Avaya Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 30, 2020

2020001688 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/918,356 06/14/2013 Krishna Kishore Dhara 4366-910 3940
48500 7590 09/30/2020
SHERIDAN ROSS P.C.
1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 1200
DENVER, CO 80202
EXAMINER
NEAL, ALLISON MICHELLE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/30/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cjacquet@sheridanross.com
edocket@sheridanross.com
pair_Avaya@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KRISHNA KISHORE DHARA,
VENKATESH KRISHNASWAMY, and
SARANGKUMAR JAGDISHCHANDRA ANAJWALA
Appeal 2020-001688
Application 13/918,356
Technology Center 3600
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, DAVID J. CUTITTA II, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–8, 10–15, and 17–23. Claims 2, 9,
and 16 are cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Avaya
Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to contextual calendaring based meeting
scheduling, which “can schedule meetings with varying states of blocking
time slots based on users’ behavior with respect to the participants, topics,
and tasks or context of the meeting.” Spec. Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
mining, by a processor of a server, context information
associated with a calendar event from multiple sources, the
sources comprising at least one recurring calendar event related
to the calendar event and at least two of a transcribed text from a
telephone call, a recurring telephone call pattern, an email, an
instant message, a text message, a voicemail message, a video
chat, a collaboration session, and a shared file, wherein the
context information relates to desired attendees for the calendar
event;
identifying, via the processor, based on the context
information, a plurality of desired attendees for the calendar
event;
ranking, via the processor, the plurality of desired
attendees according to priority scores assigned, based on the
context information, to the plurality of desired attendees in
association with the calendar event, to yield priority rankings;
placing, via the processor, a conditional hold on a time slot
on a calendar of one of the plurality of desired attendees based
on the priority rankings;
associating, via the processor, the conditional hold with
the calendar event;
generating, via the processor, a new calendar event dialog
for creating the calendar event, the new calendar event dialog
comprising an attendees field populated with at least part of the
plurality of desired attendees based on the priority rankings; and
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causing, via the processor, the new calendar event dialog
to be displayed via a user interface of a client device.
Appeal Br. 14 (Claims Appendix).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Cragun US 2003/0149606 A1 Aug. 7, 2003
Desai US 2007/0124371 A1 May 31, 2007
Sherman US 2009/0041221 A1 Feb. 12, 2009
Chakra US 2009/0307045 A1 Dec. 10, 2009
Goldsmith US 9,754,243 B2 Sept. 05, 2017

REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 3–8, 10–15, and 17–23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as being directed to ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 9.
Claims 1, 3–8, 10–15, and 17–23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over Chakra, Desai, Goldsmith, Sherman, and Cragun.
Final Act. 13.
REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
Standard for Patent Eligibility
In issues involving subject matter eligibility, our inquiry focuses on
whether the claims satisfy the two-step test set forth by the Supreme Court in
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). The Court instructs us
to “first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-
ineligible concept,” id. at 218, and, in this case, the inquiry centers on
whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea. If the initial threshold is
met, we then move to the second step, in which we “consider the elements of
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each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Id. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79, 78 (2012)). The Court
describes the second step as a search for “an ‘“inventive concept”’—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The USPTO has published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101 consistent with Alice and subsequent Federal Circuit decisions.
USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”), updated by USPTO, October 2019
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (“October 2019
Guidance Update”).
Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (referred to Step 2A, prong 1 in
the Guidance); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h))
(referred to Step 2A, prong 2 in the Guidance).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial
exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then move to Step 2B of the Guidance. There, we look to
whether the claim:
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions2
The Examiner rejects claim 1 as being directed to a judicial exception
without significantly more under Alice and also under the Guidance. Final
Act. 9–12 (under Alice); Ans. 3–5 (under Step 2A, prong one of the
Guidance). Under the first step of the Alice inquiry, the Examiner
determines claim 1 is directed to a judicial exception. Final Act. 9.
Specifically, the Examiner determines that claim 1 is directed to
“scheduling,” which the Examiner determines is a certain method of
organizing human activity under the Guidance because “the claims manage
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people.” Ans. 3.
Under Step 2A, prong two of the Guidance the Examiner determines
that “[t]he use of a processor and user interface of a client device for
receiving data, transmitting data, processing data (i.e. generating a calendar
event), displaying data (i.e. displaying the new calendar event dialog) and

2 The Final Office Action in this appeal was mailed prior to the issuance of
the Guidance, and applied the case law-based approach from previous
eligibility guidance in rejecting the claims under § 101. Appellant’s Briefs
and the Examiner’s Answer were filed and mailed subsequent to the
issuance of the Guidance, and address the issues in view of the Guidance.
Likewise, our analysis of the § 101 rejection is made under the Guidance,
which is applicable to “all applications . . . filed before, on, or after January
7, 2019.” Guidance 50.
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repeating steps is merely implementing the abstract idea” using a computer
as a tool. Ans. 4.
Under Step 2B, the Examiner determines the additional limitations of
a processor and a user interface are not considered ‘significantly more’ than
the abstract idea because they are well-understood, routine, and
conventional. Ans. 4–5 (citing Spec., Fig. 8; ¶¶ 42–51). The Examiner
explains:
From the interpretation of the Applicant's Specification, the
additional elements are recited at a high level of generality and
are recited as performing generic computer function routinely
used in computer. Further, the additional elements do not
provide improvement to the computer itself, technology nor a
technical field, and further the claimed subject matter is not
transformed into a different state or thing. Viewed as a whole,
these additional claim elements do not provide meaningful
limitations to transform the abstract idea significantly more than
the abstract idea itself.
Ans. 5.
Appellant’s Contentions
Appellant argues the claims do not fall under any of the enumerated
groupings of Step 2A, prong one. Appeal Br. 7–8, Reply Br. 2.
Specifically, Appellant argues “the claims do not involve organizing or
generating events,” and they instead “relate to generating a ‘calendar event
dialog’ with an ‘attendees field populated with . . . desired attendees’ and
causing a new calendar event dialog to be displayed.” Reply Br. 2.
According to Appellant, “the claims recite functions executed by a computer
application in creating a calendar event with desired attendees,” and
therefore do not recite any judicial exception. Reply Br. 2.
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Appellant also challenges the determination under Step 2A, prong
two, arguing “[t]he independent claims recite features which are integrated
into a practical application.” Reply Br. 3. Appellant argues “the features
which the Examiner found to be equivalent to merely stating ‘apply it,’
including ‘generating a calendar event’ and ‘displaying the new calendar
event dialog’ are the very features which integrate the other features into a
practical application.” Reply Br. 4. Appellant asserts that “by generating a
new calendar event dialog comprising an attendees field populated with
desired attendees based on priority rankings . . . the system recited in the
claim resolves deficiencies and associated problems with conventional
systems.” Appeal Br. 9.
Appellant also argues for eligibility under Step 2B of the Guidance.
Under Step 2B, Appellant argues “the claims are not obvious in view of any
of the references cited by the Examiner.” Appeal Br. 10. Appellant asserts
that, because the Examiner relies on five references in rejecting the claims
under § 103, the claims amount to significantly more than the abstract idea.
Appeal Br. 10.
Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong One3
The Judicial Exception
Applying the Guidance, we are not persuaded the Examiner has erred
in determining that the claims recite a judicial exception to patent eligible
subject matter. The Guidance identifies three judicially-excepted groupings:
(1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human activity

3 Throughout this opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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such as fundamental economic practices and commercial interactions, and
(3) mental processes. We focus our analysis on the second and third
groupings—certain methods of organizing human activity and mental
processes.4
We conclude the limitations of claim 1 recite both a mental process
and managing interactions between people (a certain method of organizing
human activity), which amounts to a combination of abstract ideas under the
Guidance.5 For example, claim 1 recites (1) “mining . . . context
information associated with a calendar event from multiple sources, the
sources comprising at least one recurring calendar event related to the
calendar event, and at least two of a transcribed text from a telephone call, a
recurring telephone call pattern, an email, an instant message, a text
message, a voicemail message, a video chat, a collaboration session, and a
shared file, wherein the context information relates to desired attendees for
the calendar event,” and (2) “identifying . . . based on the context
information, a plurality of desired attendees for the calendar event,” (3)
“ranking . . . the plurality of desired attendees according to priority scores

4 Appellant’s arguments against the § 101 rejection are made to the claims
generally, and we treat claim 1 as representative. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018) (“When multiple claims subject to the same ground
of rejection are argued as a group or subgroup by Appellant, the Board may
select a single claim from the group or subgroup and may decide the appeal
as to the ground of rejection with respect to the group or subgroup on the
basis of the selected claim alone.”).
5 RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(“Adding one abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does not render
the claim non-abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.,
839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (patent-ineligible claims were
directed to a combination of abstract ideas).
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assigned, based on the context information, to the plurality of desired
attendees in association with the calendar event, to yield priority rankings,”
(4) “placing . . . a conditional hold on a time slot on a calendar of one of the
plurality of desired attendees based on the priority rankings,”
(5) “associating . . . the conditional hold with the calendar event,”
(6) “generating . . . a new calendar event dialog for creating the calendar
event, the new calendar event dialog comprising an attendees field populated
with at least part of the plurality of desired attendees based on the priority
rankings,” and (7) “causing . . . the new calendar event dialog to be
displayed via a user interface of a client device.” As a whole, these
limitations recite a process for organizing and scheduling a meeting between
people by considering competing priorities. As such, these limitations may
be categorized as a form of managing interactions between people, which
falls within the enumerated group of “certain methods of organizing human
activity.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Separately, these limitations each recite an abstract mental process
under the Guidance because they each can be performed by a human in their
mind either through observation, evaluation and judgment, and also because
they can be performed by a human with the aid of pen and paper. See
October 2019 Guidance Update at 7 (“examples of mental processes include
observations, evaluations, judgments, and opinions”), 9 (“A claim that
encompasses a human performing the step(s) mentally with the aid of a pen
and paper recites a mental process”) (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, we
conclude the claimed process set forth in claim 1 recites judicial exceptions
of both a mental process and of a commercial interaction, which is a certain
method of organizing human activity under the Guidance.
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Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong Two
Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application
Having determined that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, our
analysis under the Guidance turns now to determining whether claim 1
recites any additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (citing MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Under the Guidance, limitations that are indicative of “integration into
a practical application” include:
1. Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other
technology or technical field — see MPEP § 2106.05(a);
2. Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular
machine — see MPEP § 2106.05(b);
3. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to
a different state or thing — see MPEP § 2106.05(c); and
4. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment, such that
the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(e).
In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of “integration into a
practical application” include:
1. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial
exception, or merely include instructions to implement an
abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool
to perform an abstract idea — see MPEP § 2106.05(f);
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2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial
exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and
3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a
particular technological environment or field of use — see
MPEP § 2106.05(h).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”).
As shown above, most of the limitations in claim 1 recite abstract
ideas. The only limitation in the claim additional to those abstract
limitations recites the use of a “server” and performing operations by “a
processor.” The use of a generic server and processor, however, merely
evinces the use of conventional computer technology to implement the
otherwise abstract process on a computer. It is well-established that the use
of generic technology to implement an abstract idea is insufficient to
integrate it into a practical application. See MPEP 2106.05(f) (explaining
that it is not indicative of integration into a practical application where the
claims “merely include instructions to implement an abstract idea on a
computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea”).
Appellant argues the claims provide an improvement to the
technology of electronic calendars because a new calendar event is
generated based on the priority rankings and an event dialog is displayed on
a user interface. Appeal Br. 9. We disagree. As we noted above, these
limitations are themselves abstract steps carried out in implementing the
abstract idea of scheduling a meeting between people by considering
competing priorities. Even if these two limitations are not themselves
considered abstract, at best, these limitations amount to extra-solution
activity. MPEP 2106.05(f) (identifying “printing or downloading generated
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menus” as an example of insignificant extra-solution activity). In sum,
Appellant’s invention is focused on improving the way meetings are
scheduled. The purported improvement provided by the claims is not to
technology, but instead to how meetings between people are scheduled, i.e.,
a certain method of organizing human activity, and therefore constitutes an
improvement to the abstract idea itself. It is well-established, however, that
improvements in the abstract idea are insufficient to confer eligibility on an
otherwise ineligible claim. SAP Am. Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161,
1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018). We conclude claim 1 is directed to a judicial
exception under step 2A, prong 2, of the Guidance.
The Inventive Concept – Step 2B
Having determined the claim is directed to a judicial exception, we
proceed to evaluating whether claim 1 adds a specific limitation beyond the
judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the
field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)) or simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 56.
Our review of the Examiner’s rejection under Step 2B is guided by the
Berkheimer Memorandum, which sets forth what fact finding requirements
are applicable to rejections under § 101. Consistent with the Berkheimer
Memorandum, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does not add
specific limitations beyond what is well-understood, routine, and
conventional.
Our analysis focuses largely on the same limitations addressed in
Step 2A, prong 2, above. We agree with the Examiner that the addition of a
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generic “server” and “processor” does not supply an inventive concept under
Step 2B because the server is described at a high level, in functional terms,
without any detail in the Specification regarding how those functions are
achieved. Spec. ¶¶ 28–29 (describing server in functional terms about what
it does, without details about how it does it). This lack of detailed
description evidences the well-understood, routine, and conventional nature
of the recited “server.”
Because the Examiner correctly concluded claim 1 is directed to a
judicial exception, and because Appellant does not identify any error in the
Examiner’s determination under step 2B of the Guidance, we sustain the
rejection of representative claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as well as of the
remaining claims.
REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejects the claims as being obvious over Chakra, Desai,
Goldmith, Sherman, and Cragun. Final Act. 13–20.
“mining . . . context information”
Relevant to the first of two issues raised by Appellant, the Examiner
finds the “mining” limitation of claim 1 is taught by Chakra, Desai, and
Goldsmith. In particular, the Examiner finds Desai teaches mining context
information from multiple sources, including those listed in the limitation.
Final Act. 15. The Examiner finds that Chakra teaches determining desired
meeting attendees for a calendar event. Final Act. 14. The Examiner further
cites Goldsmith for the limitation of “the sources comprising at least one
recurring calendar event related to the calendar event.” Final Act. 17.
Appellant argues the Examiner has erred in determining the “mining”
limitation would have been obvious over the cited prior art. Appeal Br. 11.
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Appellant broadly argues “[n]o cited reference teaches mining context
information associated with a calendar event from multiple sources as
claimed” (Appeal Br. 11), and offers specific arguments which we address in
turn.
Appellant contends “Chakra teaches only identifying participants
based on a topic of a meeting—not “context information associated with a
calendar event from multiple sources.” Appeal Br. 11. We do not find this
argument persuasive because the Examiner does not rely on Chakra for
“context information . . . from multiple sources.” Rather, the Examiner
relies on Desai as teaching mining context information from multiple
sources, and relies on Chakra for teaching “associated with a calendar
event.” Ans. 6 (“It is first noted that Chakra’s disclosure [that] discloses a
calendar management server that identifies a set of desired participants for a
meeting based on a meeting topic is more than sufficient to teach . . .
‘wherein the context information relates to desired attendees for the calendar
event.’”) (citing Chakra, Abstract, ¶ 36). That is, the Examiner relies on
Chakra as teaching scheduling of calendar events with desired attendees, and
Desai as teaching mining context information from sources in connection
with calendar scheduling.
Appellant also argues the Desai is deficient because “Desai teaches
only creating a ‘scheduling entry’ . . . based on an ‘incoming
communication.’ The ‘context information of the claim ‘relates to desired
attendees for the calendar event.’ This element is neither taught nor
suggested by Desai.” Appeal Br. 11. We do not find this argument
persuasive because the Examiner relies on Chakra for “desired attendees for
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the calendar event.” Ans. 6. As such, Appellant’s argument does not
address the findings and rejection made by the Examiner.
Appellant further argues Goldsmith fails to teach “at least one related
recurring calendar event.” Appeal Br. 12. We do not find this argument
persuasive. Goldsmith teaches that data records may be analyzed in order to
detect recurring calendar events and utilize that information for contextual
scheduling purposes. Goldsmith col. 15, l. 35–col. 16, l. 23.
In short, the Examiner relies on Desai to demonstrate that it was
known to parse information from multiple sources in order to retrieve
contextual information for scheduling a meeting, relies on Goldsmith as
demonstrating that is was known to detect and analyze recurring calendar
events, and relies on Chakra to show that is was known to use a calendar
management server to identify desired participants for a meeting. Ans. 7–8.
As such, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in determining the
“mining” limitation is taught or suggested by the combination of the cited
prior art.
“ranking . . . the plurality of desired attendees”
Claim 1 recites the limitation “ranking, via the processor, the plurality
of desired attendees according to priority scores assigned, based on the
context information, to the plurality of desired attendees in association with
the calendar event, to yield priority rankings.” The Examiner finds that
Chakra’s identification of desired attendees does not explicitly teach this
limitation, but that the recited prioritization is taught by Sherman. Final
Act. 17–18.
Appellant argues “no reference teaches or suggests the ‘ranking’ step
as recited in the claim.” Appeal Br. 12. Appellant asserts that Sherman
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deals with prioritization of phone calls, and not calendar events. Appeal
Br. 13. Appellant further argues that “[e]ven if a phone call could be
equated to a calendar event, Sherman does not teach or suggest ranking a
plurality of desired attendees as recited in the claim.” Appeal Br. 13.
We are not persuaded of error. As the Examiner explains in the
Answer, the combined teachings of Chakra and Sherman are relied upon for
the “ranking” limitation. Ans. 8. Specifically, Chakra is relied upon for
teaching the calendar event and the selection of desired attendees. Sherman
evinces that it was known to assign priority scores for scheduled phone calls
based on context information. Appellant’s arguments do not address the
teachings of Chakra. Taken together, we agree with the Examiner that the
combination of Chakra and Sherman renders obvious the argued limitation.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject the claims.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–8, 10–
15, 17–23
101 Eligibilty 1, 3–8, 10–
15, 17–23

1, 3–8, 10–
15, 17–23
103 Chakra, Desai,
Goldsmith,
Sherman, Cragun
1, 3–8, 10–
15, 17–23

Overall
Outcome
1, 3–8, 10–
15, 17–23

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED