01973250
03-11-1999
Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southeast/Southwest Areas), Agency.
Billy D. Yeats v. United States Postal Service
01973250
March 11, 1999
Billy D. Yeats,
Appellant,
v.
William J. Henderson,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Southeast/Southwest Areas),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01973250
Agency No. 4-G-780-1072-94
Hearing No. 360-95-8221X
DECISION
Appellant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (Commission or EEOC) from a final agency decision (FAD)
concerning his allegation that he was discriminated against, in
violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. �791 et seq. The Commission accepts this appeal in accordance
with EEOC Order No. 960.001.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented is whether appellant established that he was entitled
to compensatory damages beyond the amount of $1,500.00.
BACKGROUND
On January 26, 1994, appellant filed a formal complaint based on physical
disability (back injury) when on December 16, 1992, his request for
reconsideration for the position of Engineman was reviewed and denied.
Subsequently, the agency dismissed the complaint on procedural grounds
and that decision was appealed to the Commission. In Yeats v. United
States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01942946 (January 9, 1995),
the Commission reversed the agency's decision and remanded the case
for investigation. At the conclusion of the agency investigation,
appellant requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).
Thereafter, a hearing was held on January 25, 1996. On February 28, 1996,
the AJ issued a Recommended Decision (RD) finding discrimination based on
disability. Specifically, the AJ found that the agency, in its assessment
of appellant's physical condition, failed to show that his perceived
disability presented a reasonable probability of substantial harm.
Additionally, the AJ found that appellant was "entitled to some award for
any compensatory damages that he may have incurred attributable to the
Agency's discriminatory action." Accordingly, the AJ directed the agency
to fully investigate appellant's compensatory damages claim and to award
him the amount that he was entitled to under the law. On April 29, 1996,
the agency issued a final decision, concurring with the AJ's conclusion
that appellant was discriminated against based on disability. The agency
adopted the AJ's recommended relief and stated that it would "fully review
[his] claim for compensatory damages, and process accordingly."
Thereafter, by letter dated December 2, 1996, the agency sent appellant
a questionnaire and asked that he provide information concerning his
request for compensatory damages. The agency received appellant's
response on December 27, 1996. In appellant's response he stated, among
other things, "how do you determine a dollar amount on stress or of what
value is discrimination?" On February 6, 1997, the agency issued a FAD
finding that appellant was entitled to $1,500.00 in compensatory damages.
Specifically, the agency concluded that appellant, in his responses
to the agency's questionnaire and other supporting documents, had: (1)
failed to supply medical bills or statements to substantiate his claim;
(2) failed to produce documentation to show out-of-pocket expenses; and
(3) failed to show a causal connection between the discriminatory act and
his physical condition. Nevertheless, the agency concluded that appellant
was entitled to $1,500.00 because there was a finding of discrimination.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Section 102 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 CRA) 105 Stat. 1071,
Pub. L. No. 106-166, codified at 42 U.S.C. �1981a, authorizes an award
of compensatory damages as part of make-whole relief for intentional
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended. Section 1981a(b)(2) indicates that compensatory
damages do not include back pay, interest on back pay, or any other
type of equitable relief authorized by Title VII. Section 1981a(b)(3)
limits the total amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded
each complaining party for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,
and other nonpecuniary losses, according to the number of individuals
employed by the respondent. The limit for a respondent who has more
than 500 employees is $300,000. 42 U.S.C. �1981a(b)(3)(D).
The Commission has held that compensatory damages are recoverable in the
administrative process. Jackson v. United States Postal Service, EEOC
Appeal No. 01923388 (November 12, 1992), request for reconsideration
denied, EEOC Request No. 05930306 (February 1, 1993).<1> Thus, if a
complainant has alleged that he is entitled to compensatory damages and
the agency or the Commission enters a finding of discrimination, the
complainant must be given an opportunity to submit evidence establishing
his claim. To receive an award of compensatory damages, a complainant
must demonstrate that he has been harmed as a result of the agency's
discriminatory action; the extent, nature, and severity of the harm;
and the duration or expected duration of the harm. Rivera v. Department
of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01934156 (July 22, 1994), request for
reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 05940927 (December 11, 1995);
Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. N915.002 at 11-12, 14
(July 14, 1992).
"[C]ompensatory damage awards must be limited to the sums necessary
to compensate [a complainant] for actual harm, even if the harm is
intangible." Id. at 13 (citing Carter v. Duncan - Higgins, Ltd., 727
F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Thus, a compensatory damages award should
reimburse a complainant for proven pecuniary losses, future pecuniary
losses, and nonpecuniary losses.
Past Pecuniary Damages
A complainant may recover past out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a
result of the intentional discrimination. EEOC Notice No. N915.002 at 8.
Appellant asserts on appeal that the evidence of record supports "a claim
for compensatory damages in an amount greatly in excess of $1,500.00," and
that he has not yet received all of the back pay that he is entitled to.
As previously stated, compensatory damages do not include back pay and
other types of equitable relief. Furthermore, in the record before
the Commission, appellant has failed to provide any evidence concerning
medical bills and failed to present evidence detailing or substantiating
any out-of-pocket expenses. In a letter supplied by appellant's counsel,
dated August 24, 1996 (Letter), appellant stated, among other things,
that: a business partner failed to pay him; his home was burglarized;
and his wife had to undergo a hysterectomy. However, appellant
failed to show how these events were related to the discrimination.
Accordingly, we find that appellant failed to show that he was entitled
to reimbursement for any medical expenses or other out-of-pocket expenses
directly attributable to the discrimination.
Future Pecuniary Damages
We further find that appellant failed to show that he was entitled
to an award of future pecuniary damages. There is no evidence in the
record concerning the possibility of future visits to a medical provider
or any other possibility of future pecuniary damages.
Nonpecuniary Damages
An award of compensatory damages for nonpecuniary losses, including
emotional harm, should reflect the extent to which the respondent directly
or proximately caused the harm, and the extent to which other factors
also caused the harm. The Commission has held that evidence from a
health care provider is not a mandatory prerequisite for recovery
of compensatory damages. Carpenter v. Department of Agriculture,
EEOC Appeal No. 01945652 (July 17, 1995). Courts also have held that
"expert testimony ordinarily is not required to ground money damages
for mental anguish or emotional distress." Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil
Co., 37 F.3d 712, 724 (1st Cir. 1994), citing Wulf v. City of Wichita,
883 F.2d 842, 875 (10th Cir. 1989); Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509, 512
n.12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). A complainant's own
testimony, along with the circumstances of a particular case, can suffice
to sustain his or her burden in this regard. See U.S. v. Balistrieri,
981 F.2d 916, 932 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 58 (1993)
(housing discrimination). As the court noted in Balistrieri, "[t]he
more inherently degrading or humiliating the defendant's action is, the
more reasonable it is to infer that a person would suffer humiliation or
distress from that action; consequently, somewhat more conclusory evidence
of emotional distress will be acceptable to support an award for emotional
damages." Nonetheless, the absence of supporting evidence may affect the
amount of damages deemed appropriate in specific cases. Lawrence v. United
States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01952288 (April 18, 1996).
The AJ found that the evidence of record established that appellant
was entitled to some award for any compensatory damages that he may
have incurred attributable to the discrimination. The AJ based this
finding on appellant's testimony that as a result of not being awarded
the Engineman position, he was "devastated" and had to change his plans
to move. The agency adopted, and is therefore bound by, the AJ's RD,
see Miller v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01956109
(January 23, 1998); Martin v. Department of the Interior, EEOC Appeal
No. 01931768 (August 5, 1993). We must next determine the amount
of compensatory damages to be awarded. In determining the amount of
a compensatory damages award, we are guided by the principle that a
compensatory damages award is limited to the sums necessary to compensate
appellant for the actual harm caused by the agency's discriminatory action
and attempt to affix a reasonable dollar value to compensate him for that
portion of his emotional distress that was caused by the discriminations.
EEOC Notice No. N915.002 at 13.
There are no definitive rules governing the amount of nonpecuniary damages
to be awarded. However, nonpecuniary damages must be limited to the sums
necessary to compensate the injured party for actual harm, even where
the harm is intangible, see Carter v. Duncan - Higgins, Ltd., 727 F.2d
1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and should take into account the severity of the
harm and the length of time that the injured party has suffered the harm.
Carpenter v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01945652 (July 17,
1995); EEOC Notice No. N915.002 at 14. The Commission notes that for a
proper award of nonpecuniary damages, the amount of the award should not
be "monstrously excessive" standing alone, should not be the product of
passion or prejudice, and should be consistent with the amount awarded
in similar cases, see Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th
Cir. 1989); EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571,
574 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
In several recent decisions the Commission has awarded nonpecuniary
damages for emotional distress or mental anguish. In White v. Department
of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01950342 (June 13, 1997), the
Commission ordered an award of $5,000.00 in nonpecuniary damages where the
complainant's testimony and his psychologist's report indicated that the
harassment the complainant endured, which took both sexual and nonsexual
forms, led appellant to suffer from anxiety, depression, emotional
fatigue, occasional nightmares, and insomnia. In Benson v. Department
of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01952854 (June 27, 1996), the Commission
affirmed the agency's award of $5,000.00 in nonpecuniary damages where the
complainant, his relatives, and his colleagues offered testimony regarding
the embarrassment and humiliation that the complainant suffered at work
as a result of the denial of promotional opportunities, a suspension,
and other adverse actions. In Miller v. United States Postal Service,
EEOC Appeal No. 01956109 (January 23, 1998), the Commission ordered
an award of $7,500.00 in nonpecuniary damages where the complainant
produced scant evidence to support his claim and the agency, despite a
request by the Commission, failed to provide a copy of the documentary
evidence that complainant had submitted.
Having carefully considered the facts of this case, the Commission
finds that the agency's arrived at a fair determination when it awarded
appellant nonpecuniary damages in the amount of $1,500.00. In reaching
this amount, the Commission has considered a number of factors, including:
the nature and severity of the discrimination, and the nature and
severity of appellant's mental anguish and related symptoms. We also
considered that some of appellant's emotional distress during the relevant
time-frame was attributable to factors not related to the discrimination,
such as the aforementioned problems with his business partner, the
burglarization of his home and the emotional stress associated with
his wife's hysterectomy surgery. We also note that appellant failed to
present sufficient evidence concerning his mental anguish to assist the
Commission in arriving at a reasonable amount of damages. The record
contains no psychiatric evaluations or evidence that appellant received
any medications to treat his mental and emotional state. Based on all
these considerations, we find that $1,500.00 is a proper award for any
devastation or mental anguish which appellant has suffered.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record, and for the foregoing reasons,
it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to
AFFIRM the agency's final decision that appellant failed to establish
that he was entitled to compensatory damages beyond the $1,500.00 agency
award.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
this decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you
receive a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any
argument in opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to
reconsider MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request to
reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments must bear
proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request
to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received by the
Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from
the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil
action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY
(30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or
to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the
jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil
action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON
WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT
PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may
result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department"
means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or
department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
March 11, 1999
______________ ____________________________________
Date Frances M. Hart
Executive Officer
Executive Secretariat
1In Jackson, the Commission held that Congress afforded it the authority
to award such damages in the administrative process. It based this
assessment, inter alia, on a review of the statutory provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 in relation to one another and on principles
of statutory interpretation which require statutes to be interpreted
as a whole. In particular, the Commission discussed the meaning of the
statute's definition of the term "compelling party" and the significance
of the reference to the word "action" in Section 102(a). In addition
to the specific reasons set forth in Jackson for this holding, Section
2000e-16(b)(Section 717) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. �2000e
et seq.)(CRA) conveyed to the Commission the broad authority in the
administrative process to enforce the nondiscrimination provisions of
subsection (a) through "appropriate remedies." Similarly, in Section
3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA of 1991), Congress refers to
its first stated purpose as being "to provide appropriate remedies for
intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace;",
thereby reaffirming that authority. Consequently, it is our view that in
1991, Congress clearly intended to expand the scope of the "appropriate
remedies" available in the administrative process to federal employees who
are victims of discrimination. Moreover, in Section 717(c) of the CRA,
the term "final action" is used to refer to administrative decisions by
agencies or the Commission, as distinguished from the term "civil action,"
used to describe the rights of employees after such final action is taken.
Therefore, the Commission reaffirms the holding therein. See Turner
v. Department of the Interior, EEOC Appeal Nos. 01956390 and 01960518
(April 27, 1998).