Atlas Pet Company LLC

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 19, 2020

87818498 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 19, 2020)

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: February 19, 2020

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re Atlas Pet Company LLC
_____

Serial No. 87818498
_____

Wesley Schwie of Schwie Law LLC,
for Atlas Pet Company LLC.
Brent M. Radcliff, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 123,
Susan Hayash, Managing Attorney.
_____

Before Taylor, Goodman, and Larkin,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Larkin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Atlas Pet Company LLC (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register
of the standard character mark LIFETIME LEASH (LEASH disclaimed) for “animal
and pet products and accessories, namely, collars, leashes, harnesses,” in
International Class 18.1

1 Application Serial No. 87818498 was filed on March 2, 2018 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on Applicant’s claim of first use and first use in
commerce at least as early as February 19, 2018.
Serial No. 87818498
- 2 -

The Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s mark on two grounds:
(1) under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that
Applicant’s mark so resembles the registered standard character mark LIFE LEASH
(LEASH disclaimed) for “pet products, namely, pet restraining devices consisting of
leashes, collars, harnesses, restraining straps, and leashes with locking devices,” in
International Class 18,2 as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods
identified in the application, to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive; and
(2) under Sections 1, 2, and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052, and
1127, on the ground that Applicant’s original specimen of use was unacceptable.
Applicant appealed when the Examining Attorney made the refusals final.
Applicant and the Examining Attorney filed briefs,3 and following a subsequent
remand of the application to the Examining Attorney to consider Applicant’s
declaration in support of its substitute specimen, 8 TTABVUE, the Examining
Attorney withdrew the specimen refusal, 9 TTABVUE 1, leaving only the refusal
under Section 2(d) for decision. We affirm that refusal to register.

2 Registration No. 5490929 issued on June 12, 2018.
3 Citations in this opinion to the briefs refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing
system. Turdin v. Tribolite, Ltd., 109 USPQ2d 1473, 1476 n.6 (TTAB 2014). Specifically, the
number preceding TTABVUE corresponds to the docket entry number, and any numbers
following TTABVUE refer to the page number(s) of the docket entry where the cited materials
appear.
Serial No. 87818498
- 3 -

I. Record on Appeal4
The record on appeal consists of Applicant’s original and substitute specimens,5
TSDR pages regarding the cited registration,6 and dictionary definitions of the words
“leash,”7 “life,”8 and “lifetime.”9
II. Analysis of Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or deception. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d). Our determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is based on
an analysis of all probative facts in the record that are relevant to the likelihood of
confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177
USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973). We consider each DuPont factor for which there is
evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 129 USPQ2d
1160, 1162-63 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

4 Citations in this opinion to the application record are to pages in the Trademark Status &
Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) database of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”).
5 As noted above, the Examining Attorney accepted Applicant’s webpage substitute specimen
on remand. He objected in his brief to consideration of the webpage “as evidence to support
[Applicant’s] argument against the [Section 2(d)] refusal to register” on the ground that the
evidence was untimely. 6 TTABVUE 4. Because the Examining Attorney accepted the
webpage as a specimen of Applicant’s use of the mark, we will consider it for whatever
probative value it may have on the Section 2(d) refusal.
6 June 18, 2018 Office Action at TSDR 2-3.
7 Id. at TSDR 4.
8 September 11, 2018 Final Office Action at TSDR 2.
9 Id. at TSDR 3.
Serial No. 87818498
- 4 -

Two key factors in every Section 2(d) case are the first two DuPont factors
regarding the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks, and the similarity or
dissimilarity of the goods or services, because the “fundamental inquiry mandated by
§ 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of
the goods and differences in the marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper
Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976). Applicant discusses these two key
factors, 4 TTABVUE 7-10, as well as the fourth factor, the “conditions under which
and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated
purchasing,” DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567, 4 TTABVUE 9-10, and the sixth factor, the
“number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.” DuPont, 177 USPQ at
567, 4 TTABVUE 11-12.
A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Goods and Channels of Trade
We begin with the second DuPont factor, which “considers ‘[t]he similarity or
dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or
registration,’” and the related third DuPont factor, which considers “the similarity or
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.” In re Detroit Athletic
Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting DuPont, 177
USPQ at 567). Our analysis under these factors is based on the identifications of
goods in the application and the cited registration. Id.; Stone Lion Capital Partners,
LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(holding that it was “proper . . . for the Board to focus on the application and
registration rather than real-world conditions because ‘the question of registrability
Serial No. 87818498
- 5 -

of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set
forth in the application’” (quoting Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput. Servs. Inc., 918
F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
Applicant acknowledges that the “final office action applied the precedent set by
the Federal Circuit, namely Stone Lion,” 4 TTABVUE 8, but “[a]s an alternative to
the cited precedent of Stone Lion, Applicant requests a consideration by the Appeals
Board of In re ST. HELENA HOSPITAL. See In re ST. HELENA HOSPITAL, 774
F.3d 747[, 113 USPQ2d 1082] (Fed. Cir. 2014).” Id. at 9. Applicant makes the
following argument in support of its request:
[I]t is acceptable to apply the precedent of ST. HELENA
because the registrant’s goods, “LIFE LEASH” and
company, “LIFE LEASH” are unmistakably linked by their
name. Applicant’s proposed LIFETIME LEASH mark and
source of goods, Atlas Pet Company, are sufficiently
distinct to eliminate confusion with Life Leash. The Atlas
Pet Company website provided as evidence includes links
to multiple reviews of reliable dog gear. The Life Leash is
not included in any comparisons or recommendations.
Instead, Atlas Pet Company is mentioned repeatedly and
preferentially by the reviewer/consumer’s dissemination to
potential consumers.
Id.
St. Helena Hosp. did not create a different or separate test for the similarity or
dissimilarity of goods based on the actual use of the involved marks, as Applicant
seems to suggest. To the contrary, the Federal Circuit reiterated in that case that
“the question of registrability on an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of
the identification of goods set forth in the application regardless of what the record
may reveal as to the particular nature of an applicant’s goods.” St. Helena Hosp., 113
Serial No. 87818498
- 6 -

USPQ2d at 1085 (quoting Octocom Sys., 16 USPQ2d at 1787). The court simply found
that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s finding of relatedness between
services identified in the involved application as “[h]ealth care services, namely,
evaluating weight and lifestyle health and implementing weight and lifestyle health
improvement plans in a hospital-based residential program,” and goods identified in
the cited registration as “printed manuals, posters, stickers, activity cards and
educational worksheets dealing with physical activity and physical fitness.” Id. at
1087. The court noted that in “situations like the present, in which the relatedness of
the goods and services is obscure or less evident, the PTO will need to show
‘something more’ than the mere fact that the goods and services are ‘used together.’”
Id. (quoting Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel, Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
Here, unlike in St. Helena Hosp., we are not dealing with the relatedness of goods
to services, and the relatedness of the goods here is not “obscure or less evident,” but
is obvious on the face of the respective identifications. The goods identified in the
application are “animal and pet products and accessories, namely, collars, leashes,
harnesses” (emphasis added), while the goods identified in the cited registration are
“pet products, namely, pet restraining devices consisting of leashes, collars,
harnesses, restraining straps, and leashes with locking devices” (emphasis added).
To the extent that the goods described as “collars,” “leashes,” and “harnesses” in the
respective identifications are not literally identical, the broad term “pet restraining
devices consisting of collars, leashes, harnesses” in the cited registration encompasses
Serial No. 87818498
- 7 -

the “collars, leashes, harnesses” identified in the application, and those goods are
legally identical.10 See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1413
(TTAB 2018); In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1628-29 (TTAB 2018); In re
Jump Designs LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006). The second DuPont factor
strongly supports a finding of a likelihood of confusion. Solid State Designs, 125
USPQ2d at 1414.
“Because we must deem the goods to be legally identical in part, we are obligated
to assume that their channels of trade are legally identical as well, even in the
absence of record evidence.” Id. (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1359, 101 USPQ2d
1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). The third DuPont factor also strongly supports a finding
of a likelihood of confusion.
B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, we consider “the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.” Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en
1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting DuPont, 177
USPQ at 567). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the

10 We need not consider the similarity of the goods identified in the application to each of the
goods identified in the cited registration because registration may be refused as to Applicant’s
entire Class 18 application if likelihood of confusion is found as to any of the goods in the
cited registration. See, e.g., Double Coin Holdings Ltd. v. Tru Dev., 2019 USPQ2d 377409, *6
(TTAB 2019) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ
986, 988 (CCPA (1981)).
Serial No. 87818498
- 8 -

marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746
(TTAB 2018) (quoting In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)).
The proper test regarding similarity “is not a side-by-side comparison of the
marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their
commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely
to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d,
127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph
Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). “The proper perspective on which the
analysis must focus is on the recollection of the average customer, who retains a
general rather than specific impression of marks.” i.am.symbolic, 127 USPQ2d at
1630 (citations omitted).
Because the goods here are in part legally identical, “the degree of similarity
necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.” Viterra, 101 USPQ2d
at 1908 (quoting Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874,
23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
Applicant “agrees and concedes that Applicant’s mark ‘LIFETIME LEASH’ and
Registrant’s mark ‘LIFE LEASH’ are similar in appearance and sound inasmuch as
they share the root word highlighted in the submitted evidence.” 4 TTABVUE 7. We
agree with Applicant that the marks are similar in sound and appearance because
both begin with the root word “LIFE” and end with the identical word LEASH.
Serial No. 87818498
- 9 -

As noted above, the admitted similarity of the marks in these two means of
comparison may be sufficient to make them confusingly similar. Inn at St. John’s,
126 USPQ2d at 1746. Applicant argues, however, “that the two marks are distinct in
meaning when attached to their respective goods and create sufficiently different
commercial impressions so that there is no likelihood of confusion” notwithstanding
the admitted similarity of the marks in sound and appearance. 4 TTABVUE 7.
Applicant argues that the different meanings of the marks derive from the different
meanings of the words LIFE and LIFETIME. Id. at 8.
The Examining Attorney argues that “[b]oth marks at issue are comprised of an
adjective preceding a noun: LIFE LEASH and LIFETIME LEASH,” 6 TTABVUE 8,
and that in their adjective forms “LIFE is defined as ‘continuing for a lifetime;
lifelong’ and LIFETIME means ‘continuing for a lifetime; lifelong.’” Id.11 He argues
that “an identical dictionary definition is strong evidence of similarity” and that
“[h]ere, the identical definitions also convey that the marks do in fact evoke the same
commercial impression given the similarities in meaning and the syntactic structure
of the marks.” Id. He concludes that “[b]eing that the wording LIFE and LIFETIME
have nearly identical definitions, the marks are likely to evoke the same, or at least
a confusingly similar, commercial impression.” Id. at 9.
Applicant responds that the “standard viewpoint for determining the likelihood of
confusion is NOT from the reader of definitions, but instead the consumer of the goods
in question,” 4 TTABVUE 8, and that the Examining Attorney has cherry-picked the

11 September 11, 2018 Office Action at TSDR 2-3 (THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY).
Serial No. 87818498
- 10 -

similar definitions from a lengthy menu of definitions. Id. Applicant argues that its
“website states the company’s warranty and its chosen definition of lifetime:
‘Premium Products for Active Dogs – Guaranteed for life, even if your pet destroys
it.” Id. Applicant claims that “[h]ere, lifetime as a period is from the vantage point of
the consumer” and that the “definitions relied upon by the Examining Attorney center
on the period of time of the leash object.” Id. According to Applicant, “Lifetime is the
existence for the consumer and NOT the leash.” Id.
We set forth Applicant’s webpage substitute specimen below:

Applicant’s webpage reinforces the similar meanings of “lifetime” and “life” in their
adjective forms, as it states that “the Lifetime Leash is guaranteed for life, even if
your pet destroys it.” If the subtle distinction between the “lifetime” of the leash and
the “lifetime” of the pet owner claimed by Applicant exists at all, it is very unlikely to
be drawn by the ordinary consumer of the goods, who “retains a general rather than
specific impression of marks.” i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d at 1630. Because LIFE
Serial No. 87818498
- 11 -

and LIFETIME have identical or at least highly similar meanings when used in their
adjective forms in the marks, we find that the marks are quite similar in connotation
and commercial impression.
We agree with the Examining Attorney that the marks “look alike and sound alike
and are likely to convey the same idea, stimulate the same mental reaction, or have
the same overall meaning” and that the “minimal differences in the marks do not
meaningfully distinguish them.” 6 TTABVUE 9. Especially taking into account the
reduced degree of similarity between the marks required for confusion to be likely
because the marks are used on legally identical goods, the first DuPont factor strongly
supports a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
C. Purchasing Conditions and Sophistication of Consumers
“The fourth DuPont factor considers ‘[t]he conditions under which and buyers to
whom sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.’” Stone Lion,
110 USPQ2d at 1162 (quoting DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567). Applicant “requests a
consideration for the allowance of the application based on an analysis of the
sophisticated purchaser” because “circumstances suggesting care in purchasing may
tend to minimize likelihood of confusion.” 4 TTABVUE 9. Applicant argues as follows:
Purchasers of durable pet equipment and accessories are
sophisticated consumers who must ensure that the product
purchased will be durable for uses beyond those commonly
contemplated by mainstream pet owners. Specifically, the
Atlas Pet Company website includes reviews of Applicant’s
Lifetime Leash goods in the context of mountaineering
(Backpacker magazine), precision engineered goods (Gear
Patrol), snowboarding (Outside magazine), and high
fashion applications in conjunction with European
accessories (Vogue magazine). A reading of the LIFETIME
Serial No. 87818498
- 12 -

LEASH product reviews yields the conclusion that
Applicant’s goods are not in the consumer class of pet
supplies, but are in fact the consumer class of the highest
quality equipment and fashion statements available
worldwide. Applicant’s markets are so exclusive that the
goods are not compared against other leash pet supply
offerings. These comparisons negate the likelihood of
confusion cited in the first Office Action referring to leashes
in general. Furthermore, Applicant’s website sells the
goods for approximately $50 per leash. Searches on
commonly known consumer websites such as Amazon
indicate that Applicant’s price point is 2X the next nearest
product offering. Because Applicant’s goods are not
advertised or known as comparison items to other pet
supplies in either trademark class (018 or 022 in the 1st
Office Action), sophisticated consumers would not confuse
the Registrant’s products for the Applicant’s goods. The
substantially high price point of Applicant’s goods are [sic]
sufficient to conclude that sophisticated consumers would
not likely confuse Applicant’s and Registrants goods,
regardless of any alleged similarities in marks or
nomenclature.
Id. at 10.
The alleged restrictions on the nature and prices of Applicant’s goods, and on their
narrow channels of trade and sophisticated classes of purchasers, are not reflected in
Applicant’s identification of its goods as “animal and pet products and accessories,
namely, collars, leashes, harnesses.” Applicant cannot restrict its broad identification
to the “highest quality equipment and fashion statements” sold to sophisticated
consumers at “high price points” based either on arguments of counsel or extrinsic
evidence of its actual use of the mark, which is not in the record in any event. It is
well settled that
[w]here the goods in the application at issue and/or in the
cited registration are broadly identified as to their nature
and type, such that there is an absence of any restrictions
as to the channels of trade and no limitation as to the
Serial No. 87818498
- 13 -

classes of purchasers, it is presumed that in scope the
identification of goods encompasses not only all the goods
of the nature and type described therein, but that the
identified goods are offered in all channels of trade which
would be normal therefor, and that they would be
purchased by all potential buyers thereof.
Jump Designs, 80 USPQ2d at 1374. As noted above, the “question of registrability of
an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set
forth in the application,” and “[t]his is so regardless of what the record may reveal as
to the particular nature of an applicant’s goods, the particular channels of trade or
the class of purchasers to which sales of the goods are directed.” Stone Lion, 110
USPQ2d at 1162 (quotation omitted).
Accordingly, we must assume that the identified “collars,” “leashes,” and
“harnesses” encompass “all the goods of the nature and type described therein,” Jump
Designs, 80 USPQ2d at 1374, sold at all price points to all consumers of such goods.
Even if those consumers include some sophisticated purchasers, “Board precedent
requires the decision to be based ‘on the least sophisticated potential purchasers.’”
Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1163 (quoting Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Fage Dairy Proc. Indus.
S.A., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1584, 1600 (T.T.A.B. 2011), judgment set aside on other grounds,
2014 WL 343267 (TTAB Jan. 22, 2014)). There is no evidence that the least
sophisticated purchaser of collars, leashes, and harnesses would exercise anything
more than ordinary care in purchasing, and the fourth DuPont factor is thus neutral
in our analysis of the likelihood of confusion.
Serial No. 87818498
- 14 -

D. Number and Nature of Similar Marks in Use with Similar Goods
Applicant invokes the sixth DuPont factor, 4 TTABVUE 11, which considers “[t]he
number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.” Omaha Steaks Int’l,
Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 128 USPQ2d 1686, 1693 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (quoting DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567). Ordinarily, this factor involves evidence
of third-party marks, see id. at 1693-95, but Applicant claims that “it is the owner of
registered mark ‘LIFETIME COLLAR,’”12 4 TTABVUE 11, and argues that “[a]
reversal of the Examiner’s decision will result in consumers being driven to
Applicant’s own goods within the common International Class 018.” Id.
Applicant argues that “if the evidence establishes that the consuming public is
exposed to third-party use of similar marks on similar goods, it ‘is relevant to show
that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection.’” Id.
(quoting Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1693). Applicant cites In re FabFitFun, Inc.,
127 USPQ2d 1670, 1675 (TTAB 2018), 4 TTABVUE 11, in which the Board found
that the term SMOKIN’/SMOKING HOT in the marks I’M SMOKING HOT and
SMOKIN’ HOT SHOW TIME was “somewhat weak” based on 10 third-party uses of
SMOKIN’/SMOKING HOT-formatives for the involved goods. FabFitFun, 127
USPQ2d at 1675. Apparently relying solely on its own registration, Applicant “asserts
that the use of ‘lifetime’ for pet goods is prevalent and its inclusion in registered

12 Applicant did not make this registration of record, but the Examining Attorney
acknowledged in his brief that “Applicant is the owner of the now registered mark,
LIFETIME COLLARS,” 6 TTABVUE 14, so we will consider Applicant’s ownership of this
registration for whatever probative value it may have.
Serial No. 87818498
- 15 -

marks must be considered narrowly for likelihood of confusion analyses,” and
“requests a reversal of the rejection with the application of the precedent established
by In re FabFitFun.” 4 TTABVUE 11.
FabFitFun does not aid Applicant. The Board found that the 10 third-party uses
had only limited probative value to show some weakness of the cited mark because
those uses comprised “a more modest amount of evidence than that found convincing
in” in the Federal Circuit’s seminal third-party use decisions in Jack Wolfskin
Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797
F.3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2015) and Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters.
LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671 (Fed. Cir. 2015). FabFitFun, 127 USPQ2d at
1674. Here, we have a single registration owned by Applicant itself, and no
information regarding use of the LIFETIME COLLAR mark. Even assuming that
Applicant’s registration of LIFETIME COLLAR is for the same goods as those in the
involved application, a single registration is insufficient, under the sixth (or eighth,
twelfth, or thirteenth) DuPont factors, to show that the cited mark is weak, or to show
that Applicant is otherwise entitled to a registration of a different mark. See, e.g., Inn
at St. John’s, 126 USPQ2d at 1746 (“Applicant has presented no evidence of third-
party use, and at most, four third-party registrations of varying probative value (two
for non-identical services and the other two for non-identical terms),” and “this is a
far cry from the large quantum of evidence of third-party use and registration that
was held to be significant in both” Jack Wolfskin and Juice Generation); In re
i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751-52 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The
Serial No. 87818498
- 16 -

USPTO “is required to examine all trademark applications for compliance with each
and every eligibility requirement,” In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 118
USPQ2d 1632, 1635 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and “there is no rule that a prior registration
entitles a party to another registration.” In re Country Oven, Inc., 2019 USPQ2d
443903, *18 (TTAB 2019) (finding under the thirteenth DuPont factor that applicant’s
ownership of multiple prior registrations of COUNTRY OVEN-formative marks for
various goods and services did “not weigh against a finding of likelihood of confusion”
with respect to the cited and applied-for COUNTRY OVEN marks). Applicant’s
ownership of a registration of LIFETIME COLLAR does not entitle it to a registration
of LIFETIME LEASH where the record here shows that confusion is likely with
respect to that applied-for mark. The sixth DuPont factor is neutral in our analysis
of likelihood of confusion.
E. Conclusion
The key first two DuPont factor both strongly support a finding of a likelihood of
confusion, and the other DuPont factors on which there is evidence and argument are
neutral. We find, on the basis of the record as a whole, that a consumer familiar with
pet restraining devices consisting of leashes, collars, harnesses sold under the
registered LIFE LEASH mark could easily believe mistakenly that leashes, collars,
and harnesses sold under the LIFETIME LEASH mark originate with, or are
authorized or sponsored by, the owner of the cited registration.
Decision: The refusal to register under Section 2(d) is affirmed.