Avaya Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 1, 2021

2020002741 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 1, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/163,901 05/25/2016 Manish Chatterjee 648.0242 2855
93379 7590 09/01/2021
Setter Roche LLP
1860 Blake Street
Suite 100
Denver, CO 80202
EXAMINER
LINDENBAUM, ALAN LOUIS
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2466
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/01/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pair_avaya@firsttofile.com
sarah@setterroche.com
uspto@setterroche.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte MANISH CHATTEREE, BISWAJYOTI PAL, and
JAYDEEP BHALERAO
____________________

Appeal 2020-002741
Application 15/163,901
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, CAROLYN D. THOMAS and
JEREMY J. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judges.

MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–7, 10, 11, 13–17, and 20. Claims
2, 8, 9, 12, 18, and 19 have been canceled. Appeal Br. 2. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm in part.

1 Appellant refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a).
Appellant identifies the real party in interest is Avaya Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2020-002741
Application 15/163,901

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Independent Claims 1 and 5 are illustrative (emphasis, formatting, and
bracketed material added):
1. A method for controlling bandwidth in a network address
translation (NAT) system, the method comprising:
[A.] identifying a first endpoint and a second endpoint to a
communication session, wherein the first endpoint is located
within a domain of the NAT system and the second endpoint is
located outside to the domain;
[B.] determining a bandwidth limitation for the communication
session comprising a maximum bandwidth available for the
communication session;
[C.] opening a relay path having the bandwidth limitation for the
communication session,
[i.] wherein the relay path comprises a portion of a
communication path between the first endpoint and the
second endpoint that passes through a relay system and
[ii.] wherein the relay system reserves at least the maximum
bandwidth available for the communication session on
the relay path for the communication session; and
[D.] passing communications between the first and second
endpoints via the relay path.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein determining a bandwidth
limitation for the communication session comprises:
[E.] receiving an indication of a maximum bandwidth required
for the communication session from the first endpoint;
[F.] setting the maximum bandwidth available for the
communication session to at least the maximum bandwidth
required for the communication session; and
[G.] including the bandwidth limitation in a TURN [Traversal
Using Relays around NAT] allocation response to the first
endpoint.
Appeal 2020-002741
Application 15/163,901

3
REFERENCES2
The Examiner relies on the following references:
Name Reference Date
Stewart US 2014/0029462 A1 Jan. 30, 2014
Moore US 2017/0142165 A1 May 18, 2017

REJECTION
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3–7, 10, 11, 13–17, and 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Moore and
Stewart. Final Act. 2–7.
Appellant presents arguments for claims 1, 3, 5, and 7. Appeal Br. 7–
10.
To the extent that Appellant discusses claim 3, Appellant merely
references the arguments directed to claim 1. Appeal Br. 8. Such a
referenced argument (or repeated argument) is not an argument for “separate
patentability.” Thus, the rejection of claim 3 turns on our decision as to
claim 1, which is dispositive for the rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 13,
14, and 20.
To the extent that Appellant discusses claim 7, Appellant merely
repeats the arguments directed to claim 5. Appeal Br. 9–10. Thus, the
rejection of claim 7 turns on our decision as to claim 5, which is dispositive
for the rejection of claims 5–7 and 15–17.
Except for our ultimate decision, we do not address the merits of the
§ 103 rejection of claims 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13–17, and 20 further herein.

2 All citations herein to patent and pre-grant publication references are by
reference to the first named inventor only.
Appeal 2020-002741
Application 15/163,901

4
OPINION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments (Appeal Brief and Reply Brief) that the Examiner has erred.
A. Claim 1
A.1.
During examination, claims are given their broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci.
Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “Construing claims
broadly during prosecution is not unfair to the applicant . . . because the
applicant has the opportunity to amend the claims to obtain more precise
claim coverage.” Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d at 1364.
A.2.
Claim 1 recites, in pertinent part (emphasis added):
[C.] opening a relay path having the bandwidth limitation for the
communication session,
[i.] wherein the relay path comprises a portion of a
communication path between the first endpoint and the
second endpoint that passes through a relay system and
[ii.] wherein the relay system reserves at least the maximum
bandwidth available for the communication session on the
relay path for the communication session.
A.3.
As to claim 1, section C.ii., the Examiner finds:
Stewart discloses wherein the relay system reserves at
least the maximum bandwidth available for the communication
session remains available for the communication session on the
relay path for the communication session (Stewart, paragraph
[0163], reserve required access network bandwidth for the path;
Appeal 2020-002741
Application 15/163,901

5
paragraph [0175], resource reservation for the communication
session).
Final Act. 4.
A.4.
As to claim 1, section C.ii., Appellant argues:
Stewart does not disclose that resources would be reserved
for a relay path through a relay system between endpoints on
opposite sides of a NAT. Stewart does mention that TURN may
be used as a relay for traversing NAT (see ¶¶ 0150, 0153) but
does not mention that resources of a TURN system may be
reserved in the reservation embodiment discussed above.
Therefore, Stewart fails to disclose that bandwidth could be
reserved for a relay path through Moore’s relay server.
App. Br. 7 (emphasis added).
A.5.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. Appellant does not
address the actual reasoning of the Examiner’s rejection. Instead, Appellant
attacks the Stewart reference singly for lacking a teaching that the Examiner
relied on a combination of Moore and Stewart to show. In particular, the
rejection does not rely on Stewart for teaching the “relay system between
endpoints on opposite sides of a NAT” aspect disputed by Appellant.
Rather, the Examiner relied on Moore (Final Act. 3) to show the argued
“relay system between endpoints on opposite sides of a NAT” (Answer 8;
Final Act. 3), and relied on Stewart to shows it was known to “reserve[] at
least the maximum bandwidth available for the communication session
remains available for the communication session on the relay path for the
communication session” (Final Act. 4). The Examiner then reasoned that it
would have been obvious to modify the NAT relay system of Moore to
Appeal 2020-002741
Application 15/163,901

6
include functionality from Stewart. Final Act. 4. One cannot show
nonobviousness by attacking references individually when the rejection is
based on a combination of references. In re Merck & Co. Inc., 800 F.2d
1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981) (explaining the relevant inquiry is whether the claimed subject matter
would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the
combined teachings of those references).
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Moore
and Stewart.
B. Claim 5
B.1.
Claim 5 recites (emphasis added):
The method of claim 1, wherein determining a bandwidth limitation
for the communication session comprises:
[E.] receiving an indication of a maximum bandwidth required
for the communication session from the first endpoint;
[F.] setting the maximum bandwidth available for the
communication session to at least the maximum bandwidth
required for the communication session; and
[G.] including the bandwidth limitation in a TURN [Traversal
Using Relays around NAT] allocation response to the first
endpoint.
B.2.
As to claim 5, section E, the Examiner finds Moore discloses:
[R]eceiving an indication of a maximum bandwidth
required for the communication session (Moore, paragraph
[0165], lines 1-9, bandwidth threshold criterion) from the first
endpoint (Moore, paragraph [0146], lines 1-2, parameters stored
Appeal 2020-002741
Application 15/163,901

7
in endpoint memory; paragraph [0149], lines 1-2, parameters
received from other endpoint).
Final Act. 5 (emphasis added).
B.3.
Appellant raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
An amount of bandwidth available to an endpoint is not
the same as an amount of bandwidth required for a
communication session, as required by claim 5 (e.g., the amount
of bandwidth required by the communication session may be one
amount while the bandwidth available to the endpoint may be
another amount).
Also, an endpoint determining an amount of bandwidth
available based on information already stored therein does not
equate to any element of Moore receiving an indication of that
determined amount of bandwidth from the endpoint. As such,
Moore further fails to disclose receiving an indication of a
maximum bandwidth required for the communication session
from the first endpoint.
Moore further discloses that the endpoint may base the
above bandwidth determination on messages received from a
TURN server (see ¶ 0148). Moore does not disclose that the
message is specifically a TURN allocation response and does not
disclose that a bandwidth limitation would be included in the
message, as required by claim 5, rather than simply being used
as a basis for a bandwidth availability determination.
Appeal Br. 8–9 (emphasis added).
B.4.
As articulated by the Federal Circuit, the Examiner’s burden of
proving non-patentability is by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re
Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“preponderance of the
evidence is the standard that must be met by the PTO in making rejections”).
Appeal 2020-002741
Application 15/163,901

8
“A rejection based on section 103 clearly must rest on a factual basis[.]” In
re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967). “The Patent Office has the
initial duty of supplying the factual basis for its rejection. It may not . . .
resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions or hindsight reconstruction to
supply deficiencies in its factual basis.” Id.
B.5.
We conclude the Examiner’s analysis fails to meet this standard
because the rejection does not adequately explain the Examiner’s findings of
fact. Particularly, we agree with Appellant that the language of claim 5
requires that “receiving an indication of a maximum bandwidth required,”
and we agree with Appellant’s argument that “Moore [without more] fails to
disclose receiving an indication of a maximum bandwidth required.”
Appeal Br. 9 (emphasis added). Thus, we disagree with the Examiner’s
reasoning (Final Act. 5) that citing to Moore alone without further
explanation is sufficient to show the argued claim limitation. We conclude,
consistent with Appellant’s arguments that there is insufficient articulated
reasoning to support the Examiner’s finding that Moore discloses, the argued
claim limitation.
Therefore, we conclude that there is insufficient articulated reasoning
to support the Examiner’s final conclusion that claim 5 would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of Appellant’s
invention.
Appeal 2020-002741
Application 15/163,901

9
CONCLUSION
The Appellant has not shown the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 1,
3, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 20 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 20 as
being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are affirmed.
The Appellant has shown that the Examiner does err in rejecting
claims 5–7 and 15–17 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 5–7 and 15–17 as being
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is reversed.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–7, 10,
11, 13–17,
20
103 Moore, Stewart 1, 3, 4, 10,
11, 13, 14,
20
5–7, 15–
17
Overall
Outcome

1, 3, 4, 10,
11, 13, 14,
20
5–7, 15–
17

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART