Anthony J. Brescia, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 7, 1999
01983540_r (E.E.O.C. Jun. 7, 1999)

01983540_r

06-07-1999

Anthony J. Brescia, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Anthony J. Brescia, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01983540

) Agency No. 4-H-335-1233-95

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

On August 16, 1995, appellant requested counseling about being treated

like an EAS-22 employee even though appellant was a PCES-1 Postmaster.

Thirty (30) days expired with no action from the agency, so by letter

dated September 26, 1995, appellant requested that the agency �consider

this my formal EEO complaint.�<1> On September 28, 1995, the agency

responded by sending appellant a blank formal complaint form, requesting

that appellant complete the form to file a formal complaint. The agency

also included a notice of right to file a formal complaint, outlining

that appellant had 15 days from the date of receipt in which to file a

formal complaint. Appellant received the notice on September 30, 1995.

Appellant returned the form on October 25, 1995, with a note stating

that appellant filed his formal complaint on September 26, 1995.

On February 2, 1996, the agency issued a final agency decision (FAD-1)

dismissing appellant's allegation for untimely counselor contact.

Appellant's allegation was defined as: On July 8, 1995, and continuing,

appellant was reduced to a lower level in that as a PCES-1 Postmaster,

appellant has to report to a non-PCES manager. The agency found, however,

that appellant was aware of his allegation on March 3, 1995, when he was

told that his new position (which he obtained from a settlement agreement)

would not be a part of the main management cluster.

Appellant appealed, and in EEOC Appeal No. 01962822 (Sept. 19, 1996), the

Commission vacated appellant's complaint because it could not ascertain

what appellant alleged, when it occurred, when appellant was aware of

the alleged discrimination, or when he reasonably should have suspected

discrimination. Consequently, the Commission vacated FAD-1, and ordered,

inter alia, that the agency contact appellant to clarify his complaint.<2>

On remand, the agency again dismissed appellant's complaint for untimely

counselor contact (FAD-2). The agency found that appellant entered

into a confidential settlement agreement that allowed appellant to take

a PCES position, EAS-22. Further, the agency found that appellant was

aware that he would not be treated as a normal PCES employee on March 3,

1995, 164 days prior to appellant's August 14, 1995 counselor contact.

Appellant again appealed, and in EEOC Appeal No. 01972145 (Nov. 18,

1997), the Commission noted that the agency failed to contact appellant to

clarify his complaint before issuing FAD-2. The Commission found that the

record was still insufficient to determine the timeliness of appellant's

complaint, and again vacated the agency's decision. The Commission

again ordered the agency to contact appellant for clarification.

On remand, the agency sent appellant an investigative affidavit,

which appellant completed and returned on January 6, 1998. In the

affidavit, appellant stated that beginning on or about July 8, 1995,

appellant had not received the same training, pay, or benefits of other

PCES-1 executives. Appellant claims that he did not become aware of his

reduction from PCES-1 to EAS-22 until he was told of his down-grade by

letter dated July 21, 1995.

In a FAD dated March 20, 1998 (FAD-3), the agency defined appellant's

complaint as alleging discrimination on the basis of reprisal for prior

EEO activity when appellant was reduced to a lower level in that as

a PCES-1 Postmaster, appellant had to report to a non-PCES Manager on

July 8, 1995. The agency dismissed the allegation for failure to timely

file a written complaint, because appellant received a notice of right

to file a formal complaint on September 30, 1995, but did not file a

formal complaint until October 25, 1995.

On April 8, 1998, appellant filed the present appeal from FAD-3.

On appeal, appellant claims that he timely filed a formal complaint

on September 26, 1995. Further, appellant argues that the agency

disobeyed EEOC Regulations and prior Commission decisions in an attempt

to unlawfully stall appellant's complaint with procedural dismissals.

Appellant requests that attorney's fees be awarded, and that sanctions

be imposed on the agency for its misdeeds.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(d) requires, in relevant part,

that if counseling has not been resolved within thirty (30) days

of contacting a counselor, the aggrieved person shall be informed

in writing by the Counselor, not later than the thirtieth day after

contacting the Counselor, of the right to file a discrimination complaint.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.106(b) requires the filing of a written

complaint with an appropriate agency official within fifteen (15)

calendar days after the date of receipt of the notice of the right to

file a complaint. Further, EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.106 (c)

requires that the complaint contain a signed statement from the person

claiming to be aggrieved that is sufficiently precise to identify the

aggrieved individual and the agency, and that describes generally the

actions or practices that form the basis of the complaint.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(b) provides that the agency shall

dismiss a complaint or a portion of a complaint that fails to comply

with the applicable time limits contained in ��1614.105, 1614.106, and

1614.204(c), unless the agency extends the time limits in accordance

with �1614.604(c).

In the present case, the Commission finds that appellant exercised his

right to file a formal complaint on September 26, 1995, although the

agency failed to notify appellant of his right to file by the thirtieth

day after appellant contacted a counselor. Appellant submitted a written,

signed statement that manifested his intent to file a formal complaint.

Further, appellant attached a copy of his pre-complaint counseling form,

which identified the aggrieved and the agency, and described the actions

that formed the basis of his complaint. The Regulations do not require

that a formal complaint be made on a certain standardized form, nor do

they require appellant to abstain from filing a formal complaint when the

agency has failed to notify appellant of his right to file. Accordingly,

appellant's formal complaint was timely filed on September 26, 1995.<3>

Regarding appellant's request for sanctions and attorney's fees, appellant

must establish that he is a prevailing party in the matter in order to

receive attorney's fees. In order to be considered a prevailing party,

appellant must have, on a significant issue, substantially received

some of the relief he sought when he initiated his EEO action, and

appellant's EEO action must have been the catalyst motivating the agency

to provide the relief granted. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,

433 (1983). Generally, prevailing on a procedural issue does not

trigger an entitlement to attorney's fees. See Grossman v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05880472 (Sept. 22, 1988); Fowler

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01966584 (Jan. 28,

1998). While recognizing that in Weaver v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Appeal No. 01913114 (Dec. 5, 1991), the Commission held that the

agency's repeated dismissal of an appellant's complaint, and failure

to accept the complaint as ordered by the Commission, constituted an

unlawful restraint on appellant's right to file a formal complaint and,

therefore, appellant was entitled to attorney's fees, we find that in

the present case the agency has not yet defied a Commission Order to

accept the complaint. Consequently, we deny appellant's request for

attorney's fees; however, the agency is hereby advised that the further

processing of appellant's complaint should comply with all applicable

time limitations and regulations.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's decision to dismiss appellant's complaint is

REVERSED, and the allegations are REMANDED for further processing and

investigation. Appellant's request for sanctions and attorney's fees,

however, is denied.

ORDER (E1092)

The agency is ORDERED to process the remanded allegations in accordance

with 29 C.F.R. �1614.108. The agency shall acknowledge to the appellant

that it has received the remanded allegations within thirty (30) calendar

days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency shall issue to

appellant a copy of the investigative file and also shall notify appellant

of the appropriate rights within one hundred fifty (150) calendar days

of the date this decision becomes final, unless the matter is otherwise

resolved prior to that time. If the appellant requests a final decision

without a hearing, the agency shall issue a final decision within sixty

(60) days of receipt of appellant's request.

A copy of the agency's letter of acknowledgment to appellant and a copy

of the notice that transmits the investigative file and notice of rights

must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action.

The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503(a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503(g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you

have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some

jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner

suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your

civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision

or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,

you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR

DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your

appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME

AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY

HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME

AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

June 7, 1999

__________________________________

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations1Appellant claims on appeal, and

the agency does not contradict, that appellant attached a copy

of his pre-complaint counseling form to his September 26, 1995

correspondence.

2The Commission found that appellant was raising a new allegation,

not alleging breach of settlement.

3Further, the Commission notes that appellant's complaint was timely

raised with an EEO Counselor. Appellant alleged that he became aware of

his mistreatment on July 8, 1995, but the agency has provided no evidence

to establish an earlier date on which appellant should have gained a

reasonable suspicion of discrimination; a copy of the settlement agreement

was not included in the record. Appellant contacted a counselor on

August 14, 1995, less than forty-five (45) days after the incident date.