01A25101_r
02-10-2003
Alvin J. Hunter, Jr., Complainant, v. Thomas E. White, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.
Alvin J. Hunter, Jr. v. Department of the Army
01A25101
February 10, 2003
.
Alvin J. Hunter, Jr.,
Complainant,
v.
Thomas E. White,
Secretary,
Department of the Army,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A25101
Agency No. AWGYFO9903J0060
Hearing No. 270-A0-9039X
DECISION
Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint in which he claimed
that the agency discriminated against him on the bases of his race
(African-American) and in reprisal for his previous EEO activity under
Title VII when on March 30, 1999, he was moved from the Electric Shop work
area to the Mechanic Shop work area, he was assigned to a new supervisor,
and he initially had no assigned work station in the Mechanic Shop
work area.
The agency investigated the complaint and thereafter referred the matter
to an Administrative Judge (AJ), pursuant to complainant's request
for a hearing. Without holding a hearing, the AJ issued a decision
finding no discrimination. On August 27, 2002, the agency issued a
final action implementing the AJ's decision. On September 12, 2002,
complainant filed the instant appeal.
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of
the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case
can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment
is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,
an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination
that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis
first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a
prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately
prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
This order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step
normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case,
need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue,
the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the
McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant
has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions
were motivated by discrimination. United States Postal Service Board of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department
of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900150 (June 28, 1990). In this
case, the Commission finds that the agency has articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Consequently, we will
dispense with an examination of whether complainant established a prima
facie case with respect to the above cited issues and review below, the
reason articulated by the agency for its actions as well as complainant's
effort to prove pretext.
The Commission finds that the agency articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its decisions to move complainant to
the Mechanic Shop work area, change his supervisor, and also as to
why complainant did not have a work station when he reported to his
new work group. The agency stated that it restructured the Shops Unit
so that employees could work in multi-skilled teams, with each of the
two teams composed of welders, electricians, maintenance mechanics,
and machinists. Complainant's second-line supervisor stated that he
moved complainant to the Mechanic Shop area because each maintenance group
needed an electrician. Complainant's current first-line supervisor stated
that complainant had to be moved because one of the two leaders heading
the maintenance groups was an electrician. Complainant's first-line
supervisor at the time of the reorganization stated that complainant's
former supervisor was the electrician reassigned to the leader position
in the other maintenance group and the third electrician was kept at
his work location because he had become an over-hire and his position
was tenuous. The leader in complainant's maintenance group stated that
complainant did not have a place to sit when he reported to him after
the reorganization. The leader stated that his work group was at that
time still in the midst of finding space for complainant and three other
employees who were moving to the work area.
Complainant claimed that the electrician in the over-hire status should
have been moved since his position had been abolished. Complainant stated
that the agency could in the alternative have allowed employees to remain
at their original work locations and just had them report to the leaders.
Complainant also claimed that management allowed some employees to rush
to find area for their desks and that other employees were allowed to
continue to work from their old work locations. We find that complainant
has not produced any persuasive evidence to show that the agency's
purported reasons for its actions were pretextual or that its actions
were motivated by unlawful discrimination. The agency stated that the
electrician in the over-hire status had a tenuous hold on his position
since the position had been abolished and that it wanted a permanent
electrician on each of the two teams. Complainant's second-level
supervisor stated that he wanted the teams to be together, therefore
it did not make sense to allow complainant and certain other employees
to remain in their original work locations. With regard to a work area
not being available for complainant immediately after the organization,
we note that complainant's team leader stated that two White employees
and one other Black employee also did not have work spaces.
As for complainant's claim that some employees were allowed to remain
at their work locations, complainant's second-level supervisor stated
that the welders and machinists did not change work locations because
their tools were bolted to the floor or tied into the machines.
The second-level supervisor noted that electricians in contrast carry
their tools with them. Further, the second-level supervisor stated
that the tool room attendants were allowed to continue working in the
tool room since the tool room supports both maintenance units. We find
that complainant failed to rebut the agency's explanation as to why he
had to move to a different work location but other employees were not
required to do so.
After a review of the record in its entirety, it is the decision of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the agency's
final action finding no discrimination, because the Administrative
Judge's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate and
a preponderance of the record evidence does not establish that race
discrimination or reprisal occurred.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
February 10, 2003
__________________
Date