Armco Steel Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 29, 1977

232 N.L.R.B. 696 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Armco Steel Corporation and Robert G. Patterson.
Case 6-CA-8588
September 29, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND MURPHY
On December 28, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Irwin H. Socoloff issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, the General Counsel filed
cross-exceptions and a brief in response to Respon-
dent's exceptions and in support of his cross-excep-
tions; Respondent filed a brief in answer to the
General Counsel's cross-exceptions; the General
Counsel filed a "Motion to Strike Respondent's
Reply Brief'; 2 and Respondent filed an "Opposition
to Counsel for the General Counsel's Motion to
Strike and/or Motion for Leave to File 3 and/or
Motion to Strike Portions of Counsel for General
Counsel's Brief in Response to Exceptions."4
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions5 of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified
herein.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as
modified below, and hereby orders that the Respon-
dent, Armco Steel Corporation, Butler, Pennsylva-
nia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the said recommended
Order, as so modified:
The General Counsel has excepted to the Administrative Law Judge's
failure to order Respondent to rescind the warning letter given to employee
Patterson and to expunge it from his personnel records. We find merit in this
exception and accordingly shall provide for such action in our Order and
notice.
2 The General Counsel's motion to strike Respondent's reply brief is
hereby denied as lacking in merit.
3 Respondent's motion for leave to file its answering brief is hereby
granted.
4 Respondent's motion to strike portions of counsel Ibr General
Counsel's brief in response to exceptions is hereby denied as lacking in
merit.
5 We agree with the Administrative Law Judge, for the reasons set forth
fully by him, that Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(I) by threatening to
discharge employee Patterson for soliciting on company property to secure
232 NLRB No. 110
1. Insert as paragraph 2(a) the following and
reletter subsequent paragraphs accordingly:
"(a) Rescind the warning letter given to employee
Robert G. Patterson on April 18, 1975, and expunge
from his personnel file any reference thereto."
2. Insert footnote reference 13 at the end of
paragraph 1(c), insert the following as footnote 13,
and renumber the following footnote accordingly:
"13 Nothing herein, however, shall be construed as
precluding Respondent from adopting a valid no-
solicitation rule."
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
MEMBER JENKINS, concurring:
I agree with my colleagues that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by admonishing
Charging Party Robert G. Patterson to cease his
solicitation activities on company property or face
disciplinary action. However, I reject as erroneous
and contrary to the teachings of the Supreme Court
as explicated in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Addition Community Organization, et al., 420 U.S. 50
(1975), the rationale employed by the Administrative
Law Judge and adopted by my colleagues for
reaching this result.
In brief, the record shows that Respondent and the
recognized bargaining agent at Respondent's Butler
plant (Butler Armco Independent Union) agreed to a
systemic reform of the existing seniority rules and
practices at that location. The impetus for this reform
was provided by a Title VII suit involving Respon-
dent and other employers and the Steelworkers
Union, which represented Respondent's employees
at several locations other than the Butler works. This
litigation resulted in a consent decree requiring
Respondent and the Steelworkers to institute em-
ployee seniority systems based solely upon plant
continuous service. The changes in seniority institut-
ed at the Butler plant by agreement of Respondent
and the Butler Armco Independent Union closely
tracked the seniority reforms promulgated in the
consent decree and were expressly designed:
signatures on a petition because of dissatisfaction with the contractual
seniority system. Contrary to our concurring colleague, we think this case is
clearly distinguishable from Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition
Community Organization, et al., 420 U.S. 50 (1975), in that the Charging
Party here circulated a petition, addressed to both the Employer and the
incumbent Union, to renegotiate the seniority agreement. Specifically, the
petition stated, inter alia, "We feel since the Company and Independent
Union entered into this Agreement on a voluntary basis, it was a completely
negotiable agreement, and was not negotiated to the best interests of all
employees concerned.... We therefore Petition both parties to renegotiate
the entire Program ... " Thus, unlike Emporium, where the minority
employees sought to bargain directly with the employer, bypassing the
union, here the Charging Party sought to require both the Employer and the
Union to renegotiate the agreement.
696
ARMCO STEEL CORP.
to provide equal employment opportunities with-
out distinction based on race, color, sex or
national origin to all employees at the Butler
works ....
Shortly after the implementation of seniority
reforms at Butler the Charging Party commenced his
solicitation of signatures on two peitition forms. One
of these petitions was directed "against the hourly
members of the Seniority Program Committee" and
called for the replacement of such members because
of their alleged failure to represent fairly all Butler
employees. The second petition, on the other hand,
was directed squarely against the agreement to, and
implementation of, the reforms in seniority. This
petition called upon both Respondent and the
Independent Union "to renegotiate the entire [se-
niority] Program, and to use department and unit
seniority .... " On April 16, 1975, and again on
April 18, 1975, Respondent directed Charging Party
Patterson to cease his solicitation on company
property on pain of discipline or discharge.
In finding Respondent's conduct unlawful because
it interfered with Patterson's Section 7 rights, the
Administrative Law Judge apparently proceeded on
the premise that Patterson's effort to force Respon-
dent and the Union to renegotiate their agreement on
seniority constituted protected activity under the Act
unless Patterson's effort could be viewed as "aimed at
causing an illegal result." Having concluded, how-
ever, that the agreement reached by Respondent and
the Independent Union was not "the only possible
resolution of the seniority issue which will satisfy the
mandates of Title VII," the Administrative Law
Judge had little difficulty either in finding Patterson's
activity "protected" or in finding Respondent's
interference with such activity unlawful.
The error in the Administrative Law Judge's
analysis, an analysis which my colleagues adopt by
implication, is that it flies in the face of the Supreme
Court's Emporium holding. In that case the Court
stressed its adherence to the principle of exclusive
majority representation and concluded that concert-
ed activity by employees, even in protest over alleged
racial discrimination in the conditions of their
employment, was without the protection of the Act
when such activity was inconsistent with the position
taken by the employees' recognized bargaining agent.
In so doing, the Court pointed out: "Competing
claims on the employer's ability to accommodate
each group's demands . . . could only set one group
against the other even if it is not the employer's
intention to divide and overcome them." 420 U.S. at
67. And, moreover, the Court noted that the
' 192 NLRB 173 (1971).
7 '-We are not final because we are infallible but we are infallible only
because we are final."
recognized bargaining representative "has a legiti-
mate interest in presenting a united front ... and in
not seeing its strength dissipated and its stature
denigrated by subgroups within the unit separately
pursuing what they see as separate interest." 420 U.S.
at 70.
Although I dissented from the majority decision
issued by my colleagues in the initial Board proceed-
ing in The Emporium case,6 and although I continue
in the opinion that Mr. Justice Jackson's observation
on the role of the Supreme Court is perhaps apposite
to the Court's subsequent adoption of the majority's
position,7 I cannot comprehend how my colleagues
can avoid the application of the Court's Emporium
holding to the instant case.
Stripped to its bare bones, the record in this case
reveals that one of the two petitions circulated by the
Charging Party was addressed to the Employer and
sought to pressure the Employer to abrogate and
renegotiate the existing seniority agreement previous-
ly entered into between itself and its employees'
recognized bargaining agent, and to do so in
conformity with the specific demands and guidelines
set forth in the petition circulated by the Charging
Party. Through this petition the Charging Party, and
the dissident minority of employees who supported
his views, sought to usurp the function and authority
of their recognized bargaining agent and to force the
Employer to placate them by renegotiating the
existing bargaining agreement in accordance with
their demands. Thus is this case brought squarely
within the Emporium holding and, were there nothing
else in the record on which to predicate a finding of a
violation, I would be constrained to dismiss the
complaint. In justifying their refusal to follow
Emporium here, my colleagues ignore the fact that
the Charging Party's activities went far beyond a plea
to renegotiate the existing agreement, and spelled out
with great specificity just what the proposed revision
should provide in order to restore the racial discrimi-
nation which the existing agreement remedied.
Except for the fact that the protesters in Emporium
desired to eliminate racial discrimination rather than
restore it, the actions of the protesters both here and
there are indistinguishable.
There is, however, one aspect of this case the
proper consideration of which compels a finding that
Respondent's conduct violated Section 8(a)(1) as
alleged. As indicated previously, the Charging
Party's activities included the circulation of two
petitions, one of which averred that the Union had
breached its duty of fair representation and sought
employee support for the recall of employee repre-
697
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sentatives on the committee which had negotiated
the new seniority agreement with the Employer.
Respondent's April 16 and 18 warnings to the
Charging Party made no attempt to distinguish
between his solicitation on behalf of the petition
directed exclusively to the fair representation issue
and the petition demanding renegotiation of the
seniority agreement. Rather, Respondent's state-
ments amounted to a flat prohibition of all solicita-
tion activities carried on by the Charging Party.
Inasmuch as solicitation in connection with the
former petition is clearly "protected" activity within
the meaning of the Act, 8 and inasmuch as Respon-
dent has failed to show some special circumstances
to justify its infringment of its employees' undoubted
right to solicit on company property on nonwork
time, a violation of the Act is established.
I See. in this regard, N.L.R.B. v. Magnavox Company of Tennessee, 415
U.S. 322, 325 (1974). wherein the Court stated:
The place of work is a place uniquely appropriate for dissemination of
views concerning the bargaining representative and the various options
open to the employees. So long as the distribution is by employees to
employees and so long as the in-plant solicitation is on nonworking
time, banning of that solicitation might seriously dilute § 7 rights.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT instruct our employees to refrain
from engaging in solicitation activities on compa-
ny property.
WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge or other-
wise discipline our employees should they engage
in solicitation activities on company property.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act. Nothing herein, however, shall be
construed as precluding us from adopting a valid
no-solicitation rule.
WE WILL rescind the warning letter given to
employee Robert G. Patterson on April 18, 1975,
and expunge from his personnel file any reference
thereto.
ARMCO STEEL
CORPORATION
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
IRWIN H. SOCOLOFF, Administrative Law Judge: Upon
charges filed on September 5 and October 22, 1975, by
Robert G. Patterson, an individual, against Armco Steel
Corporation, herein called the Respondent, the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the
Regional Director for Region 6, issued a complaint dated
May 26, 1976, alleging violations by the Respondent of
Sections 8(a)(1) and 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act. Respon-
dent, by its answer, denied the commission of any unfair
labor practices. Pursuant to notice, hearing was held before
me in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on August 5, 1976. The
General Counsel and Respondent were represented by
counsel and all parties were afforded full opportunity to be
heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to
introduce evidence. Thereafter, the parties filed briefs
which have been duly considered.
Upon the entire record in this case, and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a Delaware corporation engaged in the
manufacture and sale of steel and steel products at its
Butler, Pennsylvania, facility. During the year preceding
issuance of the complaint, a representative period, Respon-
dent, in the course and conduct of its business operations,
received goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 at
its Butler, Pennsylvania, plant, which were shipped from
points located outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
On April 12, 1974, the Attorney General of the United
States filed an employment discrimination suit against nine
major domestic steel companies and the United Steelwork-
ers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, herein referred to as the
Steelworkers. That action,' before the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama,
alleged broad patterns and practices of hiring and job
assignment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and
national origin, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended,2 and Executive Order 11246, as
amended.3 Thereafter, in settlement of the suit, the parties
agreed to the entry of a decree, subsequently upheld by a
United States Court of Appeals,4 which, inter alia, included
provisions requiring the companies, and the Steelworkers,
I U.S. v. Alleghent-Ludlum Industries, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 74-P-
339.
2 42 U.S.C. 2000e), et seq
3 CFR 169, et seq.
U.S. v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., er al., 517 F.2d 826 (C.A. 5,
1975).
698
ARMCO STEEL CORP.
to institute employee seniority systems based solely upon
"plant continuous service." Armco Steel Corporation,
Respondent herein, was a party to that suit and is bound
by the terms of the decree at those of its locations at which
its employees are represented by the Steelworkers.
Following entry of the consent decree, on November 21,
1974, the Butler Armco Independent Union, which
represents Respondent's employees at its Butler plant,
entered into an agreement with Respondent establishing a
seniority system in conformity with the provisions of the
decree. Thereafter, in April 1975, employee Robert G.
Patterson, aggrieved by the institution of the new seniority
system, engaged in solicitation activities at the Butler plant
in an effort to cause a renegotiation of the seniority
agreement. Respondent's alleged interference with, and
restraint of, Patterson's activities gave rise to the complaint
in the instant case.
B. Facts 5
On or about April 2, 1975, Patterson and his departmen-
tal union representative, employee Ronald Dellen, met
with B. C. Huselton, Respondent's director of labor
relations and an acknowledged supervisor within the
meaning of the Act. Patterson expressed his dissatisfaction
with the new seniority program and announced his
intention to petition against it. He asked Huselton if the
latter would do anything to change that program were
Patterson able to obtain the signatures of a majority of the
unit employees on his petition. Huselton stated that he
could not guarantee anything, although he would certainly
have to look at the signatures.
On April 7, 1975, Patterson began soliciting, inside the
plant, seeking signatures on two petition forms. The first
petition accused Respondent of failing to bargain in good
faith with respect to the seniority matter; charged that the
seniority agreement was not in the best interests of all
affected employees; and urged:
We therefore Petition both Parties to renegotiate the
entire Program, and to use department and unit
seniority pertaining to a line of progression and
regression.
The second petition accused certain union representatives
of a failure fairly to represent all employees with respect to
seniority issues. By April 16, Patterson had obtained more
than 100 signatures.
Huselton placed a telephone call to Patterson on April
16, told Patterson that he was causing a problem, and
further stated that, unless Patterson ceased his solicitation
activities on company property, he would be fired. On the
next day, Patterson resumed his activities, outside the plant
near the main gate, where he remained for some 3 hours
until again admonished by Huselton to cease soliciting on
company property. 6 On April 18, Patterson received a
letter from Huselton, which stated:
s The fact findings contained herein are based on the testimony of
Patterson. Union Representative Ronald Dellen. and Respondent's supervi-
sor. B. C. Huselton.
I At or about this time, Huselton contacted Dellen and told him to
inform Patterson that. unless Patterson ceased soliciting petition signatures
on company property, he would receive a warning letter.
At 5:00 P.M., April 16, 1975, you were notified by
telephone that you had violated specific Company
regulations of the following nature.
A. Soliciting on Company property.
B. Driving in the Plant without a Drive-In
Pass.
C. Being in the Plant at unauthorized times
under other than work-related conditions.
You acknowledged that you understood and that
you were now aware of these regulations.
At 8:15 A.M., April 17, 1975, you were notified in
person that you were not authorized to solicit outside
the Main Gate and that you were on Company
property. You acknowledged that you understood.
Subject letter is to inform you that any further
violation of the cited regulations will result in more
severe disciplinary action.
Following the confrontation with Huselton at the main
gate, Patterson continued his solicitation drive, off compa-
ny property, at a point contiguous to the employee parking
lots. Patterson also solicited at a nearby bar and, by June
16, 1975, he had obtained more than 550 signatures from
an employee complement numbering 3,800. During this
campaign, he published a letter in a local newspaper which,
inter alia, contained a description of the oral and written
warnings he had received from Huselton. In addition, as
part of his solicitation drive, Patterson freely disseminated,
among the unit employees, information concerning the
Huselton warnings.
Respondent's interference with Patterson's activities was
a departure from its own past practices. This Employer has
no prior history of unfair labor practice conduct and,
moreover, it had not, heretofore, attempted to restrain any
of a host of solicitations which have occurred at the Butler
plant. Such past solicitation efforts have included periodic
petitions by employees who sought the requisite 200
signatures in order to run for union office.
Huselton testified that his warnings to Patterson were not
intended to restrict employee solicitations, other than the
one in which Patterson was engaging. Rather, according to
Huselton, the Patterson matter presented a unique situa-
tion. Patterson's activities occurred during a period of great
unrest among the Butler employees, following implementa-
tion of the seniority agreement. The issue was highly
inflammatory and gave rise to the filing of some 150
grievances, including several filed by Patterson. In addi-
tion, Huselton testified, he received complaints from
employees with respect to the aggressive nature of
Patterson's solicitations and the fact that he solicited
employees on their worktime. 7 The plant guards informed
Huselton that Patterson continually drove through the
internal plant road without authorization.
7 Patterson, in his testimony, conceded that he approached employees
during their worktime, but claimed that those employees were not actually
engaged in work when he sought their signatures. He also acknowledged
that his activities resulted in threats to his personal safety. made by fellow
employees.
699
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
C. Conclusions
The General Counsel contends that the instant case is
governed by the numerous Board and court decisions
upholding the right of employees to engage in nonwork
time solicitations on their employer's property. Thus, in
Stoddard-Quirk Manufacturing Co., 8 the Board held at 621:
To sum up, we believe that to effectuate organiza-
tional rights through the medium of oral solicitation,
the right of employees to solicit on plant premises must
be afforded subject only to the restriction that it be on
nonworking time.9
Thus, the General Counsel asserts that Respondent, by its
oral and written threats to discharge or otherwise discipline
Patterson if the latter persisted in his solicitation drive on
company property, restrained the exercise of Section 7
rights in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Indeed, the
General Counsel is of the view that the foregoing conduct
should not be construed as limited in application to the
Patterson matter but, rather, constituted an effective
promulgation of a general, unlawfully broad, no-solicita-
tion rule.
Respondent contends that its actions in this matter were
of limited scope, applying only to the Patterson solicitation
drive, and may not be viewed as a promulgation of an
unlawful rule in conflict with its own past practices. As to
the specific interference with Patterson's efforts, Respon-
dent asserts that:
(I) Patterson's activities were not protected by the
Act since he was engaged in an effort to force the
Respondent to abandon its obligations under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act.
(2) Assuming Patterson's activities were initially
protected, the statutory protection was lost when
Patterson pursued his objectives in an aggressive and
disruptive manner.
(3) In any event, Respondent's actions, in the
circumstances of this case, do not justify the issuance of
a remedial order.
Respondent's first two defenses require little attention.
Thus, unless it be assumed that the seniority agreement
instituted by Respondent and the Union is the only
possible resolution of the seniority issue which will satisfy
the mandates of Title VII (a proposition certainly not
established on this record), Patterson's efforts to cause a
renegotiation of that agreement cannot be viewed as
necessarily aimed at causing an illegal result. The short
answer to the second defense is that, whatever legitimate
concerns Respondent may have entertained with respect to
the manner of Patterson's solicitations, the restrictions it
imposed affected, not the manner, but the place of
solicitation.
Respondent's final defense, while superficially appealing,
must also fail as a matter of law. Although I agree with
8 138 NLRB 615(1962).
9 The Board has also applied this principle to concerted nonunion
activity See, e.g.. Samsoniterr Corporation, 206 NLRB 343 (1973).
"' The fact that Patterson was responsible for this circulation does not
dilute its effects upon other bargaining unit employees.
Respondent that its actions herein cannot be viewed as
tantamount to a promulgation of an unlawful rule of
general application, I cannot agree that Respondent's
interference with Patterson's activities was of a sort tending
to have only minimal impact upon the exercise of Section 7
rights by its employees. In reaching this conclusion, I am
mindful of, and sympathetic to, the fact that Respondent
has not, heretofore, sought to interfere in the organization-
al and other Section 7 rights of its employees. Moreover, as
urged by Respondent, its interference with Patterson's
solicitations occurred in unique circumstances, and against
a background of tense employee emotions created by
Respondent's voluntary efforts to comply with the man-
dates of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The difficulty
with Respondent's position is that its obligations under
Title VII, and its obligations under this Act, are not
mutually exclusive. Indeed, the fact that Patterson's
activities served to increase the tensions created by
Respondent's attempted compliance with Title VII require-
ments only underscores the importance of protecting such
activity. Otherwise, the Act's protection would run only to
concerted activity having least effect upon employee
interests.
The impact of Respondent's restraint of Patterson's
solicitation efforts was not limited to the single employee.
Some 550 of Patterson's fellow employees, by their
signatures on the petition forms, joined him in concerted
activity. Moreover, Respondent's threats, and other inter-
ference, received wide circulation among the unit employ-
ees.10 Whatever Respondent's past liberal attitude toward
employee solicitations, its actions herein conveyed the
message to its employees that solicitations on company
property will be permitted only when Respondent does not
object to the content of the solicitations.
The cases cited by Respondent, in support of its position
that its actions do not require or justify the issuance of a
remedial order, are cases in which the impact of the
unlawful conduct was clearly limited to a small number of
employees and or, the respondent itself proceeded to
remedy the effects of the unlawful conduct." Those
circumstances do not obtain here. Accordingly, I find that
Respondent, by its oral and written instructions to
Patterson, to cease soliciting on company property, on
penalty of discharge or other discipline, has violated
Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section II,
above, occurring in connection with Respondent's opera-
tions described in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening commerce and the free flow of commerce.
i" See, e.g., American Federation of Musicians, Local 76, AFL-CIO
(Jimmy Wakely Show), 200 NLRB 620(1973).
700
ARMCO STEEL CORP.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8 (aX1) of the Act, I
shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Armco Steel Corporation is an employer engaged in
commerce and in operations affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and conclusions of
law, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby
issue the following recommended:
ORDER 12
The Respondent, Armco Steel Corporation, Butler,
Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
12 In the event no exceptions are filed, as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Instructing employees not to engage in solicitation
activities on company property.
(b) Threatening employees with discharge or other
discipline should they engage in solicitation activities on
company property.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the Act to engage in concerted
activities for their mutual aid and protection or to refrain
from such activity.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its Butler, Pennsylvania, facility, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."'13 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 6, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by Respondent for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
11 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
701