Aleksandra Falkowska et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 27, 201914330196 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 27, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/330,196 07/14/2014 Aleksandra Falkowska PT1223US00 6201 132326 7590 08/27/2019 Thompson Hine LLP 10050 Innovation Drive Suite 400 Dayton, OH 45342-4934 EXAMINER WALSH, EMMETT K ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3628 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/27/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipdocket@thompsonhine.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD _____________ Ex parte ALEKSANDRA FALKOWSKA, AMAL HJIJE, CAROLINA RAMON, SEBASTIEN BARDIN, and CELINE DESPOIX1 _____________ Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 Technology Center 3600 ______________ Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, ERIC S. FRAHM, and MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges. NAPPI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final Rejection of claims 1 through 21. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. INVENTION The invention is directed to a system for a business method re-pricing of low cost carrier travel itineraries in connection with itinerary changes in a manner that is compatible with systems and/or workflows utilized for 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is, Amadeus S.A.S. App. Br. 3. Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 2 standard carriers. Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention and is reproduced below: A method for re-pricing a low cost carrier travel itinerary in a manner that is compatible with standard carrier systems, the method comprising: accessing a pricing engine of a low cost carrier system to retrieve pricing information for at least one changed element in the low cost carrier travel itinerary, the retrieved pricing information in a non-standard pricing format that is unsupported by the standard carrier systems; converting the retrieved pricing information into a standard pricing format that is supported by the standard carrier systems, the converted pricing information including a standard element not present in the retrieved pricing information; and generating at least one pricing record and populating a passenger name record associated with the low cost carrier travel itinerary to include the standard element using the converted pricing information. REJECTIONS AT ISSUE The Examiner has rejected claims 1 through 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 3–23.2 The Examiner has rejected claims 1, 4 through 11, and 14 through 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Amadeus Quick Card: Booking Low Cost Carriers through Amadeus Ticketless Access (July 2008, Available at: http//www.amadeus.com/web/binaries/blobs/ 454/33/Booking+LCCs+through+ Amadeus+ Ticketless+Access+QUICK 2 Throughout this Opinion, we refer to the Appeal Brief, filed February 13, 2018 (“App. Br.”), the Reply Brief, filed May 29, 2018 (“Reply Br.”) the Examiner’s Answer, mailed April 4, 2018 (“Answer”), and the Final Office Action, mailed September 18, 2017 (“Final Act.”). Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 3 +CARD_ 25July2008.pdf hereinafter "Amadeus") and Melet (US 2011/0167051 A1). Final Act. 7–14. The Examiner has rejected claims 2, 3, 12, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Amadeus, Melet and Daouk (US 2012/0265562 A1). Final Act 14–15. ANALYSIS We have reviewed Appellants’ arguments in the Briefs, the Examiner’s rejections, and the Examiner’s response to Appellants’ arguments. Appellants’ arguments have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1 through 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Rejection 35 U.S.C. § 101 PRINCIPLES OF LAW Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the Patent Act, which recites: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. There are, however, three judicially created exceptions to the broad categories of patent-eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012). Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 4 In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 5 products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Memorandum”). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim is directed to a judicial exception because: (1) the claim recites a judicial exception, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 6 organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) the claim as a whole fails to recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. 2018). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Memorandum. ANALYSIS Abstract Idea. The Examiner finds that the claims are not patent eligible as they are directed to a judicial exception without reciting significantly more. Final Act. 3–7. Specifically, the Examiner provides an analysis of Appellants’ claims finding that they recite limitations directed to collecting and gathering information and analyzing it, concluding they recite an abstract idea. Final Act. 4–5 (citing Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) as showing that claims that recite collecting information and analyzing have been held recite abstract ideas). Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 7 Appellants argue the Examiner overgeneralized the claims and has not adequately analyzed what the claims are directed to and that when considered as a whole the claims are directed to a patent eligible process. App Br. 7–8 (citing Enfish, LLC v Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Specifically Appellants argue that claim 1 recites: upon conversion from the non-standard format to the standard format supported by standard carrier systems, “the converted pricing information includ[es] a standard element not present in the retrieved pricing information.” Claim 1 further requires “generating at least one pricing record and populating a passenger name record associated with the low cost travel itinerary to include the standard element using the converted pricing information.” Appellant respectfully submits that this is not the same as “merely collecting information, analyzing the information, and communicating results of an analysis,” as stated by the Examiner. No aspect of analyzing collected information and communicating results of that analysis relates to populating a passenger name record associated with a low cost travel itinerary to include a standard element not present in retrieved pricing information. In this regard, the Examiner fails to consider the language of claim 1 pertaining to populating a passenger name record associated with a low cost travel itinerary. This failure to fully consider the language of claim 1 is improper because “describing the claims at such a high level of abstraction and untethered from the language of the claims all but ensures that the exceptions to §101 swallow the rule.” Enfish, 822 F. 3d at 1337. App Br. 8. Further, Appellants argue that the Examiner’s claim interpretation equating the step of “populating” data with displaying data is in error. As such Appellants assert the Examiner’s reliance on Electric Power Group and Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 8 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) is improper as the claims in Electric Power Group were directed to collecting, analyzing and displaying data, whereas the current claims include populating data which when construed in light of the Specification relates to storing data. Reply Br. 2-5. The Examiner has provided a comprehensive response to Appellants’ arguments on pages 3 through 9 of the Answer. We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection, and response to Appellants’ arguments and we concur with the Examiner’s conclusion that the claims are directed to an abstract idea. We concur with the Examiner that representative claim 1 recites collecting/gathering information and analyzing it (a mental process). Claim 1 recites “accessing a pricing engine of a low cost carrier system to retrieve pricing information for at least one changed element in the low cost carrier travel itinerary” (a data gathering or observation element), “converting the retrieved pricing information into a standard pricing format that is supported by the standard carrier systems,” (a data analysis or evaluation element), and “generating at least one pricing record and populating a passenger name record associated with the low cost carrier travel itinerary” (a step which the Examiner interpreters as displaying and Appellants assert relates to storing data). These limitations, under either the Examiner’s or Appellants’ interpretation of the “populate” limitation, recite an abstract mental process. The claims at issue in Electric Power Group recite several steps of receiving data from various sources, detecting and analyzing the data and displaying the data. Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1351–52. The court identified “we have treated collecting information, including when limited to particular content (which does not change its character as information), as within the realm of abstract ideas.” Id. at 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Further, Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 9 the court stated “that merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis.” Id. at 1354 (citing Content Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). We note that regardless whether the “populating” limitation is interpreted as displaying or storing, the limitation is nonetheless directed to an abstract concept. While the clams in Electric Power Group recite displaying data, the claims in Content Extraction, cited in support of the decision in Electric Power Group, dealt with a step of storing and identified it to be abstract mental process. “The concept of data collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-known. Indeed humans have always performed these functions.” Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347; see also Internet Patents Corp v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“the character of the claimed invention is an abstract idea: the idea of retaining information in the navigation of online forms”). Thus, Appellants’ arguments have not persuaded us the Examiner erred in finding the claims recite an abstract idea. Practical Application/Significantly more than Abstract Idea The Examiner finds that the additional claimed elements do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Final Act. 5–6. The Examiner states: While a “pricing engine” adds an additional element to the abstract idea, the additional element does not present improvements to another technological field, nor does it Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 10 improve the functioning of a computer. The generic computing elements (a pricing engine, processing units, computer readable media, and program code) are known and conventional, and besides performing the abstract idea itself, it only serves to perform well-understood computer functions such as storing, receiving, analyzing, and presenting data. None of the hardware in the claims “offers a meaningful limitation beyond generally linking ‘the use of the [method] to a particular technological environment’ that is, implementation via computers.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 610, 611 (U.S. 2010)). In addition, the non-generic computing elements of the claim are nothing more than an extra solution activity (e.g. processing and storing data, performing repetitive calculations, receiving data over a network, etc.). Looking at the limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually. There is no indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of a computer or improves any other technology. Their collective functions merely provide conventional computer implementation. As outlined in the description of Fig. 1, in paragraphs [0023-28], the specification details any combination of a generic computer system program to perform the method. Final Act 5–6. Appellants argue that the “claims are focused on a specific solution to a particular problem faced by existing computer-implemented travel reservation systems” App Br. 8. Appellants assert: Similar to the patent eligible claims in DDR, Appellant's claims do not generically recite computing technology to perform a business practice. Instead, Appellant's claims recite a specific way to re-price a low cost carrier travel itinerary in a manner that is compatible with standard carrier systems in order to solve a problem faced by existing computer-implemented travel reservation systems. App. Br. 9. Further, Appellants argue that the Examiner’s analysis is Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 11 in error as the Examiner “partitioned each of the claims into two subsets of claim elements when evaluating whether that claim constitutes patent eligible subject matter.” App. Br. 10. As such, Appellants’ the Examiner has not considered the claims as an ordered combination of elements to determine whether the additional elements transform the nature of the claim into patent eligible subject matter. App. Br. 12 (citing BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The Examiner in response states: In Examiner's Step 2A analysis, Examiner noted that the claims as a whole are directed to an abstract idea. Final Action at 4. Furthermore, the examiner identified which recited elements in the claims make up the abstract idea and separated them from those elements which recite generic computer components used as a tool for implementing the abstract idea. This does not indicate that the examiner did not view the claims as a whole. Rather, for the sake of clarity, examiner, after viewing the claims as a whole, identified the limitations which recite the abstract idea. Answer 9. Further, the Examiner states: Thus, the problem solved by the claimed invention does not “specifically arise in the realm of computer technology.” Furthermore, the claimed solution is not “necessarily rooted in computer technology.” Notwithstanding the fact that the claimed invention recites generic computer components, the claimed invention could be performed by a human using their mind and a pen and paper. Answer 10. Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 12 With respect to whether representative claim 1 is directed to a practical application of the above-identified abstract idea, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection by these arguments. While the Examiner’s analysis evaluates portions of the claim as reciting an abstract idea and the remainder of the claims as being the additional elements, the Examiner has considered the claim as a whole as the Examiner’s analysis discusses the interaction between the recited abstract idea and the additional elements. Further, we are not persuaded that the claims are rooted in computer technology or represent a technological improvement. As the Examiner identifies, the claimed method could be performed by a human using their mind and a pen and paper. The claim does not recite a particular machine or computer to implement the method of repricing the travel itinerary. The Examiner has found, and Appellants have not contested, that the recited “pricing engine” interpreted in light of the specification is a generic computing element. Further, we note in the context of the representative claim 1 it is merely a source of information and not an element, which implements or is improved by the claimed method. Thus, we concur with the Examiner that the claim does not recite a practical application or significantly more than the recited abstract idea. In summary, Appellants’ arguments have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s determination that the claims are directed to an abstract idea; of collecting/gathering information and analyzing it (a mental process(es)). Further, Appellants’ arguments have not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in finding that the claims are not: directed to an improvement in the functioning of the computer or to other technology or other technical field; directed to a particular machine; directed to performing or affecting a Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 13 transformation of an article to a different state or thing; directed to using a judicial exception in some meaningful way beyond linking the exception to a particular technological environment such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort to monopolize the judicial exception. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of representative claims 1 and claims 2 through 21 grouped with claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent ineligible subject matter. Rejections 35 U.S.C. § 103 Appellants argue the Examiner’s rejection of representative independent claim 1 is in error as the Examiner did not show the combination of the references teaches generating a passenger name record to include a standardized element and the Examiner has not provided a sufficient rationale to combine the references. App. Br. 14–17. Specifically, Appellants argue that the Examiner finds that Amadeus does not teach the passenger name record includes a standardized element. App Br. 15. Further, Appellants argue that Melet teaches converting data from a reverse pricing engine to a standardized record shown as item 418. App Br. 15. Appellants argue that this standardized record is used to provide recommendations for end-users searching for travel fares prior to booking and as such does not meet the claimed passenger name record, which is generated after the itinerary is booked. App. Br. 16, Reply Br. 7–8. With respect to the rationale to combine, Appellants argue: Examiner fails to explain why and how a person of ordinary skill would have combined the elements from the cited references to arrive at Appellant's claimed invention. Instead, the Examiner merely cites additional references that Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 14 purportedly teach elements of the claimed invention that are not found in the Amadeus NPL for the express purpose of the resulting combination having the missing feature…. At best, the Examiner's articulated reason for combining the cited references amounts to circular reasoning that describes the results of combining those references instead of reasoning with some rational underpinning/or combining those references …. As the end-user in Melet has not booked an itinerary prior to receiving the pricing information from the search engine, that pricing information lacks any disclosure relating to changed elements of a booked travel itinerary. Consequently, Melet cannot teach or suggest the claimed features related to re- pricing a low cost carrier travel itinerary. Therefore, the Examiner's articulated reason fails to explain why one skilled in the art would have modified the Amadeus NPL with unrelated elements disclosed by Melet. App. Br. 17. The Examiner in response to Appellants’ arguments states: The Amadeus NPL, as outlined on page 10 of the Final Action, already teaches the population of a passenger name record with one or more standard elements after re-pricing a fare. (Amadeus: col. 3 “PNR re-pricing” showing a PNR being repriced and col. 3 “End of Transaction” showing a PNR which has been populated with one or more data elements after the fare has been repriced). Thus, all that is missing from this claim limitation is that the standard elements included in the PNR, as taught by Amadeus, are standard elements which have been converted from a non-standard format to a standard format. Melet, in paragraph [0031] and further shown in Fig. 4, clearly teaches that one or more records may be populated to include standard elements using converted pricing information (“fares”). Thus, Amadeus teaches, in the context of re-pricing a fare, the population of a PNR with one or more standard elements and Melet teaches that one or more records may be populated with standardized elements which have been converted from a non-standard format into a standard format. Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 15 Answer 11–12. Further, with respect to Appellants’ arguments concerning the rationale to combine the references, the Examiner states that the combination the references provides the end user with a comprehensive and user-friendly interface and increases the offers provided to the user by providing the user with travel fares travel providers irrespective of the data format and searching method used. Answer 12. The Examiner cites to Melet paragraph 14 as providing support for this conclusion. We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection, response to arguments and the teachings of Amadeus and Metz and we concur with the Examiner’s findings and conclusions. Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive of error. The Examiner has found and we concur that Amadeus teaches repricing an itinerary that includes a low cost itinerary, and as such teaches generating a pricing record and populating the passenger name record as recited in representative claim 1. The Examiner has shown that Melet teaches converting retrieved pricing information into a standard format including an element not present in the pricing information. Appellants’ argument that Melet does this in conjunction with generating the options to be presented to a user, before a passenger name record is created, instead as part of a re- pricing an itinerary, is not persuasive of error. The Examiner is merely using Melet to teach a manner to gather the data from low cost carriers, and using it in Amadeus’s pre-pricing function. With regard to Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner’s rationale to combine is improper we are not persuaded of error. In KSR, the Supreme Court stated that the determination of obviousness could be supported with an “articulated reasoning with [a] rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 16 418 (2007). Here the Examiner has provide a reasoned rationale based upon the teaching of the references. We have reviewed this rationale and the evidence cited to support and consider the Examiner to have provide an adequate rationale. Additionally, we note that Appellants’ arguments concerning Metz’s teachings being directed to booking an itinerary and not re-pricing an inventory, are not persuasive. The Examiner is relying upon Melet for the manner of converting data not the use of the data. Accordingly, Appellants’ arguments have not persuaded us of error in representative claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 1 and claims 4 through 10, 11, and 14 through 21 similarly rejected over Amadeus and Melet. Appellants have not provided arguments directed to the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 2, 3, 12, and 13 over Amadeus, Melet and Daouk. Accordingly, we sustain this rejection for the same reasons as claim 1. Appeal 2018-006285 Application 14/330,196 17 DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 through 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1 through 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation