AUDI AG

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 3, 2021

2019006997 (P.T.A.B. May. 3, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/316,665 12/06/2016 Christoph DALKE 4557.0160001 2691
26111 7590 05/03/2021
STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
1100 NEW YORK AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
EXAMINER
MITCHELL, JASON D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2199
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/03/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
e-office@sternekessler.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CHRISTOPH DALKE, CHRISTIAN GRUBER,
MICHAEL SCHMAILZL, and MATTHIJS PAFFEN

Appeal 2019-006997
Application 15/316,665
Technology Center 2100
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, LARRY J. HUME, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 14–22, all of the pending claims.
Claims 1–13 have been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a).
Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Audi AG. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to “a motor vehicle having at least one control
unit, in which one or more electrical components are switched off during the
parking phase of the motor vehicle to reduce energy consumption.”
Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 14, reproduced below, is illustrative:
14. A method for operating a control unit of a motor vehicle
during a parking phase in which an ignition of the motor vehicle
is switched off to disable devices of the motor vehicle, the
method comprising:
receiving, by the control unit, an ignition-off signal for
initiating the parking phase in the motor vehicle;
switching off at least one electronic component of the
control unit after receiving the ignition-off signal;
operating, in the control unit during the parking phase, a
processor core and a memory storage unit, in which is stored
operating software provided for the operation of the control unit
when the ignition is on, to carry out an update of the operating
software via the processor core based on update data;
switching off, via an integrated circuit of a System-on-a-
Chip, peripherals of the processor core and a memory controller
of the memory storage unit not needed for the update as a
function of the ignition-off signal; and
activating a power controller of the control unit to stop the
update, wherein the power controller is configured to control the
energy usage of the control unit and switch off the processor core
and the memory storage unit,
wherein the control unit has device electronics which
comprise a circuit board on which are arranged electronic
components necessary for the operation of the control unit,
wherein the device electronics are divided into a first
power domain and a second power domain,
wherein each of the first and second power domains is
linked by a respective electrical supply line via the power
controller to a supply connection of the control unit, and
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wherein the processor core and the memory storage unit
are assigned to the first power domain and the at least one
electronic component is assigned to the second power domain,
the method further comprising:
electrically isolating the second power domain from
the supply connection via the power controller in response
to receiving the ignition-off signal; and
continuing to supply the first power domain with
voltage after electrically isolating the second power
domain from the supply connection.
Appeal Br. 18–19 (Claims Appendix).
REFERENCES2
The Examiner relies on the following references as evidence:
Name Reference Date
Moran US 2009/0300595 A1 Dec. 3, 2009
Lee US 2011/0276812 A1 Nov. 10, 2011
Hoffman US 2015/0007155 A1 Jan. 1, 2015
Bulusu US 2016/0231804 A1 Aug. 11, 2016
REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 14–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
over the combined teachings of Moran, Bulusu, and Lee. Final Act. 4.
The Examiner also rejects claim 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
over the combined teachings of Moran, Bulusu, Lee, and Hoffman. Final
Act. 10.

2 All citations herein to the references are to the first named inventor only.
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ISSUES
First Issue: Has the Examiner erred in finding a motivation to
combine the cited references?
Second Issue: If properly combined, has the Examiner erred in
finding the combined references teach or suggest the disputed limitations of
“electrically isolating the second power domain from the supply
connection,” “continuing to supply the first power domain with voltage,”
“the process core and the memory storage unit,” and “the at least one
electronic component,” as recited in claim 14?
ANALYSIS
First Issue
The Examiner rejects independent claim 14 as obvious over the
combination of the teachings and suggestions of Moran, Bulusu, and Lee.
Final Act. 4. In particular, the Examiner finds Bulusu’s powering down of
all attached peripheral devices teaches or at least suggests the disputed
limitations “switching off at least one electronic component of the control
unit after receiving the ignition-off signal” and “switching off, via an
integrated circuit of a System-on-a-Chip, peripherals of the processor core
and a memory controller of the memory storage unit not needed for the
update as a function of the ignition-off signal.” Final Act. 5.
In combining Bulusu with Moran, the Examiner finds an artisan
would have known to:
switch off components and peripherals not needed for the update
(Bulusu par. [0045] “sets the power level for platform hardware
components”). Those of ordinary skill in the art would have been
motivated to do so to “allow for reduced power use during
firmware updates, which is important for battery-powered
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devices” (Bulusu, also see par. [0015] “a vehicle telematics
device”).
Final Act. 6.
The Examiner further explains:
Bulusu teaches switching off peripherals while performing a
firmware update. More specifically, Bulusu teaches receiving an
indication that an update is going to be performed (par. [0042]
“block 502 ... identifies firmware updates”), and in response to
this indication Bulusu teaches switching off peripherals not
needed to perform the update (par. [0022] “power down all
attached peripheral devices 140”, par. [0045] “sets the power
level for platform hardware components”). This results in
battery power savings (par. [0014] “reduced power use during
firmware updates”).
Ans. 4.
The Examiner also provides a detailed rationale for why it would have
been obvious to combine Moran and Bulusu:
Moran discloses indicating and performing an update in response
to an ignition off signal as claimed (par. [0057] ""secured" when
there's no signal from the vehicle ignition", par. [0058] "updated
responsive to the determination that the vehicle is secured").
Those of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that
implementing Bulusu's power management (par. [0022] "power
down all attached peripheral devices 140") in response to
Moran's indication of an update (par. [0057] "no signal from the
vehicle ignition") would have resulted in reduced power usage
and thus been beneficial (Bulusu par. [0014] "important for
battery powered devices"). In other words those of ordinary skill
in the art would have understood that Bulusu's power
management is not inseparably tied to a boot environment, but
instead provides power savings in any situation where an update
is applied to a controller being updated.
Ans. 4.
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Appellant argues “[a] POSITA familiar with Moran's ‘secure’
environment would not look to the use of a ‘boot cycle’ or a ‘powers up’
environment of Bulusu for any relevant teachings.” Appeal Br. 7.
Specifically, Appellant argues the Examiner’s “rationale is not logical”
because “a boot-up environment” and “securing a heavy-duty vehicle” are
“diametrically opposite events.” Appeal Br. 8. According to Appellant,
“[o]ther than through impermissible hindsight, the Examiner does not offer
any credible rationale as to why a POSITA would mentally make the
connection between Moran's securing a motor vehicle after receiving the
ignition-off signal, and Bulusu’s mobile computing device at power up.”
Appeal Br. 8, 10.
We are not persuaded the Examiner's reasoning in support of the
combination is insufficient. Appellant asserts that it would be illogical to
combine teachings relating to a boot-up environment and those relating to
securing a heavy vehicle. However, as the Examiner correctly explains,
“both Moran and Bulusu are concerned with providing updated software to a
controller” (Ans. 5) and that “rather than being directed to ‘diametrically
opposite events’ they are both directed to performing firmware updates and
more specifically performing such updates on a controller powered by a
battery.” Ans. 6 (citing Bulusu ¶ 14 (“reduced power use . . . is important
for battery-powered devices”; Moran ¶ 31 (“extend battery life”).
Although Appellant argues that the combination would have been
possible only by resorting to impermissible hindsight, Appellant has not
identified knowledge gleaned only from the present application that was not
within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made.
See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392 (CCPA 1971). Nor has Appellant
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provided any objective evidence of secondary considerations (e.g.,
unexpected results), which our reviewing court guides “operates as a
beneficial check on hindsight.” Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese &
Powder Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Further, we find the Examiner's proposed combination of the cited
teachings of Moran and Bulusu, in which both are concerned with providing
updated software to a controller, is no more than a simple arrangement of
old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to
perform, yielding no more than what one would expect from such an
arrangement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. Therefore, we find the ordinarily
skilled artisan, being “a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,”
would have been able to fit the teachings of the cited references together like
pieces of a puzzle to predictably result in a system that switches off
components to reduce power usage while updating the software of a parked
vehicle. Because Appellant has not demonstrated that the Examiner's
proffered combination would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult
for one of ordinary skill in the art,” we agree with the Examiner that the
proposed modification would have been within the purview of the ordinarily
skilled artisan. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d
1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
Second Issue
Appellant argues the cited references do not teach the limitations
“electrically isolating the second power domain from the supply connection”
and “continuing to supply the first power domain with voltage.” Appeal Br.
10. Appellant contends Lee’s isolation circuit IC1does not isolate internal
block IB from the power supply but rather the neighboring power domain.
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App. Br. 11. Appellant thus argues “Lee does not teach ‘electrically
isolating the second power domain from the supply connection via the power
controller in response to receiving the ignition-off signal.”’ App. Br. 11.
Lee does not teach “electrically isolating the second power domain from the
supply connection” because Lee’s IC1 isolates the communication between
two neighboring power domains and Lee’s IC1 is activated only when the
power of the power domain is interrupted – rather than disconnecting the
power of the power domain. Appeal Br. 11. Appellant notes Lee’s IC1 is
clearly not on the power line from the power supply circuit 1013 to the
power domain 101. Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the
Examiner’s findings because Lee’s interrupting power to a power domain
block teaches “isolating” a power domain from a power supply. Ans. 9
(citing Lee ¶¶ 52, 80). And Lee supplies power to a neighboring power
domain only when the power to the first domain is disconnected using other
circuits. Ans. 9–10 (citing Lee, Fig. 12, ¶¶ 159–162).
Appellant additionally argues that it is known to a person of skill in
the art that electrical “leakage current” can be orders of magnitude lower
than the current in a power line, and that the Examiner fails to explain why it
is obvious that Lee’s IC1 that is used for “leakage current” can also be used
to control an active power supply line without damaging the circuit due to
over-heating. Id.
We are not persuaded by this argument because Lee’s active power
supply line with a power supply circuit 1013 and a power management unit
PMU 1017, together with Lee’s IC1 performing the step of isolating the
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domain from the power supply, ensure no power leakage occurs. See Lee,
Fig. 12, ¶¶ 159, 167–174, Ans. 10.
Appellant further argues Lee’s IC1 cannot continue to supply power
to the neighboring power domain after IC1 prevents the current between the
two power domains. Appeal Br. 12.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because Lee’s PMU
(power management unit) 1017 controls the direct power supply to each
domain – Lee does not teach supplying power to the domains with IC1.
Lee’s isolating a power domain allows the neighboring power domain to
continue to receive power from the power supply while the “isolated”
domain does not receive power. Ans. 10.
Appellant also argues Bulusu’s cited teachings do not suggest the
need for power domains arguing power domains provide independent power
supplies to separate power domains. Appeal Br. 13.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because Bulusu’s
supplying power to the processor 120 and firmware storage and separately
powering down peripheral devices teaches or at least suggests powering
down peripherals during an update. See Bulusu ¶¶ 45, 46.
Appellant also argues Lee’s IC1 isolates the communication between
two neighboring power domains, while Bulusu teaches the need for power
supply switches to separately power the respective components without
suggesting the need for isolation. Appeal Br. 14.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument because, as Appellant
contends, Lee teaches isolation. The Examiner explains his motivation to
combine: Including Lee’s means in Bulusu’s system would have provided
the ability to power up/down components with the additional benefit of
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guarding against power leakage, but would not produce any unexpected
results. Ans. 14. We agree with the Examiner that the recited combination
is no more than a simple arrangement of old elements with each performing
the same function it had been known to perform, yielding no more than what
one would expect from such an arrangement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416.
Lastly, Appellant argues Moran’s detecting of a lack of signal cannot
be equated to the claim’s recited “ignition-off signal.” Appeal Br. 14–15.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument because Moran’s
detecting of a lack of signal at least suggests an ignition-off signal because
detecting a lack of a signal would have indicated that the ignition was turned
off. Ans. 14–15.
Therefore, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting
independent claim 14. Appellant presents no substantive arguments for the
patentability of any other claims. Appeal Br. 16. Accordingly, we sustain
the Examiner's rejection of these remaining claims 15–21 for the reasons
stated with respect to the independent claim 14 from which they depend and
we also sustain the separately rejected dependent claim 22, not separately
argued. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of the pending claims.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
14–21 103 Moran, Bulusu,
Lee
14–21
22 103 Moran, Bulusu,
Lee, Hoffman
22
Overall
Outcome
14–22
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED