Anita Hymes-Grant, Complainant,v.Mike Donley, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 26, 2011
0120112878 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 26, 2011)

0120112878

10-26-2011

Anita Hymes-Grant, Complainant, v. Mike Donley, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.




Anita Hymes-Grant,

Complainant,

v.

Mike Donley,

Secretary,

Department of the Air Force,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120112878

Hearing No. 420-2011-00016X

Agency No. 8V0J100007

DECISION

On May 11, 2011, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s April

22, 2011, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §�

�1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the

Agency’s final order.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues presented are: (1) whether the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ)

properly issued a decision without a hearing and (2) whether the AJ erred

as a matter of law in finding that Complainant failed to establish that

she was subjected to race based discrimination.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as

an Assistant Director of the Child Development Center at the Agency’s

Keesler Air Force Base, in Biloxi, Mississippi. On March 30, 2010,

Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated

against her on the basis of race (African-American) when on February 18,

2010, she received a Notice of Decision to Suspend for Five Calendar Days.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant

with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to

request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant

timely requested a hearing. The AJ granted the Agency’s February 11,

2011, motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision

without a hearing on March 22, 2011.

The AJ found the following facts: On January 19, 2010, the Child

Development Center (CDC) Director (Director) issued a proposed five-day

suspension to Complainant for failure to complete the National Associate

for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC) accreditation portfolio for

the Keesler AFB CDC. Complainant’s second-line Supervisor (S2) issued

Complainant a notice of the discipline. Complainant was suspended from

February 22-26, 2010.

The AJ determined that Air Force CDCs must be accredited by the NAEYC

and must comply with the NAEYC Accreditation Criteria and Procedures in

order to be accredited. The NAEYC assessors, as part of the site visit

to determine accreditation, require programs to organize portfolios by

the NAEYC Early Childhood Program standards. The portfolio serves as an

opportunity for programs to present evidence of the program’s capacity

to meet the NAEYC Early Childhood Program Standards and Accreditation

Criteria over time. It is also used to track policies and record events

in order to demonstrate current implementation of the NAEYC’s standards

and criteria.

Complainant was assigned as lead to the accreditation portfolio project

and began working on it in March 2009. Although Complainant was not 100

percent responsible for completing the portfolio, she was responsible

for the completion of the portfolio. When the accreditation check was

conducted September 1- 4, 2009, Complainant’s sections were 95 percent

completed. The Director and S2 had to work nights and weekends to ensure

the Center completed all its tasks in order to receive accreditation.

As a result, the Director proposed the five-day suspension because

Complainant failed to take charge and put together the accreditation

portfolio.

The AJ determined that the Agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The AJ further found that

Complainant failed to establish that the Agency’s proffered reasons

were a pretext for discrimination. The AJ found that Complainant failed

to demonstrate that she was discriminated against as alleged.

The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s

finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected

her to discrimination as alleged. Complainant filed an appeal with

the Commission. On appeal, Complainant did not make any arguments.

The Agency requests that we affirm its final order adopting the AJ’s

finding of no discrimination.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal

and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them,

de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision

on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de

novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.B. (November 9,

1999) (providing that an administrative judge’s “decision to issue a

decision without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)] will

be reviewed de novo”). This essentially means that we should look at

this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if

accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual

conclusions and legal analysis – including on the ultimate fact of

whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue

of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated.

See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard

of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without

regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision

maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony

of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties,

and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment

of the record and its interpretation of the law”).

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission’s

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or

she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. §�

�1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment

procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where

a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary

standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of

material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court’s function is not

to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine

issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must

be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences

must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. An issue

of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact

finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103,

105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential

to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally,

an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing

unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given

(1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing,

(2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts,

(3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance

to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to

the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment “where the

[party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover

information that is essential to his opposition.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge

must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to

properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29

C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could

order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion

for a decision without a hearing).

We find that after a careful review of the record, the AJ appropriately

issued a decision without a hearing. The record reveals that ample

notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing was given

to the parties; a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed

material facts existed; the parties had the opportunity to respond to

the statement, and the parties had the chance to engage in discovery

before responding.

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was

subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would

support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending

on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 804

n.14. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant

must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s

explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

519 (1993). At all times, Complainant retains the burden of persuasion,

and it is her obligation to show by a preponderance of the evidence that

the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See Hicks, supra.

Assuming arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case

of race discrimination, we find that the record reflects that the

Agency proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Specifically, S2 issued Complainant a Notice of Decision to Suspend for

Five Calendar Days on February 18, 2010, for failure to carry out assigned

duties/instructions in a reasonable period of time. S2 provided affidavit

testimony that she chose a five-day suspension to “get Complainant’s

attention” as to the serious nature of her conduct because it was

critical for all tasks and programs of the accreditation portfolio to be

completed in a timely manner to support the Candidacy Materials Package,

which was due September 30, 2009. S2 stated that because Complainant did

not ensure the portfolio was done, or participate in the accreditation

process, she and the Director worked nights and weekends to gather,

produce, and file documents in the correct files for the portfolio.

In order to demonstrate that the Agency’s proffered reasons are not

worthy of credence, Complainant argues that she was never tasked to be

entirely responsible for ensuring the portfolio was completed. However,

we note that Complainant stated in her affidavit that she received an

e-mail from the Director stating that she would be the primary point of

contact on the NAEYC CDC portfolio.

Moreover, S2 stated that Complainant’s role was to assign sections

for the accreditation portfolio and ensure the required data and

information was placed in the portfolio box. S2 never saw any

evidence that Complainant did any work with regard to completing the

portfolio. S2 maintained that Complainant did not participate in the

overall accreditation process and she never saw her working overtime.

The Director also provided testimony stating that had Complainant taken

an active role as the Assistant Director in verifying the data she was

supposed to submit for the accreditation portfolio and helped to verify

that the information received from other staff members was accurate,

she would not have been suspended. Although Complainant testified

that she completed tasks in furtherance of completing the portfolio,

we find that the evidence of record shows that she failed to do so in

an acceptable manner. Further, nothing in the record shows that the

Agency was motivated by discriminatory animus when it disciplined her.

Accordingly, we find that Complainant failed to establish that she was

discriminated against on the basis of her race as she alleged.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the

Agency’s final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant was

not discriminated against as alleged.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File A Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

__10/26/11________________

Date

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0120112878

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120112878