Benjamin Scott. Boding et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 10, 2020

13926785 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 10, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/926,785 06/25/2013 Benjamin Scott Boding 079900-0872501
(278US02)
9664
66945 7590 02/10/2020
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP/VISA
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
BRINDLEY, BENJAMIN S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3697
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/10/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte BENJAMIN SCOTT BODING, ANDREW NAUMANN ZU
KOENIGSBRUECK, and CORY H. SIDDENS
________________

Appeal 2019-000141
Application 13/926,785
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JAMES R. HUGHES, and
JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.

CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals the Final Rejection
of claims 1, 3, 10, 11, 13, 20, 22, and 25.2 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
INVENTION
The invention relates to improving the efficiency and quality of
transaction review systems and methods. Spec. ¶ 2. Claim 1 is illustrative

1 Claims 2, 4–9, 12, 14–19, 21, 23, 24, and 26 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 25–
28.
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, Visa International Service
Association is the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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of the invention and is reproduced below:
1. A system operationally provided between a
merchant computer and a payment processing server, the system
comprising:
a first computer comprising:
a first processor; and
a first memory coupled with and readable by the
first processor, the first memory configured to store a first
set of instructions which, when executed by the first
processor, causes the first processor to:
receive, from a user device, transaction data
for a transaction between the user device and the
merchant computer of a merchant, the transaction
data including account information of a user,
retrieve a fraud profile set up by the merchant
from a first database storing fraud profiles set up by
a plurality of merchants, wherein the fraud profile
includes a first set of fraud rules pre-defined by the
merchant,
determine a first transaction score for the
transaction based on the first set of fraud rules of
retrieved fraud profile,
determine that an outcome of the transaction
is indeterminate based on the first transaction
score,
store the transaction data in a review queue
based on the indeterminate outcome of the
transaction, wherein the transaction data is
retrieved from the review queue after a
predetermined time has elapsed since the
transaction data is stored in the review queue and
the transaction data has not been reviewed;
a second computer comprising:
a second processor; and
a second memory coupled with and readable by the
second processor, the second memory configured to store
a second set of instructions which, when executed by the
second processor, causes the second processor to:
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receive the transaction data retrieved from
the review queue,
identify external data sources to query,
retrieve, prior to querying the external data
sources, one or more access rules predetermined by
the merchant from a second rules database, the one
or more access rules specifying one or more of the
external data sources to be queried based on
characteristics of the transaction, wherein the one
or more access rules are associated with at least
one of: a cost of obtaining the supplemental data,
speed of delivery of the supplemental data, or a
quality of the supplemental data,
query the one or more of the external data
sources for the supplemental data in an order
identified by the one or more access rules,
retrieve a second set of fraud rules set up by
the merchant, wherein the second set of fraud rules
are different from the first set of fraud rules;
determine a second transaction score based
on at least the transaction data, the supplemental
data and the second set of fraud rules, wherein the
second transaction score indicates whether the
transaction is accepted or rejected,
if the transaction is rejected, transmit a
notification to the merchant computer, and
if the transaction is accepted, generate an
authorization request message and transmit the
authorization request message to the payment
processing server, wherein the first computer and
the second computer are operationally provided
between the merchant computer and the payment
processing server, and
a data aggregator configured to aggregate the
supplemental data from the external data sources, and normalize
the supplemental data from the external data sources, wherein
normalizing converts the supplemental data to a common format.

Appeal Br. 24–25 (Claims Appendix) (emphases added).
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REJECTION
Claims 1, 3, 10, 11, 13, 20, 22, and 25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–6.

ANALYSIS
I. Claims 1, 3, 10, 11, 13, 20, 22, and 25 Rejected Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101
A. Legal Principles
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
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mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 192 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
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eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised
guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO’s January 7, 2019
Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance
(“Memorandum”). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
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See Memorandum.
B. The Examiner’s Conclusions and Appellant’s Arguments
The Examiner concludes the present claims recite certain methods of
organizing human activity. Final Act. 3, 6; Ans. 3, 4, 6. The Examiner also
determines the present claims do not amount to significantly more than an
abstract idea itself because the abstract idea is implemented using additional
elements that are well-understood, routine, and conventional. Final Act. 4–
6; Ans. 5 (citing buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2014); OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2015); Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266,
1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Appellant contends the Examiner does not establish a prima facie case
of subject matter ineligibility because the Examiner fails to identify clearly
the abstract idea. Appeal Br. 10–12; Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant argues the
present claims recite an improvement in computer-related technology
because transaction data processing is performed faster and, therefore,
fraudulent transactions are determined faster. Appeal Br. 13–16 (citing
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); Reply Br.
4–5. Appellant further argues the present claims are necessarily rooted in
technology to solve problems specifically arising in the realm of technology
because in situations when a transaction decision process is taking too long,
this problem is solved by modifying a computer system instead of hiring
more human reviewers. Appeal Br. 12–13, 21–22 (citing DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Additionally,
Appellant argues the present claims provides an unconventional technical
solution by utilizing a distributed system such as a first computer, a second
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computer, and a data aggregator to reduce the extra steps and
communications between the entities in the distributed systems that are
inherent in conventional systems and cause unnecessary burden on the
different parties involved that results in elements combined in an
unconventional manner. Appeal Br. 20–21 (citing Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v.
Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed Cir. 2016)). Appellant also
contends that the Examiner does not identify all the additional elements such
as a “second computer” and a “data aggregator.” Appeal Br. 16–18.
Appellant further contends that the Examiner fails to provide clear and
convincing evidence to support the finding that the additional elements
implementing the abstract idea are well-understood, routine, and
conventional. Appeal Br. 19–20 (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Reply Br. 5–6. We disagree with Appellant.
C. Discussion
1. Step 2A, Prong 1
Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question of law that is
reviewable de novo. See Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2012). We, therefore, conclude the emphasized portions of claim
1, reproduced above (see supra at 2–3), recite commercial interactions
including sales activities or business relations because claim 13 requires
transaction data processing, determining whether the transaction is

3 Claim 1, reproduced above with emphases, recites similar features as
independent claim 11. Appellant does not argue claims 3, 10, 11, 13, 20, 22,
and 25 separately, but asserts the § 101 rejection of those claims should be
withdrawn for at least the same reasons as argued for independent claim 1.
Appeal Br. 9–22. We, therefore, group claims 1, 3, 10, 11, 13, 20, 22, and
25 together and refer to those claims as the “present claims.”
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fraudulent, and accepting or rejecting the transaction. According to the
Memorandum, commercial interactions including sales activities or business
relations fall into the category of certain methods of organizing human
activity. See Memorandum. Moreover, those certain methods of organizing
human activity are a type of an abstract idea. See id.; see also Smart Sys.
Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (verifying payment information, as well as “financial transactions . . .
and data collection related to such transactions” “are directed to an abstract
idea under Alice step one.”); buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1352–54 (Claims
reciting sending and receiving communications over a computer network to
facilitate online commercial transactions are directed to “contractual
relations, which are intangible entities” and “constitute[] ‘a fundamental
economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.’”).
We, therefore, agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that the present
claims recite certain methods of organizing human activity. Final Act. 3, 6;
Ans. 3, 4, 6. We, therefore, disagree with Appellant’s argument the
Examiner does not establish a prima facie case of subject matter ineligibility
because the Examiner fails to identify clearly the abstract idea. Appeal Br.
10–12.
Because the present claims recite commercial interactions including
sales activities or business relations that fall into the category of certain
methods of organizing human activity (i.e., an abstract idea), we proceed to
prong 2.
2. Step 2A, Prong 2
The present claims do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing
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the abstract idea. In particular, we disagree with Appellant’s argument that,
similar to Enfish, the present claims recite an improvement in computer-
related technology. Appeal Br. 7–10, 14–18; Reply Br. 9–12.
Appellant does not identify persuasively how the Specification sets
forth an improvement in technology. The USPTO October 2019 Patent
Eligibility Guidance Update (“Update”, available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df), addresses how we consider any evidence that is presented to us. The
Update states:
[d]uring examination, the examiner should analyze the
“improvements” consideration by evaluating the specification
and the claims to ensure that a technical explanation of the
asserted improvement is present in the specification, and that the
claim reflects the asserted improvement. Generally, examiners
are not expected to make a qualitative judgment on the merits of
the asserted improvement. If the examiner concludes the
disclosed invention does not improve technology, the burden
shifts to applicant to provide persuasive arguments supported by
any necessary evidence to demonstrate that one of ordinary skill
in the art would understand that the disclosed invention improves
technology. Any such evidence submitted under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.132 must establish what the specification would convey to
one of ordinary skill in the art and cannot be used to supplement
the specification. For example, in response to a rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101, an applicant could submit a declaration under
§ 1.132 providing testimony on how one of ordinary skill in the
art would interpret the disclosed invention as improving
technology and the underlying factual basis for that conclusion.
Update 13 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
In this case, the Examiner concludes the present claims do not recite
an improvement to technology. Final Act. 3, 5, 7–8; Ans. 4–6, 8–9.
Consequently, we focus on any evidence Appellant cites pursuant to the
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Update. Here, Appellant does not cite any paragraphs in the Specification or
other types of evidence. Appeal Br. 13–16; Reply Br. 4–5. Therefore, the
arguments in the Appeal Brief and Reply Brief citing to Enfish is merely
attorney argument unsupported by evidence. Appeal Br. 13–16; Reply Br.
4–5.
In addition, in Enfish, the Federal Circuit considered how the present
invention was superior to the technology in the prior art. That is, the court
considered “the specification’s emphasis that ‘the present invention
comprises a flexible, self-referential table that stores data,’” “[t]he
specification also teaches that the self-referential table functions differently
than conventional database structures,” and “traditional databases, such as
‘those that follow the relational model and those that follow the object
oriented model[,]’ are inferior to the claimed invention.” Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d at 1337 (citations omitted). Moreover, in Enfish,
“‘[t]he structural requirements of current databases require a programmer to
predefine a structure and subsequent [data] entry must conform to that
structure,’ [and] the ‘database of the present invention does not require a
programmer to preconfigure a structure to which a user must adapt data
entry.’” Id. Based on the foregoing, the court determined the claims
“achieve[d] other benefits over conventional databases, such as increased
flexibility, faster search times, and smaller memory requirements.” Id.
Unlike the claims of Enfish, the present claims do not recite an improvement
in computer-related technology.
Instead, the present claims recite an abstract idea as discussed supra,
in Section I.C.1. or at best, improving an abstract idea—not a technological
improvement. The Specification indicates the additional elements (i.e., “first
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computer,” “first processor,”4 “first memory,”5 “user device,” “merchant
computer,” “first database,” “review queue,” “second computer,” “second
processor,”6 “second memory,”7 “external data sources,” “second rules
database,” “payment processing server,” and “data aggregator”) recited in
the present claims are merely generic computer components used to
implement the abstract idea. Spec. ¶¶ 18, 20, 21, 31, 34, 35, 40, 42, 44, 46,
47, 49, 60, 102. Further, the generic computer components, individually and
in combination, do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application.
Additionally, “a claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (emphasis added). “[U]nder the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim
directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or
abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive
concept necessary for patent eligibility.” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial
L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
We further disagree with Appellant’s argument that, similar to DDR
Holdings, the present claims are necessarily rooted in technology to solve
problems specifically arising in the realm of technology because in
situations when a transaction decision process is taking too long, this
problem is solved by modifying a computer system instead of hiring more
human reviewers. Appeal Br. 12–13, 21–22. The subject claim considered

4 This feature is recited in claim 1, but not recited in claim 11.
5 This feature is recited in claim 1, but not recited in claim 11.
6 This feature is recited in claim 1, but not recited in claim 11.
7 This feature is recited in claim 1, but not recited in claim 11.
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by the DDR court pertained to clicking on an advertisement for a third-party
product displayed on a host’s website, the visitor is no longer being
transported to the third party’s website. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257.
In DDR, instead of losing visitors to the third-party’s website, the host
website can send its visitors to a web page on an outsource provider’s server
that (1) incorporates “look and feel” elements from the host website and
(2) provides visitors with the opportunity to purchase products from the
third-party merchant without actually entering that merchant’s website. Id.
at 1257–58. In contrast to the claims of DDR, the present claims do not
recite incorporating “look and feel elements” from a host website and
providing visitors with the opportunity to purchase products from a third-
party merchant without actually entering the merchant’s website.
We disagree with Appellant’s argument that, similar to Amdocs, the
present claims provides an unconventional technical solution by utilizing a
distributed system such as a first computer, a second computer, and a data
aggregator to reduce the extra steps and communications between the
entities in the distributed systems that are inherent in conventional systems
and cause unnecessary burden on the different parties involved that results in
elements combined in an unconventional manner. Appeal Br. 20–21. The
subject claim considered by the Amdocs court related to distributed
architecture led to load distribution, which was an advantage over the prior
art because it made it easier to keep up with record flows, allow for smaller
databases, and minimize impact on network and system resources. Amdocs
(Israel) Ltd., 841 F.3d at 1303. Additionally, the court construed the
claimed “enhance” to mean “to apply a number of field enhancements in a
distrusted fashion.” Id. at 1292, 1300. In contrast to the claims of Amdocs,
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the present claims do not pertain to field enhancement in a distributed
network.
Appellant does not make any other arguments pertaining to step 2A,
prong 2. Because the present claims recite an abstract idea that is not
integrated into a practical application, we proceed to Step 2B.
3. Step 2B
We agree with the Examiner’s determination that the additional
elements implementing the abstract idea are well-understood, routine, and
conventional. Final Act. 4–6; Ans. 5 (citing buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014); OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life
Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The Specification
supports the Examiner’s determination in this regard because it explains that
“first computer,” “first processor,” “first memory,” “user device,” “merchant
computer,” “first database,” “review queue,” “second computer,” “second
processor,” “second memory,” “external data sources,” “second rules
database,” “payment processing server,” and “data aggregator” are generic
components. Spec. ¶¶ 18, 20, 21, 31, 34, 35, 40, 42, 44, 46, 47, 49, 60, 102.
Appellant’s Specification indicates these additional elements were well-
understood, routine, and conventional components because it describes them
at a high level of generality and in a manner that indicates that they were
sufficiently well-known. Id. Moreover, the additional elements recited in
the present claims, analyzed individually or in combination, does not result
in the claim, as a whole, amounting to significantly more than the judicial
exception.
In addition, the Examiner identifies additional elements including a
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“second processor,” a “second memory,” and a “data aggregator.” Final
Act. 4. Claim 1 recites “a second computer comprising: a second processor;
and a second memory” (claim 1 (Claim App., Appeal Br. 24–25), thus, the
claimed “second processor” and “second memory” are part of the “second
computer.” We, therefore, disagree with Appellant’s argument that the
Examiner does not identify all the additional elements such as a “second
computer” and a “data aggregator.” Appeal Br. 16–18.
We also disagree with Appellant’s argument that, similar to
Berkheimer, the Examiner fails to provide clear and convincing evidence to
support the finding that the additional elements implementing the abstract
idea are well-understood, routine, and conventional. Appeal Br. 19–20;
Reply Br. 5–6. Indeed, as noted above, the Examiner provides citations to
numerous cases that sufficiently support this finding. Ans. 5 (citing
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014); OIP
Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed.
Cir. 2012). Furthermore, the Examiner cites to the Specification (Ans. 9
(citing Spec. ¶¶ 19, 20, 102, 105)) and the Specification supports the
Examiner’s determination in this regard because it explains that the
additional elements are generic computer components. Spec. ¶¶ 18, 20, 21,
31, 34, 35, 40, 42, 44, 46, 47, 49, 60, 102.
Appellant does not argue claims 3, 10, 11, 13, 20, 22, and 25
separately, but asserts the § 101 rejection of those claims should be
withdrawn for at least the same reasons as argued for independent claim 1.
Appeal Br. 9–22. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of:
(1) independent claims 1 and 11; and (2) dependent claims 3, 10, 13, 20, 22,
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and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually
raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to
make, in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
CONCLUSION

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED

Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 10, 11,
13, 20, 22,
25
101 Eligibility 1, 3, 10, 11,
13, 20, 22,
25