ANALOG DEVICES, INC.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJun 9, 202014276238 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 9, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/276,238 05/13/2014 Dipak Sengupta ADINC.179A 7193 110833 7590 06/09/2020 KNOBBE, MARTENS, OLSON & BEAR, LLP (ADIRE/ADINC/ADHIT) 2040 Main Street, Fourteenth Floor Irvine, CA 92614 EXAMINER KARKI, PARAS D ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2626 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/09/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): efiling@knobbe.com jayna.cartee@knobbe.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte DIPAK SENGUPTA, SHRENIK DELIWALA, YING ZHAO, BRUCE FRIED, WILLIAM SCHOPPEE, and WOODROW BECKFORD Appeal 2019-002194 Application 14/276,238 Technology Center 2600 Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., BARBARA A. BENOIT, and MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges. Opinion for the Board filed by Administrative Patent Judge MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judge. Opinion Dissenting in part filed by Administrative Patent Judge CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., Administrative Patent Judge. Appeal 2019-002194 Application 14/276,238 2 DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–4, 6–8, 10, 12–20, 22–27, 29–36, 38, and 39, which are all of the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. TECHNOLOGY The application relates to the arrangement of components in a gesture sensor module. Spec. ¶ 4. ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below with the limitations at issue emphasized: 1. A gesture sensor module comprising: an optical emitter die having an emitter surface, the optical emitter die mounted on a first mounting surface; an optical sensor die having a sensor surface facing upwards, the optical sensor die mounted on a second mounting surface; a package housing the optical emitter die disposed in a first cavity of the package and the optical sensor die disposed in a second cavity of the package, wherein the first mounting surface is disposed at a first height relative to a bottom surface of the package, the second mounting surface is disposed at a second height relative to the bottom surface of the package, wherein the 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Analog Devices, Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 4. Appeal 2019-002194 Application 14/276,238 3 first height is different from the second height, and wherein a portion of an external surface of the package defines a surface for detecting a gesture by the optical sensor die; and an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) die, the optical sensor die stacked on the ASIC die such that the ASIC die is disposed between the optical sensor die and the bottom surface of the package, the ASIC die in electrical communication with the optical sensor die. REFERENCES The Examiner relies upon the following prior art references: Name Number Date Coffy US 2013/0012276 A1 Jan. 10, 2013 Costello US 2013/0292706 A1 Nov. 7, 2013 Lee US 2011/0254763 A1 Oct. 20, 2011 Patel US 8,604,436 B1 Dec. 10, 2013 Tajul US 2007/0291490 A1 Dec. 20, 2007 Varaprasad US 2009/0075092 A1 Mar. 19, 2009 Wiese US 2010/0259766 A1 Oct. 14, 2010 REJECTIONS All pending claims stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combinations of references listed in the chart below. The Examiner withdrew the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). Ans. 4.2 2 Citations to “Ans.” are to the Examiner’s Answer dated January 7, 2019. Appeal 2019-002194 Application 14/276,238 4 Claims References Final Act.3 1, 2, 12, 14–16, 23– 25, 27, 29, 30, 36, 39 Wiese, Patel, Coffy 4 3, 4 Wiese, Patel, Coffy, Varaprasad 15 6, 31, 35, 38 Wiese, Patel, Coffy, Costello 16 17–20, 22 Wiese, Patel, Costello 19 7, 10, 13, 32 Wiese, Patel, Coffy, Lee 24 8 Wiese, Patel, Coffy, Lee, Tajul 27 26, 34 Wiese, Patel, Coffy, Tajul 27 33 Wiese, Patel, Costello, Tajul 29 ISSUES 1. Did the Examiner err in finding Coffy teaches or suggests “the optical sensor die stacked on the ASIC die such that the ASIC die is disposed between the optical sensor die and the bottom surface of the package,” as recited in claim 1? 2. Did the Examiner err in finding Coffy teaches or suggests “the different heights provided at least in part by an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) die disposed underneath the sensor die,” as recited in claim 23? 3. Did the Examiner err in finding reason to modify Wiese’s straight barrier with Costello’s tapered barrier with respect to the limitation “the optical barrier tapers inwardly from a lower portion of the optical barrier to an upper portion of the optical barrier such that an uppermost portion of the first cavity is smaller than a lowermost portion of the first cavity,” as recited in claim 17? 3 There are no page numbers on the Final Office Action itself. Our references to specific pages start counting the “Office Action Summary” as page 1 and the beginning of the “Detailed Action” as page 2. Appeal 2019-002194 Application 14/276,238 5 ANALYSIS Claims 1, 2, 12, 14–16, 29, 36, and 39 Claim 1 separately recites (A) “an optical sensor die” and (B) “an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) die.” Claim 1 further recites “the optical sensor die stacked on the ASIC die such that the ASIC die is disposed between the optical sensor die and the bottom surface of the package.” The Examiner relies on Coffy for teaching the claimed stacking of the two dies, specifically the depiction in Figure 6 of the optical sensor 9 and integrated circuit chip 6. Final Act. 7. Appellant argues that in Coffy, “the optical sensor is integrated with, and forms part of, the chip 6.” Appeal Br. 12. “In no sense does the optical sensor 9 qualify as a ‘die’ separately mounted on an ASIC, as recited in Claim 1.” Id. The Examiner states Appellant “has not claimed for ‘separately mounted’” and regardless, “separation and integration of parts are well known and would be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.” Ans. 34. Figure 6 of Coffy is reproduced below: Appeal 2019-002194 Application 14/276,238 6 Figure 6 of Coffy depicts a cross-section of an electronic package during fabrication. See Coffy ¶¶ 20–23, 49. According to Coffy, “[t]he electronic package 1 comprises a receiving integrated circuit chip 6, . . . the front face 8 of which comprises . . . a main integrated light radiation optical sensor 9.” Id. ¶ 29. Thus, Coffy discloses the front face 8 of chip 6 comprises an integrated light radiation optical sensor 9. We agree with Appellant that the Examiner fails to show how Coffy’s chip comprising an integrated sensor teaches an “optical sensor die stacked on the ASIC die,” as recited by claim 1. The sensor die cannot be “stacked on” the ASIC die if the sensor and ASIC are integrated on the same die. Unlike the legal precedent cited by the Examiner inquiring whether it would have been obvious to make a cap on a tube of lipstick removable, see In re Dulberg, 289 F.2d 522, 523 (CCPA 1961), here the Examiner has not sufficiently explained whether or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to separate Coffy’s integrated chip into two separate chips or dies. See Reply Br. 4. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and its dependent claims 2, 12, 14–16, 29, 36, and 39. Claims 23–25, 27, and 30 Independent claim 23 recites “the different heights provided at least in part by an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) die disposed underneath the sensor die.” Appellant relies on substantially the same argument as claim 1, i.e., that Coffy does not teach separate dies for the sensor and ASIC. Appeal Br. 15. The Examiner likewise relies on the same findings. Ans. 41–43. Appeal 2019-002194 Application 14/276,238 7 As with claim 1, an ASIC die cannot be “disposed underneath” a sensor die if the ASIC and the sensor are on the same die. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 23, and its dependent claims 24, 25, 27, and 30. Claims 17–20 and 22 Claim 17 recites “the optical barrier tapers inwardly from a lower portion of the optical barrier to an upper portion of the optical barrier such that an uppermost portion of the first cavity is smaller than a lowermost portion of the first cavity.” The Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to modify Wiese’s straight barrier with Costello’s sloped barrier. Final Act. 22. Appellant argues the Examiner’s reasoning “at most . . . merely indicates that a skilled artisan could have combined the asserted teachings, not that there was any objective reason for doing so.” Appeal Br. 17. We agree with Appellant. Even in the Answer, the Examiner addresses only what a person of ordinary skill could do, not what they would have had reason to do. For example, the Examiner finds that “Costello’s optical light barrier could be substituted for Wiese’s optical barrier as they would both prevent transmission of light” and “the tapered optical barrier could still be substituted for Wiese’s optical barrier as they both block light.” Ans. 44 (emphasis added). “However, rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoted by KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). Thus, “the PTAB Appeal 2019-002194 Application 14/276,238 8 must make a finding of a motivation to combine when it is disputed.” In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “Although identifying a motivation to combine need not become a rigid and mandatory formula, the PTAB must articulate a reason why a PHOSITA would combine the prior art references.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the Examiner fails to provide any reason why a person of ordinary skill would have combined the references as proposed. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 17, and its dependent claims 18–20 and 22. Claims 3, 4, 6–8, 10, 13, 31–35, and 38 The remaining claims ultimately depend from the independent claims discussed above (1, 17, or 23), and the Examiner does not rely on the additional references to cure the deficiencies of the independent claims. We therefore reverse the rejection of these dependent claims for the same reasons as their respective independent claims. Appeal 2019-002194 Application 14/276,238 9 DECISION The following table summarizes the outcome of each rejection: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References Aff’d Reversed 1, 2, 12, 14–16, 23–25, 27, 29, 30, 36, 39 103 Wiese, Patel, Coffy 1, 2, 12, 14–16, 23–25, 27, 29, 30, 36, 39 3, 4 103 Wiese, Patel, Coffy, Varaprasad 3, 4 6, 31, 35, 38 103 Wiese, Patel, Coffy, Costello 6, 31, 35, 38 17–20, 22 103 Wiese, Patel, Costello 17–20, 22 7, 10, 13, 32 103 Wiese, Patel, Coffy, Lee 7, 10, 13, 32 8 103 Wiese, Patel, Coffy, Lee, Tajul 8 26, 34 103 Wiese, Patel, Coffy, Tajul 26, 34 33 103 Wiese, Patel, Costello, Tajul 33 Overall 1–4, 6–8, 10, 12–20, 22–27, 29–36, 38, 39 REVERSED Appeal 2019-002194 Application 14/276,238 10 WHITEHEAD, JR., Administrative Patent Judge, dissenting in part. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision in regard to reversing the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 17. Appellant indicates paragraph 47, element 711 provides support for the “wherein the optical barrier tapers inwardly from a lower portion of the optical barrier” limitation recited in claim 17. See Appeal Brief 6. Appellant’s Figure 7 is reproduced below: “FIG. 7 is a schematic illustration of a gesture sensor module having a laminate substrate 702 and molding compound deposited thereover.” Specification ¶ 46. The Specification discloses in paragraph 47, “The opaque molding compound 711 positioned laterally between the optical sensor die 703 and the optical emitter die 723 serves as an optical barrier, reducing the potential for cross-talk.” There is no mention of tapering the optical barrier, nor is there any mention of the significance of tapering the optical barrier in paragraph 47 of the Specification. Appellant contends: [T]he Examiner has not provided any reasoning or evidence to support the Examiner’s assertions that the references are functional equivalents. Moreover, the Examiner’s assertions with respect to such equivalence is not a reason to combine; at most, it merely indicates that a skilled artisan could have Appeal 2019-002194 Application 14/276,238 11 combined the asserted teachings, not that there was any objective reason for doing so. Appeal Brief 17 (emphasis added). Appellant further contends: [O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention. Personal Web Technologies LLC v. Apple Inc., [2016- 1174] (Fed. Cir. February 14, 2017). Therefore, there is no reason or motivation to combine Costello’s blocking layer 33 that is angled with the opaque material 150 of Wiese and/or the radiation blocking material 118 of Patel, nor are the optical barriers “functional equivalents” as asserted by the Examiner. Appeal Brief 17. The Examiner finds Weise, as modified by Patel, fails to disclose tapering the optical barrier. See Final Action 21-22. The Examiner finds Costello discloses an optical barrier tapering inward and determines modification to the Wiese/Patel combination’s straight optical barrier would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. See Final Action 22. I find the Examiner’s findings and determination sufficient to establish a prima facie case of obviousness because the Examiner cites to specific teachings in the references where optical barriers are deployed in the technology. See Final Action 21-22; see also Personal Web Technologies LLC v. Apple Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 994 (2017) (“[A] clear, evidence-supported account of the contemplated workings of the combination is a prerequisite to adequately explaining and supporting a conclusion that a relevant skilled artisan would have been motivated to make the combination and reasonably expect success in doing so.”). I find Appellant’s arguments are conclusory because they do not provide any explanation as to why the prior art’s optical barriers are not functional equivalents. See Appeal Brief 17; see also In re Appeal 2019-002194 Application 14/276,238 12 Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (attorney argument is not the kind of factual evidence required to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness). Further, the claimed optical barrier tapering does not appear to have any function other than providing the functions that a common optical barrier would provide. See Specification ¶ 47. Constrained by the record, I would sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 17. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation