01973014
01-22-2001
Alice M. Benton Complainant, v. William J. Henderson Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific/Western Region) Agency.
Alice M. Benton v. U.S. Postal Service
01973014
January 22, 2001
.
Alice M. Benton
Complainant,
v.
William J. Henderson
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Pacific/Western Region)
Agency.
Appeal No.01973014
Agency No.1F-946107894
Hearing No.370-96-2104x
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal from the agency's final decision
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination on the bases of reprisal (prior EEO activity),
age ( dob 1/10/30), and disability (delusional(paranoid) disorder),
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.; and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791, et seq.<1> Complainant alleges
she was discriminated against when: (1) she was forced to take a fitness
for duty exam in June 1994; (2) she was placed in a non-duty status
and not allowed to return to work; (3) she was not given the reasonable
accommodation of being reassigned; (4) she was subjected to disparate
treatment. The appeal is accepted pursuant to at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
For the following reasons, the Commission affirms the agency's final
decision.
The record reveals that during the relevant time, the complainant was
employed as a flat sorter machine operator at the agency's Oakland
Processing and Distribution facility.
Believing she was a victim of discrimination, the complainant sought EEO
counseling and, subsequently, filed a formal complaint on November 9,
1994. At the conclusion of the investigation, the complainant received
a copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an
EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a
Recommended Decision finding no discrimination.
The AJ concluded that the complainant established she is an individual
with a disability in that she has a mental impairment - delusional
(paranoid) disorder - which substantially limits her ability to interact
with others and maintain normal interpersonal communications. She also
concluded that the complainant is not a qualified individual with a
disability because her condition caused her to create a hostile working
atmosphere by her threatening remarks and inappropriate and delusional
accusations against her co-workers. This rendered her unable to perform
the essential functions of her job which included the ability to interact
with her co-workers.
In considering whether there was a reasonable accommodation for
the complainant's condition, the AJ found that no accommodation was
effective to enable the agency to return the complainant to her position.
She considered but eliminated the possibility that the complainant
could be returned to her position because the complainant had made
numerous threatening or inappropriate remarks towards her co-workers.
The AJ determined that although the complainant was not required to
have extensive interpersonal interactions with her co-workers, she was
required to work with others as a group on the flat sorter machine and
her behavior prevented her from doing this.
The AJ further found that reassigning the complainant to another position
in another location would not be an effective accommodation because she
had delusional thoughts even about new co-workers she had just met and
about people following her about. The AJ rejected the complainant's
treating psychiatrist's opinion that the complainant should be returned
to work at a different location because it was not based on her medical
opinion but rather on her request that the agency extend a humanitarian
gesture.
The AJ also rejected the complainant's argument that she could be given
a modified work schedule because there was no relationship between the
length of her contact with people and her delusions. She rejected
the complainant's argument that her supervisors needed sensitivity
training as not likely to be an effective accommodation. She reasoned
that the complainant's supervisors' sensitivity was not at the heart
of her inability to work with others. Also her supervisors had not
terminated her but put her in a non-duty status pending her seeking
medical attention for her disorder. The AJ found that the complainant
had discontinued her medical treatment of her own accord which led the
agency to refuse to allow her to return to work.
On the issue of age discrimination, the AJ concluded that there was
no evidence that other younger employees had received more favorable
treatment under similar circumstances.
The AJ concluded that the complainant had established a prima facie
case of reprisal but had not shown that the agency's actions were due
to her filing an EEO complaint. Instead, the evidence showed, according
to the AJ, that the complainant was required to take a fitness for duty
exam because of ongoing complaints of her co-workers about her behavior.
This evidence also supported the agency's placement of the complainant
in a non-duty status pending her seeking medical attention for her
disorder.
The agency's final decision implemented the AJ's Recommended Decision.
On appeal, the complainant argued that she was able to perform the
essential functions of her position and that the ability to communicate
with her co-workers was not an essential function of her job. She also
challenged the agency's physicians' conclusion that she was not fit to
return to her position as not credible and discredited by two other
experts. She further argued that he was not competent to state that
there was no accommodation possible because he was not an occupational
therapist. Lastly, the complainant argued that the agency had not proven
undue hardship because the only accommodation it considered was having
her work in isolation.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings
by an Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.� Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,
340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding whether or not
discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard
Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).
The complainant must first establish that she is a member of the class
of persons protected by the Rehabilitation Act, i.e., a qualified person
with a disability. She must further prove that she is a qualified
individual with a disability, i.e., one who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position in
question.
In this regard, there was no dispute among the medical professionals that
the complainant had a mental impairment known as delusional (paranoid)
disorder which substantially limited her ability to interact with
others. Even the complainant's own treating psychiatrist agreed with the
conclusions from the agency's independent medical exam which showed that
she had a �serious impairment in social and occupational functioning... a
pervasive and unwarranted tendency to interpret the actions of people as
deliberately demeaning or threatening.� In real terms described in the
record, the complainant's condition dated back to 1990 when her supervisor
documented at least 15 different incidents made by 7 different co-workers
where she had made comments using �confrontational, abusive language�
including racial and sexist slurs and threats of physical violence.
One employee reported that the complainant had made negative remarks
about every co-worker or their family members. In support of this,
the record contained a letter of warning given to the complainant in
1993 due to her calling a co-worker a �drunk and an alcoholic.�
Based on these facts, we see no reason to overturn the AJ's findings that
the complainant had a mental impairment which substantially limited her
ability to interact with others. On this point, we have recognized the
inability to interact with others as a major life activity limited by
a mental impairment. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with
Disabilities Act & Psychiatric Disabilities, No. 915.002 (3/25/97) p. 5.
Although not relied on by the AJ in her analysis, we also found
substantial evidence in the record that the complainant's condition caused
her performance to deteriorate significantly such that she was not able
to perform the essential functions of her position. The evidence on
this point included numerous documented incidents by the complainant's
co-workers in which she refused to assist them where she was required
to or of her efforts to disrupt their productivity in various ways.
Her supervisor documented in a previous request for a fitness for duty
examination, that the complainant needed constant supervision or would
not do her work. See Lassiter v. Department of Justice, EEOC No. 03940052
(July 28, 1994) (Complainant with paranoid/delusional disorder not able
to perform essential functions of job as a U.S. Marshall).
The complainant failed to refute the agency's overwhelming evidence that
she was unable to do her job. In particular, she discontinued treatment
with her psychiatrist even when the agency conditioned her continued
employment on her obtaining medical treatment. The complainant's
own physician concluded that there was no change in the complainant's
condition nor was there � improvement to suggest future success at
her original worksite.� Therefore, we sustain the AJ's finding that
the complainant was not able to perform the essential function of her
position and consequently, that she was not a �qualified' individual
with a disability.
Even if the complainant was unable to perform the essential functions
of her position, she could still be a "qualified individual with a
disability" if, with or without accommodation, she could perform the
essential functions of any position she could have held as a result
of job restructuring or reassignment. Hawkins v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Petition No. 03990006 (February 11, 1999). Therefore,
"[o]nly after determining that reassignment to a vacant position was not
possible or would result in an undue hardship, would the Rehabilitation
Act permit the agency to conclude that [a complainant] is not a qualified
individual with a disability." Kitaura v. United States Postal Service,
EEOC Petition No. 03980089 (March 11, 1999); Van Horn v. United States
Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No 01960159 (October 23, 1998).
Here, the AJ conducted an extensive review of several forms of
accommodation, including reassignment to another location, but concluded
that there was no effective accommodation for the complainant's condition.
We conclude that this is supported by substantial evidence in the
record. It was apparent that due to the complainant's behavior resulting
from her delusional disorder she was unable to differentiate between
people she had known only briefly from those she had known for some time.
Therefore, she was likely to form the same delusional thoughts about
new co-workers and supervisors as she had formed about former co-workers
and supervisors. In addition, the complainant did not refute with any
persuasive evidence that she was unlikely to engage in the same disruptive
behavior patterns that she had in the past. For these reasons, we
sustain the AJ's finding that there were no effective accommodations
which could have been instituted to return the complainant to work.
On the issue of reprisal, we see no reason to disturb the AJ's findings
that the complainant did not show a causal relationship between the
agency's actions and her filing an EEO complaint in 1992. The evidence
supported the AJ's conclusion that more likely than not, her medical
condition caused the agency to require that she submit to a fitness for
duty exam and its placement of her in a non-duty status. There was
no support in the record for the complainant's contention that these
actions were taken in retaliation for her EEO activity.
The complainant did not contest the AJ's findings of no age
discrimination.
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the
AJ's findings of fact were substantially supported by the evidence
contained in the record. We further find that the AJ's legal conclusions
regarding the complainant's status as an individual with a disability
as well as her conclusion that the complainant was not a qualified
individual with a disability, to be correct applications of the law.
The AJ's conclusions regarding the lack of an effective reasonable
accommodation which would enable the complainant to return to work,
were also supported by substantial evidence in the record. Therefore,
we sustain the AJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and after full consideration of the record
including arguments and evidence not specifically addressed herein,
we AFFIRM the agency's final decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0900)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to
file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be
filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right
to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
________________________
Frances Hart,
Executive Officer
Executive Secretariat
January 22, 2001
Date
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations
governing the EEOC's federal sector complaint process went into effect.
These regulations apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at
any stage in the administrative process. The regulations, as amended
may be found at the Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.
The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination
by federal employees or applicants for employment.