APPLE INC.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardSep 27, 20212020002820 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 27, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/869,635 09/29/2015 Thomas Alsina P27174US1 (119-1545US1) 8636 61947 7590 09/27/2021 Apple - Blank Rome c/o Blank Rome LLP 717 Texas Avenue, Suite 1400 Houston, TX 77002 EXAMINER ELJAIEK, ALEXANDER L ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2651 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/27/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): houstonpatents@blankrome.com mbrininger@blankrome.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte THOMAS ALSINA, ARVIND S. SHENOY, DANIEL CARTOON, JEFFREY L. ROBBIN, and MARK LEVY Appeal 2020-002820 Application 14/869,635 Technology Center 2600 Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, BETH Z. SHAW, and NORMAN H. BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judges. DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–9, 11, 12, 14–16, 18, 19, 21, and 22. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2018). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Apple Inc. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-002820 Application 14/869,635 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to automated content medium selection. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for delivering content for playback comprising: receiving, by a computer processor, from a client device, a first play mode request to play, on the client device, one or more unspecified content items; receiving contextual data describing an environment of a user that is associated with the first play mode request, the contextual data including at least one of a location of the client device, a time of day, or a network connection status of the client device; in response to receiving the first play mode request, selecting, by the computer processor and without user input, a first content category of media from a plurality of available content categories based on the contextual data; selecting a content source based on the selected first content category of media; selecting, independent of an indication related to content for playback from the user, by the computer processor and based on the first content category, a first content medium from a plurality of content medium types, the plurality of content medium types comprising a podcast, album, or playlist, and wherein the first content medium comprises a preferred delivery content medium associated with the first content category; determining, by the computer processor, a first content item to play that is included within the first content category and the first content medium; and delivering the first content item for playback by the client device from the selected first content medium. Appeal 2020-002820 Application 14/869,635 3 REFERENCE The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Sakai et al. US 2015/0230022 A1 Aug. 13, 2015 REJECTIONS Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Sakai. Claims 7, 14, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Sakai. OPINION 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) “[D]uring examination proceedings, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). [A]s an initial matter, the PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s specification. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). To anticipate “it is not enough that the prior art reference discloses part of the claimed invention, which an ordinary artisan might supplement to make the whole, or that it includes multiple, distinct teachings that the Appeal 2020-002820 Application 14/869,635 4 artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “[U]nless a reference discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim, it cannot be said to prove prior invention of the thing claimed and, thus, cannot anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102.” Id. “The Patent Office has the initial duty of supplying the factual basis for its rejection. It may not . . . resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions or hindsight reconstruction to supply deficiencies” in the cited references. In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967). Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 22 As an initial matter, we note that Appellant presents arguments to independent claim 1 and does not separately address independent claims 8 and 15. Because independent claims 8 and 15 contain similar limitations, we address independent claim 1 as the illustrative claim for Appellant’s arguments. We also note that the Examiner has rejected each of the independent claims based upon anticipation, and the Examiner does not reject the independent claims based upon obviousness. We limit our review to the anticipation rejection and make no findings regarding the obviousness of independent claims 1, 8, and 15 based upon Sakai alone. We further note that the claimed invention is directed to the “quick play mode” disclosed in paragraphs 83–88 of Appellant’s Specification where the computer processor selects the playlist without user input, rather than the user selecting the playlist. Appeal 2020-002820 Application 14/869,635 5 With respect to illustrative independent claim 1, the Examiner provides a rejection and provides a laundry list of citations to paragraphs and figures. Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 3–5. In the Response to Argument Sections in the Final Action and the Examiner’s Answer, the Examiner further details the responses to Appellant’s arguments by including quotations from the various portions of Sakai cited in the rejection. Final Act. 8–11; Ans. 8–20. Additionally, we note that the Examiner’s anticipation rejection hedges in the Response to Arguments section where the Examiner states “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would certainly recognize that no matter the type of content medium selected by the claim; a podcast, an album, and a playlist, are all just playlists, by plain meaning.” Ans. 9. The Examiner further states that the “Examiner believes that Sakai’s host device selects a first content medium from the claimed plurality of content medium types.” Ans. 14. The Examiner states that the “Examiner believes that Sakai’s first content medium comprises the claimed preferred delivery content medium associated with the first content category.” Ans. 17. Appellant argues that Sakai “does not teach or suggest” the claimed feature of “selecting, independent of an indication related to content for playback from the user . . . a first content medium from a plurality of content medium types, the plurality of content medium types comprising a podcast, album, or playlist,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 7. Appellant further argues that Sakai “addresses selecting content from different content categories, but does not address further selections as between the scriptable or parseable content. Parsing and assembling content from multiple sources does not address selecting a medium type from a set of medium types.” Appeal Br. 8. Appellant also argues that Sakai does not teach or suggest the claimed features of “wherein the first content medium comprises a preferred Appeal 2020-002820 Application 14/869,635 6 delivery content medium associated with the first content category,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 8. Appellant contends that while a particular script may be used to process content from a particular site, there is no indication in Sakai that any particular script may be associated with a category of content, and Sakai fails to teach or reasonably suggest “wherein the first content medium comprises a preferred delivery content medium associated with the first content category,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 8. Although we disagree with Appellant’s specific argument based upon Sakai not “teach[ing] or suggest[ing]” where the standard is whether Sakai “discloses” the claimed invention, we interpret Appellant’s arguments to be that of Sakai does not “disclose” the claimed limitations based upon the anticipation rejection. See generally Appeal Br. 7–9; Reply Br. 2–5.2 Looking at the totality of the evidence provided by the Examiner and the Examiner’s statement of the grounds of anticipation rejection and the Response to Argument section of the Examiner’s Answer, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner’s factual findings are insufficient to support the anticipation rejection. We further find that the Examiner’s arguments and rejection are based upon speculation and hindsight reconstruction because the Examiner finds many alternative teachings and suggestions in the prior art reference, but the Examiner does not make a persuasive showing how or why Sakai discloses the identical claimed invention as recited in illustrative independent claim 1. While the Examiner could have alternatively rejected independent claim 1 based upon obviousness and provided similar factual 2 We note that the Reply Brief does not include page numbers, and we count the pages with the cover page as page 1. Appeal 2020-002820 Application 14/869,635 7 findings, as in the anticipation rejection, and could have provided logical reasoning for the skilled artisan’s to combine the various alternative disclosures and embodiments of Sakai, the Examiner set forth the anticipation rejection alone, and we make no specific findings or conclusions regarding the obviousness of the claimed invention based upon Sakai alone. With regards to dependent claims 2, 9, and 16, Appellant argues that Sakai does not teach or suggest the claimed feature of “ranking a plurality of content mediums based at least in part on a number of times the user has selected the content medium,” as recited in claim 2. Appeal Br. 9. The Examiner does not specifically address the “ranking” in the rejection or the responses to Appellant’s arguments and merely quotes portions of Sakai. For this additional reason, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of dependent claims 2, 9, and 16. 35 U.S.C. § 103 Claims 7, 14, and 21 Appellant argues that the dependent claims depend from the allowable independent claims (Appeal Br. 9), and the Examiner merely finds that the arguments have been addressed with respect to the independent claims (Ans. 20, see also Final Act. 6–7). Because the Examiner has not shown how Sakai teaches or suggests the showings found to be deficient with respect to the anticipation rejection, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection. CONCLUSIONS The Examiner’s anticipation and obviousness rejections are reversed. Appeal 2020-002820 Application 14/869,635 8 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22 102(a)(2) Sakai 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22 7, 14, 21 103 Sakai 7, 14, 21 Overall Outcome 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–9, 11, 12, 14–16, 18, 19, 21, 22 REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation