Alvin N. DeVaughn, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Eastern Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 30, 2002
01993070 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 30, 2002)

01993070

07-30-2002

Alvin N. DeVaughn, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Eastern Area), Agency.


Alvin N. DeVaughn v. United States Postal Service

01993070

July 30, 2002

.

Alvin N. DeVaughn,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Eastern Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01993070

Agency No. 4D-270-0048-98

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1>

The appeal is accepted for the Commission's de novo review pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and

reverse in part the agency's final decision.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that complainant was an applicant for employment

with the agency in Greensboro, North Carolina. In December 1997,

complainant received a letter stating that the agency considered him

medically unsuitable for the position of Distribution & Window Clerk

and that his name was removed from the active register of eligibles.

The letter described complainant as having �pain in feet with long term

standing� and �transient swelling of hands and feet.� The agency deemed

these conditions �not compatible with the strenuous activities required

for the Distribution & Window Clerk position, which includes heavy

lifting up to 70 pounds, extensive heavy carrying 45 pounds and over

and excessive walking and standing for up to 8 hours per day casing the

mail, loading and unloading trucks and performing window service duties.

The agency concluded that postal employment would place complainant's

�personal health and safety in jeopardy.�

The agency's determination was based on the opinion of a consult

physician who never examined complainant but reviewed the agency's medical

examination and assessment and two rating decisions by the Department of

Veterans Affairs. The agency's medical examination and assessment were

performed by a private physician who found that complainant experienced

pain in his feet with long term standing and transient swelling of hands,

fingers and wrists. The private physician concluded that complainant had

no limitations or restrictions but suggested that complainant �may need

to sit occasionally and probably would not be able to perform extensive

repetitive motions with hands.�

The 1994 and 1998 rating decisions from the Department of Veterans Affairs

assigned complainant a 20% service connected disability evaluation for

�an arthralgic condition of the hands, wrists, and fingers, variously

diagnosed, manifested by pain and swelling� and a non-compensable service

connected disability evaluation for �pes planus, bilateral feet.� Based

on complainant's �pain in feet with long term standing� and �transient

swelling of hands and feet,� the consult physician found that there was

no accommodation which would permit complainant to perform the functional

requirements of heavy lifting, use of fingers and hands, and standing,

without risk.

Complainant sought EEO counseling and filed a formal complaint alleging,

under the theory of disparate treatment, that the agency discriminated

against him on the bases of his race (Black), perceived disability, and in

reprisal for prior protected activity arising under the above referenced

statutes when he was found medically unsuitable for the position.<2> At

the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of his right

to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or alternatively,

to receive a final decision by the agency. By letter dated July 7,

1998, complainant requested that the agency issue a final decision.

In its final decision, the agency concluded that complainant was not an

individual with a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation

Act because he did not have an impairment which substantially limited his

ability to work and because there was no evidence that he was regarded as

having an impairment which substantially limited a major life activity.

The agency further concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima

facie case of: (1) race discrimination because he failed to identify a

similarly situated individual of a different race who was treated more

favorably under similar circumstances; and (2) reprisal discrimination

because the named management official was unaware of complainant's prior

protected activity. Complainant did not submit a statement in support

of his appeal. The agency, without comment, requests that we affirm

its final decision.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

An "individual with a disability" is one who: (1) has a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities;

(2) has a record of such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such

an impairment. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g). Major life activities include,

but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,

walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.

29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(i). Sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching are also

recognized as major life activities. Interpretive Guidance on Title I

of the Americans With Disabilities Act, Appendix to 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(i).

The medical evidence in the record consists of the aforementioned rating

decisions by the Department of Veterans Affairs and the evaluations

generated by the agency in order to determine whether complainant was

medically suitable for the position of Distribution & Window Clerk.

The agency's consult physician determined that complainant could not

perform the functional requirements of a Distribution & Window Clerk

position without risk. The functional requirements included heavy

lifting up to 70 pounds, extensive heavy carrying 45 pounds and over,

and excessive walking and standing for up to 8 hours per day casing the

mail, loading and unloading trucks, and performing window service duties.

In a case involving an applicant for a Clerk position at an agency

facility in Agoura, California, the Commission found that the duties

and responsibilities of a Distribution & Window Clerk include, inter

alia, primary and secondary distribution of incoming and outgoing mail;

sales of postage stamps, stamped paper, postal cards, and money orders;

accepting forms and making window delivery; verification of mailings;

assign special delivery and registered mail for delivery; check and set

post office vending machines; issue and cash foreign and domestic money

orders; rent post office boxes; provide information to customers; and

perform various clerical and administrative duties of the office. See De

Los Santos v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01974430 (May

23, 2001). The Commission thus concluded that because the Distribution &

Window Clerk position is similar in nature to clerical or administrative

positions as well as retail or sales positions, the agency regarded

complainant as an individual with a disability who is substantially

limited in working in a broad range of jobs in various classes.

Upon our review of both medical assessments, the Commission finds that

complainant was not an individual with a disability under the first prong

of the definition under the Rehabilitation Act because complainant's

impairments do not substantially limit any of his major life activities.

However, an agency regards an individual as substantially limited in

the major life activity of working if it thinks the individual has

an impairment that significantly restricts him or her from currently

performing a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. 29

C.F.R. � 1630.2(j)(3). Since the evidence of record supports a finding

that the duties of the Distribution & Window Clerk position in Greensboro,

North Carolina were sufficiently similar to those in Agoura, California,

for the reasons articulated in De Los Santos, the Commission concludes

that the agency regarded complainant as having feet and hand impairments

which substantially limit the major life activity of working in a broad

range of jobs in various classes.

Complainant must next show that he is a �qualified person with a

disability.� 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m). A �qualified individual with

a disability� is an individual who satisfies the requisite skill,

experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the

employment position and who, with or without reasonable accommodation,

can perform the essential functions of such position. Id. Based upon

the facts in the record, we find that complainant has demonstrated

that he is a qualified individual with a disability inasmuch as he was

selected for the position at issue, pending the outcome of a medical

suitability determination. The agency, however, found that complainant

posed a direct threat and was therefore unsuitable for employment.

29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(r).

In order to exclude an individual on the basis of possible future injury,

the agency bears the burden of showing there is a significant risk, i.e.,

high probability of substantial harm. A speculative or remote risk is

insufficient. The agency must show more than that an individual with a

disability seeking employment stands some slightly increased risk of harm.

Selix v.United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01970153 (March

16, 2000). Moreover, such a finding must be based on an individualized

assessment of the individual that takes into account: (1) the duration

of the risk, (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm, (3) the

likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and (4) the imminence of

the potential harm. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans

With Disabilities Act, Appendix to 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(r). A determination

of significant risk cannot be based merely on an employer's subjective

evaluation, or, except in cases of a most apparent nature, merely on

medical reports. Rather, the agency must gather and base its decision

on substantial information regarding the individual's work and medical

histories. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422-1423 (9th Cir. 1985).

The agency made its decision to find complainant unsuitable for employment

based on the consult physician's assessment. The agency made this

determination in spite of the fact that the consult physician had never

examined complainant but relied on a private physician's evaluation.

However, review of the private physician's physical examination indicates

that complainant had no current physical limitations or restrictions.

Having carefully considered the evidence of record, the Commission finds

that the agency failed to meet its burden of showing a high probability

of substantial harm. The agency's finding of unsuitability was not

explained in any detail, nor did it include any individualized assessment

addressing the duration of the risk posed by complainant's conditions,

the nature and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood that the

potential harm will occur, and the imminence of the potential harm.

Since the Commission finds that there is no evidence to support the

agency's conclusion that complainant posed a direct threat, we conclude

that the agency's denial of employment to complainant was in violation

of the Rehabilitation Act.<3>

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record, including arguments and evidence not

specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission affirms in part

and reverses in part the agency's final decision. The record establishes

that the agency failed to investigate complainant's entitlement to the

compensatory damages he requested. Accordingly, the agency shall conduct

a supplemental investigation as to complainant's claim for compensatory

damages.

ORDER

1. Within sixty (60) days of this decision becoming final, the agency

shall offer complainant the position of Distribution & Window Clerk or

a substantially equivalent position at an agency facility within thirty

miles of complainant's home. Complainant shall be given a minimum

of fifteen days from receipt of the offer of placement within which

to accept or decline the offer. Failure to accept the offer within

the time period set by the agency will be considered a rejection of the

offer, unless complainant can show that circumstances beyond his control

prevented a response within the time limit.

2. The agency shall award complainant back pay with interest and other

benefits due complainant, for the period from December 1, 1997 to the date

he enters into or declines to enter into duty. The agency shall determine

the appropriate amount of back pay with interest and other benefits

due complainant, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501, no later than sixty

(60) days after the date this decision becomes final. The complainant

shall cooperate in the agency's efforts to compute the amount of back

pay and benefits due, and shall provide relevant information requested

by the agency. If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back

pay and/or benefits, the agency shall issue a check to the complainant

for the undisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar days of the date

the agency determines the amount it believes to be due. The complainant

may petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute.

The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the

Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled

�Implementation of the Commission's Decision.�

3. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall give complainant a notice of his right to submit

objective evidence (pursuant to the guidance given in Carle v. Department

of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (January 5, 1993)) in support

of his claim for compensatory damages within forty-five (45) calendar

days of the date complainant receives the agency's notice. The agency

shall complete the investigation on the claim for compensatory damages

within forty-five (45) calendar days of the date the agency receives

complainant's claim for compensatory damages. Thereafter, the agency

shall issue a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b).

4. The agency shall conduct training for its human resource personnel

at its Greensboro, North Carolina facilities regarding their obligations

under the Rehabilitation Act.

5. The agency is directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided

in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision."

The report shall include supporting documentation verifying that the

foregoing corrective actions have been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G0900)

The agency is ordered to post at its Greensboro, North Carolina facility

copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being

signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted

by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days,

in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are

customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that

said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0900)

This decision affirms the agency's final decision/action in part, but it

also requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a

portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in

an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar

days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion

of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion

of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative

processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after

one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your

complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until

such time as the agency issues its final decision on your complaint.

If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the

complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head,

identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file

a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

July 30, 2002

______________________________

Frances M. Hart Date

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An Agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission dated ___________ which found that a

violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. has occurred at this facility

in Greensboro, North Carolina.

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee

or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,

SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing,

promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions or privileges of

employment.

This facility was found to have violated the Rehabilitation Act

when it failed to establish that an applicant for employment posed

a direct threat that would disqualify him for the position he sought.

The facility was ordered to award the employee with a position, back pay,

and proven compensatory damages and attorney fees. This facility was

also ordered to provide relevant agency officials with training regarding

their obligations under the Rehabilitation Act . This facility will

ensure that officials responsible for personnel decisions and terms and

conditions of employment will abide by the requirements of all federal

equal employment opportunity laws and will not retaliate against employees

who file EEO complaints.

This facility will comply with federal law and will not in any manner

restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual who

exercises his or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or

who participates in proceedings pursuant to, federal equal employment

opportunity law.

Date Posted: _____________________

Posting Expires: _________________

1 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment.

2 This is complainant's second formal complaint with the agency alleging

discrimination when he was found medically unsuitable for a position.

In its final decision in DeVaughn v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01983352 (May 18, 2000), the Commission concluded that

complainant was not discriminated against on the bases of his race or

his perceived disability associated with the swelling of his hands and

fingers. Of note in EEOC Appeal No. 01983352, the Commission concluded

that the agency did not regard complainant as substantially limited

in the major life activity of working because although it found him

medically unsuitable for the position of Letter Carrier, it reinstated

complainant to the hiring register for consideration for less strenuous

agency positions such as Distribution & Window Clerk, Distribution

Clerk/Machine, Flat Sorter Machine, Mail Handler, Mail Processor and Mark

Up Clerk. In the instant case, by contrast, we note that complainant's

name was removed from the agency's hiring registers altogether.

3 The Commission finds that complainant failed to set forth evidence

from which a reasonable fact finder could draw an inference of race

discrimination. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576

(1978). Further, although the final agency decision contradicts the

named management official's admission that she was aware of complainant's

prior protected activity because he named her in his prior complaint,

we agree with the agency that complainant failed to establish a prima

facie case of reprisal discrimination. In reaching this conclusion,

we find that complainant failed to establish a nexus exists between the

protected activity and the Human Resource Specialist's signing of all

letters relating to non-selection for employment within the jurisdiction

of the Greensboro, North Carolina district which is comprised of more

than 420 facilities. See Whitmire v. Department of the Air Force,

EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (September 26, 2000).