

15, 1998, he was denied overtime. The agency accepted the complaint for

investigation and processing. At the conclusion of the investigation,

complainant was informed of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge or alternatively, to receive a final decision by

the agency. When complainant failed to respond within the time period

specified in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that it was �uncertain� whether

complainant had established a prima facie case of disability

discrimination because while the record was clear that complainant

had conditions that were permanent and physically restrictive, it

was less clear that complainant was substantially limited in a major

life activity. The agency found it did not need to determine whether

complainant had established a prima facie case by showing that he was

an individual with a disability because management had articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. It concluded

that complainant had not shown management's reasons to be pretext

for discrimination and found that he had not shown that he had been

discriminated against as claimed.

Complainant filed this appeal, without comment. The agency requested

that we affirm its FAD.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency

has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility

to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the

third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of

whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Assuming arguendo that complainant established his prima facie case

of discrimination,<1> we turn to the issue of whether the agency has

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Complainant's supervisor (S-1) testified that during the relevant time

period, complainant had medical restrictions which specified that he

was restricted from working �protracted and/or irregular hours,� among

numerous other restrictions. This meant that complainant was not able

to work overtime hours. On September 15, 1998, S-1 was absent from work

and an acting supervisor was in his place. The acting supervisor was

unaware of this restriction for complainant and he asked complainant if

he wished to work overtime. Complainant answered that he did, and was

permitted to work overtime. When S-1 returned he questioned complainant

about the overtime, and inquired whether he suffered any adverse effects.

Complainant answered that he had not and stated that he wished to work

more overtime. S-1 asked about complainant's medical restrictions, and

he testified that complainant replied that he �could get them changed.�

Complainant was allowed to keep working overtime and approximately one

and one-half months later, he provided medical documentation changing

his restrictions.

Since the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for its action, the burden returns to the complainant to demonstrate

that the agency's articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

We find that complainant has failed to do so. Complainant testified in

his affidavit that he had the same medical restrictions from September 20,

1996, through September 15, 1998, as he did when the agency allowed him

to work overtime after September 15, 1998. He claimed that because he

had no difficulty performing that overtime work, this was contrary to what

management had told him regarding the previous two years, that his medical

restrictions precluded him from performing overtime work. He stated,

�[t]his shows that management should have allowed me to work overtime

prior to September 15, 1998.� We find that, contrary to complainant's

belief, this does not show that the agency discriminated against him.

The agency acted in accordance with the medical restrictions on file

from complainant's own physicians, and complainant did not show that

the agency was mistaken in its belief that he was restricted in this

manner. In fact, complainant complied with the agency's request for new

documentation stating that he could work overtime, which shows that he

did not dispute that his documentation on record at the time reflected

a restriction on overtime. Therefore, the agency's determination that

complainant failed to establish that he was discriminated against was

correct.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

___04-16-02_______________

Date

1 We will assume without finding, for the purposes of analysis only,

that complainant is an individual with a disability.