Alex L. Ethridge, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 12, 1999
01982719 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 12, 1999)

01982719

03-12-1999

Alex L. Ethridge, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Alex L. Ethridge, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01982719

) Agency No. 4E-852-1262-95

William J. Henderson, ) Hearing No. 350-97-8350X

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

On February 20, 1998, Alex L. Ethridge (hereinafter referred to as

appellant) timely appealed the agency's final decision, dated January 21,

1998, concluding he had not been discriminated against in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e

et seq. The final agency decision was issued on December 18, 1997.

Appellant had alleged that agency officials discriminated against him on

the basis of his race (African-American) when he was denied a transfer on

June 21, 1995. This appeal is accepted in accordance with the provisions

of EEOC Order No. 960.001.

The record establishes that appellant was hired by the agency on

August 31, 1988. On February 13, 1995, appellant submitted a formal

transfer request to the Postmaster at the Phoenix District Post Office.

Appellant requested a transfer from Cheyenne, Wyoming to Phoenix or

surrounding areas. During May or June 1995, appellant's transfer

request was reviewed by the agency and a determination was made that

his application was a �border line� case. In June 1995, appellant's

file was forwarded to agency offices in Phoenix and Glendale, Arizona.

On June 13, 1995, a supervisor in the Glendale Post Office denied

appellant's transfer request. On June 19, 1995, a supervisor in the

Phoenix Post Office denied appellant's transfer request. On June 21,

1995, appellant was notified by the Human Resources Specialist at the

Phoenix District Post Office that his request to be reassigned from

Cheyenne, Wyoming to the Phoenix District Office was disapproved based

on his safety and attendance records.

The record reveals that appellant filed a formal EEO complaint with the

agency on October 20, 1995, alleging that the agency had discriminated

against him as referenced above. The agency accepted the complaint and

conducted an investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation,

appellant requested an administrative hearing before an Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Administrative Judge (AJ).

On November 26, 1997, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.109(e), the AJ issued

a decision without a hearing, finding that the agency had discriminated

against appellant on the basis of his race when he was denied a transfer.

Specifically, the AJ found that the agency produced conflicting testimony

concerning the events preceding the denial of the transfer request.

The AJ noted that the Human Resource Specialist testified in her affidavit

that neither the Personnel Office nor herself had any input into the

disapproval of appellant's reassignment request. According to the AJ,

the Human Resource Specialist also testified that the agency did not

have a written policy of hiring standards for city carrier reassignments

and that the agency considered the pattern of sick leave, i.e., sick

leave taken in conjunction with holidays and scheduled days off. The AJ

determined that the Senior Personnel Services Specialist testified in her

affidavit that the Personnel Office was specifically the area that handles

transfer requests and that they usually look for transfer applicants who

possess at least 80% of their potential sick leave. The Senior Personnel

Services Specialist also stated in a letter dated June 28, 1995, that

a determination was made by an unspecified individual that appellant's

transfer application was �borderline�, and as a result, his application

was forwarded to the Glendale and Phoenix Post Offices for consideration.

The AJ noted that the Supervisor of Customer Services testified in her

affidavit that transfer requests to Phoenix stations are approved if

the employee's file reflects a good safety record, good attendance, and

good work performance. According to the Supervisor of Customer Services,

appellant's transfer request was reviewed and denied by a supervisor at

the Glendale Post Office on June 13, 1995, a supervisor at a Phoenix

Post Office on June 19, 1995, and by herself at the Phoenix District

Post Office on September 14, 1995.

With regard to the agency's reliance on appellant's attendance and safety

records, the AJ found that the evidence demonstrated that these reasons

were a pretext for unlawful discrimination. The AJ noted that several

non-African American employees who submitted transfer requests around the

same time as appellant, were allowed to transfer to either the Phoenix

District Office or post offices in surrounding areas. The AJ observed

that many of these individuals possessed inferior sick leave balances or

had a worse safety record than appellant.<1> Finally, the AJ determined

that the agency in general utilized higher standards in evaluating the

transfer requests of African American employees. Based on all of these

factors, the AJ concluded that the evidence was sufficient to find that

the agency's articulated reasons for its denial of appellant's transfer

request were not credible and it was more likely than not that appellant

had been discriminated against on the basis of his race.

In a final decision dated January 21, 1998, the agency rejected

the findings and conclusions of the AJ, and entered a finding of no

discrimination. It is from this decision that appellant now appeals.

After a careful review of the record in its entirety, including the

statements submitted on appeal, we find that the AJ's recommended decision

set forth the relevant facts and properly analyzes the appropriate

regulations, policies and laws.

As the AJ correctly noted, appellant's complaint constitutes a claim of

disparate treatment which is properly analyzed under the three-tiered

analytical framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). See also, Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467

U.S. 867 (1984); U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,

460 U.S. 711, 715-716 (1983); Texas Department of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-256 (1981). Applying this legal standard,

the AJ properly concluded that appellant established a prima facie case

of race discrimination. Moreover, we find that the AJ was correct

in further finding that, although agency management articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying appellant's transfer

request (appellant's attendance and safety records), appellant proved,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's articulated reasons

for its actions in this matter lacked credibility and that its actions

were more likely motivated by discrimination. Nothing proffered by the

agency in its final decision or on appeal differs significantly from

the arguments raised before, and given full consideration by the AJ.

Accordingly, it is the decision of the the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission to REVERSE the agency's final decision which rejected the

AJ's finding of discrimination. In order to remedy appellant for its

discriminatory actions, the agency shall comply with the following Order.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial actions:

(A) Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the agency is directed to transfer appellant to a Post Office

in Phoenix or a surrounding area.

(B) Training shall be provided to the agency officials responsible

for the agency's actions in this matter on the obligations and duties

imposed by Title VII.

(C) The agency shall post at the Phoenix, Arizona, Post Office copies

of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed

by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by

the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days,

in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees

are customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure

that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled �Implementation of the

Commission's Decision,� within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

(D) The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled �Implementation of the Commission's

Decision.� The report shall include evidence that the corrective action

has been implemented.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1092)

If appellant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29

C.F.R. �1614.501 (e) (1) (iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. �1614.501 (e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you

have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some

jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner

suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your

civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision

or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,

you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR

DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your

appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME

AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY

HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME

AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 12, 1999

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations1Appellant possessed approximately

70% of his total earned sick leave and he had two accidents.

A caucasian male possessed approximately 15% of his total earned

sick leave and he had two accidents. An Asian female possessed

approximately 15% of her total earned sick leave and she had

no accidents. Another caucasian male possessed approximately

100% of his total earned sick leave but he had six accidents.

An additional caucasian male possessed less than 1% of his total

earned sick leave and he had one accident.