Anand Janefalkar

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 8, 2021

2020001759 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 8, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/798,468 07/14/2015 Anand Janefalkar 6394.01/8808.001 4863
23308 7590 07/08/2021
Steven Colby
Rimon Law, P.C.
420 West Main Street, Suite 101B
Boise, ID 83702
EXAMINER
TRUVAN, LEYNNA THANH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2435
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/08/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PV-PatentDoc@rimonlaw.com
docketing.rimonlaw@clarivate.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ANAND JANEFALKAR
Appeal 2020-001759
Application 14/798,468
Technology Center 2400
Before GREGG I. ANDERSON, CHRISTA P. ZADO, and
AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges.

ZADO, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–29. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ujet, Inc. Appeal
Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The Specification relates to customer authentication. Claims 1 and
18, reproduced below, are illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A customer communication system comprising:
a gatekeeper configured to receive digital identification data
and to ratify the digital identification data by comparing the
digital identification data to previously stored customer
authentication data; and
a customer relationship management system including an agent
interface configured to generate and operate a graphical user
interface, the customer relationship management system
configured to receive a customer service request from an access
device and to connect the customer service request to the agent
interface,
the customer relationship management system also including
authentication logic configured to authenticate a source of the
customer service request using at least two methods, the two
methods including:
a) providing questions to the agent interface and ratifying
responses to the questions and
b) providing digital identification data received from the
source of the customer service request to the gatekeeper
and receiving an automated ratification of the digital
identification data from the gatekeeper,
the customer relationship management system being further
configured to provide secure customer data to the agent
interface or grant permission to use the secure customer data,
only after the authentication of the source of the customer
service request.
Appeal Br. 39 (Claims App’x).
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18. An access device comprising:
a phone, a tablet, or a personal computer, wherein the phone,
tablet, or personal computer includes each of
a display;
a user input;
an input/output configured to initiate communication to a
customer relationship management system;
an authentication agent configured to receive an
authentication request from a customer relationship
management system and to automatically provide digital
identification data to a gatekeeper in response to the
authentication request, wherein the authentication request
includes an identifier of the customer relationship
management system;
an access control configured to limit access via the
display to the authentication agent; and
a processor configured to execute at least the
authentication agent.
Appeal Br. 41–42 (Claims App’x).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Silvain 2007/0174390 A1 July 26, 2007
Lindsay 2007/0250920 A1 Oct. 25, 2007

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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the
combination of Lindsay and Silvain.
Claims 18–29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by
Lindsay.
OPINION
102 Rejection of Claims 18–21
For reasons that follow, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner
has not established Lindsay anticipates claims 18–21, because Lindsay has
not been shown to disclose “wherein the authentication request includes an
identifier of the customer relationship management system,” as required by
claims 18–21. Appeal Br. 11–23.
In pertinent part, independent claim 18 recites (and claims 19–21
depending therefrom require) “an authentication agent configured to receive
an authentication request from a customer relationship management system
and to automatically provide digital identification data to a gatekeeper in
response to the authentication request, wherein the authentication request
includes an identifier of the customer relationship management system.”
Appeal Br. 41–42 (Claims App’x) (emphasis added).
The Examiner finds Lindsay’s electronic device 50 (shown in
Figures 1 and 2 of Lindsay) is “an access device” comprising “a display”
(e.g., graphical user interface 54); “a user input” (e.g., user input means 56,
such as a keyboard); “an input/output” (e.g., electronic device 50 is
configured to communicate with Internet 48 and/or communications
network 68); “an authentication agent” (e.g., Factotum software application);
“an access control configured to limit access” (e.g., provision of
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substantially limited or feigned access to user assets); and “a processor
configured to execute at least the authentication agent” (e.g., the processor
of electronic device 50, which runs the Factotum software application).
Final Act. 10–12.
As found by the Examiner, in one configuration electronic device 50
includes Factotum, wherein Factotum acts as an “authentication agent.”
Appeal Br. 21; Final Act. 10–11; Lindsay ¶ 228. Factotum “allow[s] a user
to store multiple passwords that can be automatically provided to other
servers when needed to simply authenticat[e] [] the user, who no longer
needs to remember multiple passwords . . . Factotum acts as an
authentication agent for a user.” Lindsay ¶ 228 (emphasis added).
Also found by the Examiner, Lindsay’s “authentication agent” (i.e.,
Factotum) is “configured to receive an authentication request from a
customer relationship management system and to automatically provide
digital identification data in response to the authentication request,” as
recited in claim 18. Final Act. 11–12; Appeal Br. 20; Lindsay ¶ 228.
Specifically, when a user seeks access to a website and clicks on a “log in”
link, a server provides Factotum with an authentication webpage requesting
the user’s credentials (i.e., Factotum receives an authentication request from
a CRM system). Appeal Br. 20; see also Lindsay ¶ 228. Factotum
automatically supplies the requested credentials (i.e., Factotum provides
digital identification data) in response to the request. Appeal Br. 20; see
also Lindsay ¶ 228.
Lindsay also discloses providing the digital identification data “to the
gatekeeper,” as recited in claim 18. Ans. 16–21; Appeal Br. 21.
Specifically, the user credentials (i.e., digital identification data) are supplied
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to security server 44 in Lindsay—i.e., a CRM system. Security server 44
utilizes the user credentials to control access to an asset (e.g., bank account),
and therefore includes a gatekeeper. Ans. 16–20. As explained by the
Examiner, the term “gatekeeper” is not defined in the Specification, and
therefore is interpreted broadly. Id. at 18. The illustrative, non-limiting
embodiments of gatekeeper in the Specification are consistent with the
Examiner’s interpretation of gatekeeper, namely that the term is broad
enough to encompass applications and/or software in server 44 that
authenticate user credentials. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 16–18 (describing
Gatekeeper 125 as including logic (such as “hardware, firmware, and/or
software”) that authenticates customers by automatically comparing received
digital identification data with previously stored authentication data).
Moreover, nothing in the claim language or Specification prohibit the
security server 44 from both: 1) being a CRM system; and 2) including an
integrated gatekeeper. Indeed, such interpretation is consistent with the
Specification, which explicitly states the gatekeeper may be separate from
the CRM or may be “an integral part of [the] CRM,” as shown in Figure 3 of
the Specification. Spec. ¶ 16; Fig. 3.
Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, Lindsay discloses, “an
authentication agent configured to receive an authentication request from a
customer relationship management system and to automatically provide
digital identification data to a gatekeeper in response to the authentication
request.” However, the Examiner has not established that Lindsay discloses,
“wherein the authentication request includes an identifier of the customer
relationship management system.” Final Act. 11; Appeal Br. 22.
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“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in
the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628,
631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). An Examiner carries the procedural burden of
establishing a prima facie case when the rejection satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132
in notifying the applicant of the basis of the rejection, by stating the reasons
of rejection together with such information and reference as may be useful in
judging the propriety of continuing to prosecute the application. In re Jung,
637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The procedural
burden is not satisfied “when a rejection is so uninformative that it prevents
the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for
rejection.” Id.
Here, the Examiner cites paragraphs 112 and 144 of Lindsay as
disclosing the claim recitation at issue. Final Act. 11. However, it is not
readily apparent from the cited material that Lindsay explicitly discloses an
authentication request including an identifier of the CRM system (i.e.,
server 44). Lindsay ¶¶ 112, 144. Paragraph 112 generally describes objects
involved in a security system, but does not explicitly disclose authentication
requests or the information included in such requests. Id. ¶ 112.
Paragraph 144 describes a user receiving a prompt (i.e., “authentication
request”) for security information and providing such information in
response, but does not explicitly disclose including the identifier of the
requesting server in the prompt. Id. ¶ 144. Accordingly, the Examiner has
not sufficiently shown Lindsay explicitly discloses inclusion of an identifier
of the CRM system in the authentication request. In the absence of explicit
disclosure, a reference still anticipates where disclosure is inherent.
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Verdegaal Bros., 814 F.2d 628. Although it seems that inclusion of such
identifier is inherently disclosed in Lindsay (in order to facilitate sending
credentials back to the server requesting such credentials), the Examiner
does not articulate sufficiently that this feature is inherently disclosed. Final
Act. 11; Ans. 16–20 (which does not address the issue of including an
identifier of the CRM system in an authentication request). Therefore, the
Examiner has not sufficiently provided notice to Appellant as to whether
Lindsay explicitly discloses the limitation at issue (and if so, what
constitutes such disclosure), or whether Lindsay inherently discloses such
limitation (and if so, an explanation as to how).
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the rejection of independent
claim 18, and claims 19–21 depending therefrom.2
102 Rejection of Claims 22–29
For reasons that follow, Appellant has not persuaded us that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 22–29 under Section 102. Specifically,
we disagree with Appellant’s assertion that Lindsay fails to disclose
“providing permission to discuss or access secure customer data, the
permission being provided to an agent interface in response to receiving the
ratification, the agent interface being configured for audio communication
between a customer support agent and the access device,” as recited in
claim 22.3

2 Appellant provides separate argument for claims 19 and 20. Appeal
Br. 23–27. However, because we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of these
claims for the reasons discussed above, we need not and do not address
Appellant’s separate arguments.
3 Appellant argues claims 23–29 stand or fall with claim 22. Appeal Br. 30.
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Appellant argues the Examiner erred by equating Lindsay’s password
with the claimed “permission to discuss or access secure customer data.”
Appeal Br. 28–29. We disagree that the Examiner equates Lindsay’s
password with the claimed “permission.” As explained by the Examiner,
Lindsay provides customers with password-protected access to assets (e.g., a
bank account). Ans. 22 (citing, e.g., Lindsay ¶ 20). Therefore, the password
itself is not the “permission,” but rather “permission” to access assets is
given as a result of verifying a password. Accordingly, we find no error in
the Examiner’s finding that Lindsay discloses “providing permission to
discuss or access secure customer data, the permission being provided to an
agent interface in response to receiving the ratification, the agent interface
being configured for audio communication between a customer support
agent and the access device.”
Appellant’s erroneous interpretation of the Examiner’s rejection—i.e.,
that Lindsay’s password is the claimed “permission”—propagates
throughout Appellant’s remaining arguments as to claim 21. Because
Appellant’s additional arguments are based on the incorrect assumption that
the Examiner equates Lindsay’s password with “permission,” we find such
arguments unavailing. Appeal Br. 28–29.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 22–29.
103 Rejection of Claims 1–17
For the following reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–17 under Section 103. Specifically, we
disagree with Appellant’s assertion that the combined art fails to teach or
suggest “providing questions to the agent interface and ratifying responses to
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the questions,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 31–36.4 We also disagree
with Appellant’s argument that the Examiner has failed to provide sufficient
motivation to combine Lindsay with Silvain. Id. at 36–38.
In pertinent part, claim 1 recites a customer communication system
comprising a “[CRM] system including an agent interface configured to
generate and operate a graphical user interface [GUI],” the CRM system also
including logic for “providing questions to the agent interface and ratifying
responses to the questions.” The Examiner finds that a display/login screen
is an “agent interface.” Final Act. 18–19 (citing Lindsay ¶¶ 108, 114). For
example, as shown in Figure 2 of Lindsay, security server 44 (i.e., a CRM
system) includes a display screen, i.e., an “agent interface.” Lindsay Fig. 2.
The Examiner acknowledges that Lindsay provides no explicit disclosure
that the display screen includes a GUI. Final Act. 19. However, the
Examiner finds that it would have been obvious to include a GUI, in light of
Silvain. Id. at 19–20. As to providing questions to the agent interface—e.g.,
the display screen of security server 44—and ratifying responses to the
questions, the Examiner finds that Lindsay’s display screen is used by an
agent to prompt a user with questions displayed on the screen and to connect
service requests made by users after the agent enters user responses into the
system. Id. 17 (citing Lindsay ¶¶ 114, 144); Ans. 23–24 (citing ¶¶ 108–114,
144). Lindsay discloses, for example, using a telephone as a secondary line
in which a user contacts an agent and may be prompted by the agent to
provide security credentials. Lindsay ¶¶ 143, 144. We agree with the
Examiner that this suggests the agent asks the user for credentials based on

4 Appellant argues claims 2–17 stand or fall with claim 1. Appeal Br. 38.
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question prompts on the agent’s display screen that are provided by a CRM
system—indeed, it is unlikely the agent comes up with such questions on
their own, but rather reads question prompts on their display screen.
Lindsay ¶¶ 143, 144. Lindsay also suggests that the verification of the
user’s responses used to determine whether to grant access is performed by
the CRM system, as it is unlikely the agent knows the responses, but rather
verifies responses through the CRM system. See, e.g., Final Act. 17; id. at
19–20; Ans. 23–24; Lindsay ¶¶ 108–114, 144.
Appellant’s first paragraph of argument essentially neglects the
teaching shown in Figure 2 of Lindsay, in which security server 44 includes
a display screen for agents to use as an interface. Appeal Br. 35. Appellant
instead constructs its own interpretation of what in Lindsay could possibly
be an “agent interface,” arguing that in some instances it could be included
in central system 72 (as shown in Figure 3) of Lindsay. Id. In particular,
Appellant provides arguments that assume central system 72 itself is the
“agent interface.” Id. Appellant submits that no questions are provided to
central system 72. Id.
Appellant’s next paragraph of argument acknowledges the Examiner’s
findings that the display screen, such as that of security system 44, teaches
an “agent interface.” Appeal Br. 35–36. However, Appellant submits that
questions are not provided to the display screen (i.e., asserted “agent
interface”). Id. at 35–36.
Appellant’s third paragraph of argument treats security system 70 as
the CRM system, and acknowledges that it may include a display screen.
Appeal Br. 36. Under this scenario, Appellant submits that questions are not
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provided to such display screen and security system 70 does not ratify
responses to any questions provided to such display screen. Id.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because they do not address
Lindsay’s teachings relating to an agent using an agent interface (e.g.,
display screen of security server 44) in order to interface with a customer.
Final Act. 17, 19–20; Ans. 23–24; Lindsay ¶¶ 108–114, 144, Fig. 2 (display
screen of security server 44). Appellant instead analogizes the claimed
interface with the display screen of Lindsay’s user device, rather than the
display screen of Lindsay’s security server 44, arguing that the questions
provided to the user device are more like what the claims recite. Appeal
Br. 36. But such argument neglects the findings actually made by the
Examiner and the teachings of Lindsay discussed above.
Even if we were to find Lindsay neither teaches nor suggests the
“providing questions” and “ratifying responses” limitation, the Examiner
finds that Silvain teaches use of a GUI at an agent interface that facilitates
providing questions to the GUI and the GUI providing responses that are
ratified by a CRM system. Final Act. 18–20. Appellant submits it would
not have been obvious to combine the teachings of Lindsay with Silvain to
arrive at the claimed invention, arguing that the Examiner’s obviousness
determination requires “graft[ing] the whole customer service management
system of Silvain et el. onto the security system of Lindsay.” Appeal Br. 37.
We disagree with Appellant’s assertion that the Examiner essentially grafts
Silvain’s entire CRM system onto Lindsay’s. Rather, the Examiner relies on
the CRM system of Lindsay, introducing Silvain only to show what was
well-known in the art, namely that a display screen has a GUI (which every
Windows-based system and most computer displays have), and that CRM
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system agents may interact with customers by asking them questions to
verify their credentials (which Lindsay itself teaches). Final Act. 18–20;
see, e.g., Silvain [57], ¶ 193; see also Final Act. 17 (citing
Lindsay ¶¶ 114, 144); Lindsay ¶¶ 143, 144 (describing using a telephone as
a secondary channel for verification).
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 22–29.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed in part.
More specifically, we sustain the rejections of
claims 22–29 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Lindsay; and
claims 1–17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combination
of Lindsay and Silvain.
We do not sustain the rejection of claims 18–21 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 as anticipated by Lindsay.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
18–29 102 Lindsay 22–29 18–21
1–17 103 Lindsay, Silvain 1–17
Overall
Outcome
1–17, 22–
29
18–21

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART