Avaya Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 9, 2022

2021001547 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 9, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/262,994 09/12/2016 Andrew D. Flockhart 4366-568-CON 9923 48500 7590 03/09/2022 SHERIDAN ROSS P.C. 1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 1200 DENVER, CO 80202 EXAMINER MAUNG, THOMAS H ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2654 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/09/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): cjacquet@sheridanross.com edocket@sheridanross.com pair_Avaya@firsttofile.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte ANDREW D. FLOCKHART and ROBERT C. STEINER ____________ Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 Technology Center 2600 ____________ Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JASON V. MORGAN, and JAMES B. ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judges. THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 21-35, 37-39, 41, and 42. Claims 1- 20, 36, and 40 are canceled. See Claim Appendix. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2012). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Avaya Inc. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 2 The present invention relates generally to achieving a true one-to-one match in a contact center. See Abstr. Independent claim 21, reproduced below, is representative of the appealed claims: 21. A method, comprising: determining, by a microprocessor, that an object out of objects in a contact center is available for matching, wherein the contact center comprises an objects pool comprising the objects and a counter-objects pool comprising counter-objects, wherein each of the objects is mapped to a combination of attributes in a first mapping, wherein each unique combination of attributes has a corresponding combination ID, wherein the combination IDs are mapped to the objects in a reformatted mapping, and wherein the reformatted mapping contains less data than the first mapping; and identifying, by the microprocessor, a subset of the counter-objects that match the object by scanning the reformatted mapping. Appellant appeals the following rejections:2 R1. Claims 21-35, 37-39, 41, and 42 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 9-12. R2. Claims 21-26, 28-35, 37-39, and 42 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Werth (US 2010/0138270 A1, June 3, 2010) and Lam (US 7,689,630 B1, Mar. 30, 2010). Final Act. 13- 2 The Examiner withdraws all rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112 and non- statutory double patenting. See Pre-Brief Appeal Conference Decision dated June 22, 2020; see also Ans. 20. Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 3 24. R3. Claim 27 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Werth, Lam, and Inamdar (US 2006/0093124 A1, May 4, 2006). Final Act. 24-25. R4. Claim 41 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Werth, Lam, and Wu (US 7,023,979 B1, Apr. 4, 2006). Final Act. 26- 27. We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017). We disagree with Appellant that the Examiner errs and adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner to the extent consistent with our analysis herein. We add the following primarily for emphasis. ANALYSIS Rejection under § 101 An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217-18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 4 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). In accordance with the framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). For example, concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). The USPTO published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Eligibility Guidance”), updated by USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (jointly referred to as “Revised Guidance”); see also October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (available at http://www.uspto.gov/PatentEligibility; notifying the public of the availability of the October update) (“October 2019 Update”). Under the Revised Guidance “Step 2A,” the office first looks to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 5 of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)- (c), (e)-(h)). 84 Fed. Reg. at 51-52, 55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, does the Office then (pursuant to the Revised Guidance “Step 2B”) look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Step 2A, Prong 1 (Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?) With respect to independent method claim 21, and similarly, independent system claim 30 and independent apparatus claim 39, the Examiner determines that the claims recite “analyzing information in a way that can be performed mentally” (Final Act. 9; see also Ans. 3), which we conclude are mental processes, which is a type of abstract idea. The Examiner also determines that the claims recite “the series of steps instructing how to match an object with a counter-object based on matching set of attributes” (Final Act. 10), which we conclude is a method of organizing human activity, i.e., managing interactions between people. For at least the following reasons, we are persuaded that representative claim 21 recites plural abstract ideas. See October 2019 Update at 2 (“Other claims Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 6 may recite multiple abstract ideas, which may fall in the same or different groupings, or multiple laws of nature. In these cases, examiners should not parse the claim.”). The Specification discloses: One aspect of the present disclosure proposes a queueless contact center. One-to-one optimal matching of work items and agents can be achieved by discarding the notion that queues are required in a contact center. Instead of pre-organizing work items and resources into specific buckets or queues, the present disclosure proposes a system where ultra-fast mapping can be performed. Such ultra-fast mapping may be realized by first performing a qualification determination (i.e., determine which objects are qualified to be assigned to the newly available object), an eligibility determination (i.e., determine which of the qualified objects are eligible to be assigned to the newly available object), and a suitability determination (i.e., determine which of the eligible objects are most suitable for being assigned to the newly available object). Spec. ¶ 8. In other words, Appellant’s Specification illuminates that the character of the present invention looks at matching work items with an appropriately skilled agent to perform the work by mapping the work items to agents. See also Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’ns Tech. Holdings Ltd., 955 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he specification may be helpful in illuminating what a claim is directed to [but it] must always yield to the claim language when identifying the ‘true focus of a claim.”’) (citation omitted). The Examiner determines that such mapping can be “provided on paper by reorganizing and manipulating data for presentation in a different format.” Final Act. 10. Claim 21 recites at least the following limitations: (1) “determining Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 7 . . . that an object . . . is available for matching,” (2) “an objects pool comprising the objects and a counter-objects pool comprising counter- objects,” (3) “each of the objects is mapped to a combination of attributes,” (4) “each unique combination of attributes has a corresponding combination ID,” (5) “the combination IDs are mapped to the objects in a reformatted mapping,” (6) “the reformatted mapping contains less data than the first mapping,” and (7) “identifying . . . a subset of the counter-objects that match the object.” These limitations, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite both managing interactions between people and mental processes. As the Office explains, certain methods of organizing human activity encompass both activity of a single person (for example, a person following a set of instructions or a person signing a contract online) and activity that involves multiple people (such as a commercial interaction), and thus, certain activity between a person and a computer (for example a method of anonymous loan shopping that a person conducts using a mobile phone) may fall within the “certain methods of organizing human activity” grouping. The number of people involved in the activity is not dispositive as to whether a claim limitation falls within this grouping. Instead, the determination should be based on whether the activity itself falls within one of the subgroupings [e.g., managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people]. October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility at 5. Furthermore, the Office explains, “claims do recite a mental process when they contain limitations that can practically be performed in the human mind, including for example, observations, evaluations, judgments, and opinions.” October 2019 Update at 7 (citing Electric Power Group). A claim recites a mental process when the claim encompasses acts people can Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 8 perform using their minds or pen and paper. See, e.g., CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (determining that a claim whose “steps can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” is directed to an unpatentable mental process). This is true even if the claim recites that a generic computer component performs the acts. See, e.g., Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”); see also 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind.”). For example, the aforementioned limitations encompass acts people can perform using their minds or pen and paper because people can perform the “determining” and “identifying” steps by looking at objects and making a judgment as to whether there is a match pertaining thereto. Appellant does not directly challenge whether the claims recite an abstract idea, but instead makes arguments more directly related to integrating the judicial exception into a practical application and whether specific limitations are not well-understood, routine, and conventional activity in the field. See Appeal Br. 9 (“Assuming arguendo that the claimed elements recite a method of organizing human activity, Appellant asserts that the claimed limitations recite a combination of additional Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 9 elements so that the claimed limitations are integrated into a practical application.”). Such arguments will be address below. Therefore, for at least the aforementioned reasons, we agree with the Examiner that claim 21 recites abstract ideas, which we conclude are “certain methods of organizing human activity” and/or “mental processes.” Step 2A-Prong 2 (integration into Practical Application)3 Under the Revised Guidance, we now must determine if additional elements in the claims integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h)). Here, we consider the claim as a whole, i.e., “the limitations containing the judicial exception as well as the additional elements in the claim besides the judicial exception . . . evaluated together to determine whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application.” October 2019 Update at 12. Beyond the abstract ideas noted above in the Prong-1 analysis, claim 21 also recites several additional elements: “a microprocessor,” “a contact center,” “an objects pool,” “a counter-objects pool,” and “scanning the reformatted mapping.” In addition to the components recited in claim 21, claim 39 further recites “a microprocessor executable work assignment engine” and “one or more servers.” 3 We acknowledge that some of the considerations at Step 2A, Prong 2, properly may be evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of the Office revised guidance). For purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate them under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of the Office revised guidance). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.25, 27-32. Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 10 However, these additional elements do not: (1) improve the functioning of a computer or other technology; (2) are not applied with any particular machine (except for a generic computer); (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular article to a different state; and (4) are not applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h). In other words, the aforementioned additional elements (or combination of elements) recited in at least Appellant’s representative claim 21 do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54-55 (“Prong 2”). Although Appellant contends that “[t]he additional elements recite specific improvements over prior art systems by, for example, providing improved efficiency” (Appeal Br. 9), “improve the performance of contact centers” (id. at 10-11), and “can only be used within this technology, e.g., providing computerized contact center-type service” (id. at 11), we determine that the alleged improvements relate to improved allocation of human resources, i.e., matching qualified agents with work items. That is, here the arguably innovative technique of the appealed claims is inextricably a part of the abstract idea of organizing, analyzing, and matching information. Appellant does not direct our attention to anything in the Specification to indicate that the invention provides an improvement in the computer’s technical functionality. Moreover, nothing in the claims, understood in light of the Specification, requires anything other than an off- Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 11 the-shelf, conventional computer used for collecting and analyzing various information. In contrast, the claims at issue in Enfish were directed to a specific type of data structure, i.e., a self-referential table for a computer database, designed to improve the way a computer carries out its basic functions of storing and retrieving data. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In rejecting a § 101 challenge, the court in Enfish held that “the plain focus of the claims is on an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.” Id. at 1336. Unlike Enfish, the claims here are directed not to an improvement in computer capabilities, but to the results of applying an abstract idea. Furthermore, the steps of determining and identifying are no more than pre- and post- solution activities. These pre- and post- solution steps even when performed by a microprocessor - are insufficient to integrate the judicially excepted steps into a practical application. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 224 (“use of a computer to create electronic records, track multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions” is not an inventive concept). In this regard, we find unpersuasive Appellant’s contention that “[t]he additional elements recite specific improvements over prior art systems by, for example, providing improved efficiency” (Appeal Br. 9), because the claimed process fails to improve the functioning of the microprocessor. Rather, the microprocessor merely links the underlying abstract ideas (i.e., certain methods of organizing human activity and mental processes) to a particular technological environment, i.e., contact centers. Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 12 That is, as stated in the Specification, the claimed process simply provides “[o]ne-to-one optimal matching of work items [with] agents.” Spec. ¶ 8. Thus, the claimed process uses conventional computers and computer networks to automate tasks that would have otherwise been performed by a human moderator. Such claims are not patent eligible. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible”). For these reasons, we determine the additional recitations of claim 21 do not integrate the recited patent-ineligible subject matter into a practical application. For similar reasons, we determine that the additional recitations in the dependent claims 22-29, 31-35, 37, 38, 41, and 42 also do not integrate the recited patent-ineligible subject matter into a practical application. For at least the reason noted supra, we determine that representative claim 21 (1) recites judicial exceptions and (2) does not integrate those exceptions into a practical application. Thus, representative claim 21 is directed to the aforementioned abstract ideas. Alice/Mayo-Step 2 (Inventive Concept) Step 2B identified in the Revised Guidance Turning to the second step of the Alice inquiry, we now look to whether claim 1 contains any “inventive concept” or adds anything “significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 216. As recognized by the Revised Guidance, an “inventive concept” under Alice step 2 can be evaluated based on whether an additional element or combination of elements: Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 13 (1) adds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an inventive concept may be present; or (2) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative that an inventive concept may not be present. See 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; see MPEP § 2106.05(d). Appellant contends “the aforementioned claim limitations amount to significantly more than any recited exception because the aforementioned limitations add an inventive element.” Appeal Br. 12. However, we find no element or combination of elements recited in Appellant’s claim 21 that contains any “inventive concept” or adds anything “significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application. For instance, Appellant does not adequately explain how claim 21 is performed, such that it is not a routine and conventional function of a generic computer. In fact, Appellant’s Specification discloses that a “general algorithm [] may be utilized to achieve the above-noted goals in a contact center environment” (Spec. ¶ 9 (emphasis added)) and that the methods may be performed by “a general purpose” processor. Spec. ¶ 165. Because Appellant’s independent claim 21 recites patent-ineligible abstract ideas, does not include additional elements that integrate the judicial exceptions into a practical application, and does not add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exceptions that is not “well-understood, routine, and conventional,” we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of the claims 21-35, 37- 39, 41, and 42 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent ineligible Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 14 subject matter without significantly more in light of Alice, its’ progeny, and the Revised Guidance. Rejections under § 103 Claim 21 recites, inter alia, “wherein the combination IDs are mapped to the objects in a reformatted mapping, and wherein the reformatted mapping contains less data than the first mapping; and identifying . . . the object by scanning the reformatted mapping.” See claim 21. Regarding the aforementioned limitations, Appellant contends that “[e]ven if, for example, attribute30 ‘AND’ attribute40 of Figure 3 of Lam could be said to show ‘wherein each unique combination of attributes has a corresponding combination ID,’ Lam is still silent regarding ‘wherein the combinations IDs are mapped to objects in a reformatted mapping.’” Appeal Br. 20. Appellant further contends that “Lam is silent regarding ‘wherein the reformatted mapping contains less data than the first mapping’ and ‘identifying . . . by scanning the reformatted mapping.’” Id. Appellant further contends that “each of Werth and Lam, alone or in combination, is silent regarding” the features of claim 21. Id. Firstly, Appellant’s specific arguments are directed to Lam, while the contested findings are based on the collective teachings of the references, i.e., Werth combined with Lam. See Final Act. 13-17; see also Ans. 26-29 (discussing individual attacks to the combined references). For this reason and for reasons further explained immediately below, we are not persuaded of reversible error. Specifically, Appellant’s argument against Lam separately from Werth does not persuasively rebut the combination made by the Examiner. Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 15 As noted by the Examiner (see Ans. 26), one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually, where the rejections are based on combinations of references. In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425-26 (CCPA 1981). Here, Appellant’s arguments do not take into account what the collective teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art and is therefore ineffective to rebut the Examiner’s prima facie case of obviousness. See Keller, 642 F.2d at 425 (“The test for obviousness is not whether . . . the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”) This reasoning is applicable here. Secondly, we find that Appellant’s arguments amount to general allegations that Lam (and the proposed combination) is “silent” regarding the language for claim(s) 21 (and claims 22-29, 31-35, 37, 38, 41, and 42). See generally Appeal Br. 19-27. Appellant is reminded that a general allegation that the claims define a patentable invention without specifically pointing out how the language of the claims patentably distinguishes them from the references does not constitute a persuasive response. Here, Appellant merely argues that “the prior art is silent” regarding the above- noted limitations without providing any meaningful analysis that explains why the Examiner erred. Id. Stated differently, the Examiner makes specific findings regarding the argued limitations and directs Appellant’s attention to specific portions of Werth and Lam, for example (see Final Act. 13-27), yet Appellant fails to rebut these specific findings with meaningful analysis. Instead, Appellant Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 16 generally argues that the prior art is “silent.” A prima facie case is established when the party with the burden of proof points to evidence that is sufficient, if uncontroverted, to entitle it to prevail as a matter of law. See Saab Cars USA, Inc. v. U. S., 434 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006). We find that the Examiner meets the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of obviousness, and thereby properly shifted the burden of coming forward with rebuttal or argument onto Appellant. In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Appellant, however, does not provide persuasive reasoning or rebuttal evidence to overcome the Examiner’s prima facie case. A statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We note that arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. Therefore, Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of representative claim 21. Appellant’s arguments regarding the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 30 and 39 rely on the same arguments as for claim 21, and Appellant does not sufficiently argue separate patentability for the dependent claims. See Appeal Br. 21-27. We, therefore, also sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 22-35, 37-39, 41, and 42. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 21-35, 37-39, 41, and 42 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed. Appeal 2021-001547 Application 15/262,994 17 The Examiner’s rejections of claims 21-35, 37-39, 41, and 42 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is affirmed. In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 21-35, 37-39, 41, 42 101 Eligibility 21-35, 37-39, 41, 42 21-26, 28-35, 37-39, 42 103 Werth, Lam 21-26, 28-35, 37-39, 42 27 103 Werth, Lam, Inamdar 27 41 103 Werth, Lam, Wu 41 Overall Outcome 21-35, 37-39, 41, 42 No period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED