Baltimore Steam Packet Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 18, 1958

120 N.L.R.B. 1521 (N.L.R.B. 1958)

BALTIMORE STEAM PACKET COMPANY 1521
Baltimore Steam Packet Company and Gilbert Essberg
Baltimore Steam Packet Company and Marine Allied Workers
of Maryland , District of Columbia , Virginia and West Virginia
of the Seafarers International Union of America , AFL-CIO
Baltimore Steam Packet Company and Marine Allied Workers
of Maryland , District of Columbia , Virginia and West Virginia
and the Seafarers International Union of North America, At-
lantic and Gulf District , AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 5-CA-1001,
S-CA1030, and 5-CA-1067. June 18,1958 -
DECISION AND ORDER
On October 10, 1957, Trial Examiner Thomas N. Kessel issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions to the Intermediate Report, together with a supporting
brief and request for oral argument.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Members Rodgers, Jenkins,
and Fanning].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and the prehearing rulings made by Trial Examiner
Sidney L. Feiler, and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in
the case,' and hereby adopts the findings,2 conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.
1. The Respondent excepts to certain prehearing rulings made by
Trial Examiner Feiler, contending that such rulings deprived it of
a fair hearing. The first of these exceptions is to Trial Examiner
Feiler's refusal to grant in toto the Respondent's motion for a more
definite statement with respect to the portions of the complaint which
alleged violations of Section 8 (a) (1) and Section 8 (a) (3) of the
2 The Respondent 's request for oral argument is denied as the record , exceptions, and
brief adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties.
a The Respondent contends that a "ihere recitation of testimony" by the Trial Exam-
iner is not a proper finding of fact. While some of the Trial Examiner 's findings of fact
are presented in narrative form similar to that of the actual testimony , the Trial Exam-
iner set forth completely the substance of the testimony and specific findings of fact based
thereon. Accordingly , we find that the Respondent was fully informed of "the basic
facts which are needed to sustain the order" herein. See N. L R. B. v. Andrew Jergens
Co., 175 F. 2d 130 , 136 (C. A. 9).
120 NLRB No. 193. -
483142-59-vol. 120-97
1522 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Act. In view of the fact that as a result of Trial Examiner Feiler's
partial granting of this motion and also of a subsequent Respondent
motion to require answers to interrogatories the Respondent was
apprised of the nature, dates, and feasors of the Section 8 (a) (1)
violations alleged in the complaint, and in view of the fact that the
complaint itself apprised the Respondent of the names and discharge
dates of the employees alleged to have been discharged in violation of
Section 8 (a) (3), we are of the opinion that the Respondent was
advised of these alleged violations with sufficient specificity to enable
it to litigate them fully. Moreover, we note that the Respondent did
not at the hearing request additional time to obtain or present evidence
with regard to these alleged violations, and that aside from its bare
allegation of prejudice the Respondent now fails to specify what
evidence it was prevented from introducing or in precisely what
manner it was prevented from fully litigating its defenses to these
portions of the complaint. Accordingly, we find no merit in this excep-
tion. See Cadillac Marine cC Boat Company, 115 NLRB 107, 109.
We also find no merit in the Respondents' exceptions to Trial Examiner
Feiler's denial of its motions to. take prehearing depositions and
prehearing depositions on written interrogatories. See Del E. Webb
Construction Company, 95 NLRB 377, footnote 2; N. L. R. B. v. Globe
Wireless, Ltd., 193 F. 2d 748,751 (C. A. 9).
The Respondent also excepts to certain rulings made by Trial
Examiner Kessel at the hearing with respect to the admissibility of
evidence. The first of these exceptions is to the admission of con-
versations between employee Sweets and Chief Chef Fatherly, on the
ground-that there is no sufficient showing that Fatherly is a supervisor
whose statements would be binding on the Respondent. As the record
shows that Fatherly is in charge of all eight employees in the "galley,"
that he directs these employees in their duties, that he assigns them
to different jobs, and that he recommends the hiring of "galley"
employees, we find that Fatherly is a supervisor whose statements are
binding on the Respondent. We also find no merit in the Respond-
ent's exception to Trial Examiner Kessel's refusal to permit testimony
relative to the employment status of the dischargees subsequent to
their discharge. See New Jersey Carpet Mills, Inc., 92 NLRB 604,
footnote 3. The Respondent's next exception is to the admission of
the testimony of Robert Matthews as not being the "best evidence."
In the absence of any reasons given in support of this contention, we
find this exception to be without merit.-
The Respondent also filed a "special exception" to the conduct of
Counsel for the General Counsel, contending that such conduct de-
prived it of a fair hearing. This exception is based, in substance, on
the alleged refusal or failure of counsel for the General Counsel to.
furhish Respondent with certain alleged affidavits of witnesses which
BALTIMORE STEAM PACKET COMPANY 1523
were acquired in the investigation of the case. In effect, therefore,
this is an allegation that the decision in the Jencks case applies
herein .1 As the Board has held that the Jencks decision is not
applicable to Board proceedings,' we find no merit in this exception.
2. The Respondent contends that the Trial Examiner should not
have credited the testimony of former First Mate Dunstan, on which
the Trial Examiner relied in part in finding that the Respondent was
firmly committed to prevention of the Union's organization of its
employees and pursuant to this objective had adopted a plan of action
designed to defeat such organization, and that this was the back-
ground for the alleged unlawful conduct of the Respondent. This
contention is based on the fact that in sworn statements given to the
Board's field examiner in the investigation of the case Dunstan con-
tradicted in part his testimony at the hearing. Thus, in one pre-
hearing statement Dunstan stated that he himself had decided to
discharge Essberg for loafing and keeping the other employees from
working, whereas at the hearing he testified that he was directed by
Captain Walker to discharge Essberg because of his union activities;
and in another prehearing statement Dunstan stated that he had no
knowledge of Willoughby's union activities, whereas at the hearing
he testified that Second Mate Cropper told him of such activities.'
Despite this partial, inconsistency between Dunstan's prehearing
statements and his testimony at the hearing,' the Trial Examiner
credited the testimony of Dunstan on the following grounds: (1)
Dunstan's demeanor at the hearing impressed the Trial Examiner
as that of a cooperative witness impartially recounting what he re-
membered to the best of his ability; (2) considering Dunstan's other
testimony concerning the antiunion directives given him by respon-
sible company officials and his direct supervisors, it could well be, as
Dunstan sought to indicate, by explanatory testimony with respect to
his prehearing statements, that the, falsehoods were contained in the
statements and not in his testimony, as a product of a compulsion
engendered by the antiunion tactics in, which he had been instructed
by his direct supervisors and other company officials; 7 and (3) Re-
a Jencks v. United States, 353 U S. 657
4 The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company , 118 NLRB 1280; J. J. Reddington
Electric Service Co., 119 NLRB 1816.
s The Trial Examiner incorrectly states that there was also a similar prior inconsistent
statement with respect to employee Voland'sunion activities . There is no evidence that
Dunstan made any prehearing statement with respect to Voland
6 Theie is no evidence of any other preheating statements which contradict the remain-
ing major portion of Dunstan's testimony, on which the Trial Examiner relied primarily
in making his finding of a background of Respondent antiunion ammus.
In his explanatory testimony, Dunstan stated that he was unaware that the prehear-
ing statements were under oath and had lie been cognizant thereof he would not have
made the statements , and stated further that both statements were made in the Respond-
ent's' offices in the presence of company officials.
In this connection , the Trial Examiner erroneously intimated that the prehearing state-
ment with respect to Essberg was not signed in company offices, and erroneously found
that Dunstan was therefore confused when he testified to the contrary . It is true that
1524 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
spondent failed to call a single witness to refute Dunstan's testimony
and the failure to do so was not explained, thus creating an inference
that the company supervisors and officials named by Dunstan as the
mentors or participants with him in the events which he described
would not have contradicted his testimony. As these grounds also
appear to us as being sufficient basis for crediting Dunstan's testi-
mony, and as the Board's established policy is not to overrule a Trial
Examiner's resolution as to credibility except where the clear pre-
ponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces it that the Trial
Examiner's resolution was incorrect,' we sustain the Trial Examiner's
credibility resolution with respect to Dunstan.
Moreover, even if Dunstan's testimony were totally disregarded,
there would still be ample evidence to support the Trial Examiner's
finding of a background of Respondent antiunion animus. This evi-
dence consists of : (1) Respondent President Dunn's distribution of
a letter to the employees in which he intimated that the Respondent
would go out of business if the Union came in; (2) Respondent Pur-
chasing Agent Schunke's address to a group of employees in which
he stated directly that the Respondent would go out of business if the
Union came in; and (3) the numerous statements made by supervisors
and company officials that union activity would result in loss of jobs,
that union activity would mean automatic discharge, that an employee
who engaged in union activity was "talking himself and other em-
ployees out of a job," that certain supervisors "had it in" for an em-
ployee because of his union activity and had planned a "pretext"
discharge for this employee, that Respondent would "take care of" the
employees engaged in union activity, and the frank admissions with
respect to 7 of the 8 dischargees that they were discharged for their
union activity.
3. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the eight em-
ployees named 'in the complaint were discharged by the Respondent
because of their activities and sympathies for the Union, and that the
Respondent thereby violated Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
In its brief the Respondent contends that William R. Dawson was
discharged for incompetence, adverting to the "rope splicing episode."
There is some evidence in the record which indicates that on some
occasion Dawson took longer to perform a "rope splicing" job than
is normally required. However, there is other evidence which indi-
cates that the new rope being used made it a more difficult job, and also
a Respondent witness at first testified that this statement was made at the Board office,
but this witness later testified, in corroboration of Dunstan, that it was made at company
offices.
8Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F. 2d 362 (C. A. 3).
In that case the Board also stated that it is our policy to attach great weight to a
Trial Examiner's credibility findings insofar as they are based on demeanor ; and here,
as indicated, the Trial Examiner relied on the demeanor of Dunstan as one of the three
grounds for crediting his testimony
BALTIMORE STEAM PACKET COMPANY 1525
that Dawson had to redo part of the job because of improper instruc-
tions initially given him by Second Mate Horsley. In any event, in
view of the facts that when Horsley hired Dawson he warned Dawson
of discharge if the latter engaged in union activity, that Horsley sub-
sequently interrogated Dawson as to his union membership and on this
occasion also told the latter that he should consider himself fired if
Horsley heard of any union activity, that Dawson nevertheless did
engage in union activity, and that when Dawson was discharged
shortly thereafter by Day or Port Mate Sibley the latter bluntly told
him that it, was "for holding union activities on this ship," we find
that the preponderance of the evidence clearly establishes that Dawson
was discharged for his union activity and not for incompetence.
With respect to Gilbert Essberg, the Trial Examiner correctly found
that when Essberg was discharged he remarked to First Mate Dunstan
that he had been discharged because of his union sympathies and
activities, but then incorrectly found that Dunstan simply "acknowl-
edged that he was sorry to have discharged him." The testimony on
which this finding is based is rather that Dunstan admitted Essberg's
accusation that the latter had been discharged for his union sym-
pathies and activities. Accordingly, we find that in the discharge of
Essberg, too, the Respondent frankly admitted a discriminatory
motive.
4. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent
independently violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by coercive inter-
rogation of employees concerning their union activities and the utter-
ance of threatening statements and warnings calculated to prevent
continuation of their union activities.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that Baltimore Steam Packet Com-
pany, Baltimore, Maryland, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns
shall :
1. Cease and desist from the following :
(a) Coercing, restraining, or interfering with the concerted activi-
ties of its employees by interrogating them as to their union activities
and sympathies or by warning them of or threatening them with dis-
charge or any other act of reprisal for engaging or continuing to en-
gage in their union activities.
(b) Discouraging membership in Marine Allied Workers of Mary-
land, District of Columbia, Virginia and West Virginia, Seafarers
International Union of North America, Atlantic and Gulf District,
AFL-CIO, or Seafarers International Union of America, AFL-CIO,
1526 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
or any other labor organization of its employees, by discriminating in
-regard to hire or tenure of its employees.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
-its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist the aforementioned labor organizations or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively through represent-
atives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protec-
tion, or to refrain from such activities, except to the extent that such
rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, as
guaranteed in Section 7 thereof.
(2) Take the following affirmative action which it is found will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer to William R. Dawson, Hubert Jackson, Oscar J. Sweets,
William Kunak, Gilbert Essberg, Charles L. Copeland, George T.
Willoughby, and Charles R. Voland immediate and full reinstatement
to their former or substantially equivalent positions without prejudice
to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make each of
them whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimina-
tion against them in the manner set forth in the section of the Inter-
mediate Report entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Post at its place of business in Baltimore, Maryland, and on
its vessels the District of Columbia, the City of Norfolk, and the City
of Richmond copies of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report
marked "Appendix." 9 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for the Fifth Region, shall, after being duly signed
by an authorized representative of the Respondent, be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it
for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Preserve and make available to the Board or its agents upon
request, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social-
security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the amounts of back pay
_due and the rights of employment under the terms of this Order.
(d) - Notify the Regional Director for the Fifth Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, as to what steps
it has taken to comply herewith.
0 This notice shall be amended by substituting for the words "The Recommendations of
a Trial Examiner" the words "A Decision and Order " In the event that this Order is
enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the
words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United
States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
BALTIMORE STEAM PACKET COMPANY
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
1527
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges filed in Case No. 5-CA-1001 by an individual, Gilbert Essberg,
and in Case No. 5-CA-1030 by Marine Allied Workers of Maryland, District of
Columbia, Virginia and West Virginia of the Seafarers International Union of
America, AFL-CIO, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,
by the Regional Director for the Fifth Region, Baltimore, Maryland, issued on
March 8, 1956, an order consolidating and a consolidated complaint, based on the
foregoing charges against Baltimore Steam Packet Company, herein called the Re-
spondent. On May 23, 1956, the aforesaid Regional Director issued in Case No.
5-CA-1067, another complaint against the Respondent based on a charge filed by
Marine Allied Workers Union of Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia and
West Virginia and the Seafarers International Union of North America, Atlantic and
Gulf District, AFL-CIO. This complaint was consolidated with the foregoing com-
plaint for purposes of hearing upon the order of the Trial Examiner. The charging
labor organizations in all the foregoing cases are herein separately and collectively
called the Union. Copies of the complaint, charges, orders consolidating, and notices
of hearing were duly served upon the parties.
The complaints, as amended at the hearing, alleged that the Respondent has en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National
,Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. Specifically, the complaints
allege that certain employees were discharged by the Respondent because of their
union sympathies and activities and that the Respondent thereby violated Section 8
(a) (3) of the Act, and that by other conduct the Respondent interfered with,
restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) thereof. The answers filed by the
Respondent deny the commission of any unlawful conduct and assert that the em-
ployees alleged by the complaints to have been unlawfully discharged were justifiably
discharged for good cause.
A hearing in these cases was held at Baltimore, Maryland, on various dates be-
tween April 9, 1956, and April 9, 1957, before the Trial Examiner duly designated to
conduct the hearing. All parties appeared through counsel and were afforded full
opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to produce
evidence. After the close of the hearing, the Respondents filed a brief which has
been carefully considered.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from observation of the witnesses, the
Trial Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS
Baltimore Steam Packet Company is a Maryland corporation engaged in the
transportation by water of freight and passengers between Baltimore, Maryland, and
Washington, D. C., and points in and around Old Point Comfort, Newport News, and
Norfolk, Virginia. In the course of its business, the Respondent operates three ves-
sels called the City of Richmond, the City of Norfolk, and the District of Columbia.
The complaint alleges and the answer admits that the Respondent's annual revenues
from the foregoing operations exceed $2,600,000, of which at least 90 percent is
derived from the interstate transportation of passengers and freight, and that the
Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Marine Allied Workers of Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia and West Vir-
ginia, herein called the MAW, was chartered by the Seafarers International Union of
America. AFL-CIO, herein called the SIU, for the purpose of conducting a campaign
in June 1955 among the Respondent's employees as well as employees of other em-
ployers to organize them into a union. In the course of these activities the MAW
sought the signatures of Respondent's employees to cards alleging their adherence to
"Marine Allied Workers-A. F. of L." In March 1956, these organizational activi-
ties were assumed by the Seafarers International Union of North America, Atlantic
and Gulf District, AFL-CIO, and thereafter the pledge cards on which signatures
were sought were in the name of the SIU. The MAW at the time of the hearing was
no longer organizing the Respondent's employees, but was still in existence and
interested in the prosecution of the instant proceeding. Should a representation
1528 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
proceeding be initiated before the Board seeking certification as exclusive bargaining
representative of the Respondent 's employees , the petition in such proceeding would
be filed by the SIU. I find that both the MAW and the SIU are labor organizations
within the meaning of the Act.
M. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Respondent's opposition to the Union
Robert E . Dunn , the Respondent 's president , was informed in June 1955 of the
Union 's organizing activities among the Respondent's employees and of the desire
by its official to confer with him. He thereupon referred that official to Miller, the
Respondent 's port engineer . Miller subsequently advised the Union 's official that
the Respondent would not recognize the Union as the representative of its employees
before its representative status was certified . Dunn was apprised by Miller of the
position he had taken , and later , in July, was notified by Miller of the Union 's threat
to picket to force recognition . Thereafter , Dunn distributed to the Respondent's
employees copies of a letter signed by him and dated July 8 , 1955. In substance, this
letter stressed the Respondent 's tight financial situation and emphasized that certain
other shipping companies had gone out of business because of "too much expense"
with consequent loss of employment to their employees . The letter bluntly warned
that the Respondent would go out of business "if the owners were confronted with
any material increase in expenses ," and concluded with an appeal for employee co-
operation . Called by the General Counsel as an adverse witness , Dunn was ques-
tioned closely as to the meaning and purpose of this letter . He explained that in
part it was motivated by the information he had received that the Respondent was to
be picketed on July 3, but conceded that it was sent out on July 8, even though the
expected picketing did not materialize . He denied that he intended to convey to the
employees the notion that the Respondent opposed their becoming unionized lest
this result in higher operating costs which would force it out of business. He in-
sisted several times that he merely intended through the letter to acquaint the em-
ployees with the information contained therein . While I do not regard Dunn 's letter
as coercive , I am satisfied from its content and timing as well as Dunn 's failure to
provide a more logical explanation of his intention than the one he offered , that it
was meant to reflect the Respondent 's opposition to unionization which would in-
crease its operating costs, and that it was an appeal to employees to reject the Union.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact, as related by former employee Clarence
McGlohon , that the personnel of the vessel District of Columbia were assembled one
evening in August 1955 in the dining room of the ship while it was sailing from Nor-
folk to Washington and were addressed by Schunke, the Respondent 's purchasing
agent . Schunke told them that he was aware that most of the employees had signed
cards for the Union and then predicted that if the union officials "took over" that the
Respondent would be forced out of business "because they simply couldn 't operate
on the amount of money they was making ." Dunn was on the ship at the time,
having boarded with Schunke at Norfolk.
In addition to the Respondent 's opposition to the Union as revealed by the fore-
going circumstances , there is other evidence even more forcibly and directly disclosing
union animus. Dunn claimed that in the course of the Union 's activities he had
not instructed supervisors concerning the Respondent 's attitude , but that they under-
stood the Respondent 's policy to be that employees had the right to engage in union
activities . The record shows, however , that the Respondent 's supervisors and officials
had a contrary understanding , one which indicated the Respondent 's uncompromising
opposition to the unionization of its employees with a plan of action for combating
and preventing this result even by the application of unlawful means. This condition
is amply demonstrated by the testimony of employees as detailed below , concerning
statements made by supervisors and officials and by the testimony of Beverly E.
Dunstan , a former first mate on the City of Richmond who had been employed by
the Respondent from October 1952 to August 1956 . Dunstan testified that in July
1955, sometime after the Union began its activities among the Respondent's em-
ployees, he received various instructions concerning this situation from his superiors
and company officials . Captain Chapman of the City of Richmond and Assistant
Port Engineer Walker told him to avoid hiring men for his ship who were sym-
pathetic to the Union . If their Coast Guard qualifying papers bore a recent date
they were to be sent to Walker for interviews where effort would be made to deter-
mine whether the applicants , in securing their Coast Guard papers , had received
certain letters from the Union . Those who had received such letters were to be
rejected for employment . Chapman and Walker also told Dunstan to get rid of
men who were organizing on his ship , but that in doing so to assign pretextual reasons
for their discharges . They further instructed him to be alert to union activities on
BALTIMORE STEAM PACKET COMPANY 1529
his ship in all departments and to pass on to "authorities" information of this kind
which he acquired . According to Dunstan , Captain Willy Walker, who substituted
for Captain Chapman during part of the time in question, directed him to hire men
at Norfolk through Gallagher, Respondent's agent at that point. Captain Walker
explained that Gallagher had observed certain men who he thought were trying to
organize the ship and that Gallagher would know better than Dunstan which
applicants for employment were union sympathizers.
Dunstan related that he talked about the foregoing instructions to other officers
on his ship including Second Mate Cropper, Quartermaster Emerson, the petty
officers, and the lookout man, and that he had also discussed these matters with
Second Mate Horsley of the City of Norfolk; that Cropper had told him that em-
ployees Voland and Willoughby were active-in behalf of the Union and, after they
were discharged, that he had got rid of them because they had signed pledge cards
and were sympathetic to the Union; that a few days after the discharge of Pantry-
man Sweets on the City of Richmond, Purser Bowers told him that he had discharged
Sweets for engaging in union activities ; that Sibley, the relief mate in Baltimore,
told him of a mistake by Dawson, mate on another of the Respondent 's vessels, who
had noted on the dismissal slip he had given a discharged employee that the action
had been taken because of the employee 's union activities , and that Port Engineer
Miller and Assistant Port Engineer Walker cautioned him against making the
same mistake.
Dunstan also testified that upon return to his ship on July 3, after a leave of
several days , he was directed by Captain Walker to discharge employee Essberg
because of his union activities . Dunstan discharged Essberg on July 5 when the ship
docked at Baltimore and noted on the dismissal slip as reason for the discharge that
Essberg's services were "no longer needed ." This he did despite the fact that the
deck crew , over which Dunstan was in charge, normally operated with 8 men and
at the time carried only 5 men . Essberg, in Dunstan 's opinion , was a satisfactory
employee with whom he had found no fault . Dunstan had stated in a sworn state-
ment given on August 16, 1955, to the Board 's field examiner that he himself had
decided to discharge Essberg, and that he had done so because Essberg , having been
assigned certain duties aboard ship on July 5, had been the principal spokesman in
huddles with the other men, and had consequently been loafing and keeping them
from working. Cross-examined, Dunstan claimed that he had been unaware that
he had given the statement under oath , and had he been cognizant thereof that he
would not have made the statement . He acknowledged that it was partially false,
and volunteered the explanation that it had been taken in the Respondent 's office
in the presence of certain of the Respondent 's officials and Mr . Burke, attorney
associated with counsel for the Respondent in this proceeding . Ostensibly, Dunstan
was endeavoring to establish that the falsification of his statement was induced by
fear of his employer. It was developed that Dunstan had on May 18 , 1955, signed
another sworn statement for the Board 's field examiner covering matters related
to this case . It appears that this statement was given in the office of one of the
Respondent 's officials who was present at the time.
The Respondent emphasizes Dunstan's discrepant testimony and prior sworn
statements as well as his confused explanation therefor as a reason for' rejecting all
of his testimony . In this case , as in any other where a witness' out-of-court sworn
statements conflict with his testimony at the hearing, such circumstances require close
scrutiny in passing on the credibility of the witness and the reliability of any part
of his testimony . Spontaneous reaction to recantation at a hearing of prior sworn
statements without satisfactory explanation produces sufficient doubt as to invite
general disbelief . Such automatic response , however, may lead to a superficial and
erroneous result and is not a valid substitute for careful analysis of all considerations
relevant to the reliability of the witness' testimony in part or in whole. Granted
that Dunstan 's statements and testimony relative to them weigh against his credibility,
I must consider that he otherwise impressed me as a cooperative witness impartially
recounting what he remembered to the best of his ability. Certainly, he told an
untruth at some time with respect to Essberg's discharge and his knowledge of
Voland's and Willoughby's union activities, but if his testimony concerning the
directives given him by responsible company officials and his direct superiors are
worthy of belief, then it may well be, as he sought to indicate , that the falsehoods
were contained in the statements and not in the testimony given at the hearing. Ap-
prehensions which could have impelled the giving of a false statement about Essberg
on August 16, 1955, could have been operative whether the statement was given
at the Respondent's premises or in the Board 's office, and, as to that, I am satisfied
that Dunstan was confused by the fact that he had signed one statement in the
Respondent 's offices and that when he testified that the August 16 statement was
signed there that he had in mind the May 18 statement . Whatever the explanation
1530 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for his confusion, I am satisfied that his testimony at the hearing is worthy of belief,
and that his contradictory statements given before then were the product of a com-
pulsion engendered by the antiunion tactics in which he had been instructed by his
direct superiors and other officials of the Respondent. I might have rejected his
testimony in its entirety, had the Respondent produced as witnesses to refute Dunstan's
testimony the persons named by him as the mentors or participants with him in the
events which he described. Not a single witness was called for this purpose by the
Respondent, nor was the failure to do so explained. - I infer that these persons
did not testify because their testimony would not have contradicted Dunstan's.
I find from the foregoing evidence that the Respondent was firmly committed to
prevention of the organization by the Union of its employees, and that pursuant to
this objective that it had adopted a plan of action designed to defeat the Union's
efforts to organize its employees. This is the background for the conduct alleged
by the complaints unlawfully to have been committed by the Respondent.
B. The unlawful conduct
The General Counsel's proof of unlawful conduct consists of documentary evi-
dence and testimony by several witnesses. No witnesses were called by the Re-
spondent to contradict the accounts given by these witnesses of conduct attributable
to the Respondent's agents, and the Respondent relied only upon cross-examination
to discredit them. In assessing their testimony I have carefully considered their
answers given both in direct and cross-examination, their demeanor while testifying,
as well as any inherent contradictions and implausibilities appearing in any portion
of their testimony. Thus tested, I am satisfied that the accounts of conduct
attributable to the Respondent given by these witnesses without contradiction,
supported in part by mutual corroboration and by unimpeached documentary evi-
dence, are entitled to full credit and I herewith rely upon them in the following
presentation of the relevant facts which I find are disclosed by the record.
William R. Dawson was hired as a seaman on the City of Norfolk on July
19, 1955, and was discharged on July 28, 1955. Dawson was hired by Second
Mate Horsley who was then acting as relief for the chief mate. Horsley told
Dawson that the SIU was trying to organize the Respondent's employees and "if
there was any talk of union activities on any ship we'd lose our jobs." One of
Dawson's first duties on the City of Norfolk was as lookout man. While engaged
in these duties, Horsley came to Dawson in the wheelhouse and discussed his past
employment with the Isthmian Steamship Company. Horsley pointed out that this
line had a labor contract with the SIU and then asked Dawson whether he was a
member of this labor organization. The latter merely acknowledged making several
voyages for the line, whereupon Horsley asserted that the expense of union mem-
bership was not equaled by the benefits derived therefrom. Dawson argued the
point and Horsley commented, "All you fellows that come aboard here trying to-
organize, all you're doing is trying to kill the goose that laid the golden egg. All
you're doing is just talking me, and others, out of a job." He concluded with a
warning that if he heard of union activity on his ship that Dawson should consider
himself fired' In the period when the foregoing discussion occurred, Dawson
was soliciting pledge cards for the Union from the crew of the City of Norfolk.
During his 9 days of employment he spoke during off-duty hours to 15 or 20 of
these employees in behalf of the Union. At 8 a. m. on July 28, as Dawson was
about to start work that day, Sibley, the day or port mate in charge of the crew in
the daytime, presented him with a termination slip and directed him to get his pay.
Dawson asked why he was being discharged and Sibley informed him that it was
"for holding union activities on this ship." He added that this reason would not
be put in writing. Near the close of this conversation, Dawson and Sibley were
joined by Hubert Jackson, who had been employed by the Respondent as a seaman
on the City of Richmond. Sibley proceeded to discharge Jackson in Dawson's
presence, giving Jackson, in substance, the same reason for his discharge that he
had given Dawson.
Jackson had been hired on June 2, 1955, and was discharged in the morning of
July 28 at about the time of Dawson's discharge. First Mate Dawson of the City
of Norfolk had interviewed Jackson on June 2 before hiring him and asked whether
he belonged to the Union. Jackson denied membership. During his employment
on the City of Norfolk, Jackson had in his off-duty hours solicited about 15 of the
crew to sign pledge cards for the Union. In the evening of July 26, as he boarded
his ship just before sailing time, Second Mate Horsley asked him how many men
had signed up for the Union that day, and stated that he knew Jackson was a'
union man . Jackson asked for the identity of Horsley's informant, but Horsley
BALTIMORE STEAM PACKET COMPANY 1531
claimed he was not at liberty to tell him. He further told Jackson that he was
talking himself and every one else employed by the Respondent out of a job.
Oscar J . Sweets was last hired by the Respondent as a pantryman on the City
of Richmond on May 16, 1954, and was discharged on July 9, 1955. His first con-
tact with the Union was early in July 1955, when he was asked by employees from
the engineroom on his ship whether he would like to join the Union. He indicated
his willingness and then accepted their invitation to visit the union hall . On July
7 he went to the hall and that night brought back to the ship a number of pledge
cards which he left on the messroom table. That same night, after employees
finished their duties, Sweets signed up two of them. The next day he signed up
five more. On the morning of July 9, as the ship was approaching Baltimore,
Sweets was summoned by Purser Smith, who told him he had received orders to pay
him off. Sweets asked for a reason, but Smith claimed he did not know the. reason.
Later that day Sweets had,a conversation with Fatherly, the chief chef under whom
he had worked. Fatherly told Sweets he had heard of his discharge and had
questioned Purchasing Agent Schunke about it. He was informed by Schunke it
was because Sweets had gone to the union hall the previous week. The same day,
in a subsequent conversation with Fatherly, the latter told Sweets that Schunke had
recalled to him that Sweets had belonged to the Union "on a trip before." Later
that day Sweets returned to the ship to get his discharge slip from the ship's captain.
While passing through the galley he overheard a conversation between Fatherly and
a subordinate cook in which Fatherly said that Sweets had been "fired on account
of the Union." Sweets had received no complaints about his work during his em-
ployment. In connection with the circumstances of Sweets' discharge, there should
here be noted the testimony of First Mate Dunstan, above related, that Purser
Bowers had told him a few days after Sweets had been discharged that it had been
caused by his union activities. Bowers was the regular purser on the City of
Richmond for whom Smith had been substituting at the time of Sweets' discharge.
William Kunak-had been hired on June 18, 1955, by First Mate Dawson as an
ordinary seaman aboard the City of Norfolk. Dawson discharged him 4 days later
after the vessel had made 2 round trips between Baltimore and Norfolk. Kunak
had spoken to members of the crew during his second trip while the vessel was
en route to Baltimore and had tried to solicit them for the Union. In the morning
of June 22, after the vessel had docked at Baltimore and just before it prepared to
sail again, Dawson handed Kunak a discharge slip. The latter asked for' a reason,
and Dawson refused to supply one. Kunak then went with Dawson to the purser
who informed him that his discharge had been required by the captain because of
his union activities. Kunak then demanded that this reason be stated on his dis-
charge slip, and Dawson thereupon complied with the demand. Kunak's discharge
slip is in evidence. There is a place thereon for noting the reason for the employee's
discharge. Written there by Dawson are these words: "Discharged for union
activities."
Gilbert Essberg was hired by the Respondent as a deckhand on the City of
Richmond on June 29, 1955, and was discharged on July 5. During the course of
his employment, Essberg had contacted virtually all the employees in the deck
department and several others in the stewards department and engineroom of the
vessel and had procured the signatures to union pledge cards of 9 deckhands and
at least 2 members of the engineroom. In the morning of July 5, he was handed
a dismissal slip by Cropper, one of the subordinate mates on the City of Richmond.
Later that day Essberg returned to the ship to pick up a severance slip and the pay
for his last day and had a conversation with the aforementioned First Mate Dunstan.
Essberg asked him why he had been discharged when the deck crew was then
shorthanded, and Dunstan laughingly replied that his services were no longer
needed. Essberg remarked that he had been discharged because of his union
sympathies and activities, and-Dunstan acknowledged that he was sorry to have
discharged him, that Essberg was a good worker and he would have liked to keep
him, but that he had to look out for his own job and was therefore compelled to
release him.
Charles L. Copeland was discharged on July 8, 1955, from his employment as a
junior bellman on the District of Columbia. On July 6 this vessel and the City of
Richmond were docked at Norfolk. That day Copeland was handed a union
leaflet and pledge cards by Basil Booker, known to his shipmates as "Klondike."
Booker was employed on the City of Richmond and was active on that vessel in
promoting the Union. After receiving the pledge cards from Booker, Copeland
himself signed a card and distributed the remainder to his fellow employees. He,
procured the signatures of 6 or 8 of them. Copeland's next contact with Booker
was on July 8, when the District of Columbia returned to Norfolk. - On this-
1532 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
occasion, Booker handed him more pledge cards. Purser Pratt of the District of
Columbia passed them as this incident occurred. In the afternoon of July 8, at
about 4 p. in., Copeland was dressed in his work uniform escorting passengers
from the dock aboard the vessel. In the course of these activities he was contacted
on the dock by Booker and the aforementioned Sweets from the City of Richmond.
Copeland handed Booker the pledge cards which he had received earlier and which
now bore the signatures of employees. While this was going on the captain and .
purser of the City of Richmond were engaged in conversation on the dock with two
officers from the District of Columbia. Copeland estimated that they were 30 to
40 feet from where he was conversing with Booker and Sweets. -He testified that
the officers, particularly the purser, were watching him and his companions. Shortly
after Copeland finished his business with Booker and Sweets, he went aboard the
District of Columbia. At about 4:45 p. in., he was informed by Purser Pratt that
he was discharged. Copeland asked for a reason. Pratt first told him that he had
none, but upon Copeland's insistence said, "Well, maybe undesirable," and added,
` or, have you been doing any talking around." Copeland remarked that this
inquiry was unfair, and asked to what Pratt was referring. Pratt did not answer
this question. When Copeland requested a discharge slip, he was directed by
Pratt to the ship's captain. Copeland went to the captain's quarters and explained
what had transpired. The captain expressed surprise and remarked that he had not
received any complaint about Copeland. He thereupon wrote out fiis discharge
slip. Copeland had not any indication before his discharge that his employment
was in jeopardy. On the contrary, Purser Pratt had complimented his work while
he had substituted for the head bellman in the period ending 2 weeks before his
discharge and had then assured Copeland of his opportunities if he were to remain
with the Respondent. Although Copeland had been discharged in 1954 by the
Respondent for unsatisfactory work, no complaint had been registered about the
performance of his duties during his employment preceding the discharge at issue.
George T. Willoughby was last employed by the Respondent on March 6, 1956,
to work on the City of Richmond as an ordinary seaman . He was discharged on
April 15, 1956. Willoughby and Charles R. Voland, a fellow employee aboard the
City of Richmond, had on April 12, 1956, taken over the Union' s organizing activi-
ties aboard their vessel previously conducted by an employee named Meers.
Willoughby then contacted several employees on the vessel and procured their signa-
tures to pledge cards which he turned in to the Union. Voland assisted him in these
acivities . As First Mate Dunstan was taking leave from the ship he told Willoughby
to be watchful because Charles J. Carroll, who was to relieve Dunstan, and Second
Mate John B. Cropper, "had it in for [him] because [he] was working for Union
activities." Dunstan related to him that Carroll was planning to assign him to
painting a smokestack without proper facilities for the job, and would then discharge
him for failure to carry out his assignment. He further told Willoughby that an
employee named Bobby Bishop had informed him and other of the Respondent's
officials that Willoughby was engaged in union activities. Willoughby also overheard
a conversation on the City of Richmond between Bishop and Captain Walker who
had assumed Dunstan's duties as first mate while he was on leave. In this conver-
sation , which occurred a few days before Willoughby's discharge, Bishop was asked
by Walker to divulge information he had about the Union. Bishop revealed that
Willoughby, Voland, and a third employee had signed pledge cards. Walker stated
to Bishop that "we'll take care of them boys that's working for the Union." On the
day of Willoughby's discharge, Cropper came to him while he was working and
gave him his dismissal slip with instructions to get his pay. Asked for a reason for
this action, Cropper merely told Willoughby to "figure it out." Willoughby had not
received any complaints about his work and 'had had no intimation that he would
be discharged except for a warning that he had received from Captain Emerson, the
ship's quartermaster. The aforementioned Voland had been discharged 1 day
before Willoughby. Emerson then told him that he would be discharged the next day
because of his union activities and revealed that he had acquired this information
from Captain Walker and from Cropper.
The Charles R. Voland referred to in the above account was last hired on March
31, 1956, as an ordinary seaman in the deck department of the City of Richmand..
He was discharged on April 14, 1956, by Captain Walker who was then substituting
for Dunstan as first mate. Voland had received union pledge cards from the afore-
mentioned Meers and between March 31 and April 14, he had solicited for the
Union employees in the deck and steward's departments on his vessel. He procured
no signatures . Walker discharged Voland as the City of Richmond was about to sail
from Baltimore . He informed him that they were overstaffed with ordinary seamen
and that he as well as others were-being discharged. When Voland questioned the
BALTIMORE STEAM PACKET COMPANY 1533
abruptness of his notice, Walker ordered him to leave the ship voluntarily or else he
would throw -him off. He directed Voland to go to the purser for his pay. The
latter paid him off and then sent him to Captain Chapman who gave Voland his
discharge slip and explained that due to a Coast Guard requirement the ship had to,
reduce its staff of ordinary seaman. Despite this explanation Voland observed when:
he picked up his clothes from the ship on its return to Baltimore that two new ordi-
nary seamen had been hired. He noted also that John Emerson, an ordinary seamam
with less seniority than he had, was still employed on the ship. Relevant to the
circumstances of Voland's discharge are the facts recited in connection with the above:
account of Willoughby's discharge, particularly the conversation between Bobby
Bishop and Captain Walker, and the remarks by Quartermaster Emerson to
Willoughby.
I find from the foregoing that William R. Dawson, Hubert Jackson, Oscar J.
Sweets, William Kunak, Gilbert Essberg, Charles L. Copeland George T, Willoughby,
and Charles R. Voland were discharged by the Respondent because of their activities
and sympathies for the Union and that the Respondent thereby violated Section
8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act. These findings are impelled by the proof which shows
as to each of these employees that they had engaged in union activities, that the
Respondent had knowledge of these activities, that the discharges occurred directly
after they had undertaken their union activities, that the discharges were precipitate
and without warning or any satisfactory explanation therefor by the Respondent,
In view of the voluminous proof of the Respondent's hostility and opposition to the
Union and its determination to prevent the Union from organizing its employees,
the numerous statements by supervisors and officials at or about the time of the
discharges which were undisguised or recognizable admissions of the Respondent's
unlawful motive, and the credited disclosure by First Mate Dunstan revealing the
Respondent's plan to commit the very unlawful conduct complained of in this pro-
ceeding, the findings of Section 8 (a) (3) violations above enumerated are so com-
pelling as to obviate the need for further elaboration. I shall, however; advert briefly
to one of the Respondent's defenses. The record shows that two of the employees
unlawfully discharged had accepted their employment with the Respondent with the
intention of advancing the Union's cause among their fellow employees. The record
shows further that these employees had earned more money from their previous jobs
than they received from the Respondent. The Respondent contends that these
individuals were, in effect, merely agents of the Union and not employees of the
Respondent. I accord no merit to this contention. Even if their desire to promote
the Union among the Respondent's employees was the impelling factor leading them
to seek and secure employment with the Respondent, this circumstance is immaterial
to a finding that having accepted such employment and having performed the duties
thereof they were employees of the Respondent entitled to the same statutory pro-
tections as any other employees. I emphasize that the record shows that these
employees were not discharged because of failure adequately to perform duty, but
that they were discharged only because of their union activities.
The Respondent has further violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by conduct
constituting unlawful interference with, restraint, and coercion of its employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. This conduct consists of
coercive interrogation of employees concerning their union activities and the utter-
ance of threatening statements and warnings calculated to prevent continuation of
their union activities. I have limited the number of such unlawful acts to those
delineated below, and have chosen not to list others which I could have included but
did not because they would have been cumulative, or'were not specified by the
General Counsel in his particulars furnished the Respondent before the hearing, or
because I have doubt as to the meaning and implications of the conduct. In this
last category I would include the conduct ascribed by employee Basil Booker to Chief
Engineer MacDonald Whitlock and Second Assistant Engineer William Trzise of
the City of Richmond. I have not in this report related Booker's testimony because
I felt that by doing so I would only have unnecessarily burdened the report. These
are the acts committed by the Respondent's agents which I find clearly constitute
Section 8 (a) (1) violations: (a) Second Mate Horsley's warnings to employee
Dawson that he and others would lose their jobs if they talked about the Union, and
his direct threat to discharge him for engaging in such activity; (b) First Mate
Dawson's interrogation of employee Jackson while hiring him as to his membership
in the Union; (c) Second Mate Horsley's interrogation of employee Jackson concern-
ing his union activities, and his warning that Jackson was jeopardizing his and others'
employment by his union activities; (d) First Mate Dunstan's comments to employee
Essberg when he discharged him which I construe as a statement that he had dis-
charged him because of his union activities; and'similarly Purser Pratt's comment to,
1534 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR -RELATIONS BOARD
employee Copeland at the time of his discharge which I construe as a statement by
Pratt that Copeland had been discharged because of his, union activities.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, appearing in con-
nection with its operation described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce, among the several States and tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices
it',will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that
the Respondent discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of
William R. Dawson, Hubert Jackson, Oscar J. Sweets, William Kunak, Gilbert.
Essberg, Charles L. Copeland, George T. Willoughby, and Charles R. Voland. It
will be recommended that the Respondent be ordered to offer these persons imme-
diate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges. See, The Chase
National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch, 65 NLRB
827. It will further be recommended that the Respondent make them whole for
any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against them. Loss of pay,
based upon earnings which they normally would have earned from the dates of the
discrimination against them, to the date of offer of reinstatement, less net earnings,
shall be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in
F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289; N. L. R. B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Company of
Miami, Inc., 344 U. S. 344. Contrary to the contention in this proceeding by the
Respondent, evidence that the aforementioned employees have received employment
from which they earned pay in the period subsequent to their unlawful discharges
by the Respondent is immaterial at this stage of the proceeding. Such evidence may
become relevant during the compliance stage of this proceeding. The dates of
discrimination against the aforementioned employees are as follows: William R.
Dawson, July 28, 1955; Hubert Jackson, July 28, 1955; Oscar J. Sweets, July 9,
1955; William Kunak, June 22, 1955; Gilbert Essberg, July 5, 1955; Charles L.
Copeland, July 8, 1955; George T. Willoughby, April 15,1956; Charles R. Voland,
April 14, 1956.
Because by its conduct found to be violative of the Act the Respondent infringed
upon fundamental rights guaranteed by the Act, the commission of other unfair
labor practices may be reasonably anticipated. It will therefore be recommended
that the Respondent cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon the rights
guaranteed its employees by Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
the case I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Baltimore Steam Packet Company is an employer within the meaning of Section
2 (2) of the Act, and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. Marine Allied Workers of Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia and West
Virginia, Seafarers International -Union of North America, Atlantic and Gulf
District, AFL-CIO, and Seafarers International Union of America, AFL-CIO, are
labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the
Act.
4. By discriminating with respect to the hire and tenure of employment of
employees, thereby discouraging the free exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7
of the Act and discouraging membership in and activities in behalf of the above-
mentioned labor organizations, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. -
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.] -
RETAIL STORE EMPLOYEES UNION 1535
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial - Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Management
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT coerce, restrain , or interfere with the exercise by our employees
of their rights to engage in or to refrain from engaging in union activities by
interrogating them as to their union activities and sympathies , or by warning
them of or by threatening them with discharge or any other act of reprisal for
engaging in or continuing to engage in union activities.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Marine Allied Workers of Maryland,
District of Columbia , Virginia and West Virginia , Seafarers International Union
of North America, Atlantic and Gulf District , AFL-CIO, or Seafarers Interna-
tional Union of America , AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization-of our
employees by discriminating in any manner in regard to hire, tenure, or any
term or condition of employment.
WE WILL offer to William R . Dawson , Hubert Jackson , Oscar J . Sweets,
William Kunak , Gilbert Essberg, Charles L. Copeland , George T. Willoughby,
and Charles R. Voland immediate and full reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges , and we will make them whole for any loss of pay suf-
fered as a result of the discrimination against them.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain , or coerce our employees
in the exercise of the right to self-organization , to form labor organizations, to
join or assist the above-named or any other labor organization , to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from engaging in any or all such
activities , except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in
conformity with Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
All our employees are free to become or remain , or to refrain from becoming or
remaining members of any labor organization , except to the extent above stated.
BALTIMORE STEAM PACKET COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain pasted for 60 days from the date hereoif, and must not be
altered, defaced , or covered by any other material.
Retail Store Employees Union , Local 1595, Retail Clerks Inter-
national Association , AFL-CIO and J. C. Penney Company,
Store No. 309. Case No. 14-CB-468. June 18,1958
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 13,19 ' 57, Trial Examiner Lloyd Buchanan issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
120 NLRB No. 189.