Arti Arora et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 31, 2020

10319182 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
10/319,182 12/13/2002 Arti Arora 113027.000031US1 6211
79804 7590 01/31/2020
Duncan Galloway Egan Greenwald, PLLC
9625 Ormsby Station Road
Louisville, KY 40223
EXAMINER
WONG, ERIC TAK WAI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3692
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/31/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
carnold@dgeglaw.com
kduncan@dgeglaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ARTI ARORA and EDWARD LAZEAR
____________

Appeal 2018-007209
Application 10/319,182
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ANTON W. FETTING, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and
KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judges.

FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 15–22 and 36–49. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as, Thomson
Reuters Global Resources Unlimited Company. Appeal Br. 1.

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THE INVENTION
The Appellant’s disclosure is to “digital processing and more
specifically to a system for analyzing allocation of factors relevant to
business operations.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Claim 15, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal.
15. A method for facilitating financial performance management of a
business organization, the method comprising:
using a business logic engine comprising a set of rules configured to
generate financial management projections and implemented in a computer
system having a processor and a memory and configured to provide at least a
first financial management projection by performing a first allocation of
costs and revenue among a plurality of business entities and a second
financial management projection by performing a second allocation of costs
and revenue among the plurality of business entities comprising the business
organization, wherein the first and second allocations of costs and revenue
are performed based on a determined change of data associated with the
plurality of business entities, and wherein the first and second financial
management projections comprise financial metrics associated with business
objectives for financial management excluding tax strategies, the business
objectives comprising one or more of: aligning legal entity structures with
management structures, resolving internal conflicts, and responding to
external changes;
providing by the computer system the at least first and second
financial management projections as user interface elements in a graphical
user interface arranged in a configuration adapted to support selecting a
desired allocation of cost and revenue among the plurality of business
entities; and
receiving by the computer a signal related to a selected desired
allocation of cost and revenue among the plurality of business entities.

THE REJECTION
The Examiner relies upon no evidence.
The following rejection is before us for review.
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Claims 15–22 and 36–49 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because
the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter.

FINDINGS OF FACT
We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 2–11 in the
Final Office Action2 and on pages 4–13 in the Examiner’s Answer.

35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will affirm the rejection of claims 15–22 and 36–49 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Appellant argues claims 15–22 and 36–49 as a group. (Appeal Br.
7). We select claim 15 as the representative claim for this group, and so the
remaining claims stand or fall with claim 15. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with

2 All references to the Final Office Action refer to the Final Office Action
mailed on September 13, 2017.
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that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept
of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
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attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice, or mental processes);
and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c),
(e)–(h)).
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception.
See Guidance.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that
“the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in
light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v.
Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether
the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology
or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers
are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36.
In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong
test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the
claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies],
rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance at
53; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
The Specification states:
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Maximizing financial performance is critical for
businesses. However, this goal requires understanding
complex interactions and tradeoffs that result from
allocation of factors, such as cost and revenues, within a
business. Businesses that have different geographic
locations are subjected to different laws in different
locations. Laws are often highly detailed and can
implicate many characteristics of business operation such
as transfer and handling of goods, tariffs, taxes,
environmental effects, securities-related actions,
management actions, compensation, and others. Even
within a single legal jurisdiction, different laws and
regulations may come into play to affect financial
performance depending on the company's actions.
¶ 3.
The preamble says claim 15 is “for facilitating financial performance
management of a business organization.” Understood in light of the
Specification, claim 15, recites, in pertinent part the abstractions of:
using … a set of rules . . . to generate financial
management projections and implemented … to provide
at least a first financial management projection by
performing a first allocation of costs and revenue among
a plurality of business entities and a second financial
management projection by performing a second
allocation of costs and revenue among the plurality of
business entities comprising the business organization,
wherein the first and second allocations of costs and
revenue are performed based on a determined change of
data associated with the plurality of business entities, and
wherein the first and second financial management
projections comprise financial metrics associated with
business objectives for financial management excluding
tax strategies, the business objectives comprising one or
more of: aligning legal entity structures with
management structures, resolving internal conflicts, and
responding to external changes;

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. . . selecting a desired allocation of cost and
revenue among the plurality of business entities; and
receiving . . . a selected desired allocation of cost
and revenue among the plurality of business entities.

Accordingly, the Examiner found that “the claims are directed
to performing projections of allocations of costs and revenue among a
plurality of business entities, which is a fundamental economic
practice and therefore an abstract idea.” (Final Act. 5).
We agree and thus ourselves find that claim 15 recites a method of
generating financial management projections by performing projections of
allocations of costs and revenue among a plurality of business entities based
on a determined change of data associated with the plurality of business
entities. Our finding here is consistent with the Examiner’s “directed to”
finding and the intrinsic evidence listed above. Financial management
objectives which are based on, “financial metrics associated with business
objectives for financial management excluding tax strategies, the business
objectives comprising one or more of: aligning legal entity structures with
management structures, resolving internal conflicts, and responding to
external changes,” are an important economic principle in that they provide
a metric to maintain a business entity’s solvency. The patent-ineligible end
of the spectrum includes fundamental economic principles because it is an
enumerated type of certain method of organizing human activity, which is
itself a judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52, citing Alice, 573 U.S.
at 220.
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 15 only
generically requires “computer system having a processor and a memory”
and “a graphical user interface” These components are described in the
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Specification at a high level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 34, 35, 37, 47, 48,
and Fig. 1. We fail to see how the generic recitations of these most basic
computer components and/or of a system so integrates the judicial exception
as to “impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the
claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 53.
Thus, we find that the claims recite the judicial exception of a
fundamental economic principle that is not integrated into a practical
application.
That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be
limited to financial management projections, does not make them any less
abstract. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization
or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not
make them any less abstract.”).
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
the claims are directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claims must
include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must
be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim
in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at
72–73).
Concerning this step the Examiner found the following:
The claims do not include limitations that are
‘significantly more’ than the abstract idea because the claims do
not include an improvement to another technology or technical
field, an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself,
or meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of
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an abstract idea to a particular technological environment. Note
that the limitations, in the instant claims, are done by the
generically recited computer products. The generically recited
computer elements such as ‘business logic engine’, ‘processor’,
‘memory’, ‘computer system’, ‘computer’, ‘user input device’,
and ‘module’ do not add a meaningful limitation to the abstract
idea because they would be routine in computer
implementation. The steps for data gathering and processing do
not add a meaningful limitation to the method as they would be
routinely used by those of ordinary skill in the art in order to
apply the abstract idea.
Final Act. 7–8. We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is
whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to
implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 225. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to generate, allocate, determine changes in, display and apply
decision criteria to data as a result amounts to electronic data query and
retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these
computer functions are well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also In re Katz Interactive
Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’
‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any
general purpose computer without special programming.”). In short, each
step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic
computer functions. The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the
functioning of the computer itself. In addition, as we stated above, the
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claims do not affect an improvement in any other technology or technical
field. The Specification spells out different generic equipment and
parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps
such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of
information access under different scenarios (see, e.g., See Spec. ¶¶ 34, 35,
37, 47, 48, and Fig. 1). Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing
significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea using some
unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to
transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 225–226.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellants’ claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are
considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (generate,
allocate, determine changes, display and apply decision criteria to data) and
storing is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract.
See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing
access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings,
LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation,
display, and transmission was abstract), Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast
Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding
sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract).
The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional.
We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant has submitted
concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected
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under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (App. Br. 7–19, Reply Br. 1–5). We find that our
analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which
have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various
arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
Appellant argues: “The Examiner's characterization of the claim
limitations is an overbroad and improper abstraction of the claimed
limitations, and even if it did accurately capture the claimed invention,
which it does not, this summarized version of the claim is still not directed
towards an unpatentable abstract idea.” (Appeal Br. 8–9).
We disagree with Appellant because concerning the alleged over–
breath, an abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of
abstraction. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). As to Appellant’s assertion that the Examiner’s summarized
version of the claim is not directed to an abstract idea, we disagree for the
reasons we have stated above that the claims are directed to a fundamental
economic principle which is an enumerated judicial exception. See
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52, citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 220.
Appellant next argues,
The method described in the present invention is far
removed from the concepts of risk hedging and
intermediated settlements and solves a problem unique
the computer modeling of financial management
projections using a special purpose computer comprising
at least a business logic engine and a user interface
having specific user interface elements, one that did not
exist prior to the advent of computers.
(Appeal Br. 9).
As described above, the only claim elements beyond the abstract idea
are the “computer system having a processor and a memory” and “a
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graphical user interface.” Appellant has not shown nor does it deny that the
operation of these components is well-understood, routine, or conventional,
where, as here, there is nothing in the Specification to indicate that the
operations recited in claim 15 require any specialized hardware or inventive
computer components, or that the claimed process is implemented using
other than generic computer components to perform generic computer
functions, e.g., receiving, processing, and transmitting information. Indeed,
the Federal Circuit, in accordance with Alice, has “repeatedly recognized the
absence of a genuine dispute as to eligibility” where claims have been
defended as involving an inventive concept based “merely on the idea of
using existing computers or the Internet to carry out conventional processes,
with no alteration of computer functionality.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890
F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Appellants also argue,
claim 15 is not directed to one of these patent ineligible
concepts and actually improves the functioning of a computer
and existing technology. See Specification, paras. [60-62] (‘For
the sake of efficiency, the system calculates only those portions
of the model that are actually affected by user changes . . .
[t]his saves time’).
(Appeal Br.10)
In light of the breadth of the claim, the Appellant’s argument is not
persuasive as to error in the rejection. Calculating only those portions of the
model that are actually affected by user changes is a mental process. We as
humans do it all the time with our memory, acting on those items in a group
of items that only need addressing. A claim for a new abstract idea is still an
abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138,
1151 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90).
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Appellant lists various claim limitations (Appeal Br. 12) as examples
of improvements without providing evidence that they are improvements in
the computer as contrasted with financial projection tactics. There is
insufficient evidence in the record before us that the claimed subject matter
reflects any such improvement, i.e., that the claimed method allows “the
computer system to perform the method in a faster manner.” Again the idea
of recalculating only those items which are listed as needing calculation is
an abstraction. The claims do not recite a particular way of programming or
designing the software to create a determined change/improvement, but
instead merely claim the resulting systems. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“directed to
a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic
processes and machinery”). There is no further discussion in the
Specification of the particular technology for performing this claimed step.
See Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1263
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appellants further argue, “claim 15 is directed towards novel subject
matter that could not be replicated by a human performing mental steps.
The novel steps of claim 15 could not be performed in a human mind.”
(Appeal Br. 14).
A novel and non-obvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is,
nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981) (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or
steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”). Although the claims
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purport to accelerate the process of generating financial management
projections, our reviewing court has held that speed and accuracy
increases stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general purpose
computer “do[] not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed
subject matter.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can.
(U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Here, the Appellant has not
produced evidence showing that the claimed computations cannot be made
by human interaction using a pen and paper. Instead, Appellant appears to
be relying on attorney argument alone. It is well settled that merely using a
computer to perform more efficiently what could otherwise be accomplished
manually does not confer patent-eligibility. See Id. at 1279.
We also disagree with Appellants that under the holding in Enfish,
LLC v. Microsoft Corp our decision would be different. (Appeal Br. 15–16).
In Enfish, the invention at issue was directed at a wholly new type of logical
model for a computer database: a self-referential table that allowed the
computer to store many different types of data in a single table and index
that data by column and row information. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1330–32. In
finding the claims “not directed to an abstract idea,” but “to a specific
improvement to the way computers operate,” the Federal Circuit noted that
“the claims are not simply directed to any form of storing tabular data, but
instead are specifically directed to a self-referential table for a computer
database.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336–37 (emphasis in original). We find
nothing in the claims before us in the generically claimed “computer system
having a processor and a memory” and a “graphical user interface” which
rises to the level of technical proficiency as found in Enfish. Instead, we
find the claims are focused on “economic or other tasks for which a
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computer is used in its ordinary capacity.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
822 F.3d 1336.
Likewise we fail to see the similarities asserted by Appellants (Appeal
Br. 18–19) between the claims on appeal here and those adjudicated in DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P. 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Appeal Br. 18–19. In DDR Holdings, the Court evaluated the eligibility
of claims “address[ing] the problem of retaining website visitors that, if
adhering to the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink
protocol, would be instantly transported away from a host’s website
after ‘clicking’ on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink.” Id. at
1257. There, the Court found that the claims were patent eligible because
they transformed the manner in which a hyperlink typically functions to
resolve a problem that had no “pre-Internet analog.” Id. at 1258. The
Court cautioned, however, “that not all claims purporting to address
Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” Id. Appellant provides
no support for its contention that the claims address a technological problem
“particular to the internet” by implementing a system “solv[ing] a problem
unique to an electronic computing environment.” Appeal Br. at 18.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 15–22 and
36–49 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

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DECISION
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is affirmed.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
15–22, 36–49 101 15–22, 36–49

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED