Associated Transport Co. of Texas, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 8, 1968

173 N.L.R.B. 100 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

100 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Associated Transport Company of Texas, Inc. and
General Drivers , Warehousemen & Helpers Local
Union No . 968, affiliated with International
Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America. Cases
23-CA-2636, 23-CA-2690, and 23-CA-
2690-2
October 8, 1968
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND BROWN
On May 23, 1968, Trial Examiner John P von
Rohr issued his Decision in the above-entitled pro-
ceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and
was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Ex-
aminer further found that Respondent had not
engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged
in the complaint and recommended that such allega-
tions be dismissed Thereafter, Respondent filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a
brief in support thereof, and the General Counsel
filed cross-exceptions' and a brief in support thereof
Pursuant to Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board has delegated its powers in connec-
tion with this case to a three-member panel
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner,3 as modified herein.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified
herein, and hereby orders that Respondent, Associ-
ated Transport Company of Texas, Inc., Dallas,
Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order, as so modified
1. Add the following as paragraph 2(e), and
reletter the following paragraphs accordingly.
"(e) Notify the above-named employees, if pres-
ently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States, of their right to full reinstatement, upon
application, in accordance with the Selective Service
Act and the Universal Military Training and Service
Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed
Forces."
2 Add the following immediately below the signa-
ture line at the bottom of Appendix B attached to the
Trial Examiner's Decision.
Note. We will notify the above-named employ-
ees, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States, of their right to full reinstatement,
upon application, in accordance with the Selective
Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces
I The General Counsel has not excepted to the dismissal of certain
Section 8 (a)(1) and 8(a)(3) allegations, he excepts only to the Trial
Examiner 's failure to find certain independent Section 8 (a)(5) viola-
tions
2 The Trial Examiner has inadvertently misstated certain minor
facts We hereby make the following corrective changes in the Trial
Examiner ' s Decision footnote 1, the date of the original charge from
"December 11, 1966" to "March 8, 1967 "; page 101, line 1, from
"December 14, 1967 " to "December 14, 1966", pages 105 and 106,
right columns , from "December 1967" to "December 1966" , page 107,
right column , " Beaumont and Texas" to "Beaumont and Houston,
Texas", page 108 , lines 9 & 15 , right column from "Pace " to "Satcher",
page 113 , ¶ after footnote 51, from "April 24" to "April 25", page
115, line 1 , left column , from "not on strike" to "out on strike", and
page I is, footnote 61, from " March 24, 1966" to "March 24, 1967."
3 Respondent asserts it should not be charged with David Snyder's
interrogation of employees Roy Wiggins and David W Williams in
December 1966 , for the reason that Snyder was not then a supervisor
Respondent admits that Snyder was a supervisor during January-June
1967, when he was manager of its Houston terminal , and the record
shows Snyder was assistant terminal manager in December 1966
However , even accepting Respondent 's position here would not alter
our agreement with the Trial Examiner that Respondent coercively
interrogated other employees and otherwise violated the Act Nor
would it require any change in the Order recommended by him.
We also find it unnecessary to decide whether Respondent has
engaged in independent violations of Section 8(a)(5) as alleged by the
General Counsel , considering the 8 (a)(5) finding made and the Order
entered
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN P. VON ROHR, Trial Examiner Upon charges, duly
filed,' the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board, by the Regional Director for Region 23 (Houston,
Texas) issued an Order consolidating cases and an amended
complaint on December 15, 1967, against Associated Trans-
port Company of Texas, Inc., herein referred to as the
Respondent or Company, alleging that it had engaged in
certain unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (3), (4), and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein called
the Act. A further amendment to the complaint was issued on
January 10, 1968 Thereafter the respondent filed answers
denying the allegations of unlawful conduct alleged in the
complaint.
I The various charges and amended charges herein were filed on
December 11, 1966 , and March 9, April 7 to 14, May 2 and 9, and June 26,
1967
173 NLRB No. 23
ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT CO.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Trial
Examiner John P. von Rohr on January 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26,
1968, in Houston, Texas. All parties were represented by
counsel and were afforded opportunity to adduce evidence, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses and to file briefs Briefs
have been received from the General Counsel, the Respondent
and the Charging Party and they have been carefully considered.
Upon the entire record in this case and from my observa-
tion of the witnesses, I hereby make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a Texas corporation, having its principal
office and place of business in Dallas, Texas, with terminals
located in Dallas, Houston, and Beaumont, Texas, where it is
engaged in the business of transporting by truck petroleum,
petroleum products and dry bulk commodities During the 12
months preceding the hearing herein, the Respondent received
revenues in excess of $50,000 directly from customers located
outside the State of Texas for services performed outside the
State of Texas
The Respondent concedes, and I find, that it is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union No.
968, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A The Issues
The issues in this case are- (1) Whether the Respondent
engaged in conduct independently violative of Section 8(a)(l)
of the Act, (2) whether Respondent, by suspending employees
Carl E. Satcher, Roy Wiggins, David Williams, C. B. Trout and
Thomas E Courtney and by discharging Roy Wiggins and all
striking employees violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act; (3)
whether Respondent discriminated against employee C B.
Trout in violation of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act, (4) whether
the Respondent, following Board certification, refused to
bargain in good faith with the Union in violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act; and (5) whether a strike which commenced
on May 14, 1967, was caused and prolonged by Respondent's
alleged unfair labor practices.
B. Background
The Respondent, under the principal ownership of its
president, Calvin A Barker, Sr , has been in the trucking
business for approximately 22 years. Operating as an individual
for the first 16 years, Mr Barker incorporated the Company 6
years ago.
Hitherto an unorganized company, some of the employees
contacted the Union and an organizing campaign among
Respondent's employees commenced on December 1, 1966. A
101
representation petition was filed on December 14, 1967,
following which, pursuant to a consent agreement, a Board-
conducted election was held on February 6, 1967. The Union
won the election and was certified by the Board on February
14, 1967, as the collective-bargaining agent for the employees
in a unit consisting of all drivers, mechanics and general
servicemen, domiciled at the Company's Houston, Beaumont,
and Dallas, Texas, locations, excluding all other employees,
office clerical employees, inside and outside salesmen, guards,
watchmen and supervisors as defined in the Act. There are
approximately 43 employees within the said appropriate unit.
C Interference, Restraint and Coercion
1. Statements by supervisors
a. David Snyder
David Snyder held the position of terminal manager at
Respondent's Houston terminal until on or about June 1,
1967, at which time he left the Company's employ. It is
undisputed that he was a supervisor within the meaning of the
Act at all times material hereto.2 Snyder was not called as a
witness in this case, it being the assertion of Respondent's
counsel that the present whereabouts of this individual is
unknown. Although I have taken this factor into considera-
tion, I nevertheless credit the witnesses whose testimony
concerning statements made to them by Snyder is set forth
below. Not only did these witnesses impress me as telling the
truth, but it is also noteworthy that Snyder's conduct falls in
line with a pattern of similar conduct, heremafter set forth,
engaged in by other supervisors who are still in Respondent's
employ and who testified at the hearing. The incidents
involving Snyder are as follows
1. Leonard R Drevecky is an over-the-road driver who has
been employed at the Houston terminal since August 1966 On
New Year's Day, 1967, Snyder asked Drevecky if he knew
"who the boys were" that were passing out cards for the
Union. Drevecky said that he did not know, that it was none
of Snyder's business When Snyder then asked if he had signed
a card, Drevecky replied that it was up to him to find out.
2. On January 20, 1967, Snyder again asked Drevecky if he
knew who was passing out cards, to which Drevecky again
replied that he did not know. Snyder then named employees
Roy Wiggins, Marvin Ayles and David Williams. Drevecky said
that he did not know if these employees were passing out
cards Snyder stated, "Drevecky, you don't tell me everything
you know."
3. On February 8, 1967, Snyder approached Drevecky and
stated, "I am accusing you of being the union ringleader."
Drevecky said that this was a lie. When Snyder then said that
he "heard" that Drevecky was the union leader, Drevecky said
that he was not active in the Union "at this time." Snyder
thereupon stated, "Well, I have information that Mr. Williams
and Mr. Wiggins and Marvin Ayles are " Drevecky said that he
did not know this to be a fact.
4 In the middle of December 1966, Snyder took a trip in
the same truck with Roy Wiggins, an over-the-road driver.
During the trip the Union was discussed and Snyder asked
Wiggins "who was active in this union deal " Wiggins replied by
naming himself and two other employees.
2 The foregoing is admitted in Respondent 's answer.
102 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5 In the first week of December 1966, at the beginning of
the organizing campaign, Snyder asked David W. Williams, a
truckdriver employed by Respondent, "how he was coming
along getting cards signed " Williams, who testified that he in
fact passed out 15-17 union authorization cards during the
first 10 days of December, replied that he was coming along
fairly good.
b Odis Curry
Odis Curry, the terminal manager of Respondent's
Beaumont terminal, has been in the Company's employ for
15-16 years. The incidents involving Curry are as follows
1 Carl E. Satcher, a driver employed at the Beaumont
terminal, testified that in the middle of January 1967, Curry
asked if he was the person who distributed the cards and
signed up the drivers Satcher replied in the affirmative. Curry
thereupon stated, "there is one thing I can say for you, you
don't try to hide it. I thought you was the man all the time
that was signing these drivers up in Beaumont."3
2 Satcher testified that about a week after the election
Curry told him that he did not think that the Company would
ever sign a contract with the Union, that they would close
down before they would go union He also testified that on
about two other occasions he heard Curry say that the
Company would never sign a contract. On cross-examination,
apparently in reference to the occasion during the week after
the election, Satcher testified that Curry stated that he did not
think the Company could afford to sign a contract. Curry
testified that during the months of February, March, and April
he "probably" told all the employees that Barker would not
sign a contract with the Union because he did not think the
Company could afford it However, Curry did not deny
Satcher's testimony that he stated the Company would close
down before it went union.
3 William Allen, a driver, testified that after the election
Curry stated on several occasions that Calvin Barker would
never sign a contract, that he would close up the shop before
he would sign a contract. Although he did not recall the exact
dates of these conversations, Allen testified, with respect to
the context under which these statements were made, "I guess
you might call them passing remarks in conversations, just
saying that Calvin Barker would never sign a contract and he
would close the doors and we would all go fishing before he
would sign a contract." I credit the foregoing testimony of
Allen 4
4. Harvey H. Sanders, employed by the Respondent since
1964 as a wash rack man, testified that he attended a union
meeting approximately 2 or 3 weeks before the employees
went out on strike (The strike began on May 14, 1967.) The
following day Curry asked if he had attended the meeting.
When Sanders gave an evasive answer, Curry stated, "Don't let
anyone talk you into joining the Union."5
5 Sanders also had two other conversations with Curry
prior to the strike On one such occasion Curry told him that
Calvin Barker would never sign a contract, that he already had
spent $15,000 against the Union. The other occasion occurred
3 This incident is set forth according to the credited and undenied
testimony of Satcher.
4 As prevously indicated , Curry testified that at various times during a
3-month period he told the employees that Barker would not sign a
contract because "he did not think the Company could afford it " I am
while the strike was in progress, at which time Curry came up
to Sanders and stated, "Slim, I see you are still out here on
strike " When Sanders answered "yes," Curry stated, "I told
you the man would never sign a contract."
c George C Jackson
George C. Jackson is vice president and the Respon-
ent's general manager Driver Roy Wiggins testified that
Jackson was present on an occasion when some of the drivers
were discussing the then impending election According to
Wiggins, Jackson spoke up and said, "Well, I am not worried
about it It didn't carry before, it won't carry now. But if it
does, before we sign a contract we will park every truck we
have got against the fence, lock the gates and lay everybody we
have got off." Jackson conceded that he was present at a time
when Wiggins and another driver were discussing the election
According to Jackson, Wiggins stated that the Union probably
would be voted in and that the employees would be getting "a
whole bunch of money." Jackson testified that at about this
point "I made the statement that the only kind of contract
that we would sign or any other company, for that matter,
would be one that we could live with and that before I could
see our company or any other company going broke I would
recommend that we not sign a contract that would break us, in
my estimation, that I would recommend parking the trucks
and closing the place up before I could sign a contract that
would actually break the company." On cross-examination,
Wiggins testified, "I don't remember that he said `could
afford.' He just said that he would not or could not sign a
contract and before he would he would park all the trucks
against the fence, lock the gate and lay everybody off." I
credit Wiggins' testimony that Jackson did not qualify his
remarks as to what would happen if the Company "could not
afford" to sign a contract
d Calvin B. Barker, Sr.
Marvin Ayles was in Dallas from February 15 to 19 On
Saturday, February 18, he was called into the office by the
dispatcher to see about obtaining a trip for Sunday Ayles
testified that Barker, Sr., walked into the driver's room and
went up to the coke machine as he was talking to the
dispatcher According to Ayles, Barker at this point turned
around and stated to him, "You can go back and tell all of
your friends in Houston that I will close, lock the place up
before I will sign a contract with the union." Ayles proceeded
to relate further details of the conversation, these turning to
other matters which are not relevant here Barker testified that
he did not recall this conversation However, when asked on
direct examination if he ever stated to Ayles that he would
close the place down before he would sign a contract, Barker
answered, "I don't remember saying anything in those exact
words I may have said `it would be better to close the place
down than to operate under adverse circumstances' or words
to that effect " It appeared to me that Ayles had a very good
recollection of this conversation and I do not believe that he
persuaded and find that Curry did not always qualify such statements to
the latter effect.
5 This incident is set forth in accordance with the credited and
undemed testimony of Sanders.
ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT CO. 103
fabricated this testimony I credit Ayles' account of this
conversation
Hurles Pace testified that on about April 4, he made a
trip through Dallas and stopped in to talk to Barker, Sr.,
concerning the purchase of a truck 6 During the conversation
which ensued Pace asked Barker what would happen if he
bought a truck and the Union came in and went out on strike.
According to Pace, Barker, Sr., replied, "Well, if you want to
buy the truck we will go ahead and make the deal and you can
go ahead and work. Furthermore, I am never going to sign a
contract. We don't mean to have any of them dictators, or
anything like that, in this Company I have got too much
money involved here. I don't have to put up with people like
that telling me what to do." I credit the foregoing testimony
of Pace, which is undenied.7
Turning to my conclusions concerning the facts thus far set
forth, I find that Respondent engaged in conduct violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the following conduct which,
independently and in its entirety, carried a coercive implica-
tion. (1) interrogating employees concerning their union
activities, sympathies and desires, (2) questioning employees
concerning the union activities of other employees, (3) accusing
an employee of being the union ringleader, (4) threatening
employees that the Company would close down, shut its doors
and lay off employees if the Union was selected as the
bargaining agent, and (5) telling its employees that it would
not sign a contract with the Union.
2. Threats of bodily harm to employees
if anyone gets in my way they might get run over." I am
inclined to credit Curry that he made this response rather than
that attributed to him by Pace. Concerning this incident, I
think it reasonable to assume that Curry regarded Pace's
statement that "we don't intend for those trucks to run," in
the context of the entire conversation, as a personal threat to
him in the event he drove a truck during a strike. Under the
circumstances, I do not find his response to be violative of the
Act.
It will be recalled that Pace had a conversation with Calvin
Barker, Sr., when he came to the Dallas terminal on April 4,
1967. Pace testified that in the latter part of this conversation
he stated to Barker that if he purchased a truck and if he did
not go on strike (if a strike occurred) that he would not cross a
picket line He further stated that there would be a bit of
trouble if anyone crossed the picket line and that "I wouldn't
want to get in any trouble with any of the guys that I have
worked with." According to Pace, Barker thereupon stated, "If
any of those s-o-b's down there gets in your way, run over
them. Anybody that is working for me, I will protect them "
Barker testified that he recalled this conversation but said that
he did not remember the details of it When asked on direct
examination if he stated to Pace that he would cause bodily
injury to picketing employees, Barker testified, "I never
threatened anybody . . or threatened any employee or put
any pressure on him ... " I credit Pace's specific testimony
concerning this conversation and find that Barker's statement
that he should run over any employee who got in his way to be
violative of Section 8(axl) of the Act
The complaint alleges that various supervisors "told the
employees that in the event of a strike Respondent would
cause bodily injury to employees." Several employee witnesses
testified in support of this allegation. Employee William Allen
testified that on about May 6, he asked Terminal Manager
Curry what he would do if there was a strike and a picket line
set up. Harvey Sanders, a shop boy, was present at this time.
According to Allen, whose testimony concerning this incident
is undenied, Curry replied that if the pickets got in his way lie
would run them over. Involving as it did a threat to employees
for engaging in protected activity, I find Curry's statement as
aforesaid to violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. On another
occasion, shortly before the strike, several employees became
involved in a discussion as to what would happen if a strike
occurred. Curry was present and remarked that "he would
have to drive one of the damn trucks." According to employee
Hurles Pace, he (Pace) then stated, "Mr. Curry, me and you
have been friends for a long time. Our purpose is to get a
contract We don't intend for you to drive one of those damn
trucks as long as we are on strike " Pace testified that Curry
thereupon stated, "I will tell you right now if one of you guys
get in my way I have strict orders if anybody gets in the way
out here or anything that I can run you over I will do just
that." Curry recalled this incident. He said that after he stated
that he would probably have to drive one of those damn
trucks, Pace responded "Well, we don't intend for those trucks
to run." Curry said that he responded to this by saying, "Well,
6 Shortly before this Barker made an offer to the drivers to purchase
Company trucks, although they would still remain employees of the
Company pursuant to the arrangement of the purchase contract.
7 Further of this conversation , which bears on a different subject and
concerning which Barker also testified , is alluded to hereinafter.
3. The injury to Clifford R. Buck
The complaint alleges that, "On or about May 15, 1967, at
the Beaumont terminal, Respondent caused a striking em-
ployee, Clifford R. Buck, to be struck and injured by a
truck-trailer motor vehicle driven by nonstriking employee
Royce Sinclair." It is undisputed that on this date Buck and
two other employees were picketing in the vicinity of
Respondent's main gate. However, and without relating the
details, Buck had reason to believe that on this occasion
Sinclair was about to drive a Company tractor-trailer out of a
rear exit, one that is not normally used for this purpose. Buck
thereupon went to the area of the rear exit and began
picketing back and forth in the middle of the street at the
point where the truck would make its exit. It is undisputed
that Buck was struck by the tractor-trailer when Sinclair drove
it out of the lot. There is considerable testimony in the record
from witnesses of both sides of this case. Having carefully
reviewed all this testimony, I find that the evidence is
insufficient to establish that Sinclair drove his trucks with the
purpose or intent of deliberately striking Buck .8 In this
connection, it is to be noted that a Grand Jury deemed the
evidence presented to it by the District Attorney insufficient
to return an indictment against Sinclair on this same charge.
Moreover, the evidence does not establish that Sinclair,
expressly or otherwise, acted as an agent of the Respondent in
his involvement in this incident Accordingly, it is recom-
mended that this allegation of the complaint be dismissed.
8 Although not in itself conclusive that Sinclair was not guilty of the
incident alleged , it is noteworthy that Buck unquestionably had no legal
rights to picket in the middle of the street as he was doing at the time of
this incident.
104 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4. Threats to give loads away to
other carriers
Employee Leonard Drevecky testified that he handed the
day's mail to Terminal Manager Snyder on about February 10,
1967 As he stood by, Snyder opened one of the letters and
placed it on the desk. Drevecky testified that he read the letter
and that in substance it stated "from now on for him (Snyder)
to get in touch with all the terminal managers of (other)
carriers , give all loads possible at the time." Drevecky said that
he did not see any signature, but that the letter was addressed
from the Dallas office of the Respondent to Respondent's
Houston terminal. Drevecky further testified that a telephone
call came for Snyder about 10 minutes later, as he was still in
the office. Learning that Jackson was on the telephone,
Drevecky told Snyder that he would like to speak with
Jackson. Snyder told Drevecky to pick up an extension so that
he could talk to Jackson when he was finished According to
Drevecky, he did so and at this time heard Jackson instruct
Snyder to get in touch with terminal managers of other carriers
for the purpose of giving away all loads that were possible.
Marvin Ayles testified that on February 14 he was present
in Snyder's office with several other employees. According to
Ayles, Snyder stated that he had a letter out of Dallas
instructing him to give all loads possible to Bell Transport.9
Roy Wiggins, who was one of the employees present at this
time, corroborated Ayles' testimony as aforesaid to Wiggins
testified that he made a trip that day and that when he
returned Synder showed him a letter from Jackson stating that
all possible loads would be given to Respondent' s interline
carriers.' 1
Two other employees testified to similar conversation with
Snyder. Thus, David Williams testified that a day or two after
the election Snyder stated that he had been told by Jackson
"to give anything to the interline carriers that they could
handle regardless of whether we had units sitting in the yard or
not." C. B. Trout testified that on about February 14 or 15,
Snyder called him at home and stated that he had received
instructions from Dallas that he was to contact the terminal
manager of interlining carriers and that "on any loads going
out of the Houston area he was to turn them over to the
interline carriers ." Trout said that Snyder also stated that,
upon instructions from Jackson, his (Trout's) truck was to be
deadhned. Trout testified that the next day he telephoned
Jackson in Dallas and repeated what he had been told by
Snyder. According to Trout, Jackson stated that his orders had
been misinterpreted, "that the orders were that any trucks in
the area of the interline carriers would go along with the
procedure they had been using in the past."
Concerning all the foregoing, Jackson first testified that
Snyder was made terminal manager in January, 1967 and that
prior to that he had acted as assistant terminal manager.
Without specifying the time, Jackson stated that he sat down
with Snyder and explained the Company policy with respect
9 Bell Transport is in the same business as the Respondent. It is at times
utilized by the Respondent as an interline carrier.
10 Wiggins added that Snyder mentioned two other carriers (Breeding
and Gibbons Transport) to whom such business was to be given.
11 Wiggins recalled that the letter was written in pencil on a Speed
Letter. A Speed Letter is a standard form utilized by Respondent to
transmit messages between supervisors and from supervisors to em-
ployees.
to backhauls to be given to interlining companies. Jackson
testified that just before February 10, 1967, he received a call
from the terminal manager of the Earl Gibbons Company who
claimed that the "terminal manager didn't seem to be
cooperating with us in regard to backhauls." Continuing,
Jackson testified that on February 10, he called Snyder "and
again explained to Snyder about our policy." Jackson did not
testify as to any details of this conversation. Edna Frenzel,
Jackson's office assistant, testified that she was in the office
when Jackson made this call. Although she was not on an
extension, she testified that she overheard Jackson explain
Company policy to Snyder. Frenzel testified further that the
following day (February 11, a Saturday), Mr. Watson, then the
Dallas terminal manager , called her to say that Snyder had
called him and stated that he (Watson) was to tender all loads
to interline carriers She said she thereupon told Watson to
"stop that . . it is wrong."
It may be explained here that the Respondent has agree-
ments with various interlining carvers which permit the
Company to utilize such carriers for shipments to points
outside of its own operating authority By "gentlemen's
agreements ," on some occasions when these carriers have
deliveries in the vicinity of Respondent's terminals, Respond-
ent may tender the loads to them for delivery back to their
respective home areas .' 2 Return loads thus tendered to
interline carriers are known as backhauls. However, notwith-
standing the confused testimony of Frenzel which I need not
detail here, it is clear that Respondent did not always tender
backhauls to other carriers when they had available equipment
in Respondent' s area. Thus, Barker , Sr., testified that the
granting of backhauls "depends on the dispatcher's own
initiative , so to speak." In this connection Barker further
testified. "If we are in dire need of business we would not
tender this business to somebody else and our own equipment
is set. Neither would they. We don't expect that."
As indicated above, Drevecky and Wiggins testified that
they saw a letter instructing Snyder to give away all loads
possible, and Ayles testified that Snyder told him he had
received such a letter. Mrs. Frenzel testified that she did not
prepare any letters for Jackson to be transmitted to Snyder
concerning the tendering of loads to interline carriers . Signifi-
cantly, however, Jackson did not deny that he had sent a
written document to Snyder concerning this matter. I credit
the testimony of Drevecky, Wiggins and Ayles and find that
Jackson in fact did send a memorandum or letter to Snyder' 3
which contained directions with respect to giving away loads
substantially as testified to by these employees.' 4 Further, I
am not satisfied that Respondent' s witnesses gave a full
explanation relative to Jackson's instructions to Snyder con-
cerning the giving away of loads at this time . Jackson testified
that he twice orally gave Snyder instructions concerning
Company policy on backhauls. I think it particularly curious,
therefore, that he would find it necessary to further implement
his prior oral instructions with a written memorandum. Since
12 The interline carriers in turn afford the Respondent the same
opportunity when the occasion arises.
13 It also will be recalled that Wiggins testified this letter came from
Jackson.
14 Although the General Counsel subpenaed this document , Respond-
ent's attorney asserted that no such document could be found.
ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT CO
the evidence reflects, as I have found, that Jackson in fact sent
this memorandum to Snyder, I am persuaded that this.
memorandum was prompted, at least in part, by considerations
other than those testified to by Jackson and Frenzel. Upon the
entire record herein, and particularly in view of Respondent's
entire course of illegal conduct as herein described, I find that
Snyder, by his statements to the employees heretofore set
forth, as well as his displaying Jackson's letter to Wiggins and
making it accessible to Drevecky, created the impression
among Respondent's drivers that Respondent intended to give
away all possible loads to other carriers, this notwithstanding
the availability of Respondent's own equipment and personnel.
Coming as this did within a few days after the election, I find
that this constituted a threat of retaliation against the
employees (i.e., a loss of earnings) for having selected the
Union as their bargaining representative. Respondent thereby
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.' 5 It should not go
unmentioned that Respondent in fact did release two ship-
ments to Bell Transport, one on February 13 and the other on
February 16, 1967. While Respondent's explanation for giving
these loads away at this time is open to question, I make no
finding in this regard since the General Counsel has not alleged
or contended that the giving away of these shipments at this
time constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1).
D The Section 8(a)(3) Violations
1. Preliminary statement and findings with
respect to Respondent's enforcement of its
speed rule
The cases of the employees who were allegedly discrimina-
torily suspended, and the case of one employee who is alleged
to have been discriminatorily discharged, for the most part
involve infractions of Respondent's speed limit rule. Accord-
ingly, and preliminary to a discussion of the individual cases, I
think it appropriate to first set forth the facts pertaining to
Respondent's speed rule and its enforcement or lack of
enforcement thereof prior to the advent of the Union.
According to the unrefuted testimony of driver Marvin Lee
Ayles, who has been in Respondent's employ since 1960, the
Company always has had a speed rule, but the speed limits
which Respondent set for its drivers were periodically changed
by notices posted on the Company bulletin board Thus, at
various times the speed limit set by the Respondent would
alternatively be changed in ranges from 50-55-60 miles per
hour. Beginning with a notice posted on June 27, 1966, the
three most recent notices posted on the bulletin boards are as
follows
15 In making this finding I have not overlooked Trout 's testimony that
he called Jackson the day after his conversation with Snyder and that
Jackson at this time advised that his (Jackson 's) orders were misin-
terpreted and that past procedure would be followed with respect to
giving away loads to interline carriers . Of course, in contrast to Snyder's
conversations with other employees , Trout's situation was unique in that
Snyder specifically told Trout that his truck was to be "deadlined ." But be
that as it may, there is no evidence to reflect that Snyder's conduct as to
the other drivers was in any way disavowed.
16 Satcher testified that he thought he received written warnings prior
to December, 1966. 1 am convinced and rind that Satcher was mistaken in
this testimony and that he did not receive any such written warnings prior
to this time Respondent produced Satcher 's personnel file at the hearing
and all written warnings which he received for violating the speed rule
105
[June 27, 1966]
To all Drivers.
Todays mail contained four reports of units clocked at a
rate of speed between 60 and 70 miles per hour These
reports were taken by Markel.
Company units are not to exceed 55 miles per hour. Any
derivation from this policy will be grounds for dismissal.
On January 30, 1967, the following notice was posted
Attention all Drivers
As of 2-1-67 we are changing top speed of 55 mph so that
our regulations will conform with that of the State of
Texas You will be limited as of 2-1-67 to follow all posted
speed limits. There will be no allowances made for rolling
speed, that is, speeds in excess of posted speed limits to roll
a hill. In other words 60 mph is top speed and this means
that you are held to 60-not 60% or 61 or 62. You will be
responsible for speeds in excess of 60 mph.
On March 13, 1967, the following notice was posted
Effective this date top speed allowance will be 55 mph Any
driver exceeding this limit will be dismissed immediately.
The record reflects that beginning in December, 1967, and
subsequent to the beginning of the Union's organizing cam-
paign, the Respondent initiated a policy of issuing written
warnings to various employees who exceeded the speed limit
of 55 miles per hour There is no evidence whatsoever, nor
does the Respondent contend, that any written warnings had
been issued to the employees at any time prior to the Union's
campaign,' 6 this notwithstanding the fact, as the record amply
demonstrates, that at all times prior to December, 1967, it was
not uncommon for the driver to exceed the speed limit.' 7
Calvin Barker, Jr , 22 years of age and a vice president of
the Respondent, testified that he was a "loader" and that he
began working with the Company on a part-time basis in June,
1966 However, he had also worked for the Company during
an undisclosed number of previous summers. According to
Barker, Jr., his father began teaching him the safety aspect of
the business in about November, 1966, and at about this point
it became his duty to audit the trip envelopes. These envelopes
contained reports disclosing fuel mileage, time spent on trips,
tachograph charts which showed the speed of vehicles made
during a trip and various other paperwork. The majority of the
written warnings issued during and after December, 1966, to
the drivers were issued by Barker, Jr.
The foregoing is the only testimony offered by the
Respondent with reference to the written warnings issued after
December, 1966. As indicated heretofore, the Respondent had
been in business for many years prior to the advent of the
Union and the record does not reflect any practice of issuing
written warnings throughout this lengthy period. Upon the
were introduced in evidence . None were issued to him prior to December,
1966. The first written warning which he received was issued on December
7, 1966 On December 19, 1966, he was issued a warning for having
exceeded 60 miles per hour.
17 The credited and unrefuted testimony of employees Wiggins,
Williams, Trout and Satcher . Significantly , it is undisputed that on July
15, 1966, which was less than 3 weeks after Respondent posted the rule
that speeds in excess of 55 miles per hour would be grounds for dismissal,
driver Carl Satcher was intercepted by the Markel Checking Service for
driving 65 miles per hour . Markel made a written report of this incident to
the Respondent . When Satcher asked Terminal Manager Curry about this
report Curry merely told Satcher , "Well, I wouldn 't pay too much
attention about that."Satcher heard nothing further about the matter.
106 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
entire record, including Respondent's other unlawful efforts to
combat the Union as herein discussed, I am convinced and find
that the initiation of issuing written warnings at a time
coincident with the organizing campaign was part and parcel of
Respondent's entire campaign to defeat the Union Although
this practice continued after the Union won the election, as
noted elsewhere in this Decision, Respondent continued to
engage in unfair labor practices during the post election period.
However, since there is no allegation in the complaint that the
issuance of written warnings during the period in question in
itself was a violation of the Act, I make no finding that
Respondent thereby committed an unfair labor practice
However, my findings of fact in this regard are relevant to the
alleged Section 8(a)(3) violations hereinafter discussed
2 The suspensions of Roy Wiggins and
David W Williams
In the latter part of the day on February 20, 1967, Wiggins
and Williams, paired as drivers in the same truck, departed on a
run to Cuba, New Mexico Wiggins testified that before leaving
they received instructions from Terminal Manager Snyder to
"hurry up and get down there" because of a State holiday at
their destination point on February 22. Two unexpected
factors caused a delay en route One was a snow storm which
the drivers encountered on a stretch of 150-200 miles before
reaching Big Springs, Texas Wiggins credibly testified that the
snow caused them to slow down to 30-35 mph during this
stretch with the result that they arrived in Big Springs at 3 a in
on the following morning. A further delay was encountered at
Big Spring because the interline representative of the Steere
Tank Lines, whom they were required to meet at this point,
was not there to meet them As a result, they could not depart
until he showed up and made necessary arrangements, this
taking until about 10 30 a.m. The trip was then completed and
the delivery made Upon their return to Houston, Snyder
advised each of the drivers that they were being given a 1-week
suspension. The Speed Letter which Snyder handed them at
this time stated as follows
Both divers have been warned about filling out tac charts
correctly (see attached copy). Both drivers have been
warned about excessive speed (last warning see attached
copies). On 2-20-67 in Ls338-5108 Houston to Cuba drivers
were speeding and did not fill out charts correctly One
week off for each driver upon receipt of this letter
/s/ C.A. Barker, Jr
Wiggins testified that when he protested the layoff to
Snyder, Snyder replied, "Well, you can take it to your damn
union hall and let Cherry take care of it. That is all I can tell
you."
It is undisputed that the Company speed limit at this time
was 60 mph 18 This was also the New Mexico posted speed
limit Wiggins conceded that after leaving Big Springs, Texas,
the truck at times was driven at 62 mph Although the record
does not reflect the length of time or distance during which
the truck was driven at this speed, Wiggins testified that this
occurred in New Mexico while "coming down the mountains
most of the time."
Other than the document (Speed Letter) notifying the
employees of their suspension, the Respondent offered no
testimony concerning this matter. As indicated on its face, this
document was piepared and signed by Calvin Barker, Jr.' 9
Upon the entire record, I am persuaded and find that Wiggins
and Williams would not have received the suspension in
question but for their union activities As heretofore related,
there is no question but that Respondent knew that both of
these employees were active prounion adherents and that they
had signed up their drivers at the Houston terminal.20 It is
tine that Wiggins and Williams had received written warnings
for exceeding the Company speed limit prior to their suspen-
sion, but this did not occur until after the beginning of the
Union campaign in December, 1967, in accordance with the
circumstances heretofore related In view of Snyder's instruc-
tions that the drivers "hurry" to complete the delivery at
Cuba, New Mexico, and because of the delays caused by
outside factors during the course of this trip, I do not believe
that, absent their union activities, these employees would have
been suspended for occasionally have driven 2 mph over the
speed hmit.2 1 This is particularly true when considered in the
context of Respondent's expressed hostility to the Union and
its entice course of unlawful antiunion conduct, as set forth
herein. Accordingly, I find that Respondent's suspension of
Wiggins and Williams for 1 week upon their return from the
Cuba, New Mexico, trip was in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act 22 Williams, it may be noted, did not return to
work for the Respondent following this suspension.
3. The further suspension and discharge
of Roy Wiggins
On March 24, 1967, Wiggins received a 3-week suspension,
the reasons for which are stated in the following Speed Letter
which was issued to him by Terminal Manager Snyder
This loaded at Baytown 3-22-67 at 6.10 p.m. Driver left
18 The unrefuted testimony of Wiggins . Reference is also made to the
notice posted by the Respondent on June 27, 1966 , heretofore set forth,
which changed the speed limit to 55 mph.
19 The record does not reflect the exact time when Snyder notified
Wiggins and Williams of their suspension. It is apparent , however, that
Barker, Jr ., ascertained that the truck had been driven at speeds up to 62
mph upon his review of the truck tachograph , this with the procedure
which was inaugurated in December , 1967, as heretofore set forth.
20 See paragraphs 2, 3,4 and 5 of section C ( 1)(a), above
21 Both Wiggins and Williams were experienced drivers and each had
been in Respondent 's employ for approximately 2 years They enjoyed
relatively long seniority with the Company , since the record reflects a
large turnover among the drivers For example, Marvin Ayles, the senior
driver, worked for the Company since January, 1960.
22 There is no testimony with respect to these employees not filling
out the charts correctly . For the reasons indicated above, I find this to be
an added pretext for the discrimination against these employees. I note
that on March 24, 1967, H. E. Pace was given a notice that he did not fill
out his chart correctly , this notice simply stating "Please fill out chart
correctly." Pace received no warning or suspension . There is no evidence
that Pace was active in the Union or that Respondent had any reason to
suspect that he was. Indeed , the record reflects that Pace received six
written warnings between December 3 and March 31, 1967, yet he was
never given a suspension therefor.
ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT CO. 107
ATC yard at 4 00 p.m , due to load at 4 30 p in. Left
Baytown at 7 45 P M arrived at Orange, Texas, check point
at 9 30 P.M 3-22-67 did not leave Orange until 7 45 A.M.
3-23-67 was due to arrive at 8 A M delivery Did not arrive
until 4 00 P M at Geisner, La., U.S. Rubber Co Three
weeks off
/s/Snyder
Turning to a consideration of this trip, it is preliminarily
noted that when drivers are assigned to a trip within a 500-600
mile radius of the Houston terminal, they are always given a
delivery time of 8 a.m. on the following morning.23 Further, a
large portion of Respondent's business is the transportation of
liquid fuel or other liquid products, which products are loaded
on location at various refineries located in the Houston area.
Thus, it is necessary for the trucks to be driven to the
refineries where they must be loaded before the trip is started.
There is considerable testimony in the record that it is not
unusual for dnvers of various transportation companies to wait
their turn at the refinery to be loaded, this sometimes entailing
a delay of as much as 2-4 hours On the occasion in question,
Wiggins was assigned to deliver a truckload of fuel to the U.S
Rubber Company at Geisner, Louisiana. Although Wiggins
arrived at the Baytown refinery for loading at 4.30 p.m., as
scheduled, the loading of his truck was delayed so that he did
not leave Baytown until 7.45 pm., the record clearly
indicating that this was due to the circumstance noted above
and was through no fault of his own. Wiggins reached Orange,
Texas, about 9.30 p.m., at which time he felt tired and sleepy.
Apparently having come in from another trip, Wiggins testified
that he had been working for 7-Iii' hours at this point. He
testified that inasmuch as ICC regulations require that a driver
take off 8 hours after having driven 10 hours, he decided that
rather than continue for another 3 hours he would stop and
sleep until about midnight at Orange, Texas Wiggins did this,
but when he awakened after 3 or 4 hours thick fog had rolled
in Wiggins said that observing this he decided to go back to
sleep until the sun came up and dissipated the fog 24 As a
result of all the foregoing, Wiggins did not arrive at his
destination until 4 p in the following day, this making him
about 8 hours late from the scheduled 8 a m. arrival time
However, Wiggins testified that even at this point the customer
was not ready for him and that some gasoline had to be
removed from a storage tank to make room for his delivery.
There is no evidence that the U S. Rubber Co made any
complaint to the Respondent nor was Wiggins charged with
any complaint having been received. Wiggins protested the fact
of his suspension to Terminal Manager Snyder and gave a full
explanation as to the reasons for being late. The protest was of
no avail and the suspension stood.
On about March 30, 1967, while still off on susr ' nsion,
Wiggins was summoned to the terminal where Snyder gave him
a discharge notice, signed by Barker, Jr , which stated as
follows
Subject-Dismissal of Roy Wiggins
Speed in excess of 55 mph Driver has been warned
numerous times In my opinion he is not a safe man to have
driving for ATC of Texas Inc. As of 3-30-67 Roy Wiggins is
no longer an employee of Associated Transport Company
of Texas Inc Tac chart attached, do not remove ...
Not eligible for rehire.
Upon receipt of the above notice Wiggins again protested,
stating that the discharge "wasn't right." According to the
credited testimony of Wiggins, his conversation with Snyder
then proceeded as follows.
And I asked him, I said, "Why did you do all this?" And he
told me, said, "Well I am looking out for myself." He said,
"They have offered me a good position and I am going to
take care of it." Said, "They have promised me to send me
to school and make me something in the Company, and I
am going to have to look out for myself and do all that."
Says, "If you are dumb enough to do all this stuff, well, I
am going to pass it on."
Following the foregoing, Wiggins recalled that the following
also ensued
And I asked him [Snyder] well, I knew what this was
about, but I asked him why did he want to rat on us, rat on
me, tell everything he know, and he told me what he had
found out, about us and our activities concerning the
Union, that he had passed it on, which was hisself and they
had promised him, in effect, the world (Emphasis sup-
plied)
For the same reasons set forth in the preceding section with
reference to Wiggins' suspension following the run to Cuba,
New Mexico, I find that Wiggins' suspension and discharge
following his trip to Geisner, Louisiana, was motivated, in all
or in part, by antiunion considerations on behalf of the
Respondent. I think it clear that Wiggins' late arrival at Geisner
was due to circumstances beyond his control and I am
convinced that he would not have been suspended but for the
fact that he was known by the Respondent to be a leading
union advocate. There is no evidence that Respondent had
previously disciplined drivers for late arrivals. Indeed, the
evidence reflects that it had not been unusual for other dnvers
to make late deliveries with impunity. With respect to
exceeding the Company speed limit during this trip, Wiggins
conceded that he had reached epeeds of 58 and 59 mph on the
return trip with an empty truck during a distance of
approximately 70 miles between Beaumont and Texas. This
section is a multi-lane highway with a truck speed limit of 60
mph and a passenger car speed limit of 70 mph This is the
same general highway on which the Markel Service observed
Satcher driving at a rate of 65 mph on July 15, 1966
Although Markel submitted a report of this incident to the
Respondent, it is undisputed that Respondent took no action
whatsoever against Satcher.2 5 In view of this, and of Respond-
ent's previously noted condonation of or failure to enforce the
Company speed limit prior to the advent of the Union, I am
convinced that the Respondent utilized Wiggins' latest infrac-
tion of the Company speed rule as a pretext for his discharge.
Indeed, this finding is further buttressed by the above quoted
remarks which Snyder made to Wiggins during the discharge
conversation, these clearly implicating that the real reason for
the action was his prounion activities Accordingly, I find that
23 The uncontroverted testimony of Wiggins . Wiggins testified that 24 Wiggins testified that it was the usual practice for dnvers to pull over
this practice was put into effect by Snyder when Snyder became terminal when they encountered fog.
manager . 25 As to the disparate treatment accorded Wiggins as contrasted to
Pace , seefn 22,supra
108 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent's suspension of Wiggins on March 24, 1967, and
its discharge of the employee on March 30, 1967, was in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.26
Pertinent to the case of Wiggins, as well as the other
employees whose cases are at issue herein, I fully recognize the
rightful prerogative of an employer to establish its own rules
and regulations, as well as its right to police the enforcement
thereof However, where, as here, similar violations of Com-
pany rules have been habitually overlooked and condoned, the
issue simply becomes whether, under all the circumstances, the
rules have been enforced as a pretext for discrimination.
4. The suspension of Carl E. Satcher
Except as herein noted, the facts concerning the incident
which led to Satcher's suspension are not in dispute. On about
January 18, 1967, drivers Satcher and Hurles E. Pace were
dispatched by Barker, Jr to deliver aviation fuel to Salt Flats,
Texas Although each drove a separate truck, these drivers
were instructed to make the trip together so that both would
arrive at their destination at the same time. The reason for this
was that only Satcher had a pump and therefore Pace could
not unload unless he was present with Satcher While loading
for the trip some aviation fuel was accidently splashed on
Pace's legs. After several hours en route, Pace noticed that his
legs were beginning to blister The injury grew gradually worse
and it become necessary for Pace to make several stops to rest.
Satcher would stop with him. Upon arrival at Ozona, Texas,
the injury to Pace became so painful that the drivers went to a
hospital Pace received medical treatment and, with Satcher,
remained at the hospital for about 2 hours The doctor who
treated Pace wished that he remain at the hospital for a longer
period, but Pace refused because he was running late. However,
in addition to treatment of the wound, Pace was given internal
medicine He was warned by the doctor that it might make
him sleepy and that if it did he was to pull over to the side of
the road and rest Pace, just before entering the hospital,
telephoned Calvin Barker, Jr., to notify him of the situation,
including the fact that Satcher was still with him According to
the credited testimony of Pace, Barker stated that Satcher
should remain with him and make sure that he was all right.27
En route from the hospital, it became necessary, due to Pace's
condition, for the drivers to make two stops so that Pace could
rest. The drivers finally reached their destination about 12
hours late, at which time they delivered and unloaded the fuel.
Satcher testified that he returned from the Salt Flats trip on
a Friday night. He said that he came to the terminal the next
morning and asked Barker, Jr., if he could take off from work
on the following Monday According to Satcher , Barker
replied, "Yes . in fact I am going to have to lay you off for a
week." When Satcher asked why, Barker said it was because of
the delay in delivery to Salt Flats. Satcher then stated, "Well,
26 1 am aware that Wiggins was assertedly discharged for infraction of
the speed rule after having been previously suspended assertedly because
of his infraction of the same rule. However , in view of the multiple unfair
labor practices herein found, it was up to the Respondent " to disentangle
the consequences for which it was chargeable from those from which it
was immune ." N. L.R.B. v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 105 F.2d 167, 176. This
burden, I am persuaded , has not been met here.
27 When first called as a witness, Pace did not mention his telling
Barker, Jr ., that Satcher was still with him . Although this testimony was
not adduced until Pace was called on rebuttal, I still believe that he was
telling the truth and I credit this testimony.
that don't look to me like this is a very good reason, to give a
man a week off on account of delay of oil when I had a man
with me that was sick." According to Satcher, Barker then
stated, "that's not the only reason .... You know what the
other reason is too " Satcher thereupon asked if it was because
he had passed out union cards and signed up the drivers.
Satcher said that Barker responded, "Well, I am not saying that
is why you are getting the week off. You know why it is "
Pace thereupon was suspended for 1 week without pay.
In addition to the foregoing, Pace testified that upon
learning that Satcher had been laid off, he went up to Barker,
Jr , and asked why this action had been taken Barker replied,
"I'd rather not say anything right now " Several days later
Pace again asked Barker, Jr , why Satcher had been laid off,
this time stating that it was he who had caused Pace to be late.
According to Pace, Barker replied, "Well, we don't have
anything against you and we are trying to get rid of Satcher.
You know that." Pace asked why he was trying to get rid of
Satcher Pace testified that Barker answered, "Because he is
trying to get you guys to go Union." Pace then stated, "He
ain't the only one around here who is trying to do that."
Barker, Jr., testified that the customer at Salt Flats had
called in to ask about the loads of fuel oil. According to
Barker, Satcher was given a 1-week suspension because he was
12 hours late and because he had not followed Company
procedure by calling either the customer or the terminal when
he became aware that the delivery would be late. I do not
credit this explanation by Barker, Jr. As heretofore stated, the
credited testimony of Pace reflects that Pace in fact did call
Barker and explained to him the entire situation. 28 Barker
testified further that upon being suspended, Satcher asked,
"Why don't you fire me?" Barker said that he told Satcher he
did not want to fire him because he was one of the
Respondent's "best drivers"; and that "the only reason we
suspended people was to straighten them out."
Barker, Jr., denied telling Pace that he was trying to get rid
of Satcher because of his union activities or for passing out
cards I do not credit this denial and I credit the testimony of
Pace concerning the conversations which he had with Barker
after Satcher' s suspension . However, in finding that Respond-
ent discriminatorily suspended Satcher, I do not rely on this
admission alone. Without belaboring what has already been
said, I think the facts clearly show that Pace and Satcher were
not responsible for the delay in making the Salt Flats delivery
and that they did all that was possible under the circum-
stances, including notification to Barker, Jr. Satcher was laid
off, Pace was not. There is no question that Respondent had
knowledge of Satcher's union activities, this as evidenced in
the conversation, heretofore set forth, wherein Curry ques-
tioned Satcher concerning his union activities and Satcher
freely admitted to him that he had passed out cards and signed
up some drivers. The record does not disclose whether or not
28 Barker conceded that Pace called in, but testified that Pace did not
tell him that Satcher was still running with him. Aside from my belief that
Pace truthfully testified that he did advise Barker that Satcher was still
with him, inasmuch as Barker, Jr., personally had dispatched the two
drivers to make this trip together , it would seem most unlikely that this
subject would not come up when Pace called in to report the injury and
the resultant delay. In any event , assuming Pace did not tell Barker that
Satcher was still with him, this would not alter my ultimate conclusion as
to the discrimination against Satcher.
ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT CO 109
Pace was active in the Union, but if he was, there is no
evidence that this came to Respondent's attention Satcher
admittedly was one of Respondent's "best drivers." There is
no evidence that prior to the advent of the Union any other
driver had ever been suspended for making a late delivery,
although the record reflects that late deliveries were not
uncommon Accordingly, and in view of all the foregoing, I am
convinced and find that Satcher would not have been
suspended but for his union activities Respondent's suspen-
sion of Satcher was therefore in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
5 The suspension of C. B. Trout
I, Bud Trout, Social Security # 446-14-0466, residing at
1704 San Jacinto, Pasadena, Texas, employed by Associ-
ated Transport Company of Texas, Inc., as a lease owner
operator, deny making any charges with the National Labor
Relations Board, Houston office, against Associated Trans-
port Company of Texas, Inc., 6840 Forest Park Road,
Dallas, Texas.
I have not given authority to any one person, group of
people, corporation, company, partnership or organization
of any description to file any charges against Associated
Transport Company of Texas, Inc., 6840 Forest Park Road,
Dallas, Texas, or to use my name in connection with any
charges on or prior to March 22, 1967.
/s/C B. (Bud) Trout
C B Trout has been an employee of the Respondent since
about August 1, 1966. Unlike the other drivers, Trout owned
his own truck which he operated under a lease contract with
the Respondent
Although Trout did not sign a union authorization card, he
attended two union meetings, including a meeting held on May
13, 1967, wherein the employees voted to strike, and he joined
the picketing on the first day of the strike. Of more
significance to Trout's case, however, is the fact that Trout's
name, along with five other employees, was named on the face
of the first unfair labor practice charge herein, filed by the
Charging Union on March 8, 1967 29
On March 24, 1967, Trout, who was based in Houston,
made a trip to Dallas While in Dallas he stopped in
Respondent's Dallas office, as was his custom, to ascertain
whether any backhauls were available to the Houston area.
While in the office, Barker, Sr., came up and asked Trout
whether he had received a letter from the Dallas office
notifying him that his lease would expire after 30 days. (This
letter, which in fact was sent to Trout, had not been received
by him at this time. A "decrease in our present business" was
the reason assigned in the letter for this action ) When Trout
replied that he had not received the letter, Barker stated that
he had also released trucks belonging to the Falcon Leasing
Company and to one Ercel Fowler, this because "business had
been off somewhat .i30 According to Trout, he and Barker
then became involved in an argument with Barker finally
stating that Trout had filed charges against him through the
National Labor Relations Board in Houston. To this, Trout
replied that he had not Barker stated that his name appeared
on the charges. Trout replied that he had "not signed any such
document." At this point, according to the testimony of
Trout, Barker asked if he would sign a deposition to that
effect Trout said that before he could answer, Barker stated
that if he would sign such a deposition his lease arrangement
would be reinstated. Trout agreed to do so, whereupon,
according to Trout's testimony, "he [Barker] called Mrs.
Harper in and asked her to type up this deposition." Trout
testified that Mrs. Harper typed up the document four or five
times before he finally signed. The document which Trout at
this point signed stated as follows
29 This charge alleged, inter alia, that Respondent had discriminated
against these six employees by reducing their wages and hours of work
because of their union membership and activities . This particular
allegation apparently was dismissed , for it is not alleged in the complaint
herein.
30 Although Fowler leased two trucks to the Respondent , he was not
employed as a driver
Concerning the termination of this incident Trout credibly
testified. "And after I signed this Mr. Barker told me that he
intended to fight this signing a contract with the Union if it
took every penny that he had but if he ended up winning this,
which he felt sure he would, and he was only operating two
trucks he would guarantee me that mine would be one of
them."
Concerning the foregoing conversation, Barker, Sr , con-
ceded that he questioned Trout concerning the unfair labor
practice charge, his testimony being that this occurred in the
following manner
And whatever that document was and Trout's name was on
it. So I asked Trout, I said, "What was the reason for that9 I
thought you were well satisfied as far as what you were
making money" and he said "I didn't do it." I said, "Well, if
you had nothing to do with it certainly they used your
name certainly you are involved somewhere in it. " He said,
"I don't know anything about it." I said, "Well, will you
give me a statement to that effect?" And he said "Yes, I
will give you a statement to that effect" and he dictated the
statement that he did not file any charges, he was not
involved in any charges [Emphasis supplied.]
Barker denied that he promised Trout that he would
reinstate Trout's lease if he would give him the statement
which he requested. Although Barker conceded that in fact he
at this time orally rescinded the letter cancelling the lease, he
said that this was because Trout explained that he had to make
monthly payments on his truck, whereupon he told Trout, "If
you want to go along, it is all right with me, if you want to
take a chance, as to whether you are making any money, I
don't know, but if you want to go along under these
conditions, that is all right I don't care." Trout impressed me
as a truthful witness and I credit his testimony to the effect
that Barker agreed to reinstate his lease on condition that he
sign a document disavowing the unfair labor practice charge
filed upon his behalf.3 i I find that Barker's solicitation of
Trout to disavow any connection with the filing of the unfair
labor practice charge, in the context of his conditioning the
reinstatement of Trout's lease if he did so, to be an
infringement of the rights guaranteed employees in Section 7
3 r Moreover, in view of such facts as are undisputed , Trout 's is the
more plausible version . Undoubtedly Barker knew that Trout had
payments to meet on his truck and it is unlikely that he would have
rescinded the lease cancellation for this reason . Surely, it is more than
coincidence that Barker first questioned Trout about the charges and then
reinstated the lease upon Trout's written disavowal of the unfair labor
practice charge.
110 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of the Act By this conduct, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act Since Trout's lease was reinstated only
because he disavowed the charge filed on his behalf, I find that
by this conduct Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(4) of
the Act.32
On about March 20, 1967, Trout made a trip from Houston
to the Oklahoma City-Tulsa area , making the return trip on
March 22-23 Respondent's speed limit at this time was 55
mph. As reflected by tachograph charts, Trout at various
intervals on the return trip exceeded this speed limit, at one
point running for about 2'h hours at 60 mph However, it is to
be noted that the posted speed limit on the Interstate Highway
in Oklahoma where Trout thus exceeded the Company speed
limit was 70 mph for passenger cars,33 and, I would assume,
60 mph for trucks Concerning this trip, on April 4 Calvin
Barker, Jr , issued a Speed Letter to Trout which stated
"Speed over 55 mph. First warning. Next warning one week
off. Please put mileage on chart." Trout testified without
contradiction that after receipt of this warning he spoke to
Calvin Barker, Sr , and that Barker, Sr "more or less laughed it
off." According to Trout, Barker, Sr., referred to either the
ICC or the Markel Service who checked on the Company and
stated, "Actually, these letters, warnings, etc are more or less
a formality and for their benefit Continue operating as you
were."
On May 4, 1967, pursuant to a Speed Letter issued by
Barker, Jr , Trout was given a 1-week suspension for exceeding
the Company speed limit of 55 mph. This suspension involved
a run from Baytown, Texas and Franklinton, Louisana and
return. It is undisputed that on this trip Trout drove for an
hour and one half on Interstate Highway 10 in Texas at a
speed ranging from 60-62 mph. Trout testified that when he
called Barker, Sr., about this suspension, Barker, Sr , said that
both ICC and the Markel Service had been riding him pretty
hard and that his hands were tied. Trout at this time was given
a 1-week suspension without pay and thereafter returned to
work with the Company.
Like the other drivers, the evidence reflects that prior to the
advent of the organization campaign, Trout had frequently
driven in excess of Respondent's speed limit with impunity.
Indeed, Trout testified that on the first day of his employment
Barker, Sr., looked over his truck and that he conversed with
Barker about the truck's gears and specifications Trout testified
without contradiction that on this occasion Barker stated that
although the Company speed limit was 55 mph this limit was for
the Company vehicles only and that he would not hold him
(Trout) to the 55 mph speed Trout testified that thereafter he
drove his truck "usually around sixty" but never received any
warning or reprimand for it. Concerning the trip to Oklahoma
City-Tulsa for which he received a speed warning on April 4,
Trout testified that he had previously made the same run many
times and at the same rates of speed without being warned
therefor Similarly, Trout testified that he had previously made a
run on Highway Interstate 10 in Texas, driving at the same rate
of speed as on the occasion which led to his suspension ... but
again, this did not entail a reprimand.
32 It is immaterial that the charge itself was not filed by Trout. Iowa
Beef Packers, 144 NLRB 615, 621-622
33 Unrefuted testimony of Trout.
34 It will be recalled that on March 24, Barker, Sr., accused Trout of
being "involved " with the Union because his name appeared on the charge
filed on March 8.
As above noted, on March 24, 1967, at the behest of Barker,
Sr., Trout repudiated the unfair labor practice charge of March 8,
wherein he was alleged to have been discriminated against
However, on April 11, 1967, a second amended charged was filed
which alleged, inter alia, that "on or about March 24, 1967 [the
Respondent] discriminated against C. B. Trout ... because he
filed charges under the Act .. . and because of his [union]
membership and activities ...." Although this charge did not
allege a violation of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act, a further
amended charge was filed on April 14, 1967, alleging that this
section of the Act had been violated by the above conduct Thus,
it is clear that notwithstanding Trout's disclaimer of the Union
to Barker, Sr , on March 24, Respondent subsequently had
ample cause to believe that Trout again became "involved" with
the Union 34 When this circumstance is coupled with Respond-
ent's other acts of discrimination, its strong union animus, its
lack of enforcement of the speed limit rule prior to the advent of
the Union, and the fact that it had particularly excused Trout
from complying with its speed rule prior to its having suspected
him of having become involved with the Union, I am persuaded
and find that Trout would not have been warned or suspended
for the infractions in question but for the fact of his suspected
involvement with the Union Accordingly, I find that Respond-
ent's suspension of Trout on May 4, 1967, for a period of 1 week
was violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
6. The suspension of Thomas
Eugene Courtney
Thomas Eugene Courtney, a driver, became employed with
the Respondent on or about January 19, 1967. He was not active
in the organizing campaign and, because of his employment date,
was not eligible to vote in the February 6 campaign. However,
about a week prior to the election Courtney was present when
Charles Holmes, a company driver, and Terminal Manager
Snyder were discussing the Union Courtney testified that
Holmes indicated that he was undecided how he was going to
vote and that at this point he spoke up to state "Well, the Union
is a good thing if everybody works together in the Union and for
the Union, but, if they don't, it's not good."
On April 27, 1967, Calvin Barker, Jr , issued a Speed Letter
which suspended Courtney for 2 weeks for overpurchase of
fuel 35 This suspension was later reduced, by oral notification, to
1 week. The Speed Letter, which was introduced in evidence,
states that Courtney made an overpurchase of 88 gallons of fuel
on May 20, 1967, and that "this is the 6th warning on
overpurchase." Courtney did not deny that he had made an
overpurchase in the amount indicated nor did he give any
explanation for it Neither did he deny that he had been warned
five times before the April 27 suspension
A document designated as "Driver Contract and Procedure"
must be executed by each of Respondent's driver-employees.
This contract sets forth the fuel rule, noted above, and
specifically sets forth a procedure of warnings for infractions of
this rule, including suspension for a third infraction 3 6
35 This rule provides that there is not to be in excess of 20 gallons of
fuel in the tank when a driver returns from a run The reason for this is that
the Company has its own tanks at its terminal-and fuel purchased on the
road costs more than when vehicles are fueled at the terminal.
36 The current driver contract also states that the Company speed limit
is 55 miles per hour Significantly, however, the contract does not provide
for any penalty for infraction of the Company speed limit.
ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT CO. 111
I do not believe that Courtney's preelection remark in the
presence of Snyder, as hereinabove set forth, is sufficient to
establish that this gave the Respondent cause to believe that
Courtney was an active prounion adherent Concerning
Courtney's suspension on April 27, the record reflects that
Courtney had been warned many times before and that the
disciplinary action finally taken was in accordance with the
procedure set forth in the Driver Contract. Accordingly, I find
that the General Counsel has not established by a preponderance
of the evidence that Courtney's suspension was violative of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act It is therefore recommended
that this allegation in the complaint be dismissed.
E. The Refusal to Bargain
1 Conduct of Respondent's attorney at
the hearing
The principal negotiator for the Respondent at the bargaining
sessions which are discussed below was its attorney, Roy J. True.
Except for the last meeting, all bargaining meetings were held in
True's law office in Dallas. Near the outset of the hearing, True
made the following statement from counsel table
Excuse me, Mr Linton. If it would be any help at this time I
would like to offer, rather than try to do this by total recall,
which is so difficult, it might be of benefit to the Trial
Examiner and all present if we tender recordings of the
entire conference that we are going to be going over for
play in open court, if you would like to.
Upon the foregoing assertion, the Trial Examiner asked
whether recordings in fact were taken of the bargaining
conferences. To this True responded, "Partially, some of the
conferences were recorded."37
Based upon True's assertion as aforesaid, the General
Counsel amended the complaint at the hearing to allege that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by-
Secretly recording by tape recorder collective bargaining
conferences with the Union without disclosing or giving
notice to the Union at any time that such bargaining
conferences were being secretly tape recorded, thereby
failing to meet and confer with the Union in good faith.
Subsequent to the above amendment, and late in the
hearing when called as a witness for the Respondent and
having been duly sworn, True did a complete turnabout and
testified that no tape recordings were made of any of the
bargaining meetings. On this state of the record, and in the
absence of any further evidence, I am unable to find that the
General Counsel has sustained the burden of proof as to the
above allegation in the complaint. However, in view of True's
unequivocal representation in open court that tape recordings
in fact were taken, and his subsequent denial under oath that
this was true, I must view True's testimony in the instant case,
unless uncontroverted or corroborated or supported by other
evidence, as unworthy of belref.38 This was a serious mis-
representation to all the parties and to the Trial Examiner and
c.nnot be lightly regarded
2. The bargaining meetings
As noted earlier in this Decision , the Union was certified by
the Board on February 14, 1967.39 The Union sent its first
bargaining proposal, which was in the form of a completely
drafted contract, to the Company on February 24, 1967.
Aubrey Cherry, a business agent of the Charging Union,
testified that he called Calvin Barker, Sr ., on February 27 or
28, and spoke to him over the telephone. According to the
credited testimony of Cherry, Barker at this time stated that
he had 32 or 33 pieces of equipment that he wished to register
by April 1, that he had had several major accidents that were
not covered by insurance, that there " just wasn't any money,"
and that therefore he wished the negotiations to be postponed
for 1 year. Cherry told Barker that he could not do this
Cherry called Barker again on March 10, and Barker at this
time stated that he had turned the Union's proposal over to his
attorneys 40
The first bargaining meeting between the parties was held in
True's office on March 31. Present for the Union was Cherry,
E. F. Johnson, business agent for Teamster Local 744, and a
Mr. Wakefield, business agent for Local 745 No Company
officials were present, the Respondent being represented by its
attorneys, True and his partner, Henry Klepak. This meeting
lasted for approximately 2 hours during which the parties went
over article by article the first 13th pages of the Union's 36
page contract proposal. It is undisputed that except for the
matter of checkoff, the parties were in substantial agreement
to the noneconomic provisions set forth in this portion of the
Union's proposal The matters thus agreed upon included such
subjects as the scope of the agreement, maintenance of
standards, union stewards, absences, seniority, and the like.
A second bargaining meeting was held at True's office on
April 4 With Cherry present, the chief negotiator for the
Union at this meeting was R B. Bunch, an organizer for the
Southern Conference of Team: tern. True represented the
Respondent, again with no Company official present. True
told Bunch that he had authority to negotiate an agreement,
although it would have to be subject to the approval of the
Company. It is undisputed that at about this point True
submitted to Bunch the Company's profit and loss statement
for the preceding year, and claimed that the Company could
not afford to meet the Union's economic demands. Bunch did
not examine the statement proffered by True, stating that he
was not a bookkeeper. Instead, Bunch requested that the
Union be permitted to have its accountant examine the
3 7 As further reflecting that this was an unequivocal assertion that tape
recordings were taken , True at this point further stated
Let me stipulate something in the record for you, Dick. This is done in
our office as a matter of course -the tapes are sometimes retained.
They are sometimes not. They are edited afterwards, that is not-they
are not done in confidential conference . This was viewed as a
non-confidential conference . And we did tape it without anyone's
knowledge . So to make that clear , this was not a matter that was done
behind their backs or anything . It's a matter of course . (Emphasis
supplied.)
38 As to his assertion that tape recordings had been made, and
attempting to explain this entire conduct, True testified, "I think this to
be a remark in open court made by counsel as an advocate and it is in the
province of an advocate to make whatever remarks he thinks are
stategically beneficial."
39 The Respondent does not dispute the Union 's majority status or the
appropriateness of the collective bargaining unit found by the Board, as
heretofore set forth.
40 Barker , Sr. recalled one conversation with Cherry at about this time.
Barker testified that he told Cherry, "This is the wrong time for us to enter
into anything of this nature since we are in the financial position we are
in ... why don't you delay this until such time as we can publish these
new tariffs and our new tariff is going to give an increase and if you had a
contract after these tariffs then you could take credit for these increases.
112 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Company books 41 In any event, it is undisputed that when
faced with True's assertion that the Respondent could not
meet the Union's economic demands as set forth in the
proposed contract then before it, Bunch pulled out a copy of a
current contract which the Union had with the Earl Gibbon
Petroleum Transport Company and submitted it to True, at
the same time stating that this contract contained the "least
economic" provisions which the Union had with any company
in the tank transport business.42 True briefly examined the
economic provisions of the Gibbon contract and then, accord-
ing to his own testimony, admittedly stated, "Well, this looks
like more what we can talk about here This appears to be
something, that could constitute reasonableness This other
thing [the Union's first proposed contract] was so completely
ridiculous that we didn't have anything to talk about But here
this appears to be something that we could-that could be a
reasonable contract " After some further discussion, it is
undisputed that True assured the Union that he would discuss
the contract with his client and, further, that he then would
draft a written counter proposal which he would mail to the
Union 43
True testified that he contacted the Company following the
April 4 meeting, but was advised by Company officials that
"we can't afford those pay provisions "44 On about April 17,
True spoke to Cherry and advised him of his client's position.
According to True, at this time he told Cherry, "Look, Cherry,
my client-I think I made a mistake on the first meeting My
client is adamant about some things and he is really disagree-
able about some things and I think that it would help a great
deal if I put you people together."4 5 It is undisputed that the
parties then agreed to meet on April 25 However, it is
noteworthy that True did not submit a written counter-
proposal to the Union, as he said he would at the April 4
meeting 4 6 In fact, Respondent never submitted a written
counterproposal to the Union
The April 25 meeting again took place at True's office in
Dallas. This was the first time Company officials were present.
These were Barker, Sr , Barker, Jr , and Jackson Bunch and
Cherry were present for the Union. True left the room shortly
after the conference started, this specifically for the purpose of
permitting the Company officials and Union representatives to
confer between themselves However, Bunch credibly testified
that before leaving the room True stated that a C P.A. had
checked the Company's books, that the Company was not in a
financial position to offer an increase, and that "he wanted Mr.
41 At either this or the next meeting , True indicated that permission
would be given for the Union 's accountant to examine the books on
Company premises, but that it would not turn over the books for
examination away from the premises . The Union did not accept this offer.
42 At one point Bunch stated that the tank line industry was "a
cut-throat industry competitive wise" and that it was the Union's desire to
"negotiate some uniformity of a contract."
43 The foregoing is the substance of the April 4 meeting, all of which is
not in substantial dispute. I do not credit the testimony of True, which
Bunch denied , that at this meeting (1) The Union insisted that the
contract must have a checkoff provision and (2) that the Union would not
bargain "down " from the Gibbon contract . Aside from the fact that I am
impelled to strongly question the reliability of True 's testimony, as
heretofore discussed, Union representatives Bunch and Cherry impressed
me as honest witnesses who testified in a forthright and intelligent
manner.
44 Testimony of True
45 Affidavit of True, as incorporated and set forth in the record
transcript.
46 In somewhat confused testimony , True gave several reasons for not
submitting a counterproposal . One was that it wouldn't do any good to
Barker and Mr Jackson to go through this thing with us and
see what we could come up with "
There is some conflict as to what transpired after True left
the room Starting with the testimony of Bunch, Bunch said
that first there was some discussion concerning the Company's
operating authority, its lease arrangements with other compa-
nies and the extent of the Company's interlining arrangements
Bunch testified that the Company representatives, with Barker,
Sr , acting as principal spokesman, began talking about the
Company's financial difficulties and the fact that matters
pertaining to taxes and registration were coming up It is
undisputed that during the course of this discussion Barker,
Sr., became ill The upshot of the Company's position,
according to Bunch, was that Barker, Sr., finally stated that
financially the Company could not do anything and that the
only thing they could agree to was not to reduce the present
rates of pay to the Company employees Bunch testified that
after listening to all the Company's problems, he finally
offered to sign a short term contract for a duration of from 90
to 120 days in which the Company would agree to do exactly
what they were doing with no change in the Company's
current rate of pay 47 However, according to Bunch, the
Respondent gave no answer to his proposal during this phase
of the day's bargaining session Bunch said that the discussion
was interrupted several times due to Barker, Sr.'s leaving the
room because of his illness. It is undisputed that Barker, Sr.,
became so ill near the end of the morning session that he
finally left the meeting and did not return.48
Turning now to the Company witnesses, Barker, Sr ,
testified that at this meeting he discussed the financial
condition of the Company and that "I told him [Bunch] that
we weren't in a position to take on any additional expenses
inasmuch as we were already losing money and had lost money
the previous year " Barker said that Bunch finally offered a
90-day contract, but that he told Bunch that he would rather
have one for a longer duration. Barker testified that Bunch
then offered him "a 90-day contract with the present pay
status and everything," to which he replied, "Okay, I will take
it." However, he testified that Bunch then stated, "Well, I have
to have fringe benefits in this." At this point in the record
Barker's testimony was left dangling and he gave no further
explanation as to what occurred thereafter, except that he said
he repeated to Bunch that he could not obligate the Company
to additional expense. Barker's testimony reflects that at about
this point he left the room because of illness.
submit a counterproposal because "the [Company] accountants have
looked at it [ the Gibbon contract], everybody has looked at it , we just
can't do it." Otherwise, True testified that he could not get around to
drafting a counterproposal because ( 1) his daughter was ill and he had
to spend 1 week at the hospital , and (2 ) he was busy negotiating other
business contracts.
47 Bunch initially testified that this offer only referred to non-
economic items . However, on cross -examination and in rebuttal, Bunch
made it clear that this offer included incorporation of Respondent's
present wage rates . Although this latter testimony to this extent was
inconsistent with his direct testimony , I think that Bunch was initially
mistaken and I do not regard this as warranting any adverse reflection
upon his credibility Indeed, Barker , Sr. conceded that "he [Bunch]
said he would give me a 90-day contract with present pay status and
everything ." In summing up his offer of the 90 - 100 day contract, Bunch
testified , "I just asked the question `Would they sign an agreement with
us that they would continue to do exactly what they were doing by
putting it in contract form for a period of 90 or 120 days.' " I believe
this testimony accurately reflects the manner in which the offer was
made
48 Barker , Jr., and Jackson , who at this time left the room with Barker.
Sr , also did not return.
ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT CO. 113
Barker , Jr., gave very brief testimony concerning the April
25 meeting. He testified that Bunch and Cherry "made an
offer of a contract for 90 days, approximately just the way we
are running, with health benefits to our employees" and that
his father was agreeable to it. Barker, Jr., testified that at this
point True entered the room and that the Union"started
adding stipulations to the contract that they had not men-
tioned to my father," these, he said, including vacation pay
and "possibly retirement benefits."
The testimony of Jackson, who also attended the April 25
meeting, is not in accord with that of Barker, Sr. While
Jackson's testimony is quite confusing, he started by testifying
that Cherry and Bunch offered a 90-day contract with present
benefits and that then "we did discuss at that time the
possibility of adding in the health benefits and also the pension
plan into the contract in addition and this was for a 90-day
period and at the end of that time it would be opened up for
negotiations." He said he thought that agreement had been
reached "on those two points," but that at this point Barker,
Sr., became ill and left the room and that True then came into
the room. In further confusing testimony, Jackson then
testified, "I am the one who made the suggestion that we
could go along with the health and benefit changes and I so
marked it, this when Mr. True picked up the piece of paper, it
was marked "ok" on it I am the one that did it." He said that
at this time "vacation plans" were brought up, but that Barker,
Sr., thereupon came back into the room "and he was informed
of the fact that vacations and this had been added and that this
was not what he agreed to or understood." Other than to
testify that True thereupon objected to a contract of only 90-
day duration, Jackson did not testify to anything further
concerning this meeting.
Apart from the substance of the discussions, I do not credit
the testimony of Barker, Jr., and Jackson that True came back
to the room and entered the discussion in the morning session.
From the testimony of Bunch, Barker, Sr., and also from the
otherwise confusing testimony of True, it is clear that he did
not .4 9 In any event it is clear that True did talk to the Union
representatives in the absence of Company officials after lunch
and I shall consider this testimony. However, True testified
that he held a private discussion with the Company officials
prior to the lunch break. According to True's pretrial
statement, Barker, Sr., at this time told him "I don't want a
90-day contract, I don't want any two year contract ; I want a
four year or five year contract and I want it on these terms and
that's all I'll do, that's all I'll do."50
The discussion after lunch was very brief. Bunch credibly
testified that at this time, and in the absence of Company
officials, True simply advised that the Company could not
agree to a 90-day contract. I do not credit True's confusing
version of what transpired after lunch. However, I set forth the
principal part of this testimony, which was as follows:
Q. Tell us what the offer was you made them at that
time?
A. The offer was that on the-we offered them the same
scale as we are on now except we would add to it the
Health Fund if it was-I believe it was the Health Fund, it
was either the Health Fund or Pension Fund, but it wasn't
both. I recall it was one or the other and it is in my mind
that it was the Health Fund, we would make contributions
to the Teamster's Health Fund similar to the Earl Gibbon
contract and that we would get together further and work
out the noneconomic provisions but we would go ahead and
give them the check-off but we wanted it to terminate-we
wanted it to be at least as long as the Earl Gibbon contract
at the end of 1970.
Q. And what economic benefits did you propose insofar
as were paid to the employees?
A. The same pay.
Q. The prevailing rate of pay?
A. The prevailing rate of pay except we would make the
contributions for each employee to the Health Fund.
Q. That is the prevailing rate of pay that the Company
at that time was paying to its employees?
A. That is right, except per employee contribution to
the Health Plan, Bunch said . "Well, what about the
agreement?" and I said "What agreement?" He said "The
agreement we had about other things " I said "Mr. Bunch,
from what I saw in this room before you went to dinner
you didn't have any agreement but if you think you had
any agreement then the agreement is your own and I am
making you a firm offer here and now" he said to me "That
is no offer."s I
As indicated above, there is considerable confusion and
contradiction between the Respondent witnesses concerning
the April 24 meeting. I do not credit the testimony of Barker,
Sr., that at one point he was willing to agree to the 90-day
contract proposed by the Union which would include the
present Company benefits, but that the Union thereupon
sought to add other economic items . Indeed, True's testimony
reflects that just before lunch Barker told him that he did not
want to sign a short term contract of any nature, but that
rather he sought to obtain a contract for 4 to 5 year
term ... and this, according to True, to include terms which
would only incorporate the Respondent 's existing wages and
economic benefits. Concerning the April 25 meeting, I credit
the testimony of Bunch as hereinabove set forth.
On May 10, 1967, a final meeting was held before an
arbitrator of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
Both sides met individually with the arbitrator, but no progress
was made. Although thereafter both sides briefly met together
with the arbitrator, Bunch testified that most of this time was
taken up with True's discussion of the Respondent's financial
position. True testified without contradiction that he offered
to let the Union examine the Respondent's books and records
but that the Union refused. In short, nothing was accom-
plished at the May 10 meeting.
3. Conclusions as to the refusal to bargain
From the facts in this case as hereinabove set forth, I think
it abundantly clear that the Respondent did not enter into
49 The parties broke for lunch when Barker, Sr ., left the room because
he became ill.
50 True also testified at the hearing concerning his private discussion
with Company officials , but this testimony is much too confusing to
decipher . In fact , True's testimony concerning his entire negotiations with
the Union is so verbose, rambling and confused that it is difficult to draw
any conclusion even from his version as to what he claimed transpired.
5 r I specifically do not credit True's testimony to the effect that in the
session with Union officials after lunch he made any offer which would
include contributions to the Union's Health and Welfare Fund and a
checkoff provision.
114 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
negotiations with the good faith required by the Act. To the
contrary, I conclude and find that Respondent entered into
negotiations with a predetermined intent not to enter into a
contract with the Union and that in such "negotiations" as
finally did take place Respondent merely gave lip service to its
bargaining obligations 52 As to my finding of Respondent's
predetermined intent, I need only refer to the numerous
pronouncements, set forth in a preceding section herein, which
Respondent made to its employees that it would never sign a
contract with a union That these were not empty threats is
amply demonstrated by Respondent's subsequent conduct at
the bargaining table. In essence, the total bargaining picture
may be summed up as follows At the March 31 meeting, the
Respondent agreed, with possible minor exceptions, to accept
the first 12'f pages of the Union's contract proposals At the
following meeting on April 21, Respondent's attorney indi-
cated that the Gibbon contract which was then submitted by
the Union appeared to offer a reasonable basis for arriving at
agreement on econormc matters and he therefore promised
that utilizing the Gibbon contract as a guideline he would draft
a written counterproposal on behalf of the Respondent and
submit it to the Union before the next meeting True
admittedly failed to keep this commitment, and I find his
failure to submit any such counterproposal to be in itself an
indicia of a lack of good faith on behalf of the Respondent to
meet its bargaining obligations. Although at that point it still
was not too late to cure this deficiency, Respondent's further
conduct serves but to emphasize its complete rejection of the
collective bargaining principle Thus, when at the April 25
meeting Bunch finally offered a 90-100 day contract to
include nothing more than the existing Company benefits,
Respondent was not even willing to accept this all but
complete surrender by the Union in its effort to arrive at some
agreement. Instead, according to the best credit I can give
True's testimony, Respondent proposed that the Union accept
a contract to run for 4 or 5 years which would do nothing
more than to include prevailing Company benefits 53 Here, as
in N.L.R.B v. Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company, 205
F.2d 1 3 1 , 139 (C A 10), cert denied 346 U S 887, "it is
difficult to believe that the Company with a straight face and
in good faith could have supposed that this proposal had the
slightest chance of acceptance by a self-respecting union, or
even that it might advance the negotiations by affording a basis
of discussion, rather it looks more like a stalling tactic by a
party bent upon maintaining the pretense of bargaining "
In sum, I find and conclude that Respondent's whole course
of dealing with the Union clearly demonstrates that it engaged
in "surface bargaining" 54 and that at no time did it make a
genuine effort to reconcile the differences between it and the
Union, contrary to its obligation to approach the bargaining
table with an open mind and, through give and take negotia-
tions, to attempt to reach an agreement. L L Mature
Transport Company v N.L R B., 198 F 2d 735 (C.A 5)
Accordingly, I find that by failing to bargain in good faith with
the Union, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act 5 5
4. The unfair labor practice strike
On May 13, 1967, approximately 17 employees attended a
union meeting called by Union Representative Cherry Accord-
ing to the credited testimony of Cherry and four employee
witnesses who attended the meeting, 56 Cherry advised the em-
ployees of the Union's futile attempts to bargain with the
Respondent. He also noted the unfair labor practice charges
which had been filed concerning the discharge of Wiggins and
the suspensions of other employees In view of all the fore-
going, Cherry told the employees that it was his recommenda-
tion that strike action be taken. The employees thereupon
unanimously voted in favor of a strike and a strike, in which
not all of Respondent's employees participated, commenced
on the morning of May 14, 1967.57 Upon the entire record in
this case it is abundantly clear, and I find, that the strike
commenced as a result of Respondent's Section 8(a)(1), (3),
(4), and (5) unfair labor practices, as earlier found herein, and
that it remained an unfair labor practice strike at all times
material hereto.
F Respondent's Discharge of Striking Employees
and its Refusal to Reinstate Them Upon Their
Unconditional Offer to Return to Work
It is undisputed that by letter dated May 15, 1967, the
Respondent notified each of the striking employees as follows
Notice has been taken by the Company of your absence
from your job Unless this situation is remedied and you
return to your job within twenty-four (24) hours from date
of this letter you will be terminated and employment with
this Company will cease
George C. Jackson
Vice president
It is undisputed that all striking employees were terminated
on May 16, 1967, for the reason that they did not return to
work in accordance with the deadline set in the letter. Except
to the extent that economic strikers may be replaced, it is well
settled that it is an unfair labor practice to discharge
52 The briefs from the parties , including the Respondent , indicate that
they are amply familiar with the large body of law dealing with the
obligations of good -faith bargaining Accordingly , I do not deem it
necessary to burden this report with a lengthy citation of cases on the
subject.
53 It will be recalled that prior to the first bargaining meeting Barker,
Sr., asked Union Representative Cherry to postpone bargaining for 1 year.
Significantly , Barker , Sr., testified that during this conversation he told
Cherry, "Why don't you delay this until such time as we can publish these
new tariffs and our new tariff is going to give an increase and if you have a
contract after these tariffs then you could take credit for these increases. "
Obviously , although this testimony reflects that Respondent anticipated
higher earnings , any long term contract would foreclose the Union from
seeking any further wage adjustment.
54 N L.R.B. v. Herman Sausage Company, Inc., 275 F.2d 229 (C.A. 5)
55 In view of this overall finding, I deem it unnecessary to isolate and
pass upon each of the independent Section 8 (a)(5) allegations in the
complaint. The recommended remedial order herein requires Respondent
to bargain in good faith over all subject of collective bargaining. I do
specifically find, however , that the General Counsel has not sustained the
burden of proof as to paragraph 14 of the complaint and I shall
recommend that this allegation be dismissed.
56 Drevecky,Ayles,Wiggins,andAllen.
57 Referring to an isolated portion of Wiggins' testimony , Respondent
asserts in its brief that "a vote on a Company contract proposal was first
taken and refused by the employees " Upon the testimony of Cherry and
the employees who testified , including the entire testimony of Wiggins, it
is clear, and I find, that no such action occurred.
ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT CO.
employees who are not on strike' 8 Accordingly, I find that
Respondent additionally violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act by its discharge of the striking employees on May 16,
1967.
Finally, by letter dated September 11, 1967, the Union, as
the designated bargaining representative, notified the Respond-
ent, inter alia, as follows
This letter constitutes formal notification that each and
every one of the striking employees makes an unconditional
application to return to work as quickly as possible and that
each one of them specifically requests that his application
be considered as a continuing application and offer to
return to work when employment is available
The Respondent did not reply to the above letter and it is
undisputed that it did not reinstate the strikers pursuant to the
above unconditional application made on their behalf. As
unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to reinstatement to
their jobs upon unconditional application, regardless of
whether or not they have been replaced, Respondent's refusal
to reinstate the striking employees was in violation of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.' 9
IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of Re-
spondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (3), (4),
and (5) of the Act, it will be recommended that Respondent
be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
It has been found that the Respondent refused to bargain in
good faith with the Union that represented a majority of the
employees in an appropriate unit Accordingly, I shall recom-
mend that Respondent, upon request, bargain with the Union
as the exclusive representative of the employees in the
appropriate unit.
I have also found that the Respondent discriminatorily
denied reinstatement to the unfair labor practice strikers
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Respondent offer the
employees named in Appendix A, attached hereto, immediate
and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equiva-
lent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges, discharging, if necessary, any replace-
ments in order to provide work for such strikers.60 It is also
recommended that the Respondent reimburse the foregoing
58 N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegram Company, 304 U.S. 333,
347,N.L R.B v U.S. Cold Storage Company, 203 F.2d 924 (C.A. 5).
59 N.L.R.B. v. National Shirt Shops of Florida, Inc., 212 F.2d 491,
494 (C.A. 5).
60 It appears that some of these employees have been reinstated,
although the record is not clear as to the number or identity of such
employees. This factor , including the effect it may have upon the amount
of backpay owing to the striking employees , shall be taken into
consideration at the compliance stage of this proceeding.
115
employees for any loss of pay they may have suffered by
reason of the Respondent's discrimination against them, by
paying to each of these employees a sum of money equal to
the amount that he normally would have earned as wages from
the date of his unconditional application for reinstatement to
the date of the Respondent's offer of reinstatement, less his
net earnings during said period The amount of backpay due
shall be computed in the manner prescribed by the Board in F
W Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and with interest
thereon as prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716
Having found that the Respondent discriminatonly sus-
pended Carl E. Satcher, Roy Wiggins, David W Williams, and
C B Trout, it is recommended that Respondent make these
employees whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered
during the periods of their suspension, in the manner hereto-
fore indicated 61
In view of Respondent's refusal to bargain, its discrimina-
tion against employees, and its coercive statements, the
commission of similar and other unfair labor practices may be
anticipated I shall, therefore, recommend that Respondent
be ordered to cease and desist from in any manner infringing
upon the rights guaranteed to its employees by Section 7 of the
Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon
the entire record, I make the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1 Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2 General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union
No. 968, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3 All drivers, mechanics and general service men, domi-
ciled at the Respondent's Houston, Beaumont, and Dallas,
Texas, locations, but excluding all other employees. office
clerical employees, inside and outside salesmen, guards, watch-
men and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. General Drivers Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union
No. 968, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, at
all times material hereto, has been and still is the exclusive
representative of all the employees in the aforesaid unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the
aforesaid labor organization as the exclusive representative of
its employees in an appropriate unit, the Respondent has
61 It has been found that Roy Wiggins was discharged on March 30,
1967 Since his discharge occurred prior to the inception of the strike
period , his backpay shall run from March 24, 1966 (the date of his initial
suspension which was culminated with his discharge on March 30, 1967),
until such time as Respondent has offered him immediate and full
reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position, which
action is herewith recommended , without prejudice to his seniority and
other rights and privileges.
116 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6. The strike beginning on May 14, 1967, was at all times
an unfair labor practice strike.
7. By denying reinstatement to the strikers upon their
unconditional application, the Respondent has discriminated
in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of its
employees, thereby discouraging membership in the Union,
and has violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
8. By discriminatorily suspending Roy Wiggins, Carl E
Satcher, David W Williams, and C. B Trout, as found above,
and by discriminatorily discharging Roy Wiggins, as found
above, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act
9. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees
in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act, as found above, the Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
10. By requiring C. B. Trout to disavow the unfair labor
practice charge filed on his behalf as a condition to reinstating
his lease, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practice within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act
11. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act
12 The Respondent has not violated Section 8(a)(3) or (1)
of the Act by its suspension of Thomas Eugene Courtney
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions
of law, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, it is
recommended that Respondent Associated Transport Com-
pany of Texas, Inc , its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain in good faith concerning rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment with General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers
Local Union No. 968, affiliated with International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, as the exclusive representative of all drivers, mechan-
ics and general servicemen, domiciled at its Houston, Beau-
mont and Dallas, Texas locations, excluding all other employ-
ees, office clerical employees, inside and outside salesmen,
guards, watchmen and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) Discouraging membership in the above-named Union,
or in any other labor organization, by discharging, suspending,
refusing to reinstate, or otherwise discriminating against
employees in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment.
(c) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
union activities, sympathies and desires, coercively interroga-
ting employees concerning the union activities, sympathies and
desires of other employees, accusing employees of being
ringleaders in the Union; threatening employees with layoff,
closing of the terminal and loss of economic benefits,
threatening employees with bodily harm because of their
activity on behalf of the Union, and indicating that it will not
sign a contract with the Union.
(d) Requiring employees to disavow unfair labor practice
charges filed by them or on their behalf under threat of
economic reprisal.
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named
Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain
from any or all such activities
2 Take the following affirmative action which is necessary
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively in good faith with
General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union No.
968, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as the
exclusive representative of all drivers, mechanics and general
servicemen, domiciled at its Houston, Beaumont and Dallas,
Texas locations, excluding all other employees, office clerical
employees, inside and outside salesmen, guards, watchmen and
supervisors as defined in the Act, with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ-
ment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such
understanding in a signed written agreement.
(b) Offer to the employees named in Appendix A, attached
hereto, immediate and full reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights and privileges.
(c) Make whole the said employees, in the manner set forth
in the section entitled "The Remedy," for any loss of pay each
may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's discrimina-
tion against him
(d) Make whole Roy Wiggins, Carl E. Satcher, David W.
Williams and C B Trout, in the manner set forth in the section
entitled "The Remedy" for any loss of pay each may have
suffered by reason of the discrimination against him.
(e) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board
or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports necessary to analyze the amounts of all backpay
due and the rights to reinstatement under the terms of the
Recommended Order
(f) Post at its place of business and terminals in Houston,
Beaumont, and Dallas, Texas, coies of the notice attached to
this report as an Appendix B .62 Copies of the notice to be
furnished by the Regional Director for Region 23 shall be
posted immediately upon their receipt, after being duly signed
by a representative of the Respondent. When posted, they shall
remain posted for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicu-
ous places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that these notices are not altered,
defaced or covered by any other material.
62 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
the words "a Decision and Order " shall be substituted for the words "the
Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further Decision and Order."
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of the United States
ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT CO
(g) File with the Regional Director for Region 23 within 20
days from the date of service of this Decision, a written
statement setting forth the manner and form in which it has
complied with these Recommendations. 3 `
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dis-
missed insofar as it alleges violations other than those
specifically herein found.
63 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 23 , in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX A
Beaumont Terminal
William E. Allen
Clifford R. Buck
H J Holmes
Leonard C Jenkins
Hurles E. Pace
Harvey H. Sanders
Carl E Satcher
Roy Wiggins
Houston Terminal
Marvin L Ayles
Joe Bailey
Thomas E. Courtney
Leonard R. Drevecky
Elmer H. Henry
Conda Muse
C W. Stone
C B Trout
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner
of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to
effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, we hereby notify our employees that
WE WILL bargain, upon request, with General Drivers,
Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union No. 968, affiliated
with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as the exclusive
representative of all employees in the bargaining unit
described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment or other conditions of employment, and, if an
understanding is reached, embody it in a signed agreement.
The bargaining unit is
All drivers, mechanics and general service men, domiciled
at our Houston, Beaumont and Dallas, Texas locations,
excluding all office clerical employees, inside and outside
salesmen, guards, watchmen and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
117
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees
concerning their union activities, sympathies or desires or
those of other employees.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with layoff, closing
of the terminals, loss of economic benefits or with bodily
harm because of their activity on behalf of the Union
WE WILL NOT tell our employees that we will not sign
a contract with the Union
WE WILL NOT discriminate against any employee
because he has filed charges under the Act.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the above-
named labor organization, or any other labor organization
of our employees, by discriminating in regard to their hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition thereof
WE WILL make whole Carl E. Satcher, David W
Williams, C B. Trout, and Thomas Eugene Courtney for any
loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against
them.
WE WILL offer immediate and full reinstatement to Roy
Wiggins to his former or substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privi-
leges, and make him whole for any loss of earnings he may
have suffered because of the discrimination against him.
WE WILL offer the employees named in Appendix A,
attached hereto, immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, discharging, if
necessary, any replacements hired on or since May 14,
1967, and make them whole for any loss of pay suffered by
reason of the discrimination against them
All of our employees are free to become or remain, or
refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the above-
named Union, or any other labor organization.
ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT
COMPANY OF TEXAS, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from
the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this Notice or
compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly
with the Board's Regional Office, 6617 Federal Office Building,
515 Rusk Avenue, Houston, Texas 77002, Telephone
228-4721.