Apple Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 2, 2020

14703366 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/703,366 05/04/2015 Yeping Su 082438.030451 2269
139020 7590 10/02/2020
BakerHostetler / Apple Inc.
Washington Square, Suite 1100,
1050 Connecticut Ave, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20036-5304
EXAMINER
HAGHANI, SHADAN E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2485
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eofficemonitor@bakerlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte YEPING SU, HSI-JUNG WU, KE ZHANG, CHRIS
Y. CHUNG, and XIAOSONG ZHOU

Appeal 2019-004326
Application 14/703,366
Technology Center 2400
Before KEVIN F. TURNER, JAMES R. HUGHES, and
CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claims 1–32 are pending, stand rejected, are appealed by Appellant,
and are the subject of our decision under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a).1 See Final Act.
1–2.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Apple Inc. See
Appeal Br. 2.
2 We refer to Appellant’s Specification (“Spec.”), filed May 4, 2015
(claiming benefit of US 62/047,415, filed Sept. 8, 2014); Appeal Brief
(“Appeal Br.”), filed Jan. 16, 2019; and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”), filed
Appeal 2019-004326
Application 14/703,366

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The invention, according to Appellant, relates generally to “video
streaming techniques,” and more particularly, to “the art for video streaming
techniques that provide efficient switching among different coded streams of
a common video sequence.” (Spec. ¶ 4). More specifically, Appellant’s
claims recite distribution servers, coding servers, computer readable storage
devices, and methods for coding a common video sequence multiple times.
See Spec. ¶ 12. As explained by Appellant, “a common video sequence is
coded multiple times to yield respective instances of coded video data” that
may be “coded according to a set coding parameters derived from a target bit
rate of a respective tier of service,” and where “[e]ach tier may be coded
according to a constraint that limits a maximum coding rate of the tier to be
less than a target bit rate of another predetermined tier of service.” Spec. ¶
12; see Spec. ¶¶ 12, 44; Abstract. Claim 1 (directed to a method), claim 11
(directed to a distribution server), claim 18 (directed to a coding server),
claim 24 (directed to a computer readable storage device), and claim 27
(directed to a method) are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method, comprising:
coding a common video sequence multiple times to yield
respective instances of coded video data, each instance having
video data coded according to a set of coding parameters derived
from average bit rate of a respective tier of service and wherein
the instantaneous coding rate of a given tier fluctuates about its
average bit rate,

May 13, 2019. We also refer to the Examiner’s Final Office Action (“Final
Act.”), mailed Aug. 3, 2018; and Answer (“Ans.”) mailed Mar. 13, 2019.
Appeal 2019-004326
Application 14/703,366

3
wherein for the given tier, coding is constrained to limit a
maximum coding rate of the tier to be less than a[n] average bit
rate of another predetermined tier of service.
Appeal Br. 13 (Claims App.).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Chou US 6,637,031 B1 Oct. 21, 2003
Hasek US 2009/0083279 A1 Mar. 26, 2009
Dazzi et al. (“Dazzi”) US 2011/0191446 A1 Aug. 4, 2011
Liao et al. (“Liao”) US 2012/0155553 A1 June 21, 2012
Miles et al. (“Miles”) US 2013/0268961 A1 Oct. 10, 2013
McPhillen et al.
(“McPhillen”)
US 2014/0185667 A1 July 3, 2014
Lee et al. (“Lee”) US 2016/0234116 A1 Aug. 11, 20163
REJECTIONS4
1. The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 31,
and 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over McPhillen and
Lee. See Final Act. 2–6.
2. The Examiner rejects claims 2, 5, 11–15, 17, 19, and 26 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over McPhillen, Lee, and Dazzi. See
Final Act. 7–9.

3 Lee (US 2016/0234116 A1) was filed on Sept. 17, 2014, claiming benefit
of Korean Application (KR) 10-2013-0112119, filed on Sept. 17, 2013.
4 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. Because the present application
has an effective filing date (Sept. 8, 2014) after the AIA’s effective date for
applications (March 16, 2013), this decision refers 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Appeal 2019-004326
Application 14/703,366

4
3. The Examiner rejects claims 6, 16, 22, and 25 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over McPhillen, Lee, Liao, and Hasek. See
Final Act. 9–10.
4. The Examiner rejects claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over McPhillen, Lee, and Miles. See Final Act. 10–11.
5. The Examiner rejects claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over McPhillen, Lee, and Liao. See Final Act. 11–12.
6. The Examiner rejects claims 27–30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over McPhillen, Lee, and Chou. See Final Act. 12–15.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues independent claims 1, 11, 18, and 24, and dependent
claims 2–10, 12–17, 19–13, 25, 26, and 28–30, together as a group with
respect to the § 103 rejections. See Appeal Br. 6–12. Appellant provides
nominal separate arguments with respect to independent claim 27. See
Appeal Br. 11–12. We select independent claim 1 and independent claim 27
as representative of Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 1–32. 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Obviousness Rejections of Claims 1, 11, 18, and 24
The Examiner rejects independent claim 1 as being obvious in view of
McPhillen and Lee. See Final Act. 2–6; Ans. 18–22. Appellant contends
McPhillen and Lee do not teach the disputed features of claim 1. See Appeal
Br. 5–11; Reply Br. 2–3. Specifically, Appellant contends that although
“Lee may disclose network management techniques, Lee is otherwise
unrelated to the limitations in claim 1” because “Lee does not disclose
coding of video, . . . controlling network traffic between related applications,
Appeal 2019-004326
Application 14/703,366

5
[or] . . . a bandwidth constraint between unrelated applications.” Appeal Br.
6–7; see Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant also contends that Lee does not disclose
“a bandwidth constraint at all,” or “rates for coding,” or “any relationship
between two tiers or instances of a common video.” Appeal Br. 7.
Appellant additionally contends “McPhillen does not disclose any
constraints between a maximum bitrate of one representation of a video and
the average bitrate of another representation of the same video.” Appeal Br.
9; see Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant additionally contends the Examiner-cited
portions of Lee describe predicted bitrates rather than constraints, do not
describe “coding rates” but instead “describe[] network channel usage
constraints,” and do not “disclose a constraint that relates two tiers or
instances of a common video” but instead describe “unrelated software
applications” and, therefore, “Lee does not disclose a constraint between two
tiers, as in the claims.” Appeal Br. 9; Reply Br. 2–3.
We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 2–4) and
(2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans.
18–22) in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur with the
findings and conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we provide the
following analysis for emphasis.
Appellant’s claim 1 broadly recites a method for “coding a common
video sequence multiple times to yield respective instances of coded video
data” with “each instance “coded according to a set of coding parameters
derived from average bit rate of a respective tier of service” and “for the
given tier, coding is constrained to limit a maximum coding rate of the tier to
be less than a[n] average bit rate of another predetermined tier of service”
Appeal 2019-004326
Application 14/703,366

6
(Appeal Br. 13 (claim App.) (claim 1))—i.e., coding a common video
sequence multiple times resulting in multiple instances of coded video where
each instance is coded according to a coding rate and, for a particular tier of
service, an instance is coded with a maximum coding rate that is less than an
average bit rate of a different, predetermined, tier of service. As explained
by the Examiner, McPhillen describes coding a common video sequence
multiple times, resulting in multiple versions of coded video data, each being
coded according to a set of parameters and having different transmission
bitrates (or tiers of service). See Final Act. 3 (citing McPhillen ¶ 13); Ans.
20. Appellant does not dispute these Examiner findings with respect to
McPhillen. See Appeal Br. 6–11; Reply Br. 2–3. The Examiner also finds
that McPhillen describes coding rate constraints—“McPhillen also discloses
‘coding is constrained’” in that McPhillen discloses ‘bit allocations for the
frame,’” which is “an explicit constraint.” Ans. 20 (citing McPhillen ¶ 15)
(emphasis omitted); see Ans. 21. Appellant concedes that McPhillen does
describe a coding (rate) constraint, but asserts that McPhillen does not
describe the coding constraint recited in claim 1 (or the other pending
claims)—“such a generic statement regarding coding constraints does not
meet the claimed constraint” (Reply Br. 2).
The Examiner relies on Lee to teach the tier coding rate constraints.
See Final Act. 3–4; Ans. 18–22. As explained by the Examiner, Lee
describes two different quality of service requirements (QoS) or tiers of
service—QCIx and QCIy. See Final Act. 3–4; Ans. 21–22; Lee ¶ 144; Fig.
23. Lee also describes a “max_rate” for QCIy and an “avg–rate” for QCIx
which are the rates at which the different tiers will be transmitted. See Final
Act. 3–4; Ans. 21–22; Lee ¶ 144; Fig. 23.
Appeal 2019-004326
Application 14/703,366

7
Appellant contends (supra) that Lee describes predicted transmission
bitrates rather than coding rate constraints, but Appellant misconstrues Lee.
Lee describes that the rates in Figure 23 are part of a profile and may include
“a transmission rate limit value.” Lee ¶ 144. Therefore, Lee at least
suggests rate constraints for different tiers of service.
Appellant interprets Lee too narrowly, and does not address the
combination of McPhillen with Lee. Appellant fails to appreciate that the
combination of McPhillen and Lee at least broadly suggests coding a
common video sequence multiple times resulting in multiple instances of
coded video with each instance being coded according to a coding rate. The
combination of McPhillen and Lee also at least suggests a coded video
instance for a tier of service that is coded with a maximum coding rate less
than an average bit rate of a different tier of service.
Instead, Appellant focusses on the individual teachings of McPhillen
and Lee and does not address the combination of McPhillen and Lee
discussed by the Examiner. See Ans. 19–22. Thus, Appellant does not
persuasively rebut the Examiner’s findings with respect to the combination
of references and improperly attacks the references individually instead of
addressing the combination as a whole. The cited references must be read,
not in isolation, but for what each fairly teaches in combination with the
prior art as a whole. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references).
Appellant’s arguments do not take into account what the combination of
McPhillen and Lee would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the
art—
Appeal 2019-004326
Application 14/703,366

8
The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference; . . . Rather, the test is what the
combined teachings of the references would have suggested to
those of ordinary skill in the art.
In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the
Examiner’s finding that the combination of McPhillen and Lee together
teaches or at least suggests “coding a common video sequence multiple
times to yield respective instances of coded video data” and “for the given
tier, coding is constrained to limit a maximum coding rate of the tier to be
less than a[n] average bit rate of another predetermined tier of service”
(Appeal Br. 13 (claim App.) (claim 1)). Thus, Appellant does not persuade
us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of representative claim 1.
Independent claims 11, 18, and 24 include limitations of commensurate
scope. Therefore, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of
representative claim 1 and independent claims 11, 18, and 24, not separately
argued with particularity (supra). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Obviousness Rejection of Claim 27
The Examiner rejects claim 27 over McPhillen, Lee, and Chou. See
Final Act. 12–14; Ans. 22. Appellant contends McPhillen, Lee, and Chou
do not teach the disputed feature of claim 27. See Appeal Br. 11–12; Reply
Br. 3. Specifically, Appellant contends that McPhillen and Lee do not teach
coding rate constraints similar to claim 1 (supra) (see Appeal Br. 11–12),
and “Chou does nothing to cure the deficiencies of McPhillen and Lee”
(Appeal Br. 12). For the same reasons as claim 1 (supra), we conclude
Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness
Appeal 2019-004326
Application 14/703,366

9
rejection of claim 27. Therefore, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of claim 27.
Obviousness Rejections of Dependent Claims
Appellant does not separately argue the rejections of dependent claims
2–10, 12–17, 19–13, 25, 26, and 28–30. See Appeal Br. 12. For the same
reasons as claim 1 (supra), Appellant does not persuade us of error in the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claims 2–10, 12–17, 19–13,
25, 26, and 28–30, not separately argued with particularity (supra). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Therefore, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness
rejections of claim 2–10, 12–17, 19–13, 25, 26, and 28–30.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
1–32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s
rejections of claims 1–32.
Appeal 2019-004326
Application 14/703,366

10
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 4, 7, 9,
18, 20, 21, 23,
24, 31, 32
103 McPhillen, Lee 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 18,
20, 21, 23, 24,
31, 32

2, 5, 11–15,
17, 19, 26
103 McPhillen, Lee,
Dazzi
2, 5, 11–15, 17,
19, 26

6, 16, 22, 25 103 McPhillen, Lee,
Liao, Hasek
6, 16, 22, 25
8 103 McPhillen, Lee,
Miles
8
10 103 McPhillen, Lee,
Liao
10
27–30 103 McPhillen, Lee,
Chou
27–30
Overall
Outcome
1–32

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED