Ashley Elizabeth. Micks et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 14, 2019

14973454 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 14, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/973,454 12/17/2015 Ashley Elizabeth Micks 83606683 (FGTL-04700) 1084
130881 7590 08/14/2019
Stevens Law Group - FGTL
1754 Technology Drive, Suite 226
San Jose, CA 95110
EXAMINER
BERNS, MICHAEL ANDREW
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3663
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/14/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
uspto@stevenslawgroup.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ASHLEY ELIZABETH MICKS, HARPREETSINGH BANVAIT,
JINESH J. JAIN, BRIELLE REIFF, and SNEHA KADETOTAD
____________

Appeal 2019-000861
Application 14/973,4541
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before STEFAN STAICOVICI, JAMES P. CALVE, and LEE L. STEPINA,
Administrative Patent Judges.

STAICOVICI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision in the Final Office Action (dated Apr. 12, 2017, hereinafter “Final
Act.”) rejecting claims 1, 4–12, and 14–20.2 We have jurisdiction over the
appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

1 Ford Global Technologies, LLC is identified as the real party in interest in
Appellant’s Appeal Brief (filed May 16, 2018, hereinafter “Appeal Br.”)
Appeal Br. 3.
2 Claims 2, 3, and 13 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 21, 23 (Claims App.).
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INVENTION
Appellant’s invention relates to “methods, systems, and apparatuses
for detecting a vehicle’s turn signal status.” Spec. para. 1.
Claims 1, 11, and 16 are independent. Claims 1 and 11 are illustrative
of the claimed invention and read as follows:
1. A method comprising:
detecting, at a first vehicle, a presence of a second
vehicle in an adjacent lane;
identifying, in an image of the second vehicle, a sub-
portion of the image containing a turn signal indicator of the
second vehicle, wherein identifying the sub-portion
containing the turn signal indicator comprises processing the
image of the second vehicle using a first neural network
trained to recognize one or more turn signal regions of
interest;
processing the sub-portion of the image to determine a
state of the turn signal indicator using a second neural
network trained to determine a state of one or more turn
signal indicators; and
notifying a driver or performing a driving maneuver, at
the first vehicle, based on the state of the turn signal
indicator.

11. A driving control system for a vehicle, the system
comprising:
one or more sensors for obtaining sensor data in a region
near a vehicle, the one or more sensors comprising a camera;
a boundary component configured to identify a sub-
portion of an image containing a turn signal indicator of a
proximal vehicle, wherein the boundary component identifies
the sub-portion containing the turn signal indicator by
processing the image of the second vehicle using a first
neural network trained to recognize one or more turn signal
regions of interest;
a turn signal component configured to process the sub-
portion of the image to determine a state of the turn signal
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indicator using a second neural network trained to determine
a state of one or more turn signal indicators; and
a driving maneuver component configured to determine a
driving maneuver for the first vehicle based on the state of
the tum signal indicator.

REJECTIONS
I. Claims 11, 12, 14, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)
as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
II. Claims 11, 12, 14, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
as indefinite.
III. Claims 1, 4, 6–12, and 14–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Weisswange et al. (US
2016/0214647 A1; pub. July 28, 2016, hereinafter
“Weisswange”) in view of Lee (US 2016/0339959 A1; pub.
Nov. 24, 2016).
IV. Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Weisswange, Lee, and Ismail et al. (US 2016/0091609 A1;
pub. Mar. 31, 2016, hereinafter “Ismail”).

ANALYSIS
Rejection I
Interpretation of Claims 11, 12, 14, and 15 Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f)
The Examiner interprets the limitations “boundary component,” “turn
signal component,” and “driving maneuver component,” as recited by
independent claim 11, as limitations that invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) because
“they use a generic placeholder ‘component’ coupled with functional
language without reciting sufficient structure to achieve the function,” and,
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moreover, “the generic placeholder is not preceded by a structural modifier.”
Final Act. 5; see also Examiner’s Answer (dated Sept. 11, 2018, hereinafter
“Ans.”) 10.
In response, Appellant disagrees with the Examiner’s interpretation of
independent claim 11, and its dependent claims 12, 14, and 15, as means-
plus-function claims. See Appeal Br. 11. Appellant contends that “the
claims recite sufficient structure, material, and/or acts” for performing the
claimed functions. Id. at 12. According to Appellant, “the claim language
includes sufficient acts for performing the claimed function.” Reply Brief
(filed Nov. 7, 2018, hereinafter “Reply Br.”) 5 (emphasis added). More
specifically, Appellant notes that independent claim 11 recites the acts of:
(1) “processing the image of the second vehicle using a first neural network
trained to recognize one or more turn signal regions of interest;” (2) “using a
second neural network trained to determine a state of one or more turn signal
indicators;” and (3) “based on the state of the turn signal indicator” for
performing the functions of the claimed “boundary component,” “turn signal
component,” and “driving maneuver component,” respectively. Id. at 2, 5–6
(emphasis omitted).
For the following reasons, we agree with the Examiner’s
determination that independent claim 11, and its dependent claims 12, 14,
and 15, invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). We appreciate that “failure to use the
word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply.”
Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. Inti Trade Commission, 161
F.3d 696, 703–704 (Fed. Cir. 1998). However, “[i]n deciding whether [this]
presumption has been rebutted, the focus remains on whether the claim as
properly construed recites sufficiently definite structure to avoid the ambit of
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§ 112, ¶ 6.” Id. at 704. Generic terms such as “mechanism,” “element,”
“device,” and other nonce words that reflect nothing more than
verbal constructs may be used in a claim in a manner that is tantamount to
using the word “means” because they “typically do not connote sufficiently
definite structure” and therefore may invoke section 112, para. 6. See
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see
also Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“To
invoke [35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6], the alleged means-plus-function claim
element must not recite a definite structure which performs the described
function.”). Here, although independent claim 11 does not use the term
“means,” nonetheless, claim 11 includes the non-structural generic term
“component.” See Appeal Br. 22–23. Also, we note that use of the terms
“boundary,” “turn signal,” and “driving maneuver” do not modify the term
“component” to recite sufficiently definite structure to preclude the
invocation of 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), but merely describe the function of the
“component.” Specifically, the “boundary component” identifies “a sub-
portion of an image,” i.e., identifies a boundary, the “turn signal component”
determines “a state of the turn signal indicator,” and, the “driving maneuver
component” determines “a driving maneuver.” See id.
Furthermore, we do not agree with Appellant that independent claim
11 recites sufficient acts for performing the specified function of each of the
claimed “boundary component,” “turn signal component,” and “driving
maneuver component.” For example, even though we appreciate that the
function of “identify[ing] a sub-portion of an image” is performed by the
“boundary component” by “processing the image . . . using a first neural
network,” the generic act of “processing . . . using a first neural network,” is
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not sufficient to impart structure.3 In a similar manner, although the
function of “determin[ing] a state of the turn signal indicator” is performed
by the “turn signal component” by “using a second neural network trained to
determine a state of one or more turn signal indicators” the generic act of
“using a second neural network” is likewise not sufficient to impart
structure. In other words, the acts of processing by and/or using a computer,
i.e., a neural network, to perform each of the specified functions of the
claimed “boundary component,” “turn signal component,” and “driving
maneuver component” is not sufficient to impart structure.
As such, for the foregoing reasons, the claim term “component” is not
otherwise modified by any structure, material, or acts for performing the
claimed function. Accordingly, the rebuttable presumption that 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(f) does not apply due to the lack of the term “means” is overcome.
Therefore, we construe the limitations “boundary component,” “turn signal
component,” and “driving maneuver component,” recited in independent
claim 11, as invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), and, thus, as being limited to “the
structure, materials, or acts described in the [S]pecification . . .
corresponding to the claimed function and equivalents thereof.” Williamson
v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing
Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp., 325 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).

3 A “neural network” is “computer architecture in which a number of
processors are interconnected in a manner suggestive of the connections
between neurons in a human brain and which is able to learn by a process of
trial and error.” See https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/neural%20network (last visited July 31, 2019).
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Rejection of claims 11, 12, 14, and 15 Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)
The Examiner rejects independent claim 11, and its dependent claims
12, 14, and 15, under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to comply with the
written description requirement, because independent claim 11 invokes 35
U.S.C. § 112(f) and the Specification fails to disclose “corresponding
structure to the means plus function limitations.” Final Act. 2–3.
Appellant contends the Specification describes “using ‘a special
purpose or general-purpose computer including hardware, such as, for
example, one or more processors and system memory’” and “including
computer readable media, networks, computer-executable instructions, and
numerous other details,” to satisfy the written description requirement.
Appeal Br. 9 (citing Spec., paras. 15–34, Fig. 1). Appellant points to Figure
6 and paragraphs 44, 49–55, 61, and 62 of the Specification as describing the
claimed “boundary component,” “turn signal component,” and “driving
maneuver component.” Id. Appellant further notes that the Specification
describes “[d]ata structures or hardware structures such as deep neural
networks [and] a decision matrix.” Id. at 10 (citing Spec., para. 12).
The Examiner responds that the Specification describes respective
functions of the claimed “boundary component,” “turn signal component,”
and “driving maneuver component,” but does not sufficiently describe
structures or algorithms for performing the claimed functions. See Ans. 4–5.
According to the Examiner, Appellant’s “Figure 6 is merely a schematic
block diagram and discloses no structure or algorithm” and paragraphs 44,
49–55, 61, and 62 of the Specification describe the functions of the claimed
“boundary component,” “turn signal component,” and “driving maneuver
component,” but not the structure to perform the functions. Id. at 4.
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According to the Specification, the claimed “boundary component,”
“turn signal component,” and “driving maneuver component” perform the
functions discussed above in Rejection I using “hardware, software,
firmware, digital components, or analog components” that include a
computer (personal, laptop, desktop, PDAs, mainframe, mini, mobile
telephones), computer storage media (RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM,
SSDs), a computer network (hardwired, wireless), computer executable
instructions (binaries, assembly language, source code), and application
specific integrated circuits (ASIC). See Spec. paras. 15–20. However, such
a generic listing that encompasses any and all means that may be used to
accomplish the claimed functions, without providing the specific structure,
does not reasonably convey to a person having ordinary skill in the art that
Appellant had possession of the subject matter later claimed.
Furthermore, in a case such as this, which involves special purpose
computer-implemented means-plus-function limitations, the Federal Circuit
“has consistently required that the structure disclosed in the [S]pecification
be more than simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor,” and
that the Specification must disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed
functions. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty. Ltd. V. International Game Tech.,
521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Federal Circuit has held that “the
[S]pecification can express the algorithm ‘in any understandable terms
including as a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or in any
other manner that provides sufficient structure.’” Noah Systems, Inc. v.
Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Finisar Corp. v.
DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Noah states
“[s]imply disclosing software, however, ‘without providing some detail
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about the means to accomplish the function[,] is not enough.’” Id. (citing
Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1340–41).
Here, the Specification provides neither a mathematical formula, a
flow chart, nor any prose description of a “boundary component,” a “turn
signal component,” and a “driving maneuver component.” At best, the
Specification refers generically to the use of a neural network or decision
matrix, but provides no details on their structure or on how they accomplish
the function recited by the claims. See Spec. paras. 50, 51, and 61.
Appellant’s Figure 6 is merely a block diagram that illustrates the claimed
“boundary component,” “turn signal component,” and “driving maneuver
component,” but does not illustrate how they function. Furthermore, the
description of “object recognition algorithms” or “edge or boundary finding
image processing algorithms,” without any other details, does not impose
any particular structure on the generically described first and second neural
networks of the “boundary” and “turn signal” components, respectively. See
id., para. 49. According to Noah, this is insufficient to provide sufficient
structure in the Specification to avoid pure functional claiming, i.e., such
disclosure is not “adequate disclosure” to qualify as “corresponding
structure” that performs the claimed function. Noah, 675 F.3d at 1311–12,
1314–17.
Hence, for the foregoing reasons, we agree with the Examiner’s
determination that independent claim 11, and its dependent claims 12, 14,
and 15, do not comply with the written description requirement, due to the
absence of a mathematical formula, prose, a flow chart, or other types of
detailed descriptive support for the means-plus-function language. As the
Specification fails to provide adequate descriptive support for the
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corresponding structure of the claimed “boundary component,” “turn signal
component,” and “driving maneuver component,” we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of independent claim 11, and dependent claims 12, 14, and 15,
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), as failing to comply with the written description
requirement.

Rejection II
The Examiner also rejects independent claim 11, and its dependent
claims 12, 14, and 15, under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite, because
independent claim 11 invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) and the Specification fails
to disclose “corresponding structure to the means-plus-function limitations,”
similarly as discussed above. Final Act. 3.
Appellant argues that the claims are not indefinite in light of the
Specification describing structure for the means-plus-function limitations, as
discussed above. Appeal Br. 10–11; see also Reply Br. 4.
However, for the reasons discussed above, we also agree with the
Examiner’s determination that independent claim 11 is indefinite. “Failure
to describe adequately the necessary structure, material, or acts in the written
description means that the drafter has failed to comply with the mandate of
§ 112 ¶ 2[] . . . the mandate that all claims must particularly point out and
distinctly claim the subject matter which applicants regards as his
invention.” In re Dossel, 115 F.3d 942, 946 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In this case,
as discussed supra in Rejection I, we cannot determine what structure is
required to achieve the respective functions of the claimed “boundary
component,” “turn signal component,” and “driving maneuver component,”
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because the Specification provides neither a mathematical formula, a flow
chart, nor any prose description to achieve the respective functions.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the claimed “boundary
component,” “turn signal component,” and “driving maneuver component”
lack sufficient precision to permit one of ordinary skill in the art to
adequately determine the metes and bounds thereof. See Haliburton Energy
Services, Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Although
applicants are allowed to claim their inventions broadly, they must do so in a
way that distinctly identifies the boundaries of their claims.). Accordingly,
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 11, and dependent
claims 12, 14, and 15, under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), as being indefinite.

Rejection III
Rejection of claims 11, 12, 14, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
In view of the Examiner’s determination that independent claim 11
and dependent claims 12, 14, and 15 are indefinite, it follows that the prior
art rejection of claims 11, 12, 14, and 15 must fall because it is necessarily
based on speculative assumptions as to the meaning of the claims. See In re
Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–63 (CCPA 1962). It should be understood,
however, that our decision in this regard is pro forma and based solely on
the indefiniteness of the claimed subject matter, and does not reflect on the
adequacy of the prior art evidence applied in support of the rejections.

Rejection of claims 1, 4–10, and 16–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner finds Weisswange discloses most of the limitations of
independent claims 1 and 16 including, inter alia, detecting a presence of a
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vehicle [11] located in an adjacent lane, identifying in an image of the
detected vehicle a sub-portion that contains a turn signal indicator, and
determining a state of the turn signal indicator by processing the sub-portion
of the image. Final Act. 7 (citing Weisswange, paras. 27–29, 33, 35, Fig. 3),
10–11. However, the Examiner further finds that Weisswange fails to
disclose use of a neural network. Id. at 7, 11. Nonetheless, the Examiner
finds Lee discloses that “identifying the sub-portion containing the turn
signal indicator comprises processing the image of the . . . vehicle using a
first neural network trained to recognize one or more turn signal regions of
interest . . . and using a second neural network trained to determine a state of
one or more turn signal indicators.” Id. at 7, 11 (citing Lee, para. 120).4
Thus, the Examiner concludes that
It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the
relevant art before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention to combine the method as disclosed by Weisswange
with the use of neural networks, as disclosed by Lee, to process
the image to recognize a turn signal region and determine the
state of a turn signal indicator to identify driving conditions on
the roadway, using a standard processing technique.

Id.
Appellant argues that because “Weisswange is completely silent as to
how the turn signal is identified,” Weisswange “fails to disclose identifying,
in an image of the . . . vehicle [11], a sub-portion of the image containing a
turn signal indicator of the second vehicle.” Appeal Br. 16 (emphasis
omitted).

4 The Examiner identified citations in the Final Action to paragraph 0120 of
Lee is “a typographical error and should be 0170.” Ans. 11.
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The Examiner responds that Weisswange discloses identifying a turn
signal for vehicle 11 by image processing vehicle 11 to establish grid cells.
Ans. 11 (citing Weisswange, para. 33). According to the Examiner,
“Weisswange . . . does not describe in detail any sub-portion of the image,
but it is assumed that the ‘grid cells’ labeled for [vehicle] 11 are processed to
determine the turn signal indicator.” Id. (emphasis added).
Appellant’s argument is persuasive, because the Examiner’s finding
that Weisswange processes grid cells to identify a turn signal is inadequately
supported. Specifically, Weisswange discloses a system for assisting a
driver of an ego vehicle in estimating future movement behavior of first and
second vehicles 10, 11 using a plurality of sensors 2.1, 2.2 mounted on the
ego vehicle that generate a grid shaped representation 13 defining a top-
down view of an environment sensed by sensors 2.1, 2.2 including grid cells
assigned with labels for characteristic information, such as “car” for first and
second vehicles 10, 11 “obstacle” for building 12, “road” for road 9, and
“free” for areas to the right and left of road 9 where driving is not possible.
See Weisswange, paras. 29, 30. Weisswange further discloses employing
information from grid shaped representation 13 and other sensed data to
estimate future movement behavior of vehicle 11, including identifying a
turn signal for vehicle 11. See id. paras. 32, 33.
However, Weisswange does not disclose how its driver assisted
system processes the information from grid shaped representation 13 and
other sensed data from sensors 2.1, 2.2 to identify a turn signal for
vehicle 11. Thus, the Examiner’s assumption that the “‘grid cells’ labeled
for [vehicle] 11 are processed to determine the turn signal indicator” requires
speculation on the Examiner’s part. See Ans. 11. The Examiner has not
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provided sufficient evidence or technical reasoning for a skilled artisan to
determine that Weisswange processes grid cells 13 labeled for vehicle 11 to
identify both the turn signal indicator and the status of the turn signal
indicator. See In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967) (holding
that “[t]he legal conclusion of obviousness must be supported by facts.
Where the legal conclusion is not supported by facts it cannot stand.”).
Furthermore, the Examiner’s position of using Lee’s neural networks
to process an image to both recognize a turn signal region and to determine
the state of the turn signal indicator in Weisswange likewise is based on
speculation. See Final Act. 7, 11. Specifically, Lee discloses driver
assistance apparatus 100 having processor 170 for processing images
received from a camera including, inter alia, object detector 434 and object
verification unit 346. See Lee, para. 156. Lee further discloses that object
detector 434 detects an object from an image, whereas object verification
unit 346 classifies and verifies, i.e., identifies, the object via “an
identification method using a neural network.” Id., paras. 168–170.
Hence, although Lee discloses employing a first neural network for
classifying and verifying, i.e., identifying, an object detected from an image,
Lee lacks any disclosure of using a second neural network to determine a
state of the identified object. The Examiner has not provided sufficient
evidence or technical reasoning for a skilled artisan to determine that Lee’s
neural network is trained to both identify an object from an image and to
determine a state of the object, i.e., “a state of the turn signal indicator” as
claimed. Just because “[n]eural networks are . . . a well known
mathematical process,” as the Examiner contends, this does not mean that
Lee’s neural network is trained to both identify an object from an image and
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to determine a state of the object. See Ans. 11. Furthermore, even though
the Examiner’s position is that application of a known neural network, such
as Lee’s, to turn signal processing in particular would have been obvious to
a person of ordinary skill in the art, the Examiner has not made any finding
as to the particular type of neural networks called for in independent claims
1 and 16, namely, first and second neural networks trained (programmed) to
identify an object from an image (“trained to recognize one or more turn
signal regions of interest”) and to determine a state of the object (“trained to
determine a state of one or more turn signal indicators”), respectively.
In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims 1, 4, 6–10, and 16–20
as unpatentable over Weisswange and Lee.

Rejection IV
The Examiner’s use of the Ismail disclosure does not remedy the
deficiency of the combination of Weisswange and Lee discussed supra. See
Final Act. 12–13. Thus, for the reasons discussed above, we also do not
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 5 as unpatentable over the
combined teachings of Weisswange, Lee, and Ismail.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 11, 12, 14, and 15 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) is affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 11, 12, 14, and 15 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) is affirmed.
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The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 4, 6–12, and 14–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Weisswange and Lee is reversed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Weisswange, Lee, and Ismail is reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART