Arlene S.,1 Complainant,v.Kevin McAleenan, Acting Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Sep 24, 2019

0120180055 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 24, 2019)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Arlene S.,1
Complainant,

v.

Kevin McAleenan,
Acting Secretary,
Department of Homeland Security
(Transportation Security Administration),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120180055

Agency No. HS-TSA-01867-2014

DECISION

Complainant timely filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s final decision
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation
Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission
AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision.
ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues presented are: (1) whether Complainant established that she was a qualified individual
with a disability; (2) whether Complainant was entitled to be reassigned to another position as a
reasonable accommodation because she was not qualified for her Transportation Security Officer
(TSO) position; (3) whether the Agency committed a per se violation of the Rehabilitation Act;
and (4) whether Complainant established that she was subjected to hostile work environment
harassment, as alleged.

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
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BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Transportation
Security Officer (TSO) at the Ronald Regan National Airport in Arlington, Virginia. Report of
Investigation (ROI), at 20. In 2011, Complainant was diagnosed with a form of anxiety,
requiring regular doctor’s visits and medication. Id. at 72. As a result of her condition,
Complainant was incapacitated from her position for as many as two to three days per month in
2011, down to one to two days per month by 2013. Complainant would regularly request leave
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) due to her condition. Id. at 74.

On November 25, 2013, the Administrative Officer (AO) met with Complainant to discuss the
need for a Department of Health and Human Services Federal Occupational Health (FOH)
review regarding Complainant’s medical status and fitness-for-duty. Id. at 121. Thereafter, on
December 31, 2013, the AO sent an email to Complainant, copying Human Resources (HR) staff
and other officials in Complainant’s chain-of-command. Id. at 146-147. Therein, the AO asked
that Complainant sign form “FOA-6,” to authorize the release of her medical information, which
would allow an Agency medical professional to contact her medical care provider directly. Id. In
an email dated January 2, 2014, to the AO, Complainant expressed her displeasure that HR and
other officials had access to her personal medical documentation. Id. at 147.

On May 5, 2014, the FOH sent Complainant a letter, medically disqualifying Complainant from
her position. Id. at 148. In the letter, the FOH wrote that “according to the TSA psychological
guidelines for anxiety related dysfunction . . . anxiety that interferes with the ability to focus or
sustain attention on job tasks is unacceptable.” Id. The FOH specifically noted that, based on
Complainant’s doctor’s recommendation for a reduced work schedule and the frequency of the
Complainant’s use of family medical leave, Complainant could not be cleared for duty as a TSO.
Id.

The Agency then placed Complainant on paid administrative leave beginning on July 7, 2014,
due to the FOH’s determination that Complainant could not be cleared for duty. Id. at 165-66. In
a form letter dated July 10, 2014, the AO instructed Complainant to immediately return her
uniform, identification badge, and parking permit. Id. at 167. The form letter noted that
Complainant had previously been instructed to return the identified items on July 2, 2014, and
warned that Complainant’s failure to return the described items could result in civil and/or
criminal prosecution. Id.

On October 8, 2014, the Agency’s Chief Medical Officer issued Complainant a Fitness-for-Duty
Reconsideration Report. Id. at 171-172. Therein, the Chief Medical Officer found that
Complainant still demonstrated an inability to perform all the essential requirements of her job
due to her Anxiety Disorder based on the Medical and Psychological Guidelines for the
Transportation Security Officer job series. Id. The Chief Medical Officer therefore determined
that Complainant remained medically disqualified from her position as a TSO. Id.

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Subsequently, on December 30, 2014, the Agency issued Complainant a Notice of Termination.
Id. at 173-177. In the Notice, the Agency cited to the Chief Medical Officer’s review of
Complainant’s medical documentation that indicated Complainant demonstrated an inability to
perform all of the essential requirements of her job due to her Anxiety Disorder, based on the
Medical and Psychological Guidelines for the Transportation Security Officer job series. Id. The
Notice of Termination noted that Complainant was referred to the Agency’s Office of
Reasonable Accommodation for participation in the job search program. Id. It was reported,
however, that no suitable position was found for Complainant throughout the Agency. Id. The
Agency therefore moved forward with Complainant’s termination, and Complainant was
medically removed from service with the Agency. Id.

On November 10, 2014, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency
discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American), sex (female, sexual
orientation), color (brown), and disability (anxiety) when:

1. On November 25, 2013, the AO made degrading comments regarding whether her
condition was getting better and asked her for a projection of dates that she would be
out of work due to her medical condition;

2. On or around December 31, 2013, the AO sent an email to her regarding her medical
information and included five other individuals who did not have a “need to know”
related to her medical condition;

3. On May 5, 2014, she was deemed unfit for duty based on documentation she
submitted with her request for FMLA;

4. On May 7, 2014, management denied her request for overtime;

5. On July 7, 2014, management placed her on Administrative Leave, pending a
decision on her proposed removal;

6. On July 10, 2014, the AO sent her a letter threatening to prosecute her if she did not
return her Agency uniforms and property; and

7. On January 2, 2015, the Agency terminated her from her position.

On July 8, 2015, Complainant amended her complaint to include the following claim:

8. On an unspecified date, the AFSD denied Complainant’s use of FMLA and placed
her on Leave Without Pay prior to her removal.

Following the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of
investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge
(AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing but subsequently withdrew her request.
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Consequently, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). Therein,
the Agency concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to
discrimination as alleged.

The Agency initially found that Complainant did not show that she is a “qualified” individual
with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. In so finding, the Agency noted that unacceptable
medical conditions listed in the TSA’s Medical and Psychological Guidelines for TSOs included
anxiety-related dysfunctions. The Agency noted that Complainant’s doctor diagnosed
Complainant with “life-long” anxiety, and during her flare-ups Complainant would not be able to
perform her job functions. The Agency also noted that Complainant’s doctor recommended that
Complainant reduce her work schedule by four hours a day from March 2013 through July 2014.
The Agency also cited to Complainant’s FMLA leave summary, which reflected that
Complainant used more than 166 hours of leave for anxiety between March 2013 and early 2014.
The Agency found that, based on the review of available medical documentation, Complainant
could not show that she met the Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA) mandated
standard. The Agency also found that it articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its
actions, which Complainant did not show were pretextual. The Agency further found that
Complainant failed to establish that its actions towards her were severe or pervasive enough to
rise to the level of a hostile work environment.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant maintains that the Agency violated the FMLA, which caused her to
accrue many hours of leave without pay. Complainant argues that an employer cannot use an
employee’s request for use of FMLA as a negative factor in employment, such as for hiring and
firing. Complainant maintains that she was terminated for exercising her rights under the FMLA.
Complainant asserts that on May 5, 2014, she was deemed unfit for duty based on her FMLA
documentation, and that she was not made aware of her work status until July 7, 2014.

Complainant believes that she was wrongly terminated from her position, as her level of anxiety
was never officially determined by the FOH, but merely assumed. Complainant maintains that
her anxiety did not interfere with her ability to focus or sustain attention, as she had very
acceptable test scores. Complainant also states that on July 10, 2014, she received a letter
demanding that she return all federal property (her uniform, badge, etc.) or she would be
prosecuted. Complainant states that she received this letter despite not being placed on
administrative leave until July 2, 2014. Complainant additionally states that the AO made
degrading comments about a complaint Complainant decided not to pursue. Complainant states
that management ordered the AO to change her Leave without Pay (LWOP) to approved leave
under the FMLA. Complainant further maintains that she was subjected to a continual hostile
work environment when she was no longer allowed to wear her assigned baggage uniform and
was instead forced to wear a checkpoint uniform while “running” bins.

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Complainant lastly states that there is some documentation missing from the ROI, including the
Former Deputy Assistant Federal Security Director’s (DAFSD) affidavit, her email to the Former
DAFSD dated June 4, 2014, and a character letter from her supervisor dated June 4, 2014.2

The Agency did not submit a statement or brief in opposition to Complainant’s appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b), the Agency’s decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part
1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of
review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal
determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents,
statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the
parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and
its interpretation of the law”).

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Initially, to the extent that Complainant claims the Agency violated the FMLA, we note that the
FMLA falls under the regulatory ambit of the Department of Labor, not the Commission.
Therefore, the Commission has no jurisdiction over this type of claim. See Stensgard v. U.S.
Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120122478 (Sep. 26, 2012).

We further note that the Commission has the discretion to review only those issues specifically
raised in an appeal. See Mannon v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0720070074 (Apr. 4,
2012), citing EEO MD-110. Because Complainant, on appeal, does not address the Agency’s
findings with regard to her race, color, and sex, we decline to address those bases in this
decision.

Relationship Between the Rehabilitation Act and the Aviation Transportation Security Act
(ATSA)

Under the Commission’s regulations, the Agency is required to make reasonable accommodation
to the known physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability unless the Agency can show that accommodation would cause undue hardship. 29
C.F.R. § 1630.9.

2 Notwithstanding Complainant’s assertions, we find that that the record is adequately developed
in this case. Moreover, Complainant has not shown how the inclusion of the identified
documentation would change the outcome of the instant decision.
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An individual with a disability is “qualified” if he or she meets the skills, experience, education,
and other job-related requirements of the position at issue and can perform the position’s
essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). In this
case, the Agency argues that Complainant is not qualified for her TSO position because she does
not meet the position’s medical qualification requirements.

The Agency asserts that Complainant is not qualified for a TSO position because she cannot
meet the medical requirements mandated by the ATSA. Congress enacted the ATSA
immediately after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, “to improve aviation security” by
effecting “fundamental change in the ways [the United States] approaches the task of ensuring
the safety and security of the civil air transportation system.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-296, at 53
(2001), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 589, 590. Toward that goal, Congress created a new
Agency, the TSA, which has sweeping responsibility for airport security screening, including
setting the qualifications, conditions, and standards of employment for airport security screeners.
49 U.S.C. § 114. Section 111(d) of the ATSA, codified as a note to 49 U.S.C. § 44935, states, in
pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Under Secretary of
Transportation for Security may employ, appoint, discipline, terminate, and fix
the compensation, terms, and conditions of employment of federal service for
such a number of individuals as the Under Secretary determines to be necessary to
carry out the screening functions...

49 U.S.C. § 44935 note, 115 Stat. 597, 620.

The statute requires that security screeners “demonstrate daily a fitness for duty without any
impairment due to illegal drugs, sleep deprivation, medication, or alcohol,” 49 U.S.C.
§ 44935(e)(2)(A)(v), and “possess basic aptitudes and physical abilities, including color
perception, visual and aural acuity, physical coordination, and motor skills. Id. § 44935(f)(1)(B).
The ATSA also provides that “at a minimum [a security screener] must meet such other
qualifications as the Under Secretary may establish.” Id. § 44935(e)(2)(A)(iv).
Nevertheless, the Commission has held that the ATSA does not divest the Commission of
jurisdiction over a complaint brought by a TSO against the Agency under the Rehabilitation Act
or other statues the Commission enforces. Kimble v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., EEOC Appeal No.
0120072195 (Nov. 24, 2009). Although Congress gave the Agency broad authority to establish
terms and conditions of employment for security screeners, that authority does not include
complete exemption from § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act and the other employment
discrimination laws. Chapman v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 0120051049 (Aug.
6, 2008), req. for recons. den., EEOC Request No. 0520080805 (Dec. 11, 2008); Adams v. Dep't
of Homeland Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 0120054463 (Aug. 31, 2007); Getzlow v. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 0120053286 (June 26, 2007), req. for recons. den., EEOC
Request No. 0520070839 (Oct. 12, 2007). Accordingly, the Commission has authority under the
Rehabilitation Act to hear complaints involving TSO positions. Id.

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Moreover, in Getzlow, the Commission found that, although a complainant must show that he or
she meets the standards established pursuant to the ATSA to be qualified under the
Rehabilitation Act, not all of these standards will conflict with the Rehabilitation Act. The
Agency must comply with the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act where there is no conflict
between the qualifications established pursuant to the ATSA and the requirements of the
Rehabilitation Act. Id. If a conflict exists between the two standards, however, the ATSA
standard will supersede any Rehabilitation Act requirements to the contrary. Id.

Qualification Standard and Complainant’s Removal
Here, the Medical and Psychological Guidelines for Transportation Security Administration
Transportation Security Officer Job Series, October 1, 2013, page 67, establish a qualification
standard for individuals with anxiety-related dysfunctions. Specifically, the standard requires
disqualification for:

Job-related anxiety symptoms consistent with panic disorder, phobias (e.g.,
claustrophobia, touching), rigid/inflexible obsessive compulsiveness, inability to
cope with crisis or stress situation, or excessive performance anxiety; anxiety
related speech disorder (e.g., stutter), anxiety that interferes in the ability to focus
or sustain attention on job tasks (e.g., x-ray monitor); anxiety that results in
physical responses (e.g., tremors, fainting, shortness of breath).

As such, in the instant matter, Complainant must show that she can meet the Agency’s standard
concerning anxiety. Complainant has not made that showing. Specifically, in her FMLA
documentation completed on March 1, 2013, Complainant’s doctor lists the diagnosis of an
anxiety disorder with an unknown frequency of incapacitation. ROI, at 137-139. The doctor
recommended a reduced work schedule by four hours a day between March 2013 and February
2014. Id. The record also shows that Complainant used more than 166 hours of leave under the
FMLA between March 2013 and early 2014 for her anxiety disorder. Id. at 24. Accordingly, she
has not shown that she was qualified for the TSO position.

The discussion of “qualified” does not end at Complainant’s position of record. The term
“qualified individual with a disability,” with respect to employment is defined as a disabled
person who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
the position held or desired. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). The term “position” is not limited to the
position held by the employee, but also includes positions that the employee could have held as a
result of reassignment. Therefore, in determining whether an employee is “qualified,” an agency
must look beyond the position which the employee presently encumbers. EEOC Enforcement
Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, EEOC No. 915.002 (rev. Oct. 17, 2002) (Enforcement Guidance).

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Complainant has an evidentiary burden in such reassignment cases to establish that it is more
likely than not (preponderance of the evidence) that there were vacancies during the relevant
time period into which she could have been reassigned. Complainant can establish this by
producing evidence of particular vacancies. However, this is not the only way of meeting
Complainant’s evidentiary burden. In the alternative, Complainant could show that: (1) she was
qualified to perform a job or jobs which existed at the agency, and (2) there were trends or
patterns of turnover in the relevant jobs so as to make a vacancy likely during the time period. In
the case at hand, the Agency notes that Complainant was referred to the Agency’s Office of
Reasonable Accommodation for participation in a job search program. ROI, at 175. However, no
position was found throughout the Agency. Id.
Complainant has not challenged the Agency’s finding that there were no other positions to which
she could have been reassigned during the relevant time period. Therefore, we find that
Complainant has not demonstrated that she was a qualified individual with a disability covered
under the Rehabilitation Act. As such, she has not shown that the Agency failed to provide her
with a reasonable accommodation and/or violated the Rehabilitation Act when she was
terminated from her position.
Improper Dissemination of Complainant’s Medical Documentation (Claim 2)

The Commission has found that Agency officials may share confidential medical information
about an employee with other Agency officials on a “need to know” basis, if doing so is
necessary to ensure compliance with the Rehabilitation Act. See Skarica v. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 0120073399 (Mar. 5, 2010).
In the instant case, Complainant contends that the AO disseminated her medical information in
an email dated December 31, 2013, to Agency officials who did not have a “need to know.” We
note that the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) requires employers to treat as
confidential all information obtained regarding the medical condition or history of an employee.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(3)(B), 12112(d)(4)(C). 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c)(1) provides, in pertinent
part, that: “Information obtained . . . regarding the medical condition or history of any employee
shall ... be treated as a confidential medical record.” By its terms, this requirement applies to
confidential medical information obtained from “any employee,” and is not limited to individuals
with disabilities. See Hampton v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01A00132 (April 13,
2000). Improper Agency disclosure of such medical information constitutes a per se violation of
the Rehabilitation Act. Vale v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05960585 (Sept. 5, 1997).

Nevertheless, the record shows that Complainant’s medical information was not shared through
the December 31, 2013, email. Specifically, in the email, the AO requested that Complainant
sign form “FOA-6,” to authorize the release of her medical information. ROI, at 146-147. The
AO, however, did not mention Complainant’s medical condition and did not attach any medical
documentation to the email. Id. Therefore, we find that Complainant did not establish that the
AO committed a per se violation of the Rehabilitation Act when he sent the December 31, 2013,
email, which carbon copied HR staff and other management officials. As such no medical
information was released.
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Hostile Work Environment

To establish a prima facie case of hostile environment harassment, a complainant must show
that: (1) she is a member of a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in
the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the
harassment complained of was based on the statutorily protected class; and (4) the harassment
affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment. Humphrey v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01965238 (October
16, 1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11.
In determining that a working environment is hostile, factors to consider are the frequency of the
alleged discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,
and if it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. See Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The incidents must have been “sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of [Complainant’s] employment and create an abusive working
environment.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. The harasser’s conduct should be evaluated from the
objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim’s circumstances. Enforcement Guidance
on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994) (Enforcement
Guidance on Harris).
In the instant case, Complainant’s examples of harassing behavior include being forced to wear a
Checkpoint uniform while “running bins” and receiving the letter demanding that she return her
badge and uniform. Complainant also contended that on November 25, 2013, the AO requested
that she provide projected dates when she would be off work due to her medical condition.
Complainant asserted that during the course of the meeting, the AO stated to her that she “clearly
was not getting any better” and asked her “how did he know [Complainant] wasn’t going to call
out every day from now until the end of the year?”
The Commission finds, however, that even assuming, arguendo, that Complainant was a
qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, she has not
demonstrated that management’s conduct towards her was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment. The Commission notes that Title VII
is not a civility code. Rather, it forbids “only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
81 (1998). Therefore, we find that Complainant has not established that she was subjected to a
legally hostile work environment.
CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not
specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision.

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STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact
or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of
Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party
shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for
reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405;
Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110),
at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the
Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC
20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a
legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The
agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal
(FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of
service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration
as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within
ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action,
you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or
department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do
so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.
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RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may
request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or
costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may
request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of
court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The
court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter
the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to
File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

September 24, 2019
Date