AOL Inc.v.Coho Licensing, LLCDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 20, 201413208404 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2014) Copy Citation Trials@uspto.gov Paper 10 571-272-7822 Entered: November 20, 2014 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ AOL INC. and CLOUDERA, INC., Petitioner, v. COHO LICENSING LLC, Patent Owner. ____________ Case IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 __________ Before LINDA M. GAUDETTE, WILLIAM A. CAPP and MIRIAM L. QUINN, Administrative Patent Judges. QUINN, Administrative Patent Judge. Opinion dissenting-in-part filed by CAPP, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 2 AOL Inc. and Cloudera, Inc. (collectively, “Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting inter partes review of claims 1–20 of U.S. Patent No. 8,166,096 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the’096 Patent”). Coho Licensing LLC (“Coho”) did not file a Patent Owner Preliminary Response. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). We conclude that Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in challenging these claims and we decline to institute inter partes review. I. BACKGROUND A. The ’096 Patent (Ex. 1001) The ’096 patent, titled Distributed Processing Multiple -Tier Task Allocation, relates to distributed computer processing in a networked environment. Ex. 1001, 1:29–30. A computer which has been allocated a distributed processing task portion may reallocate a portion of its task, i.e. a subtask, to another computer in the network. Id. 1:66–2:7. The roles of various computers in the network are transitory. Id. at 2:53–57. For example, a computer initiating distributed processing and allocating task portions for its task may next have a task or subtask portion allocated to it by another computer in a succeeding task. Id. The described method(s) manage the allocation of tasks and subtasks, the tasks and subtasks are performed, and the results are collated. Id. at 1:66–2:7. Figure 2 of the ’096 patent is reproduced below. IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 3 Figure 2, above, depicts a block diagram of distributed processing participatory computers 100 connected to each other through network 99. Id. at 2:4143. Computers 100 are participatory based upon having installed required software. Id. at 2:43–45. Computer 11 in Figure 2 is depicted in the role of an allocating computer, signifying initial allocation of task portions. Other computers are signified by their roles. Id. at 2:4950. B. Illustrative Claim Petitioner challenges claims 1–20. Claims 1, 8, and 14 are independent claims. Illustrative claim 1 is reproduced below. 1. A computer-implemented method comprising: a first computer receiving via network communication a plurality of sets of calculated results from a plurality of computers, wherein said plurality of sets are calculated from portions of a single computing task, IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 4 wherein said first computer receiving a second set of said plurality of sets, said second set comprising results from a second computer calculating a second task portion after said second computer received said second task portion from a third computer, said second task portion being divided from a third task portion, said third task portion comprising after division said second task portion and a fourth task portion, wherein said first computer receiving a fourth set of said plurality of sets, said fourth set comprising results from said third computer calculating a fourth task portion after said third computer receiving said third task portion from a fourth computer; and said first computer collating said plurality of sets into a final result set. C. The Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability Petitioner challenges claims 1–20 of the ’096 patent based on the alleged grounds of unpatentability set forth in the table below, as further supported by the Declaration of Anthony D. Joseph (Ex. 1006). Reference(s) or other grounds Basis Claims challenged Spawn (Ex. 1004) 1 § 102 1–20 Spawn and Kisor (Ex. 1005) 2 § 103 2, 4, 11, and 18 Knowledge and Skill of a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art § 103 1–20 1 Waldspurger et al., Spawn: A Distributed Computational Economy, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, 18(2), 103117 (1992). 2 US Patent No. 6,098,091 (iss. Aug. 1, 2000). IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 5 D. Claim Interpretation In an IPR, claims of unexpired patents are construed by applying the broadest reasonable interpretation, in light of the specification. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,764 (Aug. 14, 2012). Consistent with the broadest reasonable construction, claim terms are presumed to have their ordinary and customary meaning, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In its Petition, Petitioner proposed constructions for a multitude of terms. Pet. 10–14. Based on our review of the present record, however, we do not discern a need to construe expressly any of the claim terms of the ’096 patent at this time. II. ANALYSIS A. Anticipation by Spawn 1. Spawn (Ex. 1004) Spawn is directed to an open, market-based computational system. Ex. 1004, Abstract. The Spawn system utilizes idle computational resources in a distributed network of computer work stations. Id. Applications are divided into manager (M) and worker (W) modules. Id. at 10–11. An application manager coordinates the execution of a set of tasks in a distributed application. Id. It arranges, via communication with the resource manager, for child workers and sub-managers to perform subtasks. Id. A root application manager resides at the top-level user’s personal workstation and serves as the user-interface for distributed computation. Id. IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 6 The resource manager is responsible for initiating and monitoring the execution of the application task. Id. at 9. The resource manager also serves as the interface between high-level applications and the rest of the Spawn system. Id. Typically, a worker performs computations and reports partial reports to its immediate manager. Id. at 10. The process of combining and processing the partial reports is shown in Figure 1, reproduced below. Id. In Figure 1, above, workers (W) report to their local managers (M) who, in turn, report to a higher level of management. Ex. 1004, 11. Data produced by subtask workers is aggregated by upper level managers and, finally, the root manager presents the results to the user. Id. 2.Analysis of Evidence Presented Regarding Anticipation of claims 1, 8, and 14 by Spawn The Petition sets forth each element of claims 1, 8, and 14, respectively, in a separate paragraph. Pet. 17–28, 34–43, and 47–52. Each paragraph cites to specific passages in Spawn that purportedly read each IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 7 respective element of claims 1, 8, and 14 onto a corresponding passage in Spawn. Id. The independent claims are directed, generally, to a method of distributed computing where a first computer receives sets of data processing results from a plurality of computers. See Ex. 1001, claims 1, 8, and 14. Claim 1, in particular, recites that “said second computer received said second task portion from a third computer.” Id. at 6:1113. Claims 8 and 14 recite similar limitations. See id. at 6:5051 (“said first portion [of a task] received by said first computer from a second computer via inter- computer communications”(claim 8)), 7:1920, 2324 (“said first subtask portion received by said fourth computer from a third computer” and “said third computer received said first task portion from a second computer” (claim 14)). We are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that Spawn discloses the limitation concerning tasks received by one computer from another computer. Petitioner relies on Spawn’s application subtasks as corresponding to the above limitations. See Pet. 2122, 3738, 4950. With regard to claim 1, the Petition states that “the second-tier ‘application subtask’ computer in Spawn (i.e., the ‘the third computer’ in the language of the claim element) takes a subtask (which is a portion of the initial task) and divides it into ‘subtasks’ and sends the subtasks to third-tier computers for processing.” Id. at 22 (referring to annotations of Figure 1 of Spawn and citing page 11 of Spawn in support for this statement). According to Petitioner, the “third-tier computer” processes task portions sent to it from another computer.” Id. at 23 (no citations to Spawn provided to support this statement). The Petition, however, does not show or explain how Spawn IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 8 discloses that a so-called “third-tier computer” receives subtasks from the “second-tier computer.” At best, the Petition shows how the “third-tier computer” reports to the next higher level of management, and eventually to the root manager, which presents the results to the user. See Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1004, Fig. 1). There is a lack of explanation of how Petitioner contends a Spawn computer receives a task from another computer. The passages in Spawn that Petitioner cites to support its assertions are also inconclusive. Petitioner cites to certain passages in pages 10 and 11 of Spawn, but Petitioner fails to explain how these passages describe receiving the tasks that are alleged to occur in Spawn. For example, the Petition alludes to page 11 as disclosing dividing a subtask into “subsubtasks” and sending the “subsubtasks” to third-tier computers for processing. Figure 1, on page 11 of Spawn, shows that managers make reports to the next higher level of management. Figure 1 of Spawn does not show that the computer running the “subsubtask” receives the subsubtask from the computer running the “subtask” preceding it. Nor does Petitioner allude to any specific disclosure at page 11 that describes or explains computer-to-computer reception of subtasks. No other passages or explanations of Spawn are identified in the Petition as disclosing this limitation. We have reviewed Petitioner’s evidence and are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing that each of the limitations of claims 1, 8, and 14, respectively, are disclosed by Spawn. IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 9 3. Claims 2–7, 9–13, and 15–20. Claims 2–7 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1. Ex. 1001. Claims 9–13 depend from claim 8. Id. Claims 15–20 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 14. Id. With regard to these dependent claims, the Petition does not present evidence or arguments different from those discussed above. Accordingly, having reviewed Petitioner’s evidence, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing that each of the respective limitations of claims 2–7, 9–13, and 15–20 is met by Spawn. B. Obviousness over Spawn and Kisor 1. Kisor (Ex. 1005) Kisor is directed to a method and system for assigning tasks to peer- to-peer computers connected to a network. Ex. 1005, Abstract. Figure 1 of Kisor is reproduced below. IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 10 In Figure 1, the computer network 100 includes central computer 104 and a plurality of remote computers 108, 112, 116, and 120. Ex. 1005, 3:18–24. Each computer, including both the central computer and the remote computers, may be coupled to other computers in the network via a variety of communication techniques. Id. at 3:24–33. Central computer 104 executes management program 144 to coordinate operation of the network. Id. at 3:45–46. Kisor’s central computer coordinates tasks performed by a plurality of independent remote computers. Id. at 2:21–24. The central computer polls the remote computers as to their availability and computational capabilities. Id. at 2:24–27. The central computer then matches tasks to be completed IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 11 with remote computers based on the results of the polling and transmits the task to the assigned remote computers. Id. at 2:27–31. Kisor discloses that high priority tasks may be duplicated and sent to multiple remote computers to ensure robustness and prevent system failure. Id. at 6:20–22. Kisor’s central computer polls remote computers regarding the time of day when the remote computers will be idle. Id. at 2:19–30. 2. Analysis Petitioner relies on the same disclosures in Spawn concerning the computer-to-computer receiving of subtasks, discussed above. Petitioner relies on Kisor as teaching the additional limitations recited in dependent claims 2, 4, 11, and 18. Further, Petitioner does not show that Kisor makes up for Spawn’s deficiencies by, at a minimum, teaching the computer-to- computer receiving of subtasks discussed above. Because we have determined that the Petition fails to show sufficiently how these limitations are met by Spawn, or by Kisor, we are not persuaded that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in shown that dependent claims 2, 4, 11, and 18 are obvious over Spawn and Kisor. C. Obviousness Based On Level of Ordinary Skill Petitioner asserts that all of the challenged claims are obvious based on the knowledge, skill, and creativity of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention. Pet. 59–60. Petitioner’s contentions are supported by a series a statements in Dr. Joseph’s declaration regarding basic computer science techniques that are taught to undergraduate students. Id., Ex. 1006, ¶¶ 21–28. Dr. Joseph’s Declaration, in turn, refers generally IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 12 to voluminous excerpts from three computer science treatises. Ex. 1006, ¶ 22–26 (including Attachments B, D, and E. 3,4,5 ). Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying factual findings, including the differences between the claims and the prior art. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). A petitioner who does not state the differences between a challenged claim and the prior art, and relies instead on the Patent Owner and the Board to determine those differences risks having the corresponding ground of obviousness not included for trial for failing to adequately state a claim for relief. See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., CBM2012-00003, 2012 WL 9494791, at *2 (PTAB 2012). A petition for inter partes review must identify, “in writing and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). A petition must include “[a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence” and “where each element of [each challenged] claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon [and] the relevance of the evidence to the challenge raised.” 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.22(a)(2), 42.104(b)(4), (5). 3 RONALD B, GRAHAM ET AL., CONCRETE MATHEMATICS: A FOUNDATION FOR COMPUTER SCIENCE (2d ed. 1994). 4 HAL ABELSON ET AL., STRUCTURE AND INTERPRETATION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS (2d ed. 1996). 5 GREGORY R. ANDREWS,, FOUNDATIONS OF MULTITHREADED, PARALLEL, AND DISTRIBUTED PROGRAMMING, PART II (1999). IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 13 Petitioner devotes approximately one and one-half pages to this ground of unpatentability in its 58 page Petition. Pet. 59–60. Petitioner’s contentions (Pet. 59–60) are conclusory in nature and fail to satisfy the requirements in our rules that a petition contain a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence and identify where each element of each challenged claim is found in the prior art. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.22(a)(2), 42.104(b)(4), (5). Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing that claims 1–20 are obvious based solely on the alleged knowledge of someone of ordinary skill in the art. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we deny institution of inter partes review of the ’096 patent based on all the grounds asserted in the Petition. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied and no trial is instituted. Case IPR2014-00364 Patent 6,289,096 B1 CAPP, Administrative Patent Judge, dissenting-in-part. I agree with the decision to deny institution of a trial as to claims 1– 20 under the third ground of unpatentability based on nothing more than the knowledge of someone of ordinary skill in the art. I dissent from the decision to deny institution of a trial on the grounds of anticipation of claims 1–20 over Spawn and the unpatentability of claims 2, 4, 11, and 18 over Spawn and Kisor. A. Anticipation by Spawn In my opinion, Petitioner has made a threshold showing that Spawn discloses each and every limitation of the challenged claims and thus anticipates them. Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (a patent is invalid for anticipation if a single prior art reference discloses each and every limitation of the claimed invention). Spawn differs from the invention disclosed in Patent Owner’s Specification primarily in its use of a Resource Manager to conduct auction transactions between top level computers that buy distributed computing time and lower level computers that sell unused computing time. Ex 1004, Sec. III.B.2. However, this distinction does not defeat a finding of anticipation. The claims at issue have “comprising” transition phrases and, as such, do not preclude the use of additional elements that are not claimed. See Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (comprising transition means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim). IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 2 As shown in Figure 1, Spawn discloses a two-tiered system of distributed computing. Ex. 1004, Fig 1. Although Figure 1 discloses the upward reporting chain of a completed task, it is clear from the overall context of Spawn that the upward reporting chain merely retraces the downward chain where tasks are delegated from a top-level application. The majority faults Petitioner for not detailing “how” the data processing task is allocated and distributed. The claims, however, only require “that” the data processing task is allocated and sub-allocated and that the results thereof are reported to the “first” or top level computer. The only “how” requirement in the claims is: “receiving via network communication.” Ex. 1001, claim 1. 6 There is no serious question that, in Spawn, a distributed processing task originating at a top level computer is transferred and allocated to computers at two tiers or levels and that the transfers are via network connection. Similarly, there is no serious question that, after tasks are allocated and distributed to allocated and sub-allocated computers, the results are collated and reported back to the top level computer. The Petition adequately identifies the various sets among the plurality of sets of calculated results and their associated tasks portions and maps them to the claim language for claim 1. Pet. 17-28. Given the breadth of the claim language, I do not believe that a detailed showing of “how” the transfer occurs is or should be required as part of a threshold showing to institute a trial in this case. Without prejudging what the final outcome of the trial would be in this case, it is my opinion that Petitioner has made a threshold showing 6 “receiving by inter-computer communications.” Id. claim 8. IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 3 sufficient to warrant institution of a trial on the ground of anticipation over Spawn. B. Obviousness over Spawn and Kisor In my opinion, Petitioner has made the requisite threshold showings that the combination of Spawn and Kisor discloses all of the limitations of claims 2, 4, 11, and 18, and that Spawn discloses all of limitations of claims 1–20 and thus anticipates those claims. Kisor discloses distributed computing with scheduling features, Kisor lacks only a disclosure of distributed computing at multiple levels of distribution. Based on the record before us, Petitioner has made a reasonable showing that the ’096 patent does nothing more than arrange old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform. Neither does it appear that the combination yields anything more than one would expect from such an arrangement. Controlling precedent dictates that, if such is proved at trial in accordance with the requisite burden of proof, the combination is obvious. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007); Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976) Without prejudging what the final outcome of the trial would be in this case, it is my opinion that Petitioner has made a threshold showing sufficient to warrant institution of a trial on the ground of obviousness over Spawn and Kisor. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully DISSENT. IPR2014-00774 Patent 8,166,096 B1 4 For PETITIONER: David Pekarek Krohn PERKINS COIE LLP dpekarekkrohn@perkinscoie.com For PATENT OWNER: EUGENIO J. TORRES Ferraiuoli LLC etorres@ferraiuoli.com Kris S. LeFan Lowe & Associates, P.C. 11400 Olympic Boulevard, Suite 640 Los Angeles, CA 90064 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation