Automotive Titling of Colorado, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 16, 2020

14754509 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/754,509 06/29/2015 Kenneth Rand Alley 0067P01a1 6511
39208 7590 11/16/2020
CR MILES, P.C.
CRAIG R. MILES
405 MASON COURT, SUITE 119
FORT COLLINS, CO 80524
EXAMINER
PRESTON, JOHN O
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3691
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/16/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte KENNETH RAND ALLEY
____________

Appeal 2020-004441
Application 14/754,509
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 79–98.1 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed
October 4, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer mailed January 23,
2020 (“Ans.”); and the Final Office Action mailed April 5, 2019 (“Final
Act.”). Appellant identifies Automotive Titling of Colorado, Inc., as the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claims generally relate to “an automotive titling system in
which motor vehicle titling data elements entered in a motor vehicle titling
inquiry author generates a motor vehicle titling inquiry which applied to a
motor vehicle titling database generates motor vehicle titling data
instructions relevant to a motor vehicle titling event.” Spec. 1:7–10.
Claim 79 is the sole independent claim on appeal. Claim 79,
reproduced below, with bracketed matter, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
79. A computer system for characterizing and calculating fee
taxes payable on a motor vehicle transaction, comprising:
[a1] an administrator computer including:
[a2] a non-transitory computer readable medium;
and
[a3] a processor operably coupled to said non-
transitory computer readable medium, said non-transitory
computer readable medium including a computer code
executable to:
[b] display an administrator user fee-tax graphic user
interface on a display surface of an administrator computer, said
administrator user fee-tax graphic user interface having a
hierarchical structure which by administrator user interaction
activates a fee tax module to couple one or more fee-tax
identifiers to each of said fee-taxes, said hierarchical structure,
comprising:
[c] a first level hierarchical structure including a taxing
entities list which by administrator user interaction allows
selection of a taxing entity by operation of a taxing entity
selection module from a plurality of taxing entities which causes
a corresponding taxing entity identifier to couple to said fee-tax;
[d] a second level hierarchical structure including a fee-tax
type list which by administrator user interaction allows selection
by operation of fee-tax type selection module of a fee-tax type
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from a plurality of fee-tax types which causes a corresponding
fee-tax type identifier to couple to said fee-tax; and
[e] a third level hierarchical structure which by operation
of said fee-tax type selection module displays a fee-tax type
template on said display surface of said administrator computer
based upon prior selection of said fee-tax type from said plurality
of fee-tax types, wherein selection of a straight fee tax causes
display of a straight fee-tax template, wherein selection of a
value-based fee type causes display of a value-based fee-tax
template, and wherein selection of a calculated fee type causes
display of a calculated fee-tax template.

REJECTIONS
1. Claims 79–98 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
a judicial exception without significantly more.
2. Claim 79–98 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Bedell (US 7,010,518 B1, iss. Mar. 7, 2006), Irwin
(US 5,899,978, iss. May 4, 1999), and Stokes (US 2003/0144931 A1, pub.
July 31, 2003).
ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
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Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187, 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more
than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a
mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a
claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not
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accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be
circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular
technological environment.” Id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an
application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure
or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”), and 191 (citation
omitted) (citing Benson and Flook).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.”).2 “All USPTO personnel

2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the
“October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
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are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the
guidance.” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 51; see also October 2019
Update 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:

3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. - Section
III(A)(2), 54–55. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg., “[a]
claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will
apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Id. at 54.
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52–56.
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework
With regard to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework and
Step 2A, Prong One, of the 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 54, the
Examiner determines that the claims broadly recite “a system for
characterizing and calculating fee taxes for a motor vehicle transaction,
which is a mental process (i.e. abstract idea).” Final Act. 4; see also Ans. 3.
According to the Examiner, “the claimed invention is clearly directed to a
mental process because the determination of a fee-tax is a task that can be
performed in the human mind and has been for years.” Ans. 12–13. Thus,
when viewed through the lens of the 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.,
the Examiner’s analysis depicts the claimed subject matter as a “[m]ental
process[]—[a] concept[] performed in the human mind (including an
observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion.” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 52 (footnotes omitted).
In response, Appellant argues that independent claim 79 is not
directed to an abstract idea because the Examiner overgeneralizes the claims
as being directed to “a system for characterizing and calculating fee taxes for
a motor vehicle transaction, which is a mental process (i.e. abstract idea).”
Appeal Br. 18 (quoting Final Act. 4). According to Appellant, independent
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claim 79 “is not directed to a mental process” because “[c]laim 79 is directed
to a ‘computer system’ which is a physical device including ‘a processor’
and ‘a non-transitory computer readable medium including a computer
code.’” Appeal Br. 20.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in determining that
claims 79–98 are directed to an abstract idea. The Federal Circuit has
explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims,
considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as
a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335
(quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346
(Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific
improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an
“abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id.
at 1335–36.
In making this determination, we note that the Specification is titled
“VEHICLE FEE-TAX MANAGEMENT SYSTEM,” and states that the
disclosure generally relates to an automotive titling system in which motor
vehicle titling data elements entered in a motor vehicle titling inquiry author
generates a motor vehicle titling inquiry which applied to a motor vehicle
titling database generates motor vehicle titling data instructions relevant to a
motor vehicle titling event.” Spec. 1:7–10. According to the Specification,
[t]he conventional approach to registering the title of a motor
vehicle with a motor vehicle jurisdiction typically involves
manually populating the fields if one or more motor vehicle
registration documents, producing other required registration
documents, and calculating fees in the format or amount required
by the motor vehicle jurisdiction in which the motor vehicle is
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owned or operated (the “motor vehicle title registration
application”).
Id. at 1:20–24. The Specification identifies many problems related to
disparate “titling laws, regulations, rules, tax rates, form documents, filing
locations, or other requirements (‘motor vehicle registration requirements’)”
across various jurisdictions. Id. at 2:6–3:27. To address these problems, the
claimed invention
provide[s] a motor vehicle titling database which contains a
plurality of motor vehicle titling data entities which can be
mapped against a plurality of inquiry fields and motor vehicle
titling data elements (which can be applied individually or in
various permutations and combinations) in a motor vehicle
titling inquiry to generate the motor vehicle titling instructions
for each motor vehicle titling event regardless of the actual
location of: the titling entity, motor vehicle jurisdiction which
controls the performance of the motor vehicle buyer, the motor
vehicle sales entity, the motor vehicle insurance entity, the motor
vehicle financing entity, the motor vehicle, or the like.
Id. at 4:7–14.
Consistent with this disclosure, independent claim 79 recites “[a]
computer system for characterizing and calculating fee taxes payable on a
motor vehicle transaction” comprising “an administrator computer” that
includes “a non-transitory computer readable medium” and “processor”
(limitations [a1]–[a3]). The system includes processes to (1) “display an
administrator user fee-tax graphic user interface” (limitation [b]) that (2)
allows “selection of a taxing entity . . . from a plurality of taxing entities
which causes a corresponding taxing entity identifier to couple to said fee-
tax” (limitation [c]); (3) allows “selection . . . of a fee-tax type from a
plurality of fee-tax types which causes a corresponding fee-tax type
identifier to couple to said fee-tax” (limitation [d]); and (4) displays “a fee-
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tax type template,” i.e., “a straight fee-tax template,” “a value-based fee-tax
template,” and “a calculated fee-tax template” based upon the selected “fee-
tax type” (limitation [e]). In other words, independent claim 79 recites a
system for characterizing and calculating the amount of taxes due on a motor
vehicle by selecting “a taxing entity” from a list of taxing entities, selecting
“a fee-tax type” from a list of fee-tax types, and displaying “a fee-tax type
template.”
Here, we note that providing data is an extra-solution activity. See In
re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom Bilski
v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (characterizing data gathering steps as
insignificant extra-solution activity). Selecting data presented on a screen is
a form of choosing an option, a step that can be performed mentally or by
pen and paper. See In re Rudy, 956 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“This
mental process of hook color selection based on a provided chart
demonstrates that claim 34 as a whole is directed to an abstract idea.”).
Similarly, any analyses recited in the claim can be performed mentally. See
Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (citing cases) (“[W]e have treated analyzing information by steps
people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without
more, as essentially mental processes.”). Displaying the results of the
selection and/or analyses is insignificant post-solution activity. See id.; see
also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11 (“Flook stands for the proposition that the
prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment’ or adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity.”’) (quoting
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92).
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When considered collectively and under the broadest reasonable
interpretation, the limitations of independent claim 79 recite a way of
characterizing and calculating the amount of taxes due on a motor vehicle by
selecting “a taxing entity” from a list of taxing entities, selecting “a fee-tax
type” from a list of fee-tax types, and displaying “a fee-tax type template.”4
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that claim 79 recites an abstract idea, i.e.,
a “[m]ental process[]—[a] concept[] performed in the human mind
(including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).” 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52 (footnote omitted).
Our reviewing court has held similar concepts to be abstract. For
example, the Federal Circuit has held abstract the concepts of customizing
information based on known user information in Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“Capital One Bank”), customizing a user interface based on user selections
in Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1271
(Fed. Cir. 2016), collecting, analyzing, manipulating, and processing data
and displaying the results of the analysis, manipulation, and processing in
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Capital One Fin.”), “selecting certain information,
analyzing it using mathematical techniques, and reporting or displaying the
results of the analysis” in SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d
1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018), and “gathering and analyzing information of a

4 We note that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different
levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240
(Fed. Cir. 2016). The Board’s “slight revision of its abstract idea analysis
does not impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241.
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specified content, then displaying the results.” See Electric Power, 830 F.3d
at 1354.
As such, we disagree with the Appellant’s contention that claim 79 is
not directed to a mental process simply because it is “directed to a ‘computer
system.’” Appeal Br. 20. Here, we note that Appellant does not assert that
the specific steps of providing, selecting, and displaying cannot practically
be performed in the human mind. Rather, Appellant refers to the specific
“physical device” recited as support that independent claim 79 does not
recite a mental process and thus does not recite an abstract idea and that the
claim is directed to a computer user interface. See id. at 18–23. However,
as discussed more fully below with respect to Step 2A, Prong Two of the
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg., simply reciting and requiring a
computer for the functions of the claims does not change the result that the
claim recites an abstract idea. At best, the specific physical elements
“limit[] the invention to a technological environment for which to apply the
underlying abstract concept.” Capital One Fin., 850 F.3d at 1340; see also
Ans. 12.
Having concluded that claim 79 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea, we turn to Step 2A, Prong Two of the 2019 Revised Guidance
and determine whether the claim integrates the recited judicial exception
into a practical application of the judicial exception. Here we look to see if,
for example, any additional elements of the claim (i) reflect an improvement
in the functioning of a computer or to another technological field, (ii)
implement the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine,
(iii) effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different
state or thing, or (iv) use the judicial exception in some other meaningful
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way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 55;
see also MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Here, the only additional element recited in claim 79 beyond the
abstract idea is the “administrator computer” including a “non-transitory
computer readable medium,” “processor,” and “graphic user interface on a
display surface” – an element that, as the Examiner observes (see Ans. 13) –
is described in the Specification as a generic computing element. For
example, the Specification discusses an example computer system may
“include without limitation hand-held devices, such as personal digital
assistants or camera/cell phone, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-
based or programmable consumer electronics, network PCs, minicomputers,
mainframe computers, and the like.” Spec. 12:24–13:3, 13:16–14:25.
We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct
us to any indication, that the operations recited in claim 79 or dependent
claims 80–98 require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive
computer components, i.e., a particular machine, invoke any asserted
inventive programming, or that the claimed invention is implemented using
other than generic computer components to perform generic computer
functions. See DDR Holdings, Inc. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of
generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim
patent-eligible.”). Independent claim 79, unlike the claims found non-
abstract in prior cases, uses generic computer technology to present
information for the purpose of characterizing and calculating the amount of
taxes due on a motor vehicle, and does not recite an improvement to a
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particular computer technology. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314–15 (Finding
claims not abstract because they “focused on a specific asserted
improvement in computer animation.”).
Appellant argues that “[w]hen Claims 79–98 are evaluated, it is
unambiguously clear that the claims recite 1) a specific implementation -
rather than just a result - of a specific solution to a problem in the computer
arts; and 2) a particular improvement to computer functionality.” Appeal Br.
22–23. We disagree.
Appellant does not provide reasoning or evidence, and we do not see
from the claim, how the limitations claim a technological solution to
computer-based problem, i.e., a solution “necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. The problem
being addressed by the inventors, i.e., “accurate determination of the fees or
taxes or both payable on a given motor vehicle transaction performed in any
one of a plurality of fee-tax entities by providing incremental stepwise
guidance in each of the three resultant templates of Claim 79” is not one that
arises specifically in computer technology. Appeal Br. 23. Instead, as the
Specification indicates, the problem existed prior to computer technology.
See Spec. 1:20–28 (Discussing “[t]he conventional approach to registering
the title of a motor vehicle with a motor vehicle jurisdiction.”)
Further, the purported solution comprises, at best, a generic computer
system with a graphic user interface operating in its ordinary and
conventional capacity. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 224–26. Appellant does not
contend that they invented any of the claimed components or their basic
functions or that those components, claimed generally, were unknown in the
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art as of time of the invention. Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d at 1270. The “focus”
of the claim is not “on the specific asserted improvement in computer
capabilities”; but rather, on using a computer user interface to implement the
abstract idea of characterizing and calculating the amount of taxes or fees
due on a motor vehicle. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336; see also Alice, 573
U.S. at 223 (holding that attempting to limit the use of an abstract idea to a
particular technological environment does not make a claim patent-eligible)
(quoting Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11).
Claim 79 simply provides for a user to select information using a
graphics user interface, and the display of information based on some basic
analysis; there is no improvement to the existing display or graphical user
interface. Instead, the claim here is similar to those of Trading Tech. Int’l.,
Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2019) that did not “solve any
purported technological problem.” Any improvement lies in the process of
presenting information for the purpose of characterizing and calculating the
amount of taxes due on a motor vehicle, the abstract idea itself, and not to
any technological improvement.
Similarly, “[c]laims 80–89 recite an element common to each of the
three templates which by user interaction allow the user to couple specific
identifiers to the fee-tax” and claims 90–96 “provide specific guidance for
user interaction,” which are not technological benefits or technological
improvements. Appeal Br. 23–25. Instead, as the Examiner points out,
claims 79–98 are directed to “a computer-based solution to an administrative
problem: the cumbersome administration of tax and fee administration over
a multitude of jurisdictions with varying rules and regulations governing the
assessment of the fee/tax.” Ans. 13. To the extent the Appellant argues that
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the claimed invention “reduces the combinatorial permutations to a
simplified implementation and results in determination and return of a more
accurate fee-tax”, such an improvement is not directed to the computer or
interface. See Appeal Br. 27; see also Trading Tech., 921 F.3d at 1089–90.
Accordingly, we conclude claims 79–98 do not contain an element or
combination of elements that impose a meaningful limit on the abstract idea
that integrates the abstract idea into a practical application. Thus, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner’s determination that claims 79–98 are
directed to an abstract idea.
Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that
claims 78–98 are directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step
2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice
framework, whether the claims include additional elements or a combination
of elements that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether the additional
elements amount to “significantly more” than the judicial exception itself.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
Here, we agree with the Examiner that the claims do “not include
additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than
the judicial exception because the additional elements merely provide
instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer.” Final Act. 5;
Ans. 14.
Taking the claimed elements separately, the functions performed by
the “administrator computer” are purely conventional. A generic processing
device and “graphic user interface on a display surface” implement the
processes of the claims operate in their ordinary and conventional capacities
to perform the well-understood, routine, and conventional functions of
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providing, selecting, and displaying data. See Electric Power, 830 F.3d
at 1355 (gathering, sending, monitoring, analyzing, selecting, and presenting
information does not transform the abstract process into a patent-eligible
invention); see also In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607,
612 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[S]toring, receiving, and extracting data” are generic
computer functions.); SAP America, Inc. v. Investpic, LLC, 898 F.3d
1161, 1169–70 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[S]electing certain information, analyzing
it using mathematical techniques, and reporting or displaying the results of
the analysis” were “basic functions” of a computer.); Alice, 573 U.S. at 226
(“Nearly every computer will include a ‘communications controller’ and
‘data storage unit’ capable of performing the basic calculation, storage, and
transmission functions required by the method claims.”).
Considered as an ordered combination, the components of the
Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the
operations are considered separately. The sequence of providing, selecting,
and displaying data is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to
be abstract. See Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1354–56 (holding that the
sequence of gathering, analyzing, and displaying in real-time was abstract);
see also SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1170 (holding that selecting information,
analyzing it, and displaying the results of the analysis was abstract).
Appellant further argues that “[c]laims 79–98 generally improve
computer-functionality in the subject field or provide a graphic user
interface which provides a novel implementation with a novel result which is
not otherwise practicably possible by merely human manipulation due to the
vast number of permutations and combinations of all of the fee-tax factors.”
Appeal Br. 27. However, the claims do not, for example, purport to improve
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the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an improvement in
any other technology or technical field, as discussed above with respect to
Prong Two of Step 2A. Instead, claims 79–98 amount to nothing
significantly more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using generic
computing elements, which, under our precedents, is not enough to
transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 226.
Appellant’s other arguments, including those directed to now-
superseded USPTO guidance, have been considered but are not persuasive
of error. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 51 (“Eligibility-related
guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP
(published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”).
We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claim 79 and dependent claims 80–98 under 35
U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 79–
98.

Obviousness
Claims 79–98
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claim 79 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because the
combination of Bedell, Irwin, and Stokes fails to disclose or suggest “a
second level hierarchical structure including a fee-tax type list which by
administrator user interaction allows selection by operation of fee-tax type
selection module of a fee-tax type from a plurality of fee-tax types which
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causes a corresponding fee-tax type identifier to couple to said fee-tax,” as
recited by limitation [d] of independent claim 79. Appeal Br. 29–32.
The Examiner maintains the rejection is proper, and cites Bedell, at
column 6, lines 10–35, Irwin, at column 9, lines 1–30, and Stokes, at
paragraph 51. Final Act. 6–7; Ans. 14–15. In this regard, the Examiner
concludes that
[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at
the time the invention was made to combine the GUI with a
hierarchical data structure as cited in Bedell and the taxing entity
and fee-tax data as taught by Irwin with the fee-tax calculation
features of Stokes because the claimed invention is merely a
combination of old elements, and in the combination each
element merely would have performed the same function as it
did separately with a reasonable expectation of success and
predictable results. Irwin does not teach the remaining
limitation.
Final Act. 7.
Bedell is directed to a data “management tool to permit users of
analytic engines and other information resources to custom structure a data
schema for business intelligence and other purposes.” Bedell, col. 1:6–10.
More particularly, Bedell discloses “a user defined data object hierarchy,
which permits a user to associate data objects into a hierarchy of their
choosing, not limited to the data structures of the underlying physical
storage.” Id. at 1:65–2:2.
Irwin is directed “a centralized system for processing titles for a
plurality of vehicles subject to different jurisdiction-specific requirements.”
Irwin, col. 1:8–10. Irwin discloses that
any given client 18 may provide identifying data 24 describing a
number of vehicles to central office 22. After receipt of data 24,
system 10 generates a number of jurisdiction-specific form
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documents 26. As noted above, form documents 26 may include,
but are not limited to, title/ownership certificates, registration
documents, financing disclosures, or operator licenses. In
addition to form documents 26, system 10 preferably generates
at least one reconciliation document 28 reflecting the payment of
fees associated with the filing of form documents 26.
Id. at 3:46–57 (emphases omitted). Irwin describes that its system may
“calculate any applicable fee payment associated with the current form
document 26.” Id. at 8:50–52. In this regard, Irwin discloses that
a particular jurisdiction may require payment of a vehicle
registration fee related to the filing of a registration document.
The amount of the registration fee may be dependent upon
several factors such as the gross vehicle weight, the number of
cylinders, the purchase price, the age of the vehicle, or the like.
Title, license, and other fees may be based upon similar factors.
During the calculation of such fees, task 84 may access the
current data record and/or a fee database 86 that includes fee
schedules for the various jurisdictions. After task 84, form
generation process 60 exits, preferably to task 62 of titlework
process 50.
Id. at 8:52–63.
Stokes is directed to a system “for calculating transaction-based
taxes.” Stokes ¶ 2. Stokes discloses that its system provides information
such as “merchant characteristics 30, transaction characteristics 32,
subscription characteristics 34, and any other categories of information” to a
tax calculation application 36. Id. ¶ 59. Stokes describes that “merchant
data 30 is nexus information” that identifies a particular jurisdiction. Id.
¶ 51. Stokes discloses “tax calculator 38 is the engine underlying the
application 36 that actually generates a tax calculation 44 utilizing
information received from the application 36 and information on one or
more tax databases 40.” Id. ¶ 62. Stokes describes that “each tax
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calculation 44 uses various inputs to generate each tax calculations 44, and
those inputs can be stored along with the corresponding tax calculations 44
on the database 40.” Id. ¶ 66. More particularly, Stokes discloses that “tax
database 40 can also store tax rate information, classification and exemption
information relating to categories of purchased items 24, and other
information that is not inputted into the system 20 by the merchant 26 or the
purchaser 22.” Id.
Stokes further discloses that its “tax database 40 can be configured to
interface directly with a tax authority 46 from one or more jurisdictions in
setting up the various tax rules that apply to a particular jurisdiction.” Id.
¶¶ 66, 67 (“The system 20 is sufficiently flexible to incorporate changes in
tax laws, and the taxing practices of national, state, county, city, local, and
other tax authorities 46.”). Stokes also discloses that “interface subsystem
50 can be divided into a transaction interface for receiving transaction data
32, a subscription interface for receiving subscription data 34, and a
merchant interface for receiving merchant data 30.” Id. ¶ 81. “The only
limits to the number of transactions that can be processed by the transaction
subsystem 56 are the inherent limits to the infrastructure configuration
utilized by the system 20.” Id. ¶ 83. Stokes describes that “setup subsystem
54 can be responsible for processing and accessing information required by
the tax calculator 38 that is not limited to the specific transaction.” Id. ¶ 85.
More particularly, Stokes discloses that “setup subsystem 54 can also
provide the means for receiving, storing, updating, selecting, applying, and
enforcing the nexus characteristics of the merchant 26.” Id. ¶ 88.
In response to Appellant’s argument, the Examiner states that “Stokes,
in combination with the hierarchical structure taught by Bedell, suggests a
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second revel hierarchical structure . . . fee-tax type list which by
administrator user interaction allows selection of a fee-tax type from a
plurality of fee-tax types.” See Appeal Br. 29–33; see also Ans. 14. The
difficulty with the Examiner’s analysis, as Appellant points out, is that the
“Examiner does not individually map all the elements of the second level
hierarchical structure or the third level hierarchical structure within the
description of Stokes.” Appeal Br. 29.
Here, while we agree with the Examiner that Bedell teaches the
claimed “hierarchical structures” (Final Act. 5–6), we cannot agree with the
Examiner that the relied upon disclosure of Stokes discloses or suggests “a
fee-tax type list which by administrator user interaction allows selection of a
fee-tax type from a plurality of fee-tax types,” as required by independent
claim 79. See Final Act. 5–6 (citing Stokes ¶ 51). Instead, the relied upon
portion of Stokes refers to “nexus information” which simply identifies what
particular jurisdiction a specific transaction occurs in during tax calculation
processing. See, e.g., Stokes ¶ 51 (“One category of merchant data 30 is
nexus information. Tax calculations relating to a specific transaction in a
particular jurisdiction will differ depending on whether the merchant 26 has
a nexus with respect to the particular jurisdiction.”). Thus, we agree with
Appellant that the relied upon portion of Stokes “does not teach or suggest
any elements already within the breadth of the first level hierarchical
structure,” as required by limitation [c] of independent claim 79.
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of independent claim 79 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same reasons, we
also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 80–98.
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CONCLUSION
In summary:

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
79–98 101 Eligibility 79–98
79–98 103(a) Bedell, Irwin,
Stokes
79–98
Overall
Outcome
79–98
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED