Auto Processing Company

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 1981

258 N.L.R.B. 854 (N.L.R.B. 1981)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Auto Processing Company and Auto Warehousing
Company and Automotive and Special Services
Local Union No. 461, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America
Automobile Painters' Local Union No. 518 and
Automotive and Special Services Local Union
No. 461, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America
Auto Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 99 and
Automotive and Special Services Local Union
No. 461, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America. Cases 19-CA-12495, 19-CB-3801,
and 19-CB-3802
September 30, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
ZIMMERMAN
On June 4, 1981, Administrative Law Judge
Roger B. Holmes issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Charging Party
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and Re-
spondents Automobile Painters' Local Union No.
518 and Auto Sheet Metal Workers Local Union
No. 991 and the General Counsel filed cross-excep-
tions and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings, 2 and conclusions 3 of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
As noted by the Administrative Law Judge. Local 99 is the succes-
sor, as a result of a merger, to Auto Sheet Metal Workers Local Union
No. 387, the original Respondent in Case 19-CB-3802.
2 In sec. 3, par. 6. of his Decision, the Administrative Law Judge erro-
neously found that prior to 1980 the Charging Party, Teamsters. Local
Union No. 461, represented the unit of Auto Warehousing employees at
Seattle which added accessories and loaded the vehicles on railroad cars.
However, the record indicates these employees were never represented
by the Charging Party. Nevertheless, this erroneous factual finding does
not affect our decision in this case.
3 As noted in the Administrative Law Judge's Decision, Respondent
Unions filed a representation petition on June 25, 1980. On July 29. 1980.
the Regional Director dismissed the representation petition. On Septem-
ber 5, 1980, pursuant to a request for review by Respondent Unions, the
Board affirmed the Regional Director's dismissal of the petition subject
to reinstatement after disposition of the unfair labor practice charges in
the instant case. Having found that no accretion has taken place, we are
reinstating and remanding the representation petition to the Regional Di-
rector for further appropriate processing.
258 NLRB No. 115
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the consolidated complaint be,
and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition in Case
19-RC-9854 be, and it hereby is, reinstated and re-
manded to the Regional Director for processing in
accordance with Section 102.63 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
ROGER B. HOLMES, Administrative Law Judge: Based
on unfair labor practice charges filed on June 9, 1980, in
Cases 19-CA-12495, 19-CB-3801, and 19-CB-3802 by
Automotive and Special Services Local Union No. 461,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, the General
Counsel issued on July 30, 1980, a consolidated com-
plaint alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (5)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein
called the Act, by Auto Processing Company and Auto
Warehousing Company, and further alleging violations
of Section 8(b)(l)(A) and (2) of the Act by Automobile
Painters' Local Union No. 518 and Auto Sheet Metal
Workers Local Union No. 99.
The hearing was held on February 5, 1981, at Seattle,
Washington. The due date for post-hearing briefs was
March 12, 1981.
FINDINGS OF FACT
i. THE EMPI.OYER AND THE UNIONS
The Board's jurisdiction is not in issue in this proceed-
ing. Auto Warehousing Company and Auto Processing
Company are both incorporated in the State of Washing-
ton. Those companies are headquartered at the same lo-
cation in Seattle, Washington. The individual who owns
100 percent of Auto Warehousing is also the owner of 80
percent of Auto Processing. The remaining 20-percent
interest in Auto Processing is held by James J. Stein,
who is the president of both Auto Warehousing and
Auto Processing. Stein is the person who has the main
control over the labor policies of both Companies. At
the time of the hearing, the officers of the two Compa-
nies were the same, except for Ivan Haynes, who is one
of the two vice presidents of Auto Warehousing, but
who is not an officer of Auto Processing.
As will be described more fully later herein, Auto
Warehousing is engaged in the processing of imported
automobiles, and Auto Processing is engaged in perform-
ing body repair work and painting work on such auto-
mobiles. In view of the foregoing, and the findings of
fact to be set forth in section III,A, and section IV,B,
herein, I find that Auto Warehousing and Auto Process-
ing are a single integrated business enterprise and alter
854
AUTO PROCESSING COMPANY
egos. While the two Companies will be referred to indi-
vidually with respect to their business history and cur-
rent operations, they will also be referred to at times, for
convenience, as Respondent Employer.
Based on the portion of the pleadings which are not in
dispute, I further find that the business operations of Re-
spondent Employer meet the indirect inflow and indirect
outflow jurisdictional standards of the Board.
It was admitted in the pleadings that all three of the
Unions involved in this proceeding are labor organiza-
tions within the meaning of the Act. It was further
agreed at the hearing that Auto Sheet Metal Workers
Local Union No. 99 is the successor, as a result of a
merger, to Auto Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No.
387.
II. THE WITNESSES
Eight persons were called as witnesses in the hearing
of this proceeding. In alphabetical order by their last
names, the witnesses were: Robert Buchman, who is an
employee of Auto Warehousing; Hilaire Gagner, who is
a vice president of Respondent Employer; Ali Guruscu,
who is a shop foreman of Auto Processing; Gary R.
Mims, who is an employee of Auto Warehousing; John
B. Mullavey, who is a business representative of Re-
spondent Sheet Metal Workers Union; John Newell, who
is the president and the business agent of the Charging
Party Teamsters; James J. Stein, who is the president of
Respondent Employer; and Ernest W. Wilde, who is the
business agent and financial secretary of Respondent
Painters' Union.
The findings of fact to be made herein will be based
on portions of the testimony of each one of the witnesses
named above. It should be noted, however, that the rec-
ollection of Shop Foreman Guruscu differed, in part,
from that of employees Buchman and Mims. The latter
two persons had the more positive recall, and I accept
their testimony. It should be explained that Guruscu did
not permanently begin working at the Tacoma facility
until January 1, 1981. From October 1979 to January 1,
1981, Guruscu worked for different time periods at either
the Seattle pier 91 location or the Tacoma facility. For
example, he spent 75 percent of his working time at Seat-
tle and 25 percent of his working time at Tacoma be-
tween November 1979 and March 1980. He spent 70 per-
cent of his working time at Seattle and 30 percent of his
working time at Tacoma from March 1980 to the end of
the year 1980. Unlike Guruscu, Buchman and Mims
worked in the Tacoma body shop during that entire time
period, and they had the opportunity personally to ob-
serve the work force. Respondent Unions' Exhibit 7 con-
tains estimates based on Guruscu's best judgment at the
time of its preparation, but note that Guruscu would
have needed to examine timecards to be more specific.
In addition, part of the explanation for the differences
in recollections may result from the fact that certain em-
ployees were transferred temporarily from Seattle to
Tacoma to perform marine survey work. That type of
work involves inspecting automobiles for dents and other
damage, and such work would be performed before the
automobiles went into the body shop. Note that Ander-
son, Burgess, Lewis, Miller, and Thomson fell into that
category. While they were doing the marine survey
work, they would not be in the body shop where Buch-
man and Mims were working. Thus, that may explain
some of the differences in the recollections among the
witnesses, as well as Gagner's recollection on that sub-
ject. In any event, Respondent Employer sold its Seattle
pier 91 facility on January 5, 1981, and, thus, the poten-
tial for transfer or interchange of employees between Se-
attle and Tacoma had ceased prior to the hearing.
The findings of fact to be made herein will also be
based upon portions of the documentary evidence intro-
duced by the parties.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Operations in Seattle Before March 1980
Auto Warehousing began its operations in Seattle
around 1962. It moved its operations about five times,
and it eventually ended up at terminal 115, which is lo-
cated on the Duwamish River. Terminal 115 is located
on land which is owned by the Port of Seattle. Auto
Warehousing leased the building there.
Auto Processing was formed in 1971. Gagner succinct-
ly explained the reason for the formation of Auto Proc-
essing:
Q. What led to the formation of Auto Processing,
Mr. Gagner?
A. Well, Datsun became one of the larger im-
porters and they were mixed in with all the rest of
the imports at Terminal 115 and space became a
problem. And, being as large as they were, they de-
manded a facility of their own, so Auto Processing
was formed and that account was moved to Pier 91.
Q. Okay, so is it fair to state that Auto Process-
ing was formed specifically to handle this Datsun
account?
A. Yes.
Since the early 1960's Respondent Unions had repre-
sented the body shop employees of Auto Warehousing in
Seattle. After Auto Processing was formed in 1971, Re-
spondent Unions have also represented the body shop
employees of Auto Processing. Collective-bargaining
agreements have been negotiated between Respondent
Employer and Respondent Unions covering those em-
ployees.
Introduced into evidence as the General Counsel's Ex-
hibit 2 was a copy of a collective-bargaining agreement
between Auto Processing and Respondent Sheet Metal
Workers Union. It covers journeymen automobile sheet
metal workers, radiatormen, trimmers, and registered ap-
prentices. The contract is dated August 1, 1978. It has
effective dates from July 1, 1978, to February 1, 1981.
Introduced into evidence as the General Counsel's Ex-
hibit 3 was a copy of a collective-bargaining agreement
between Auto Processing and Respondent Painters
Union. The contract covers automobile painters, includ-
ing the head painter, journeyman painter, helpers, sand-
ers, and rubbers. The agreement was signed on August I,
1978. It has effective dates from June 1, 1978, to June 1,
1981.
855
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
By 1975, Mazda was the principal car being imported
and processed at terminal 115 by Auto Warehousing.
The body shop for Auto Warehousing at that time was
located at terminal 115 in Seattle, and the body shop for
Auto Processing was located at pier 91 in Seattle. To
even the workload and to gain efficiency, the decision
was made in 1975 to have the Auto Processing employ-
ees perform the bodywork and the paint work at both
terminal 115 and pier 91. It was further decided that
those employees would work under the supervision of
one body shop foreman. From 1975 through 1979, Auto
Processing averaged employing 20 body shop employees.
During that time there was constant interchange among
those Auto Processing employees between the two Seat-
tle locations. Respondent Unions continued to represent
the body shop employees of Auto Processing. The Auto
Warehousing employees, who added accessories and
loaded the vehicles on railroad cars, were represented by
the Charging Party. Both the employees of Auto Proc-
essing, who were represented by Respondent Unions,
and the employees of Auto Warehousing, who were rep-
resented by the Charging Party, worked alongside one
another.
As a result of a ship's hitting a bridge over the Duwa-
mish River in Seattle, other ships no longer went up that
waterway. Therefore, Mazda had to have its automobiles
unloaded from ships at another location, and then Mazda
had to pay to have its automobiles transported to Termi-
nal 115. That procedure was not practical. A decision
was made in October 1979 both by Mazda and Stein for
Respondent Employer to move the Mazda operation to
Tacoma. However, that move was not accomplished
until the following March 1980.
B. The Operations in Tacoma Before March 1980
The first facility in Tacoma operated by Auto Ware-
housing is known as the Chevy Luv facility. The work
at that facility involves the assembly of trucks. The truck
bed is bolted onto the truck frame and chassis. In addi-
tion, some accessories are added to the vehicle.
Auto Warehousing has about 60 employees at the
Chevy Luv facility, and those employees have been rep-
resented by the Charging Party under collective-bargain-
ing agreements since 1978 or 1979. However, the body
repair and paint work is not performed by the Auto
Warehousing employees at that facility. Instead, such
work on the Chevy Luvs is subcontracted to another
company's body shop.
The distance between Respondent Employer's Seattle
facilities and the Tacoma facilities is 35 miles.
The second facility of Auto Warehousing in Tacoma is
known as the Chrysler facility. Auto Warehousing ac-
quired that facility on May 15, 1979, from Port Services
Company. The Chrysler facility processes automobiles
which are produced by Mitsubishi and imported by
Chrysler.
When the Port Services Company first moved from
Portland, Oregon, to Tacoma in the early 1970's, that
company subcontracted the body and repair work to a
couple of local body shops. In 1975 the Port Services
Company began operating its own body shop at the
Chrysler facility.
The Charging Party represented the employees of the
Port Services Company at the Chrysler facility. Intro-
duced into evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 11 is a
copy of a collective-bargaining agreement between the
Port Services Company and the Charging Party.
Introduced into evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit
6 was a copy of an agreement between the Charging
Party and Auto Warehousing whereby Auto Warehous-
ing agreed to accept and to be bound by the collective-
bargaining agreement between Port Services Company
and the Charging Party. (See G.C. Exh. 5.) General
Counsel's Exhibit 6 reveals that it was signed on Septem-
ber 14 and 17, 1979. However, the date of acceptance of
the contract was May 15, 1979.
Introduced into evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit
8 was a copy of an addendum to the agreement between
the Charging Party and Auto Warehousing. It was
signed on August 20, 1979. That document added job
classifications and wage rates for the following: mainte-
nance person; bodyman journeyman; apprentice body-
man; and it included parts person in the same classifica-
tion as truck assembly and forklift driver.
Under those agreements, the Charging Party has rep-
resented the employees of Auto Warehousing who work
on the Chrysler account. That has included the employ-
ees who performed the sheet metal bodywork and the
paint work for Auto Warehousing, and those employees
who have added accessories to those automobiles and
who have been engaged in railcar loading.
In November 1979, three employees of Auto Process-
ing came to work temporarily at the Chrysler facility of
Auto Warehousing. They were transferred there to work
in the body shop where a backlog of about 600 damaged
automobiles had accrued at that location. The Auto
Processing employees worked at the Chrysler facility for
about a 1-1/2 month, and then they returned to Seattle.
They did not come back to the Chrysler facility until
March 1980.
C. The Events in March 1980 and Thereafter
In March 1980, Auto Warehousing transferred its
Mazda operations from terminal 115 in Seattle to a new
facility in Tacoma. That new facility is known as the
Mazda facility. It is adjacent to Auto Warehousing's
Chrysler facility and Auto Warehousing's Chevy Luv fa-
cility. The Mazda facility is separated from the other
two facilities by fences. Auto Warehousing leases all of
the buildings at all three facilities. The Port of Tacoma
owns the land.
At the time of the hearing, there were approximately
45 employees of Auto Warehousing who were working
at the Mazda facility. The Charging Party represents
those employees under a collective-bargaining agreement
with Auto Warehousing.
Along with the move of the Auto Warehousing Mazda
operations to the new facility in Tacoma, Auto Process-
ing's body shop work on Mazda vehicles was transferred
to the body shop building at the adjoining Chrysler fa-
cility. The reason for selecting that location for the body
and paint work on the Mazda automobiles was succinctly
856
AUTO PROCESSING COMPANY
explained by Gagner who said, "It's the only body shop
for the three facilities."
The body shop at the Chrysler facility is located in a
separate building, which is about 30 feet from the main
building at the Chrysler facility. After the transfer of
Auto Processing employees from Seattle to Tacoma, the
work in the Chrysler facility body shop was divided into
a body repair shop and a paint shop. The two shops are
physically separated by a wall. That was done to prevent
the dust from the grinding and sanding work from get-
ting into the paint work. Since the volume of work being
done at the body shop substantially increased after the
transfer of the Auto Processing employees, it was
thought that a wall separating the body repair shop and
the paint shop was essential to prevent dust damage to
the paint.
Auto Processing did not use "combination men" to
perform both jobs of sheet metal work and painting
work. Therefore, the three employees of Auto Ware-
housing, who were working in the Chrysler facility body
shop prior to the transfer of Auto Processing employees,
were given the choice of working either in the sheet
metal body repair shop or the paint shop. They selected
the body repair shop.
Since the transfer of the Auto Processing employees in
March 1980 to the Chrysler facility body shop, the
number of employees working in that shop has fluctuat-
ed between 12 and 16 in number. Only three of those
employees, who are employees of Auto Warehousing,
have been represented by the Charging Party. As noted
above, they work in the sheet metal body repair shop.
All of the employees of Auto Processing, as many as 13
in number, have continued to be represented by one of
the two Respondent Unions. It was stipulated at the
hearing that, at all times material herein from March
1980 forward, Respondent Unions have had in their
membership a majority of the employees who are em-
ployed by Respondent Employer at its body shop at the
Chrysler facility.
Ali Guruscu is the shop foreman over all of the em-
ployees in the Chrysler facility body shop. He is em-
ployed by Auto Processing. Larry Johnson, who is em-
ployed by Auto Warehousing, is the leadperson over the
sheet metal body repair shop. Ray Carbaugh, who is em-
ployed by Auto Processing, is the leadperson over the
paint shop. Guruscu does not report to the general man-
ager of the Chrysler facility. Instead, Guruscu reports di-
rectly to Vice President Gagner.
Both the Auto Processing and the Auto Warehousing
employees in the Chrysler facility body shop punch the
same timeclock, and they work side by side. Between 60
to 70 percent of their working time has been spent on
the Mazda automobiles. Chrysler automobiles have taken
about 30 percent of their working time, and Chevy Luvs
have taken as little as 2 percent of their working time.
The type of vehicle coming into the body shop depends
on the type of car arriving on the ships. Gagner ex-
plained, "It's not unusual to have all the Mazda damaged
[automobiles] processed and our next ship in will be
Chrysler which then loads up the shop pretty much with
Chrysler products."
It was stipulated that, at all times material herein, Re-
spondent Employer was subject to conflicting recogni-
tional demands by the Charging Party on the one hand,
and by Respondent Unions on the other hand. Since
April 1980, the Charging Party has sought to have the
Auto Processing employees who work in the Chrysler
facility body shop, to be included with the employees of
Auto Warehousing who work at the Chrysler facility.
(See, for example, G.C. Exh. 10, which is a letter dated
April 21, 1980, from Newell to Respondent Employer,
and which sets forth the Charging Party's statement of
position regarding the body shop employees.) Respond-
ent Employer has declined the demands of the Charging
Party, because of the collective-bargaining agreements
between Auto Processing and the two Respondent
Unions.
Introduced into evidence as Respondent Unions' Ex-
hibit I was a copy of a representation petition filed by
Respondent Unions on June 25, 1980, in Case 19-RC-
9854. Included with that exhibit is a copy of a letter
dated July 3, 1980, from an attorney in Region 19 of the
Board who advised the parties that the representation
proceeding was "blocked" by the pending unfair labor
practice charge in this case.
Introduced into evidence as Respondent Unions' Ex-
hibit 2 is a copy of a petition for review of the action of
the Regional Director for Region 19 of the Board, who
dismissed the representation petition on July 29, 1980.
(See Resp. Unions' Exh. A attached to the request for
review which Respondent Unions filed with the Board in
Washington, D.C.)
Introduced into evidence as Respondent Unions' Ex-
hibit 3 was a copy of a "Ruling on Administrative
Action," which was issued on September 5, 1980, by the
Board in Washington, D.C. The Board held:
Having duly considered Joint Petitioners' request
for review of the Regional Director's dismissal of
the instant petition, the Board concluded that it
raises no issues warranting reversal. The issues
raised in the request will be litigated in the consoli-
dated Cases 19-CA-12495, 19-CB-3801 and 19-
CB-3802.
Accordingly, dismissal of the petition is hereby af-
firmed. However, it is subject to reinstatement, if
appropriate, upon disposition of aforesaid unfair
labor practice cases.
D. Conclusions
In their post-hearing briefs, the counsel for the Gener-
al Counsel and the attorney for Respondent Unions have
argued persuasively from their respective viewpoints in
this case. Numerous cases have been cited by them.
While there are some factual differences in the cases, it is
helpful to look for guidance to the rationale and criteria
discussed in those decisions. No one case has been found
which is dispositive of the issues in this proceeding.
In Westwood Import Company, Inc., 251 NLRB 1213,
1220 (1980), Administrative Law Judge Jerrold H. Sha-
piro discussed certain principles applicable to a consider-
ation of an accretion issue:
857
DIECISIONS OF NATIONAL. LABOR REI.ATI()NS I()ARI)
"An accretion is, by definition merely the addi-
tion of new employees to an already existing
group." NL.R.B. v. Food Employers Council Inc..
(and Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 399 F.2d 501,
502 (9th Cir.). Employees so added to an existing
bargaining unit are regarded as a part of that unit.
See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 440
F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1971). In deciding whether a new
group of employees is an accretion to an existing
bargaining unit, the Board not only considers such
factors as functional integration, level of manage-
ment control, similarity of working conditions, bar-
gaining history, employee interchange, job skills,
and physical separateness but also gives special
weight to the interests of the unrepresented employ-
ees in exercising their own right to self-organiza-
tion. See Food Employers Council, Inc., supra at 501,
504. Hence, even though an overall bargaining unit
may be appropriate if the issue is raised in the con-
text of a petition for a representation election, the
Board will not, "under the guise of accretion,
compel a group of employees, who may constitute a
separate appropriate unit, to be included in an over-
all unit without allowing those employees the op-
portunity of expressing their preference in a secret-
ballot election or by some other evidence that they
wish to authorize the union to represent them."
Melbet Jewelry Co., Inc., (and I.D.S.-Orchard Park,
Inc., 180 NLRB 107, 110 (1969). And, "when the
relevant considerations are not free from doubt,"
the Board and courts are in agreement that "it
would seem more satisfactory to resolve such close
questions through the election process rather than
seeking an addition of the new employees by a find-
ing of accretion" because "as a general rule, the ac-
cretion doctrine should be applied restrictively since
it deprives the new employees of the opportunity to
express their desires regarding membership in the
existing unit." Westinghouse Electric Corp. v.
N.L.R.B., 440 F.2d 7, 11 and cases cited therein.
Particularly in view of the collective-bargaining histo-
ry of separate representation of the Auto Warehousing
employees and the Auto Processing body shop employ-
ees by different labor organizations, the Board's holding
in Massachusetts Electric Company, 248 NLRB 155
(1980), is especially applicable to the issues in this pro-
ceeding. The Board held in that case at 157:
Under normal accretion principles, when employ-
ees are transferred from an employer's facility
where operations have ceased and are joined with
similarly situated employees covered by a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement at another of the employ-
er's facilities, they will be considered an accretion
to that contract unit if the functions and classifica-
tions of the transferred employees remain essentially
unchanged. Here, although the employees that have
been transferred to MaIden are performing functions
and duties similar to those performed prior to the
merger, they had been represented previously by
labor organizations different from those represent-
ing employees at Malden. Furthermore, these em-
ployees continue to be the subject of competing
representational claims at the merged location. We
are therefore confronted with the merger and com-
mingling of employees represented historically by
different labor organizations, and covered under dif-
ferent collective-bargaining agreements.' In these
circumstances, statutory policies will not be effectu-
ated if, through the application of ordinary princi-
ples of accretion, a bargaining agent is imposed on
either unit of the newly integrated operation found
appropriate." We therefore find that a question con-
cerning representation is presented by the petitions. '
Accordingly, the current contracts between the
Employer and the Unions are not a bar to the hold-
ing of elections in the units described below.
See National Carloading Corp. and Pacific d& .Ilounti Shippcer.
Inc.. 167 NtLRH 8)01, 802 (1lh7).: oot Ga Comlpany,. 221 NLRI
628. 629 (1975) (hereinafter rerton a%; iu ne mral Electric Comnpa-
ny. 170 NLRB 1272, 1274 (19h68)
'See National Carloading. upra at 802. In so holding. we reject
the Steelworkers contention that uder the General ltrusiont prin-
ciples. the incoming clerical employees should be considered an ac-
cretion mt) the existing bargaining unit at Maiden To hold that 33
employees may choose the bargalring representative of 37 employ-
ees is contrary to the majoritarian principles of the Act See Panda
Terminals, Inc., ec., 161 NLRB 1215. 1223 (1966); General Electric
Company, 185 NLRB 13 14 (1970). In this connection, wte find
that the decision in Bosron Gas 11, cited in the Steelworkers brief.
is distinguishable. There, unlike here, the Steelworkers was suffi-
ciently predominant (184 present to 80 incoming employees) to
remove any question concerning representation.
9Cf. Westinghouse Electric Corporation. 144 NLRB 455 (1963);
National Carloading. vtpra: Boston Gas I. upra; General Electric
Company supra.
After reviewing the Board's decision in the Massachu-
setts Electric case, I conclude that one factor which
weighs against finding that an accretion has occurred in
this case is the long history of separate collective-bar-
gaining representation of the body shop employees by
different labor organizations and under different collec-
tive-bargaining agreements. As the Board pointed out,
statutory policies would not be effectuated by imposing a
bargaining agent on the employees in the newly integrat-
ed operation. Without repeating here the findings of fact
previously made, it will be recalled that the Auto Proc-
essing body shop employees had a long and substantial
collective-bargaining history of representation by one of
the two Respondent Unions. On the other hand, the
body shop employees of Auto Warehousing had been
represented for a substantial period of time by a different
labor organization as part of a unit of all employees at
the Chrysler facility.
Based especially on the nature of the work performed
in the body shop, as distinguished from the different type
of work performed by other employees at the Chrysler
facility, and based on their physical separation from
those employees in a separate building, I conclude that a
unit of body shop employees at the Chrysler facility may
constitute an appropriate unit separate and apart from
the other employees at the Chrysler facility. In this con-
nection, it should also be remembered that the body shop
employees at the Chrysler facility perform their work on
858
AUTO PROCESSING COMPANY
automobiles from the other two adjoining facilities of
Respondent Employer, as well as those automobiles from
the Chrysler facility. Thus, the Chrysler facility body
shop employees do not merely work on the Chrysler
automobiles. The volume of the body repair and paint
work performed on Mazda automobiles from the Mazda
facility far exceeds the volume of work performed on
Chrysler automobiles and Chevy Luv trucks.
Since I conclude that the body shop employees at the
Chrysler facility may constitute a separate unit, apart
from the other Chrysler facility employees, I conclude
that this is another factor which weighs against finding
an accretion of the Auto Processing body shop employ-
ees into an overall unit of Chrysler facility employees.
As the Board held in Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. and South
Prairie Construction Co., 231 NLRB 76, 77 (1977), "[O]ur
primary concern is the degree of common interests of the
employees involved." See also Mego Corp. and Samet
and Wells, Inc., 254 NLRB 300 (1981).
Still another factor which I conclude weighs against
the finding that an accretion has taken place in this case
is the fact that a larger number of employees represented
by Respondent Unions would have their collective-bar-
gaining representative changed by the smaller number of
body shop employees represented by the Charging
Party. Without repeating here the findings of fact set
forth in section III,C, herein, it will be recalled that since
March 1980 there have been three body shop employees
of Auto Warehousing, who are represented by the
Charging Party, and there have been as many as 13 body
shop employees of Auto Processing, who have been rep-
resented by one of the two Respondent Unions. It was
stipulated that, at all times material herein from March
1980 forward, Respondent Unions have had in their
membership a majority of the employees who work in
the body shop at the Chrysler facility. In Servair, Inc.
and Servair Maintenance, Inc., 252 NLRB 670, 675
(1980), the Administrative Law Judge in that case held
that, "It is clearly unlawful to 'accrete' a large group to
a small unit." His citation was to the Board's decision in
The Wackenhut Corporation, 226 NLRB 1085 (1976).
After considering all of the foregoing and the argu-
ments advanced by the respective parties, I conclude
that the evidence does not warrant a finding that the
body shop employees of Auto Processing, who are rep-
resented by one of the two Respondent Unions. consti-
tute an accretion to the overall unit of Chrysler acilit
employees, who are represented by the Charging Party.
Accordingly, I further conclude that a preponderance of
the evidence does not establish the allegations of unfair
labor practices set forth in the General Counsel's consoli-
dated complaint. Therefore, I will recommend to the
Board that the General Counsel's consolidated complaint
in this proceeding be dismissed.
Respondent Unions seek to have a representation elec-
tion held among the employees involved in this case. In
my view, the question of whether the representation pe-
tition should be reinstated, and whether the representa-
tion proceedings should be resumed. is a matter for the
Board in Washington, D.C., to determine in accordance
with the Board's "Ruling on Administrative Action."
(See Resp. Unions' Exh. 3, which is quoted in sec. III,C,
herein.)
CONCI.USIONS OI LAW
I. Respondent Employer is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. The Charging Party and Respondent Unions are
labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. Respondent Employer and Respondent Unions have
not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the
General Counsel's consolidated complaint for the reasons
which have been set forth above.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding,
and pursuant to the provisions of Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue this recommended Order.
ORDER'
It is hereby ordered that the consolidated complaint in
this proceeding be dismissed in its entirety.
' In the event that no exceptions are filed, as provided by Sec. 102.46
of the Board's Rules and Regulations. the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations. be adopted by the Board, and shall become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
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