Apple Inc.v.Homer Martin Peavy

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 30, 2019

91229208 (T.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2019)

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: September 30, 2019
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
———————
Apple Inc.
v.
Homer Martin Peavy
———————
Opposition No. 91229208
———————
Glenn A. Gundersen, Jennifer Insley-Pruitt, and Spencer Joffrion, DECHERT, LLP,
for Apple, Inc.
Homer Martin Peavy, pro se.
———————
Before Thurmon, Deputy Chief Administrative Trademark Judge, Mermel-
stein and Ritchie, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Mermelstein, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Homer Martin Peavy filed an application seeking registration on the Principal
Register of the standard-character mark APPLE PENCIL (PENCIL disclaimed) for
[w]riting and drawing instruments, artist’s pencils, color
pencils, paper identification tags, printed paper labels, in
Class 16.1
Registration is opposed by Apple, Inc., which alleges (1) that Applicant’s mark is
likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive, Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15

1 Application No. 86765783, filed September 23, 2015, based on use in commerce under Trade-
mark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), alleging first use and use in commerce as of June
11, 2015.
Opposition No. 91229208
2
U.S.C. § 1052(d), in view of Opposer’s prior use and registration of the standard-char-
acter mark APPLE PENCIL (PENCIL disclaimed) for “input devices for computers
and handheld mobile digital electronic devices”;2 (2) that Applicant’s mark is merely
descriptive, Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1); and (3) that Appli-
cant’s use-based application is void ab initio because the mark was not in use on the
identified goods as of the filing date, citing Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(a); Laboratories du Dr. N.G. Payot Establissement v. Sw. Classics Collection
Ltd., 3 USPQ2d 1600 (TTAB 1987); 37 C.F.R. § 2.34(a)(1)(i).
Both parties filed briefs. Although Opposer’s opening brief addressed all three
grounds for opposition, Applicant’s responsive brief addressed only the issue of like-
lihood of confusion.3
We sustain the opposition on the ground of likelihood of confusion.
I. Preliminary Matter – Motion to Withdraw
Applicant was represented in this proceeding by Michael D. Stewart. On July 28,
2019, Mr. Stewart filed a motion to withdraw as counsel pursuant to an agreement
to be excluded on consent from practice before the USPTO in non-patent matters. 42
TTABVUE 2; see In re Stewart, Proceeding No. D2019-45, Final Order (Dir. USPTO
July 3, 2019). Mr. Stewart’s motion meets the requirements for a motion to withdraw,

2 Registration No. 5028493, issued August 23, 2016, based on Trademark Act § 44, and claim-
ing a foreign priority date of April 20, 2015, based on a Jamaican application.
3 By failing to address two of the three grounds for opposition, Applicant forfeited his right to
be heard on those grounds, although it was not a concession of Applicant’s case. Opposer
bears the burden of proving its case, even in the absence of argument by Applicant.
Opposition No. 91229208
3
see Trademark Rule 2.119(b), and is accordingly GRANTED.4
In his motion to withdraw, Mr. Stewart requested a suspension of thirty days to
allow Applicant to retain new counsel. 42 TTABVUE 2. Opposer objected to suspen-
sion, arguing that this case had already been submitted for decision on the briefs,
that there are no further proceedings in which substitute counsel might participate,
and that further delay would be prejudicial to Opposer. 43 TTABVUE 2–3. With re-
gard to Mr. Stewart’s motion, as more than thirty days have elapsed since the motion
was filed, Applicant has now had more than the requested time in which to appoint
new counsel. The motion to suspend is accordingly DENIED as moot. The record will
reflect Mr. Peavy’s address as Applicant’s address for correspondence.
II. The Record
The record comprises the pleadings5 and pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.122(b),
the file of the opposed application. In addition, Opposer submitted the following evi-
dence:
A. Opposer’s evidence
• Trial Declaration of Thomas R. La Perle, Director in the Legal Department of
Apple Inc. 30 TTABVUE. Among other testimony and evidence, Mr. La Perle
identified and offered in evidence Opposer’s Registration No. 5028493,6 for the

4 A copy of this decision will be sent to Mr. Stewart.
5 Opposer attached a number of exhibits to its Notice of Opposition. With the exception of an
opposer’s pleaded registration, “an exhibit attached to a pleading is not evidence on behalf of
the party to whose pleading the exhibit is attached.” Trademark Rule 2.122(c). As none of the
exhibits to the Notice of Opposition was a pleaded registration, we have disregarded them.
6 The ’493 Registration issued during the course of this proceeding based on Application No.
86765783. Opposer pleaded ownership of the ’783 Application in its notice of opposition. 1
TTABVUE 3, ¶ 1. Because Opposer submitted the resulting registration during its testimony
period, it is properly of record, and we deem the pleadings to be amended to assert the ’493
Registration. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. O’Rourke, 92 USPQ2d 1042, 1045 n.12 (TTAB 2009).
Opposition No. 91229208
4
mark APPLE PENCIL in standard characters for “input devices for comput-
ers and handheld mobile digital electronic devices,” issued August 23, 2016.
30 TTABVUE 350–53. The evidence and testimony establish that the ’493
Reg. is subsisting and owned by Opposer.7
• Notice of Reliance on Internet Documents, 26 TTABVUE. Opposer’s Internet
documents include:
o Documents offered “to show the history, development, and strength of Op-
poser’s APPLE PENCIL mark”;
o Documents “relevant to show the strength of Opposer’s APPLE family of
marks”;
o “Internet dictionary and online database documents . . . relevant to show
third party understanding of the term ‘apple’ to denote a type of wood”;
o “Internet documents from third party websites . . . relevant to show third
party use of the term ‘apple’ to denote a type of wood.”
• Notice of Reliance on Official Records, 27 TTABVUE.
o “[O]fficial records . . . relevant to show Opposer’s ownership of and rights
in its family of trademarks consisting, in whole or in part, of the word
APPLE . . .”;
o The file history of the subject application “including the disclaimer state-
ment and the specimen, [which] are relevant and admissible under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)) as admissions against interest by Appli-
cant of the descriptiveness of Applicant’s APPLE PENCIL mark.
• Notice of Reliance on Statements in Pleadings. 28 TTABVUE. Opposer notes
Applicant’s admission to ¶ 6 of the notice of opposition “as admissions against
interest by Applicant of the descriptiveness of Applicant’s APPLE PENCIL
mark.” As the pleadings are automatically part of the record, this notice of

7 Mr. La Perle also identified and offered in evidence a number of other registrations owned
by Opposer, including Reg. No. 5028531 for the mark

for the same goods as those in the ’493 Registration. 30 TTABVUE 354. Neither this nor
Opposer’s other registrations or marks were pleaded as a bar to Applicant’s registration, alt-
hough Applicant did not object to their introduction. While we find that the issue of likelihood
of confusion with respect to these registrations was tried by implied consent, Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(b)(2); Morgan Creek Prods. Inc. v. Foria Int’l Inc., 91 USPQ2d 1134, 1138 (TTAB 2009),
we do not find it necessary to consider them in reaching a decision.
Opposition No. 91229208
5
reliance was unnecessary.
• Notice of Reliance on Discovery Responses, 29 TTABVUE. Opposer relies on
Applicant’s responses to Opposer’s interrogatories “to show the nature, dates,
and extent of Applicant’s use of Applicant’s APPLE PENCIL mark and the
derivation of Applicant’s . . . mark.”
B. Applicant’s Evidence
Applicant did not submit any testimony or notices of reliance during its testimony
period. Although Applicant later moved to reopen testimony, 31 TTABVUE, the mo-
tion was denied, 37 TTABVUE.
III. Standing
To establish its standing, Opposer must show a real interest in the outcome of the
proceeding and a reasonable basis for its belief of damage. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063;
Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 111 USPQ2d 1058,
1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 50 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir.
1999). Opposer’s submission of its pleaded registration for APPLE PENCIL ade-
quately establishes its interest in this proceeding and a reasonable basis for its belief
that damage would result from registration of Applicant’s mark. Having established
its standing with respect to its likelihood of confusion claim, Opposer need not sepa-
rately show its standing to assert its other claims. See, e.g., Coach Servs., Inc. v. Tri-
umph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1377, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1727-28 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“once an opposer meets the requirements for standing, it can rely on any of the
statutory grounds for opposition set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1052.”); Liberty Trouser Co.
v. Liberty & Co., 222 USPQ 357, 358 (TTAB 1983).
Opposition No. 91229208
6
IV. Likelihood of Confusion
A. Priority
Because Opposer established ownership of its pleaded registration, priority is not
an issue with respect to the registered mark and the goods identified in it. King Candy
Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 110 (CCPA 1974).
Nonetheless, both parties argue priority: Applicant claims priority based on its reg-
istration of domain names in June 2015. App. Br., 39 TTABVUE 7–8 (“Applicant
clearly has priority over Opposer as to use.”). For its part, Opposer quotes Herbko
Int’l Inc. v. Kappa Books Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 USPQ2d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002), in
discussing its need to prove priority, App. Br., 38 TTABVUE 25–26, concluding that
its evidence “is more than sufficient to show [its] priority.” Id. at 26. Both are incor-
rect.
Herbko was a cancellation proceeding, and in a cancellation, the petitioner must
always prove its priority. See Brewski Beer Co. v. Brewski Bros. Inc., 47 USPQ2d
1281, 1284 (TTAB 1998). Oppositions are different: absent a counterclaim, once the
opposer makes a pleaded registration of record, priority is removed as an issue, even
if the applicant was in fact the first to use its mark or file its application. Massey
Junior Coll., Inc. v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 492 F.2d 1399, 181 USPQ 272, 275 n.6
(CCPA 1974) (“prior use need not be shown by a plaintiff relying on a registered mark
unless the defendant counterclaims for cancellation”). In other words, introduction of
the opposer’s pleaded registration does not prove priority; it eliminates the need to
Opposition No. 91229208
7
prove priority with respect to the mark and goods in the registration.8 See King
Candy, 182 USPQ at 110.
B. Applicable Law
Our determination under Trademark Act § 2(d) is based on an analysis of the pro-
bative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of likeli-
hood of confusion. See In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ
563, 567 (CCPA 1973); In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201,
1203–04 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considera-
tions are the similarities between the marks and the relatedness of the goods. Feder-
ated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA
1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of
differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the
marks.”). Opposer bears the burden of proving its claim of likelihood of confusion by
a preponderance of the evidence. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55
USPQ2d 1842, 1848 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

8 Even if priority were an issue, Applicant’s argument that it has priority by virtue of its June
2015 registration of domain names containing its mark is misplaced. App. Br., 39 TTABVUE
7–8. Applicant submitted no evidence of such registrations, and in any event, the mere reg-
istration of a domain name does not constitute use of a trademark in commerce. Stawski v.
Lawson, 129 USPQ2d 1036, 1045 (TTAB 2018) (citing Brookfield Comms., Inc. v. W. Coast
Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 50 USPQ2d 1545, 1555 (9th Cir. 1999)). Applicant is entitled to
rely on the filing date of its application, Trademark Act § 7(c), as is Opposer. In this case,
Opposer’s application was filed two weeks prior to Applicant’s, claiming a foreign priority
date of April 20, 2015, which is prior to Applicant’s purported domain name registrations.
Opposition No. 91229208
8
C. Analysis
1. Similarity of Marks
Applicant’s mark, APPLE PENCIL (standard characters; PENCIL disclaimed)
is identical in every respect to the mark in Opposer’s pleaded registration.
This factor clearly favors a finding of likely confusion.
2. Similarity of Goods; Channels of Trade; Purchasers
We evaluate the relatedness of Applicant’s and Opposer’s goods and services based
on the identification of goods and services set forth in the involved application, com-
pared with the identification of goods and services contained in Opposer’s registra-
tion. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001,
1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Computs. Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937,
16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB
1981). And as the court of appeals has noted, “[i]t is proper to construe applicant’s
description of its goods in the manner most favorable to opposer.” CBS Inc. v. Morrow,
708 F.2d 1579, 218 USPQ 198, 199 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen.
Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981).
In considering the similarity of the goods, the issue is not whether purchasers
would confuse the goods but whether there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source
of the goods or services. L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1439 (TTAB
2012); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830, 831 (TTAB 1984). “It is not necessary that the
parties’ goods be the same or even competitive to support a finding of likelihood of
confusion.” Coach Servs., 101 USPQ2d at 1722 (citation omitted). Rather, “likelihood
of confusion can be found if the respective products are related in some manner [ ]or
Opposition No. 91229208
9
if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise
to the mistaken belief that they emanate from the same source.” Id. at 1722 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d
1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Thor Tech Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1635 (TTAB
2009)). Finally, we keep in mind that when the involved marks are identical, the ex-
tent to which the applicant’s and registrant’s goods must be similar or related to sup-
port a finding of likelihood of confusion is lessened. In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d
1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001). It is only necessary that there be a viable relationship be-
tween the goods to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. In re Concordia Int’l
Forwarding Corp., 222 USPQ 355, 356 (TTAB 1983). “[E]ven when goods or services
are not competitive or intrinsically related, the use of identical marks can lead to the
assumption that there is a common source.” In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 315
F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Shell Oil Co., 992
F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
In this case, Applicant’s goods are “writing and drawing instruments, artist’s pen-
cils, color pencils, paper identification tags, printed paper labels.” Opposer’s goods are
“input devices for computers and handheld mobile digital electronic devices.” Opposer
focuses on the first item in Applicant’s identification, as do we. See Tuxedo Monopoly,
209 USPQ at 988 (likelihood of confusion may be found based on any item in the
application).
Opposer argues that its goods should be considered similar to Applicant’s for at
least two reasons: First, because Applicant’s “writing and drawing instruments” could
Opposition No. 91229208
10
be construed as included within Opposer’s “input devices for computers. . . .” Opp. Br.,
38 TTABVUE 29–30. And second, because Opposer’s “ ‘input devices’ and Applicant’s
‘writing and drawing instruments’ are both used for writing and drawing.” Id. at 30.9
Applicant argues that the parties’ goods are not sufficiently related to support a
finding of likelihood of confusion:
Applicant is manufacturing and marketing pencils made of
apple wood. Opposer is manufacturing and marketing sty-
lus’ [sic] for use on computer-associated products. The pur-
chaser of one of Applicant’s products would be completely
different than the purchaser of one of Opposer’s products.
Further Opposer’s products are designed to be used with
other of Opposer’s products. Applicant’s apple pencils are
not used with computers.
App. Br., 39 TTABVUE 6.
Applicant’s argument is unavailing because Applicant’s identification of goods is
considerably broader, including all “writing and drawing instruments.” Paula Payne
Prods. Co. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 473 F.2d 901, 177 USPQ 76, 77 (CCPA 1973) (“we
give full sweep” to applicant’s identification of goods). Applicant’s goods are broad
enough to include Opposer’s “input devices for computers,” because, as Opposer
points out, its “input devices” are in fact “writing and drawing instruments.” See Opp.
Br., 38 TTABVUE 29–30. As Applicant recognizes, Opposer’s actual product is a com-
puter stylus, which is an instrument used with a computer for writing and drawing.
Because Opposer’s “input devices” are encompassed by Applicant’s “writing and

9 Opposer lists as a third reason that the fame of its APPLE and APPLE-formative marks
makes it likely that consumers will assume that goods sold under Applicant’s APPLE
PENCIL mark emanate from Opposer. Id. at 30–31. The fame of Opposer’s mark is
addressed below.
Opposition No. 91229208
11
drawing instruments,” they are legally identical in part.
But even if not identical, Applicant’s broadly worded “writing and drawing instru-
ments” are related to Opposer’s “input devices,” at least one purpose of which is writ-
ing and drawing on computers and similar devices. See Stone Lion Capital Partners,
LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“Parties that choose to recite services in their trademark application that exceed
their actual services will be held to the broader scope of the application.”). Thus, even
if we assume that Applicant’s “writing and drawing instruments” are limited to those
used for writing and drawing on paper and other physical media, Opposer’s input
devices accomplish the same thing by permitting the user to write and draw on an
electronic device.
Applicant argues that “no consumer would confuse Applicant’s wood pencils for
Opposer’s stylus.” App. Br., 39 TTABVUE 7. But even assuming that Applicant’s
goods were wood pencils and Opposer’s were styluses, rather than the goods set out
in the application and pleaded registration, Applicant’s argument is misplaced. The
issue is not whether the goods will be confused with each other, but rather whether
the public will be confused as to their source. Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus.
Inc., 518 F.2d 1399, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (CCPA 1975) (“[T]he law has long protected
the legitimate interests of trademark owners and consumers from confusion among
noncompetitive, but related, products bearing” similar marks.).
Construing Applicant’s goods most favorably to Opposer as the senior user, we
find them to be related to Opposer’s goods, if not identical.
Opposition No. 91229208
12
We likewise find that Applicant’s goods are likely to be sold through the some of
the same channels of trade to some of the same purchasers as Opposer’s. Applicant
argues that “Opposer’s products are sold through its own website, authorized re-
sellers and through its own stores,” App. Br., 39 TTABVUE 6. Nonetheless, we may
not read limitations into either Opposer’s registration or Applicant’s application. In
re Bercut-Vandervoort & Co., 229 USPQ 763, 764–65 (TTAB 1986). To the contrary,
to the extent that the goods are identical-in-part, the purchasers of the goods and
their channels of trade are presumed to be identical. In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co.,
403 F.2d 752, 159 USPQ 721, 723 (CCPA 1968) (“we have legally identical goods,
hence the same class of purchasers”); see In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101
USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (even though there was no evidence regarding
channels of trade and classes of consumers, the Board was entitled to rely on this
legal presumption in determining likelihood of confusion).
But even if the goods are not considered identical they both function as writing
and drawing devices, and their usual purchasers would thus encompass the same
consumers. While Opposer’s input device is different from, say, a wooden pencil, it
shares the same function of writing and drawing, and is in fact marketed as such to
artists, students, and others who might use both traditional writing devices as well
as electronic ones such as Opposer’s. See, e.g., La Perle Dec., 30 TTABVUE 6, ¶ 13
(“the APPLE PENCIL . . ., which operates like a classic writing instrument, has be-
come a well-regarded tool among many groups of users, including students and art-
ists.”); id. at 246–335 (advertisements featuring APPLE PENCIL). We acknowledge
Opposition No. 91229208
13
that not all users of traditional writing and drawing devices such as pencils and pens
are likely to be among the purchasers of Opposer’s goods. Nonetheless, it is likely that
all, or nearly all, of Opposer’s prospective purchasers are users of pencils and pens.
While the groups are not coextensive, the overlap is significant.
These factors favor a finding of likely confusion.
3. Strength of Prior Mark
Mr. La Perle testified to Apple’s registration and use of various APPLE and
APPLE-formative10 marks over more than four decades. La Perle Dec., 30 TTABVUE
4–10, 350–93 (registrations); Opp. Not. of Reliance on Official Records, 27 TTABVUE
7–62 (registrations). His testimony and the accompanying exhibits are sufficient to
show that the APPLE mark enjoys very considerable renown, at least in the field of
computer software and hardware.
The device marketed as the APPLE PENCIL was introduced in September, 2015,
La Perle Dec., 30 TTABVUE 6, and has been the subject of a number of
advertisements and displayed in stores. Id. at 7–9. Although this evidence is not
sufficient to establish significant renown for the APPLE PENCIL mark itself, we
find that the inclusion in it of Opposer’s very well-known APPLE mark lends the
APPLE PENCIL mark a measure of strength. It is noted that Opposer has

10 Several of the registrations and uses consist of or comprise the design of an apple — —
in place of the word APPLE. We include these marks in our consideration of Opposer’s re-
nown. Although these marks do not include the word APPLE, “a picture and the word that
describes that picture are given the same significance in determining likelihood of confu-
sion.”) (citing In re Serac, Inc., 218 USPQ 340, 341 (TTAB 1983)). Not only does the design in
question here look like an apple, but due to Opposer’s marketing using both the word and
design marks, consumers are well aware that they are equivalent and both indicate Opposer
as the source of the branded goods.
Opposition No. 91229208
14
disclaimed PENCIL in the pleaded registration. While the disclaimer does not
remove PENCIL from Opposer’s mark, it does establish that the descriptive term
does not form a strong impression in the mark as a whole, leaving APPLE as the
dominant, source-identifying element of the mark. The commercial impression of
Opposer’s pleaded APPLE PENCIL mark is highly similar to that of Opposer’s other
APPLE and APPLE-formative marks, and consumers who are aware of the renown
attributable to those other marks are likely to attribute some measure of renown to
Opposer’s APPLE PENCIL mark, as well.
This factor favors a finding of likely confusion.
D. Balancing the Factors
The marks at issue are identical and the parties’ goods are either legally identical
in part or related. Assuming the goods are identical, their channels of trade and
purchasers are likewise identical. Even if the goods are not identical, their potential
purchasers significantly overlap. Finally, the renown of Opposer’s APPLE marks
supports a finding of likely confusion.11 Because all relevant du Pont factors are in
Opposer’s favor, we find that Applicant’s mark so resembles Opposer’s APPLE
PENCIL mark as to be likely to cause confusion.
V. Other Issues
In light of our finding on likelihood of confusion, we need not reach the issues of
descriptiveness or nonuse.
Decision: Mr. Stewart’s motion to withdraw as counsel is GRANTED. His motion to

11 Since all relevant factors favor finding a likelihood of confusion, even without this finding
of commercial renown, we would reach the same conclusion on likelihood of confusion.
Opposition No. 91229208
15
suspend is DENIED as moot. The opposition is sustained under Trademark Act
§ 2(d).

cc: Homer Martin Peavy
1066 Via Grande
Cathedral City, CA 92234
twigpencils@icloud.com

Glenn A. Gundersen
DECHERT LLP
glenn.gundersen@dechert.com, trademarks@dechert.com,
gayle.denman@dechert.com, jennifer.insley-pruitt@dechert.com

Michael D. Stewart
ms@themiamilaw.com