AutoAlert LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 19, 2020

2019001864 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 19, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/263,894 04/28/2014 Boyd Hodson Warner AUTLT.011C1 3262
20995 7590 06/19/2020
KNOBBE MARTENS OLSON & BEAR LLP
2040 MAIN STREET
FOURTEENTH FLOOR
IRVINE, CA 92614
EXAMINER
ARAQUE JR, GERARDO
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/19/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
efiling@knobbe.com
jayna.cartee@knobbe.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte BOYD HODSON WARNER and
JEFFREY STUART COTTON
________________

Appeal 2019-001864
Application 14/263,894
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before JASON V. MORGAN, JAMES B. ARPIN, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.

MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–12. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as AutoAlert,
LLC. Appeal Br. 3.
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Summary of the Disclosure
Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to the analysis of customer
data to predict vehicle mileage and generate alerts. Spec., Abstract.
Representative claim (disputed limitations emphasized)
1. A method comprising:
receiving over the Internet, from a first computer terminal
located at a vehicle dealer, an actual mileage reading for a
current vehicle belonging to a potential customer, the actual
mileage reading taken while the current vehicle was in the
custody of the vehicle dealer during a vehicle service visit;
executing software on a computer system that is hosted on a
second computer terminal remotely from the vehicle dealer, the
software configured to determine, for the potential customer,
that the potential customer qualifies as a prospect by:
selecting the actual mileage reading and a corresponding
historical date on which the actual mileage reading was
taken for the current vehicle of the potential customer;
calculating, based on the actual mileage reading and
corresponding historical date, an estimated rate of
mileage accumulation for the current vehicle;
determining, based on the estimated rate, a first predicted
mileage value for the current vehicle on a first date
subsequent to the historical date;
determining an estimated trade-in value for the current
vehicle based on the first predicted mileage value;
calculating an estimated payment for a replacement
vehicle based on the estimated trade-in value of the
current vehicle; and
identifying the potential customer as a prospect if a
difference between the estimated payment for the
replacement vehicle and a current payment for the
current vehicle is within a predetermined range;
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generating an interactive user interface comprising:
a plurality of tabs selectable by a user, at least one of the
plurality of tabs comprising mileage information;
a plurality of client names, each associated with client
automobile sale data, displayed in response to user
selection of the tab comprising mileage information,
wherein the plurality of client names comprise the name
of the potential customer and an indication that the
potential customer will likely exceed or has already
exceeded a mileage threshold, the indication based on the
first predicted mileage value for the current vehicle or on
the actual mileage reading taken during the vehicle
service visit;
in response to the actual mileage reading taken during the
vehicle service visit, transmitting to the vehicle dealer, over the
Internet using a public key encryption, an alert that the
potential customer was identified as a prospect, the alert
comprising the indication; and
reserving access for individuals authorized by the vehicle dealer
to receive the alert, while restricting access by unauthorized
individuals, by requiring each individual to provide a password
to login to the interactive website.
Appeal Br. 30–31 (Claims App’x).
The Examiner’s Rejections and Cited References
The Examiner rejects claims 1–12 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to patent-ineligible subject matter. Non-Final Act. 2–26.
The Examiner rejects claims 1–5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Cotton (US 7,827,099 B1;
issued Nov. 2, 2010), Cina (US 7,239,234 B2; issued July 3, 2007), Treyz et
al. (US 6,526,335 B1; issued Feb. 25, 2003) (“Treyz”), Hallowell et al. (US
2010/0223106 A1; published Sept. 2, 2010) (“Hallowell”), and the
Examiner’s Official Notice. Non-Final Act. 27–42.
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The Examiner rejects claims 6–12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Cotton, Cina, Treyz, and the
Examiner’s Official Notice. Non-Final Act. 42–59
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
To constitute patent-eligible subject matter, an invention must be a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or [a] new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. There are
implicit exceptions to the categories of patentable subject matter identified
in 35 U.S.C. § 101, including: (1) laws of nature; (2) natural phenomena;
and (3) abstract ideas. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014). The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a framework for
distinguishing patents with claims directed to these implicit exceptions
“from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Id. at
217 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
66 (2012)). The evaluation follows a two-part framework: (1) determine
whether the claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract
idea; and (2) if so, then determine whether any element, or combination of
elements, in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to
significantly more than the patent-ineligible concept itself. See id. at 217–18.
Last year, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published
guidance on the application of the two-part analysis. USPTO, 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (January 7,
2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”); see also USPTO, October 2019 Update:
Subject Matter Eligibility, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (Oct. 17, 2019) (“Oct. 2019
Update”). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
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(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (see 2019 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 54 (step 2A, prong one)); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see id. at 54–55 (step 2A,
prong two); MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
35 U.S.C. § 101
Step 2A, Prong One
The Examiner determines that claim 1 recites generating sales leads
by gathering and analyzing
a user’s current agreement with regards to a service or product,
gathering and analyzing new agreements that are related to a
user’s current agreement, comparing the two agreements,
determining the potential that a user may be interested due to a
similarity, deal, offer, and so forth that the new agreement may
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offer, contacting a user, [and] presenting the new offer to the
user.
Non-Final Act. 3; see also id. at 5 (citing Spec. ¶ 2). Thus, the Examiner
determines claim 1 recites “a fundamental economic practice, a method of
organizing human activities.” Id. at 4.
Appellant does not present arguments that are pertinent to step 2A,
prong one. Thus, Appellant’s arguments are addressed below under step 2A,
prong two, and step 2B. Moreover, the Examiner’s determinations are
supported by the recitations of claim 1, which include: (1) “receiving . . . an
actual mileage reading for a current vehicle belonging to a potential
customer”; (2) determining “that the potential customer qualifies as a
prospect by . . . [determining] if a difference between the estimated payment
for the replacement vehicle and a current payment for the current vehicle is
within a predetermined range”; and (3) “transmitting to [a] vehicle dealer . . .
an alert that the potential customer was identified as a prospect.”
These recitations demonstrate that claim 1 recites identifying potential
customers by ascertaining which individuals are most likely to be interested
in an available offer because an estimated payment for a replacement vehicle
is close to the current payment for a current vehicle. See Spec. ¶ 197 (“in
one embodiment where the threshold percentage value is 10 percent, if a
client leases a first automobile at $500 a month and a second associated
automobile is available for lease at $550 a month, the system would generate
an alert because the second automobile’s payment is within 10%”). That is,
claim 1 recites mapping customers to prices, a concept similar to the patent-
ineligible concept of offer-based price optimization (i.e., mapping prices to
customers). See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2015). Thus, claim 1 recites certain methods of organizing human
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activity in the form of a fundamental economic practice or commercial or
legal interactions (including marketing or sales activities), and, therefore,
claim 1 recites an abstract idea. Cf. id. (the “concept of ‘offer based pricing’
is similar to other ‘fundamental economic concepts’ found to be abstract
ideas”); see also Oct. 2019 Update 6; 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52.
Step 2A, Prong Two
Appellant argues claim 1 is patent-eligible because it recites a number
of specific “limitations in reference to the visual alert system alone,”
including generating an interactive user interface comprising:
• “a plurality of tabs selectable by a user, at least one of the
plurality of tabs comprising mileage information,”
• “a plurality of client names, each associated with client
automobile sale data, displayed in response to user selection
of the tab comprising mileage information,”
• “the plurality of client names comprise the name of the
potential customer and an indication that the potential
customer will likely exceed or has already exceeded a mileage
threshold,” and
• “the indication based on the first predicted mileage value for
the current vehicle or on the actual mileage reading taken
during the vehicle service visit.”
Appeal Br. 13. Thus, Appellant argues claim 1 is “directed to an even more
‘particular manner of summarizing and presenting information in electronic
devices’ than the claim in” Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs.,
Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Appeal Br. 13. That is, Appellant
argues claim 1 is “drawn to a ‘particular tool for presentation’ that focuses
on a specific—and inventive—‘device or technique for displaying [that]
information.” Id. at 14 (citing Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830
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F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also Reply Br. 2–4. Appellant
also argues claim 1 improves “the functioning of graphical user interfaces.”
Reply Br. 7 (citing Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x
1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because the interactive user
interface recitations represent insignificant extra-solution activity. See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Unlike the patent-eligible claim in
Core Wireless, which was “directed to an improvement in the functioning of
computers, particularly those with small screens” (880 F.3d at 1363), the
generated user interface of claim 1 fails to “improve the functioning of the
computer, make it operate more efficiently, or solve any technological
problem” (Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1093 (Fed.
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 954 (2020)). Instead, the generated user
interface recites “a purportedly new arrangement of generic information that
assists” (id.) a dealer in seeing “that particular customers are prospects for
new agreements because of their mileage” (Spec. ¶ 117). A claim, like
Appellant’s claim 1, “focused on providing information . . . in a way that
helps [a human] process information more quickly,” does not recite some
manner of “improving computers or technology.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc.
v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (“claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying
the abstract idea on a computer [does not] provide a sufficient inventive
concept” (emphasis added)); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of
Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“the fact that the required
calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not
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materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter”
(emphasis added)).
Appellant also argues the way a user interacts with claim 1 “is not
arbitrary because it is configured to identify the plurality of client names and
an indication of whether each ‘will likely exceed or has already exceeded a
mileage threshold,’ which may be based on an ‘actual mileage reading taken
during the vehicle service visit.’” Id. Specifically, Appellant argues “the
system can update a user in real-time” and that “the user interface can be
time-dependent.” Id. at 14–15 (emphases added) (citing Spec. ¶¶ 22, 208);
see also Reply Br. 13–14.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive at least for the reason they are
not commensurate with the scope of the claimed invention. Although
Appellant argues embodiments can have real-time or time-dependent
features, Appellant does not identify any recitations that require such
features.
We are unable to discern any other additional recitations that integrate
the underlying abstract idea of claim 1—certain methods of organizing
human activity in the form of a fundamental economic practice or
commercial or legal interactions (including marketing or sales activities)—
into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
Therefore, we determine that claim 1 does not integrate the identified
abstract idea into a practical application, and we conclude that claim 1 is
directed to an abstract idea.
Step 2B
Because we find that the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we
now consider whether the claims include additional limitations, such that the
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claims amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Appellant argues
the Examiner “provides no evidence to support a conclusion that the specific
elements of Appellant’s claims—such as the interactive user interface and
other elements quoted above-are ‘well-understood, routine, and
conventional.’” Appeal Br. 16. In particular, with respect to the Examiner’s
taking of Official Notice that “at the time of the invention, tabs were well-
understood, routine, and conventional” (Ans. 5; see also Non-Final Act. 38),
Appellant argues the Examiner failed to meet the evidentiary requirements
of Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (see Reply Br. 9–
10).
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because the Examiner notes
that support for the Official Notice “can be found in the references that have
been cited in the PTO-892.” Non-Final Act. 38 (emphasis omitted). The
references the Examiner refers to are in a Notice of References Cited (i.e.,
form PTO-892) provided February 28, 2018—the date of the Non-Final
Action. This notice included multiple references dated before the filing date
of Appellant’s application. Notice of References Cited, PTO-892, at *1 (Feb.
28, 2018). In particular, the Notice cites to Lancaster et al. (US 2002/
0065707 A1; published May 30, 2002) (“Lancaster”), Horvath (US 2006/
0041443 A1; published Feb. 23, 2006), and Inbarajan et al. (US 2007/
0179798 A1; published Aug. 2, 2007). The Notice also cites to an archived
Wikipedia entry. Tab (GUI), Wikipedia, archived copy available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20050903011759/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Tab_(GUI) (Sept. 3, 2005) (“Wikipedia Tab (GUI)”). Although Wikipedia is
generally disfavored as a source (see, e.g., Ex parte Three-Dimensional
Media Group, Ltd., No. 2009-004087, 2010 WL 3017280, at *17 (BPAI
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2010) (non-precedential)), the relevant disclosures of Wikipedia Tab (GUI)
are corroborated by the traditional references cited. That is, all four
references disclose the use of tabs as graphical user interface elements. See,
e.g., Lancaster, Figs. 9–13; Horvath, Figs. 21–23 and 25; Inbarajan, Fig. 3;
Wikipedia Tab (GUI) (a “tab in graphical user interfaces is a typically
rectangular small box (usually containing a text label or graphical icon)
associated with a view pane” (emphasis omitted)). These cited publications
support the Examiner’s taking of Official Notice that tab elements of a
graphical user interface were well-understood, routine, and conventional.
Berkheimer Memorandum, USPTO, at *4, available at https://www.uspto.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-20180419. PDF (Apr.
19, 2018).
Appellant contends it is insufficient that the Examiner shows that tabs
as graphical user interface elements were well-understood, routine, and
conventional because the Examiner still fails to show “that all of these
elements were ‘well-known’ or ‘common’ at the time of the invention.”
Appeal Br. 16. That is, Appellant points to the content of the tabs (e.g., “at
least one of the plurality of tabs comprising mileage information”) and
argues “[t]he scope of official notice was not commensurate with the scope
of [the] missing elements.” Reply Br. 9.
The Examiner’s Official Notice and analysis persuasively show that
using tabs to organize the display of particular information (e.g., mileage
information) was a well-understood, routine, and conventional activity. See,
e.g., Ans. 5 (“the information does not affect the tabs and their functions and
the tabs do not affect the information”). Moreover, after reevaluating our
determination that displaying the claimed tab content—i.e., interactive user
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interface elements—represents insignificant extra-solution activity, we are
unable to discern the presence of a patent-eligible inventive concept. See
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
We also agree with the Examiner that the other additional elements of
claim 1 are generic computer elements that are well-understood, routine, and
conventional. See Non-Final Act. 10; see also, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 163, 166, 172
(disclosing how embodiments could be implemented with “any network,”
“any databases,” “computer software, hardware, firmware, or any
combination [thereof],” including “specialized computers,” “personal
computer[s], cellular phone[s], laptop[s], or other device[s] capable of
connecting to the Internet”). Importantly, the generic computer elements, as
claimed, are merely used to implement the underlying abstract idea and do
not perform non-generic functions. See MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) (citing DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257–59 (Fed. Cir.
2014)). As the Examiner correctly determines, the additional elements of
claim 1, even when read as an ordered combination, represent a
“conventional computer implementation” that does not provide significantly
more than the recited abstract idea. See Non-Final Act. 11; see also 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
For these reasons, the additional elements of claim 1 do not provide
significantly more than the underlying abstract idea—certain methods of
organizing human activity in the form of a fundamental economic practice or
commercial or legal interactions (including marketing or sales activities).
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
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Additional Appellant Arguments
Appellant argues “[c]laim 1 does not attempt to preempt the use of the
asserted abstract idea, or any abstract idea, by others.” Appeal Br. 16; see
also Reply Br. 10. Appellant’s contention is unpersuasive because “[w]hile
preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility,” as “questions
on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). No additional determination
regarding preemption is necessary here because the two-part analysis (i.e.,
steps 2A (prongs one and two) and 2B) shows that claim 1 is directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of
claim 1, and claim 6, which Appellant argues is patent-eligible for similar,
and similarly unpersuasive, reasons. Appeal Br. 24–26.
Dependent Claims
Appellant also contends the Examiner only briefly addresses
dependent claims 2–5 and 7–12, even though the dependent claims “describe
additional and/or different features.” Appeal Br. 23, 26. We agree with the
Examiner, however, that, although the dependent claims “add further details
of the abstract steps/elements recited,” the dependent claims do not recite
“an improvement to another technology or technical field, an improvement
to the functioning of the computer itself, or meaningful limitations beyond
generally linking the use of [the] abstract idea to a particular technological
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environment.” Non-Final Act. 24–25. Accordingly, we also sustain the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of dependent claims 2–5 and 7–12.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 because
the combination of Cotton, Cina, and Trez fails to teach or suggest
“receiving over the Internet, from a first computer terminal located at a
vehicle dealer, an actual mileage reading for a current vehicle belonging
to a potential customer, the actual mileage reading taken while the
current vehicle was in the custody of the vehicle dealer during a vehicle
service visit” or “in response to the actual mileage reading taken during
the vehicle service visit, transmitting to the vehicle dealer . . . an alert.”
Appeal Br. 26. Nevertheless, Appellant’s conclusory assertions are
unpersuasive because they do not address with persuasive specificity the
Examiner’s findings and analysis with respect to the cited references and
what their combination teaches or suggests. Non-Final Act. 27–36; Ans. 9–
13.
Appellant also contends the Examiner erroneously attempts “to
replace over 100 words with the single word ‘tabs.’” Appeal Br. 27. That is,
Appellant argues that the Official Notice regarding the use of tabs as
graphical user interface elements “fails to account for all the remaining
missing elements.” Reply Br. 15. Appellant’s contentions are unpersuasive,
however, because the Examiner relies on the combination of Cotton, Cina,
and Treyz to teach or suggest the remaining missing elements (i.e., the
information displayed in the tabs). See, e.g., Appeal Br. 28–29, 31–36. The
Examiner’s Official Notice and analysis persuasively show that it would
have been obvious to use tabs to organize the display of the particular
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information taught or suggested by the combination of Cotton, Cina, and
Treyz. See, e.g., Ans. 14.
Appellant further contends the Examiner presents a “complicated
rationale” in the Answer—relying on flawed premises and reflecting reliance
on impermissible hindsight reasoning—to show that it would have been
obvious to an artisan of ordinary skill to combine the teachings and
suggestions of the cited references. Reply Br. 17. Specifically, Appellant
argues that, unlike Cotton, the invention of claim 1 is directed to “a real-time
solution.” Id. (citing Spec. ¶¶ 28, 208). Appellant also argues claim 1 does
not encompass embodiments that include “generation of ‘a large amount of
alerts.’” Id. (citing Ans. 12). Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive,
however, because they are not commensurate with the scope of claimed
invention. That is, Appellant merely provides evidence that claim 1 can
encompass embodiments that have real-time or time-dependent features, but
Appellant does not identify any recitations that require such features.
Similarly, Appellant fails to identify any recitations limiting claim 1 to
embodiments where a large number of alerts may be generated.
Moreover, Appellant contends for the first time in the Reply Brief that
the Examiner erred in relying on Cina to teach or suggest use of an “actual
mileage reading taken during the vehicle service visit” because “the
claimed method results in calculations that require more precision” than
what Cina teaches or suggests. Reply Br. 17. Appellant also argues for the
first time in the Reply Brief that the Examiner erred in relying on Treyz to
teach or suggest taking an actual mileage reading during a vehicle service
visit. Id. at 18 (citing Ans. 12–13). Appellant’s contentions with respect to
Cina and Treyz are untimely, however, because they are directed to findings
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the Examiner originally made in the Non-Final Action—not to new findings
in the Answer. Compare Non-Final Act. 33 with Ans. 10 and Non-Final Act.
35 with Ans. 12. Arguments raised in the Reply Brief that were not raised in
the Appeal Brief and that are not responsive to arguments raised in the
Answer will not be considered without a showing of good cause. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection
of claim 1, and claims 2–5, which Appellant does not argue separately with
persuasive specificity. Appeal Br. 28. Appellant also unpersuasively argues
claim 6 is patentable based on recitations in claim 6 that are similar to
recitations in claim 1. Id. at 26. Accordingly, we also sustain the Examiner’s
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 6, and claims 7–12, which Appellant
does not argue separately with persuasive specificity. Id. at 28.
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CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–12 101 Eligibility 1–12
1–5 103(a) Cotton, Cina, Treyz,
Hallowell, Official
Notice
1–5
6–12 103(a) Cotton, Cina, Treyz,
Official Notice
6–12
Overall
Outcome
1–12
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED