Alice M. Benton Complainant,v.William J. Henderson Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific/Western Region) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 22, 2001
01973014 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 22, 2001)

01973014

01-22-2001

Alice M. Benton Complainant, v. William J. Henderson Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific/Western Region) Agency.


Alice M. Benton v. U.S. Postal Service

01973014

January 22, 2001

.

Alice M. Benton

Complainant,

v.

William J. Henderson

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Pacific/Western Region)

Agency.

Appeal No.01973014

Agency No.1F-946107894

Hearing No.370-96-2104x

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal from the agency's final decision

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination on the bases of reprisal (prior EEO activity),

age ( dob 1/10/30), and disability (delusional(paranoid) disorder),

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.; and the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791, et seq.<1> Complainant alleges

she was discriminated against when: (1) she was forced to take a fitness

for duty exam in June 1994; (2) she was placed in a non-duty status

and not allowed to return to work; (3) she was not given the reasonable

accommodation of being reassigned; (4) she was subjected to disparate

treatment. The appeal is accepted pursuant to at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

For the following reasons, the Commission affirms the agency's final

decision.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, the complainant was

employed as a flat sorter machine operator at the agency's Oakland

Processing and Distribution facility.

Believing she was a victim of discrimination, the complainant sought EEO

counseling and, subsequently, filed a formal complaint on November 9,

1994. At the conclusion of the investigation, the complainant received

a copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a

Recommended Decision finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that the complainant established she is an individual

with a disability in that she has a mental impairment - delusional

(paranoid) disorder - which substantially limits her ability to interact

with others and maintain normal interpersonal communications. She also

concluded that the complainant is not a qualified individual with a

disability because her condition caused her to create a hostile working

atmosphere by her threatening remarks and inappropriate and delusional

accusations against her co-workers. This rendered her unable to perform

the essential functions of her job which included the ability to interact

with her co-workers.

In considering whether there was a reasonable accommodation for

the complainant's condition, the AJ found that no accommodation was

effective to enable the agency to return the complainant to her position.

She considered but eliminated the possibility that the complainant

could be returned to her position because the complainant had made

numerous threatening or inappropriate remarks towards her co-workers.

The AJ determined that although the complainant was not required to

have extensive interpersonal interactions with her co-workers, she was

required to work with others as a group on the flat sorter machine and

her behavior prevented her from doing this.

The AJ further found that reassigning the complainant to another position

in another location would not be an effective accommodation because she

had delusional thoughts even about new co-workers she had just met and

about people following her about. The AJ rejected the complainant's

treating psychiatrist's opinion that the complainant should be returned

to work at a different location because it was not based on her medical

opinion but rather on her request that the agency extend a humanitarian

gesture.

The AJ also rejected the complainant's argument that she could be given

a modified work schedule because there was no relationship between the

length of her contact with people and her delusions. She rejected

the complainant's argument that her supervisors needed sensitivity

training as not likely to be an effective accommodation. She reasoned

that the complainant's supervisors' sensitivity was not at the heart

of her inability to work with others. Also her supervisors had not

terminated her but put her in a non-duty status pending her seeking

medical attention for her disorder. The AJ found that the complainant

had discontinued her medical treatment of her own accord which led the

agency to refuse to allow her to return to work.

On the issue of age discrimination, the AJ concluded that there was

no evidence that other younger employees had received more favorable

treatment under similar circumstances.

The AJ concluded that the complainant had established a prima facie

case of reprisal but had not shown that the agency's actions were due

to her filing an EEO complaint. Instead, the evidence showed, according

to the AJ, that the complainant was required to take a fitness for duty

exam because of ongoing complaints of her co-workers about her behavior.

This evidence also supported the agency's placement of the complainant

in a non-duty status pending her seeking medical attention for her

disorder.

The agency's final decision implemented the AJ's Recommended Decision.

On appeal, the complainant argued that she was able to perform the

essential functions of her position and that the ability to communicate

with her co-workers was not an essential function of her job. She also

challenged the agency's physicians' conclusion that she was not fit to

return to her position as not credible and discredited by two other

experts. She further argued that he was not competent to state that

there was no accommodation possible because he was not an occupational

therapist. Lastly, the complainant argued that the agency had not proven

undue hardship because the only accommodation it considered was having

her work in isolation.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings

by an Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.� Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,

340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding whether or not

discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard

Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

The complainant must first establish that she is a member of the class

of persons protected by the Rehabilitation Act, i.e., a qualified person

with a disability. She must further prove that she is a qualified

individual with a disability, i.e., one who, with or without reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position in

question.

In this regard, there was no dispute among the medical professionals that

the complainant had a mental impairment known as delusional (paranoid)

disorder which substantially limited her ability to interact with

others. Even the complainant's own treating psychiatrist agreed with the

conclusions from the agency's independent medical exam which showed that

she had a �serious impairment in social and occupational functioning... a

pervasive and unwarranted tendency to interpret the actions of people as

deliberately demeaning or threatening.� In real terms described in the

record, the complainant's condition dated back to 1990 when her supervisor

documented at least 15 different incidents made by 7 different co-workers

where she had made comments using �confrontational, abusive language�

including racial and sexist slurs and threats of physical violence.

One employee reported that the complainant had made negative remarks

about every co-worker or their family members. In support of this,

the record contained a letter of warning given to the complainant in

1993 due to her calling a co-worker a �drunk and an alcoholic.�

Based on these facts, we see no reason to overturn the AJ's findings that

the complainant had a mental impairment which substantially limited her

ability to interact with others. On this point, we have recognized the

inability to interact with others as a major life activity limited by

a mental impairment. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with

Disabilities Act & Psychiatric Disabilities, No. 915.002 (3/25/97) p. 5.

Although not relied on by the AJ in her analysis, we also found

substantial evidence in the record that the complainant's condition caused

her performance to deteriorate significantly such that she was not able

to perform the essential functions of her position. The evidence on

this point included numerous documented incidents by the complainant's

co-workers in which she refused to assist them where she was required

to or of her efforts to disrupt their productivity in various ways.

Her supervisor documented in a previous request for a fitness for duty

examination, that the complainant needed constant supervision or would

not do her work. See Lassiter v. Department of Justice, EEOC No. 03940052

(July 28, 1994) (Complainant with paranoid/delusional disorder not able

to perform essential functions of job as a U.S. Marshall).

The complainant failed to refute the agency's overwhelming evidence that

she was unable to do her job. In particular, she discontinued treatment

with her psychiatrist even when the agency conditioned her continued

employment on her obtaining medical treatment. The complainant's

own physician concluded that there was no change in the complainant's

condition nor was there � improvement to suggest future success at

her original worksite.� Therefore, we sustain the AJ's finding that

the complainant was not able to perform the essential function of her

position and consequently, that she was not a �qualified' individual

with a disability.

Even if the complainant was unable to perform the essential functions

of her position, she could still be a "qualified individual with a

disability" if, with or without accommodation, she could perform the

essential functions of any position she could have held as a result

of job restructuring or reassignment. Hawkins v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Petition No. 03990006 (February 11, 1999). Therefore,

"[o]nly after determining that reassignment to a vacant position was not

possible or would result in an undue hardship, would the Rehabilitation

Act permit the agency to conclude that [a complainant] is not a qualified

individual with a disability." Kitaura v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Petition No. 03980089 (March 11, 1999); Van Horn v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No 01960159 (October 23, 1998).

Here, the AJ conducted an extensive review of several forms of

accommodation, including reassignment to another location, but concluded

that there was no effective accommodation for the complainant's condition.

We conclude that this is supported by substantial evidence in the

record. It was apparent that due to the complainant's behavior resulting

from her delusional disorder she was unable to differentiate between

people she had known only briefly from those she had known for some time.

Therefore, she was likely to form the same delusional thoughts about

new co-workers and supervisors as she had formed about former co-workers

and supervisors. In addition, the complainant did not refute with any

persuasive evidence that she was unlikely to engage in the same disruptive

behavior patterns that she had in the past. For these reasons, we

sustain the AJ's finding that there were no effective accommodations

which could have been instituted to return the complainant to work.

On the issue of reprisal, we see no reason to disturb the AJ's findings

that the complainant did not show a causal relationship between the

agency's actions and her filing an EEO complaint in 1992. The evidence

supported the AJ's conclusion that more likely than not, her medical

condition caused the agency to require that she submit to a fitness for

duty exam and its placement of her in a non-duty status. There was

no support in the record for the complainant's contention that these

actions were taken in retaliation for her EEO activity.

The complainant did not contest the AJ's findings of no age

discrimination.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's findings of fact were substantially supported by the evidence

contained in the record. We further find that the AJ's legal conclusions

regarding the complainant's status as an individual with a disability

as well as her conclusion that the complainant was not a qualified

individual with a disability, to be correct applications of the law.

The AJ's conclusions regarding the lack of an effective reasonable

accommodation which would enable the complainant to return to work,

were also supported by substantial evidence in the record. Therefore,

we sustain the AJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, and after full consideration of the record

including arguments and evidence not specifically addressed herein,

we AFFIRM the agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0900)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

________________________

Frances Hart,

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

January 22, 2001

Date

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations

governing the EEOC's federal sector complaint process went into effect.

These regulations apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at

any stage in the administrative process. The regulations, as amended

may be found at the Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment.