Avondale Mills

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 10, 1952

100 N.L.R.B. 1102 (N.L.R.B. 1952)

1102 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
exclusive representative of all such employees for the purposes of
collective bargaining, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other conditions of employment.
MEMBERS HOUSTON and MURDOCK took no part in the consideration
of the above Supplemental Decision and Certification of Representa-
tives.
AVONDALE MILLS and LOUISA CLINE. Case No. 10-CA-1274. Septem-
ber 10, 1952
Decision and Order
On April 3, 1952, Trial Examiner Lloyd Buchanan issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Re-
spondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent and the
General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report with
supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-mem-
ber panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Murdock and Peterson].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.
Order
Upon the entire record in the case and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Avondale Mills,
Pell City, Alabama, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Interrogating its employees concerning concerted activities.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organiza-
tion, to form labor organizations, to join or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collec-
100 NLRB No. 156.
AVONDALE MILLS 1103
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from
any or all of such activities, except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3)
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post at its plant at Pell City, Alabama, copies of the notice
attached hereto and marked "Appendix A." 1 Copies of said notice,
to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall,
after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted
by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-
tained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to,its employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable step's sliall'be taken by the Respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply therewith.
IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges that
the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act by its discharge
of Louisa Cline, be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
Appendix A
NOTICE TO ALL' EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees
that:
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning concerted
activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees yin the exercise of the right to
self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such activities,
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree-
1 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals.
there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order " the words
"Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order "
1104 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ment requiring membership in a labor organization as -a condi-
tion of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of then
Act.
All of our employees are free to become, remain, or to refrain from
becoming or remaining members in good standing in any labor organi-
zation except to the extent that this right may be affected by an
agreement in conformity with Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
AVONDALE MILLS,
Employer.
Dated -------------------- By --------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This. notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
The complaint herein alleges that the Respondent has violated Section
8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, by
discharging and refusing to reinstate Louisa Cline, and Section 8 (a) (1) of
the Act by said alleged acts and by threats and interrogation of employees
concerning concerted activities; all in violation of Section 2 (6) and (7) of
the Act. The answer admits the discharge but denies the allegations of unfair
labor practice.
A hearing was held before me at Pell City, Alabama, on March 11, 1952. Pur-
suant to leave granted to all parties, a brief was thereafter filed by the
Respondent.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following : -
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS
It was admitted that the Respondent, an Alabama corporation, manufactures,
sells, and distributes, at its plants at Pell City and other places in Alabama,
cotton, rayon cloth, yarn, and related products valued at more than $1,000,000
annually, more than 90 percent of which, in value, is shipped out of Alabama ;
and that its annual purchases exceed $1,000,000, more than 25 percent of which,
in value, originated outside the State of Alabama and was shipped in interstate
commerce to the Respondent's plants. It was stipulated and I find that the
Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR,LABOR PRACTICES
A. The alleged violation' of Section 8 (a) (1)
It is undisputed that Brazier, the Respondent's spinning room overseer at the
Pell City plant, asked four spinners whether they would walk out if the other
employees did. Such a pattern of interrogation constitutes interference with
employees' concerted activities,' and I so find. An employer may not poll
' "Independent," so-called, as distinguished from "derivative" violation of Section
8 (a) (1)
2 Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Company, 85 NLRB 135$.
AVONDALE MILLS 1105
employees on their intention to engage in concerted activities. The absence
of a union does not lessen the interference ; on the contrary, it might be argued,
employees engaging in concerted activities minus outside support may be more
susceptible to interference. In any event, the tendency of such interrogation,
repeated as in this case, is clear e
Cline, the charging party, testified that Brazier threatened to fire her unless
she agreed not to join the other spinners if they struck. I do not credit` this
testimony in the light of the question which Brazier, as noted, put to several
employees, and their uniform reply that they would join in a strike. As set
forth, infra, Brazier appears to have pleaded with Cline not to quit, and it is
therefore unlikely that he threatened to fire her.
B. The alleged violation of Section 8 (a) (3)
Cline's discharge is admitted ; the reason therefor is not. Apparently about
the middle of December 1950, the gears on spinning machines, running at about
161 turns, were speeded up to include 3 additional turns. For several weeks
the work ran poorly, and on January 22, 1951, several spinners agreed to speak
to Brazier and to strike if he did not do something about it.
Shortly after the shift started on January 23, Cline and Green, both " spinners,
went into Brazier's office, spoke about the work, and Cline as spokesman told
him that, the employees would have to quit if something were not done about it.'
Green said that she would not quit, but asked that something be clone about
the work. From this point, the testimony differs markedly. According to
Brazier and Green, Cline said that the work was running so bad they would all
have to quit ; and if the others didn't, she would. Cline denied making the
latter statement.
Brazier and Green testified that at this point the latter returned to her work,
Cline remaining in Brazier's office, while Cline testified that Green was there as
long as she was. The fact in this connection is not so important as the indication
of reliability. Green testified that while she was there reference was made to
the possibility of quitting, not of striking. I believe that Green left the office
early, whether in fear of losing her job (she appeared to be timorous) or for
whatever reason, and I find that Cline, nervous and excitable, was mistaken
in her recollection.
Brazier then asked Cline to return to her job and give him a chance to speak
with Clark, the plant manager, and she agreed. A short time later, after he had
seen Clark and was told that checkers would be in the following day to see what
could be done although the gear would not be changed, Brazier called Green
into his office and asked her whether she would walk out if the others did. She
replied that she would.
Brazier testified that he then called Cline into his office, told her of his conver-
sation with Clark, and explained that the gears had been changed to help em-
8 Whatever may elsewhere have been determined concerning an employer's request for
information on union activities, the inquiries here were directed toward the actions of
the employees questioned and called for statements of their intention to engage or refrain
from engaging in concerted activities.
4 Nor do I credit her statement that Brazier simultaneously demanded that she agree,
as she did , not to ask others to strike. Parenthetically , it does not otherwise appear
that Cline asked others to strike (she did ask one spinner whether she would loin in any
strike) or that Brazier thought that she had
Cline testified that she spoke of the employees striking, not quitting, and only after
Brazier asked what they would do , he prompted it, and she did not volunteer any such
warning or threat although, as she testified, several of the employees had agreed, before
she spoke to Brazier, that they would strike if he did not do something about the work,
I do not credit her version
1106 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployees on another process. Cline was not satisfied, however, and said that she
would shut down part of her job. Brazier replied that this would spoil the work
and she would not be permitted to do it, and he asked her to give him an oppor-
tunity to do something about it. (He explained that Cline was a good worker,
and he did not want to lose her.) Twice he gave her a few minutes to "think
it over,"' but she agreed only that she would run what she could and would
shut down what she could not run. He thereupon fired her.
Cline denied that she had threatened to shut down part of her job. The issue
then is whether she was fired for making such a threat or because, as she testified,
she refused to agree to remain on the job if the other spinners struck.
Cline came in the next day, apologized' to Brazier, and asked to be permitted
to go back to work. To this request and several renewals, he replied that he
could not promise. (She also asked Clark to take her back, and he asked her to
give him time.) Wordsworth, another employee, was temporarily assigned to
Cline's station before the latter left on the 23d. Brazier testified that he had
decided on' the 24th to give Wordsworth the job permanently, but did not "get
around to'it" until the following Monday, the 29th.
Cline's minister, who called on Brazier a few days after her discharge, testified
that Brazier told him that he had let her go because she refused to agree to work
'if the others struck. Later, Clark told him that Cline had refused to do her
work. Brazier denied that he gave the minister the explanation charged to
him or any explanation for Cline's discharge.
Not without some doubt,' I credit Brazier's account that lie discharged Cline
because she refused to run her job. Testimony to the contrary may have resulted
from innocent and inadvertent error. Other employees, referred to in the pre-
ceding subsection,' were not discharged for declaring that they would join a
strike, and while this does not preclude the possibility that Cline was discharged
for such a statement, General Counsel has not sustained the burden of proving
that she was for that reason" I find that her discharge was not discriminatory
within the meaning of the Act.
As for the refusal to reemploy Cline, it might well be doubted whether she
could claim the job -under the circumstances if she were a returning economic
striker. But she had not joined others in a strike; beyond the visit to Brazier's
office, which was a concerted activity;' she acted alone, and she was in fact
discharged. Having lawfully discharged her, the Respondent was under no
obligation to reemploy her. I find no unlawful refusal to reinstate Cline.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section IT, above, occurring in
connection with the operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States,
and tend to lead to labor disputes buidening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
° Cline agreed that Brazier told her to think it over , but as noted, infra, differed with
respect to the subject of such further consideration
' She exp'ained that this was for her refusal to say that she would not go out on strike
if the others struck
1 Samuel 16 • 7b.
One of these, Lilas Smith, testified that she told Brazier that she would not walk out.
'° Lila. Smith, called bs General Counsel, testified that Brown also spoke to Brazier on
.January 23 and told him that she would "have to quit" if something weren't done about
the work running so had.
0 11 Cf. Root-Carlin, Inc, 92 NLRB 1313, and cases cited The dispute in the instant
c.ese is not over the existence of concerted activity, but whether such activity prompted
the discharge.
WHITEACRE GREER FIREPROOFING COMPANY 1107
IV, THE REMEDY
Since it has been Pound that the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging
in certain unfair labor practices affecting commerce, I shall recommend that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action in order to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondent, by interrogation concerning concerted
activities, interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in violation of
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. I shall therefore recommend that the Respondent
cease and desist therefrom.
For the reasons stated in the subsection entitled "The alleged violation of
Section 8 (a) (3)," I shall recommend that the complaint be dismissed insofar
as. it alleges the discriminatory discharge of and refusal to reinstate Louisa Cline.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case. I make the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By interrogating its employees concerning concerted activities , thereby
interfering with, restraining , and coercing them in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
2. The aforesaid labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce,
within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
3. The Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of the Act by. discharging and refusing to reinstate Louisa Cline.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]
WHITTEACRE GREER FIREPROOFING COMPANY' and INTERNATIONAL
UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS , AFL, PETITIONER . Case No.
8-RC-1716. September 10,196?
Decision and Direction of Election
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Carroll L. Martin,
hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing
are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Members Houston, Murdock, and Styles].
'The Employer 's name appears as amended at the hearing . Because its name was
incorrectly designated as "Whitacre & Greer" In the petition , the Employer moved to dis-
miss the petition. The Employer was given sufficient notice in advance of the hearing
that it was the employer of the employees involved in this proceeding to adequately pre-
pare itself for the hearing . As the Employer was therefore not prejudiced by the mis-
nomer in the petition , we shall deny its motion.
I The motions of the Employer and the Intervenor , Local 755 , United Brick & Clay
Workers of America, AFL, to dismiss the petition on the grounds of contract bar and
inappropriateness of the requested unit are denied for the reasons stated , infra.
100 NLRB No. 174.
227260-53-vol. 10071