ALCATEL-LUCENT USA INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 5, 2020

2019002038 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 5, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/145,460 05/03/2016 Adiseshu Hari 819097-US-NP 1690
46363 7590 10/05/2020
Tong, Rea, Bentley & Kim, LLC
Nokia
12 Christopher Way
Suite 105
Eatontown, NJ 07724
EXAMINER
KABIR, JAHANGIR
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2439
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/05/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@trbklaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ADISESHU HARI and TIRUNELL V. LAKSHMAN
Appeal 2019-002038
Application 15/145,460
Technology Center 2400

Before ADAM J. PYONIN, DAVID J. CUTITTA II, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.

CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20, all the claims under
consideration. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Alcatel-Lucent
USA Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Invention
Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to “provid[ing] security for
Internet resources of the Internet by supporting various types of verification
related to Internet resources of the Internet, which may include verification
of Internet resource ownership, verification of Internet resource transactions,
or the like.” Spec. 4:13–17.2
Exemplary Claim
Claims 1, 19, and 20 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below
with certain limitations at issue italicized, exemplifies the claimed subject
matter:
1. An apparatus, comprising:
a processor and a memory communicatively connected to
the processor, the processor configured to:
generate an Internet resource transaction for an Internet
resource, the Internet resource transaction indicating an
allocation of the Internet resource from a first Internet
participant to a second Internet participant;
broadcast the Internet resource transaction via a peer-to-
peer system;
receive, via the peer-to-peer system, an Internet resource
block including the Internet resource transaction; and
associate the Internet resource block with an Internet
blockchain.
Appeal Br. 35 (Claims Appendix).

2 We refer to: (1) the originally filed Specification filed May 3, 2016
(“Spec.”); (2) the Final Office Action mailed May 15, 2018 (“Final Act.”);
(3) the Appeal Brief filed September 17, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); (4) the
Examiner’s Answer mailed November 15, 2018 (“Ans.”); and (5) the Reply
Brief filed January 11, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
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REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following prior art references:
Name Number / Title Date
Angel US 2006/0265508 A1 Nov. 23, 2006
Tang US 7,834,652 B1 Nov. 16, 2010
Haldenby US 2017/0046792 A1 Feb. 16, 2017
Kurian US 2017/0243025 A1 Aug. 24, 2017
REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1–11 and 16–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over the teachings of Kurian and Haldenby.3 Final Act. 13–
23.
The Examiner rejects claim 12–15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Kurian, Haldenby, and Angel.
Final Act. 23–25.
OPINION
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of Appellant’s arguments and evidence.
Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018).
We disagree with Appellant that the Examiner erred and adopt as our own
the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner to the extent consistent
with our analysis herein. Final Act. 13–14; Ans. 3–8. We add the following
primarily for emphasis.

3 Although the Examiner indicates that the claims are rejected over the
teachings of Kurian, Haldenby, and Tang, Tang is not discussed in the
rejection of any of claims 1–11 or 16–20. Final Act. 13.
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Claim 1 recites a processor configured to “generate an Internet
resource transaction for an Internet resource, the Internet resource
transaction indicating an allocation of the Internet resource from a first
Internet participant to a second Internet participant.” Appeal Br. 35. The
Examiner relies on Kurian to teach or suggest this limitation. Final Act. 13;
Ans. 4. Kurian relates generally to using block chain to verify and track in a
distributed ledger the availability of portions of a divisible resource that can
be distributed amongst users. Kurian ¶ 4. In particular, the Examiner finds
“Kurian teaches managing [a] user account and the account balance
associated with the account” and that a “‘resource’ includes accounts and/or
other property available to the user,’ (e.g. online/internet resource).” Ans. 4
(citing Kurian ¶¶ 4, 9, 23–26, 39, Figs. 3–5).
Appellant argues that Kurian’s online resources are not Internet
resources, as claimed, because “Kurian primarily describe the ‘resource’ as
being monetary resources or goods.” Appeal Br. 27; Reply Br. 4–6.
This argument is unpersuasive because Appellant fails to establish
that the Examiner’s interpretation of “Internet resource,” as recited in claim
1, is not the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with Appellant’s
Specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2004). The Specification does not define expressly “Internet resource.”
Rather, the Specification describes “Internet resource” in non-limiting
language as including “e.g., Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, AS numbers, IP
prefixes, DNS domain names, or the like.” Spec. 1:12–13. In view of this
open-ended description, Appellant fails to set forth any disclosure of an
Internet resource in the Specification that is inconsistent with the Examiner’s
interpretation. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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Appellant, therefore, fails to demonstrate that the Examiner’s broad but
reasonable interpretation of Internet resource as encompassing Kurian’s
online resources is inconsistent with Appellant’s Specification or is
otherwise unreasonable. In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382–83
(Fed. Cir. 2017).
Appellant further argues “the Examiner improperly confuses a non-
Internet resource that happens to be accessible to a user via the Internet
(namely, the ‘account’ of Kurian) with an ‘Internet resource’ that is a
resource of the Internet.” Reply Br. 3 (emphasis omitted); Id. at 6.
However, as the Examiner notes (Ans. 4), Kurian’s online resource
transactions include “initiating an automated teller machine (ATM) or online
banking session” (Kurian ¶ 24).
This argument is unpersuasive because Appellant fails to show why a
resource that is accessible via the Internet, such as an ATM or online bank
account, cannot be construed as an internet resource, using the Examiner’s
broad but reasonable interpretation of an internet resource discussed directly
above. Accordingly, Appellant fails to show why Kurian’s online resource
fails to teach or suggest an Internet resource, as recited in claim 1.
Next, Appellant argues, “even assuming arguendo that the ‘resource’
of Kurian may be interpreted as teaching the ‘Internet resource’ as claimed,”
Kurian’s
teaching of receiving an indication that a first user has assigned
a first portion of a finite divisible resource to a second user, as
disclosed in the cited portions of Kurian, is different than
generating a resource transaction for a resource (much less an
Internet resource transaction for an Internet resource).
Appeal Br. 28.
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The Examiner relies on Kurian’s disclosure of “‘receiving an
indication that the first user has assigned the first portion of the finite
divisible resource to a second user from among the plurality of the users.’”
Final Act. 13 (citing Kurian ¶ 9, emphasis omitted). The Examiner finds,
that “[b]roadly interpreted, assigning a portion of the resource by one entity
to another entity over internet network is ‘generating an Internet resource
transaction.’” Ans. 5–6.
In response, Appellant merely asserts, without further explanation,
that the cited portion of Kurian is different than generating a resource
transaction as claimed. Although Appellant underlines “generating” and
“resource transaction” from the claim, Appellant does not provide any
evidence––much less persuasively rebut––why the limitation at issue is not
taught by Kurian’s allocating a portion of an Internet resource, such as an
online bank account, from a first user to a second user. Mere speculation
unsupported by factual evidence is entitled to little probative value. Cf. In re
Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Next, Appellant argues,
even assuming arguendo that the “resource” of Kurian may be
interpreted as teaching the “Internet resource” as claimed . . . ,
the cited portions of Kurian still would fail to teach or suggest
the feature of “an Internet resource transaction indicating an
allocation of the Internet resource from a first Internet participant
to a second Internet participant” as claimed . . . [because] the
Examiner fails to cite any part of the cited portions of Kurian that
teaches or suggests an Internet participant.
Appeal Br. 29; Reply Br. 7.

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Appellant’s argument that the Examiner fails to cite any part of
Kurian that teaches or suggests an Internet participant is unpersuasive
because Appellant fails to specifically address all the Examiner’s findings.
For example, Appellant does not sufficiently address the finding that
“Kurian discloses ‘receiving indication that the first user has assigned the
first portion of the finite divisible resource to a second user from among the
plurality of the users,’” and that Kurian’s first and second users teaches the
claimed first and second Internet participant. Ans. 7 (citing Kurian ¶ 9, Figs.
3–5). Appellant further argues that “the fact that the resource has been
assigned from the first user to the second user in Kurian, even if the
assignment is achieved via the Internet, does not establish that the users
themselves are Internet participants.” Reply Br. 7.
Although Appellant underlines certain portions of the argument,
Appellant does not provide sufficient evidence or persuasive reasoning that
Kurian’s use of blockchain to track the distribution of a resource over the
internet from a first to a second user, “does not establish that the users
themselves are Internet participants.” Id. Accordingly, Appellant fails to
persuasively rebut the Examiner’s finding that Kurian’s allocating a portion
of an Internet resource, such as an online bank account, from a first user to a
second user teaches the limitation at issue.
Claim 1 further recites a processor configured to “receive, via the
peer-to-peer system, an Internet resource block including the Internet
resource transaction.” Appeal Br. 35. The Examiner relies on Haldenby to
teach or suggest this limitation. Final Act. 14; Ans. 8. Haldenby relates
generally to tracking shared ownership and usage of assets, like Internet-
connected devices, using block-chain-based ledger data structures.
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Haldenby, Abstract. The Examiner finds “Haldenby teaches an event
triggering based on a sale or a transfer of an ownership interest [i.e. resource
transaction], with in multiple owners or/and joint owners network [i.e. peer-
to-peer system].” Final Act. 14; Ans. 8 (citing Haldenby ¶¶ 171-174).
Appellant first argues the combination of references cited by the
Examiner “loses the fact that the Internet resource transaction that is
included in the Internet resource block that is received via the peer-to-peer
system is the Internet resource transaction that was broadcast via the peer-to-
peer system.” Appeal Br. 29–30; Reply Br. 8.
This argument is unpersuasive because Appellant provides
insufficient evidence or persuasive reasoning to demonstrate why the cited
combination loses the fact alleged by Appellant.
Second, Appellant argues that Haldenby’s disclosure of applying an
updated version of ledger data does not teach or suggest “receipt of an
Internet resource block via a peer-to-peer system, much less receipt of an
Internet resource block via a peer-to-peer system where the Internet resource
block that is received via the peer-to-peer system includes an Internet
resource transaction . . . that was broadcast via the peer-to-peer system.”
Appeal Br. 30.
Appellant’s seven word summary of Haldenby, followed by a
conclusion that Haldenby “does not teach or suggest” the recited claim
language (in this instance with underlined claim language), is not a
substantive argument that persuasively and specifically addresses why the
Examiner erred. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require
more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the
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claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were
not found in the prior art.”).
In the Reply, Appellant argues that the Examiner “fails to establish (1)
that the sale or transfer of an ownership interest (asserted to be the resource
transaction) was broadcast via the multiple owners and/or joint owners
network (asserted to be the peer-to-peer system).” Reply Br. 9. Thus,
Appellant argues for the first time that the cited combination fails to teach
broadcasting “the Internet resource transaction via a peer-to-peer system,”
as recited in claim 1.
We decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in the Reply
Brief. These arguments are waived in the absence of a showing of good
cause by Appellant, because the Examiner has not been provided a chance to
respond. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2); In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that an argument not first raised in the brief to the
Board is waived on appeal).
For the reasons discussed, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1. Accordingly,
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of that claim, as well as the rejection of
independent claims 19 and 20, and dependent claims 2–17, which Appellant
does not argue separately with particularity. Appeal Br. 31–33.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103.

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–11,
16–20
103 Kurian, Haldenby 1–11,
16–20

12–15 103 Kurian, Haldenby,
Angel
12–15
Overall
Outcome
1–20
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED